VZCZCXRO5806
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSK #0217/01 1842246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 032246Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0342
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0348

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MINSK 000217 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PINR BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS: CODEL CARDIN SECURES AMCIT'S RELEASE, ADVANCES 
DIALOGUE 
 
MINSK 00000217  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) A CODEL led by Helsinki Commission Chairman Senator 
Cardin visited Belarus June 30, the most senior USG delegation 
since the 1994 visit of President Clinton.  The CODEL met with 
President Lukashenka -- who pardoned AMCIT Emanuel Zeltser in 
response to the CODEL's request -- for over two hours, and 
presented detailed U.S. concerns about human rights in Belarus. 
Lukashenka was generally dismissive about human rights issues, 
stating at length that the U.S. should focus on economic and 
strategic factors, and expressed the view that U.S. sanctions 
should be lifted quickly: the delegation confirmed that the 
lifting of sanctions was a mutual goal, but one that could only 
be reached by further concrete dialogue and reforms.  End 
summary. 
 
Meeting Participants 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) U.S. 
 
Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), Chairman, Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Delegation Chair 
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL), Assistant Senate Majority Leader 
Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY 28), Chairwoman, House Rules 
Committee 
Rep. Mike McIntyre (D-NC 7), House Armed Services Committee 
Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-TX 25), House Ways and Means Committee 
Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-AL 4), House Appropriations Committee 
Rep. Christopher Smith (R-NJ 4), House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), Senate Armed Services Committee 
Minsk Charge Jonathan Moore 
Fred Turner, Chief of Staff, CSCE 
 
Belarus 
 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
Boris Batura, Chair of the Council of the Republic 
Vladimir Andreychenko, Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Martynov 
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Valentin Rybakov 
 
Lukashenka's Introduction 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Lukashenka began the meeting with a long opening 
statement; he did not introduce his Belarusian colleagues. 
After welcoming the delegation, he told of his conviction that 
"your visit will open a new page in Belarusian-U.S. relations" 
and expressed the hope that the delegation would obtain an 
"objective and unbiased view" of Belarus.  Lukashenka showed 
particular pleasure at the (coincidental) timing of the 
delegation's visit, coming on the eve of a "holy day" for 
Belarus -- the 65th anniversary of the country's liberation by 
the Soviet army -- and noted that "given our tragic experience, 
we are interested in constructive relations." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On sanctions, Lukashenka was blunt: "The U.S. will 
realize the hopelessness of sanctions...we are ready to restore 
diplomatic...staff in exchange for the removal [sic] of the 
Belarus Democracy Act...we need to put schemes and stereotypes 
aside."  Lukashenka claimed that the European Union (EU) had 
moved forward where the U.S. had not: "we are a reliable partner 
of the EU" and "they have shown readiness to move forward." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Lukashenka cited areas of cooperation, such as 
bilateral trade, non-proliferation (referring to Belarus' 1994 
surrendering of its nuclear weapons) as well as fighting drug 
trafficking, trafficking in persons (TIP), and terrorism.  He 
defended the state of human rights in Belarus only indirectly, 
arguing that "Belarus is a young state...we don't have your 
long-term experience as an 'older democracy'."  Lukashenka also 
cited Belarus' economic difficulties, and expressed thanks to 
the U.S. for its engagement with the IMF.  (Comment: The IMF had 
voted June 29 -- the U.S. abstained -- to increase Belarus' 
previously approved $2.5 billion credit by about $1 billion. 
End comment.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In closing, departing from his prepared remarks, 
Lukashenka stressed that "it is obligatory for our relations to 
be normalized...the question is, will that happen with us or the 
people who come after us...let's eliminate barriers and start 
drawing our relations in 'bright colors'.  The U.S. is the 
leading country of the world, a center of high technology, with 
many clever people...We are ready to take steps that do not 
compromise our sovereignty or independence...we have no closed 
topics." 
 
Chairman Cardin's Introduction 
------------------------------ 
 
MINSK 00000217  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Chairman Cardin thanked Lukashenka for accommodating 
the delegation, explained that the visit was taking place under 
the auspices of the CSCE, and introduced the U.S. participants. 
The Chairman spoke of the importance of Belarus to the U.S., 
adding that the election of Barack Obama brought new 
possibilities for bilateral relations.  He quickly described 
Belarus' compliance with its OSCE commitments for human rights 
and democracy as "critically important", underlining that under 
the Helsinki Final Act each member state can challenge others on 
their commitments. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Before presenting detailed areas of concern, Chairman 
Cardin raised the case of ill and imprisoned AMCIT Emanuel 
Zeltser, asking Lukashenka to "use his authority" to bring about 
Mr. Zeltser's humanitarian release. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Cardin cited freedom of assembly, NGO registration and 
the conduct of elections as areas that needed improvement; while 
recognizing the benefits of trade, he also stressed the need for 
economic reform.  The Chairman also noted that it would be 
easier for the U.S. could better observe what happens in Belarus 
if there were more staff in the U.S. Embassy.  (Comment: Embassy 
Minsk has been limited by the GOB to a maximum of five permanent 
diplomatic staff since May 2008.  End comment.) 
 
Lukashenka's Response 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Lukashenka appeared somewhat agitated and began his 
response in that spirit: "Dear Mr. Cardin, all of your 
conclusions should be based on the truth."  Lukashenka claimed 
that "there are more NGOs per capita in Belarus than in the 
U.S." and that the opposition's rights to confront the 
authorities are protected by the constitution.  After 
denigrating the opposition, he blustered that "the Europeans 
understand the weakness of the opposition" and know that the 
"President represents the interests of the population, not the 
opposition."  Lukashenka suggested that someone from Congress or 
the "CIA, FBI, or White House" should visit Belarus for a while, 
after which he/she would conclude that the situation is "no 
worse than in the U.S." 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Lukashenka condemned what he called "double 
standards": "Our election law is no worse and no better than 
those in other countries of the former USSR, Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan...[but] you do not talk to them in the language of 
sanctions."  Finding that GOB policy was "socially oriented", 
Lukashenka asserted that reforms are carried out "in the 
interests of the people." 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Lukashenka dismissed most of the press at this point, 
and raised privatization with the hope that some Belarusian 
firms would be acquired by U.S. firms rather than by others 
(read: Russia).  He then accused Embassy Minsk of not informing 
Congress of these points, and asked rhetorically "are we in a 
state of war?...The U.S. is a huge empire, we are ready to build 
normal relations...why are you trying to find problems in our 
country [and] repeating the concerns of the opposition?" 
Continuing in this vein, with Charge present, Lukashenka 
declaimed that "we cannot allow opposition protests to be led by 
U.S. diplomats, as [former] Ambassador [Karen] Stewart did with 
her staff...observe the actions of the opposition, but do so 
professionally." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) On ill and imprisoned AMCIT Emanuel Zeltser, who had 
been in GOB custody since March 2008 (and the subject of 
repeated requests for his release on humanitarian grounds), 
Lukashenka said that "I never thought this issue would arise 
between our countries...[but] by the Belarusian Constitution I 
can let this person free...if this will help our relations, I 
will take this step today."  Lukashenka made a further appeal 
for the delegation to look at Belarus with "eyes wide open", and 
complained that Charge [who had accompanied and briefed the 
CODEL on their bus from Lithuania that morning] "could have told 
you a lot of things that are happening in Belarus." 
 
Delegation Response 
------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Chairman Cardin first assured Lukashenka that the 
delegation's concerns were based on information from multiple 
sources, not just Embassy Minsk, and noted that "we do not view 
you as an enemy; we view you as a country that needs to make 
progress on reform."  He confirmed that the release of AMCIT 
Emanuel Zeltser would be a "very positive step."  Senator Durbin 
congratulated Belarus on the July 3rd holiday, and asked about 
Belarus' dependence on Russia for energy and export markets, 
adding a general query about Belarusian-Russian relations. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Rep. Smith repeated the thanks for the decision to 
 
MINSK 00000217  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
release Mr. Zeltser.  Stressing the bipartisan nature of the 
delegation and the support of both parties for the Belarusian 
Democracy Act, he encouraged Lukashenka to broaden his own 
sources of information.  The Congressman explained to the 
President that U.S. concerns about human rights were shared 
widely in various international fora, including the OSCE and 
UNGA, and noted that President Obama had continued the 
fundamental sanctions regime that was established under 
President Bush.  Smith welcomed the opportunity for dialogue, 
suggesting Lukashenka engage in similar dialogue with the 
opposition; he also acknowledged the terrible effect of the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster and praised Belarusian cooperation on TIP. 
He asserted that "a journalist who criticizes you can face four 
years in jail" and confirmed that no such threat faces 
journalists in the U.S.  Rep. Smith added that he has met people 
who have beaten at protests in Belarus and that there are also 
concerns about religious freedom in the country. 
 
Lukashenka's Rejoinder 
---------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Angrier now, Lukashenka sputtered that "you 
absolutely lack realistic information...[what you know] is 
shared through your embassy from the opposition."  He described 
the Chernobyl tragedy (Belarus "did not build it, benefit from 
it, or blow it up" but received 80% of the radioactive material) 
and U.S. sanctions as being in the same context.  "The U.S. 
should have helped us; instead, you introduced sanctions...the 
U.S. has offended Belarus." 
 
¶17.  (SBU) On Russia, Lukashenka characterized his interactions 
with Russian leaders: "How can you do this to us [blocking 
natural gas and oil, blocking dairy exports]...Belarus was a 
shield defending Moscow [in the Second World War]...how could 
you stop your assistance? 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Returning to U.S.-Belarusian topics, Lukashenka 
requested that the Belarus Democracy Act should be "taken away": 
"Lift all sanctions imposed on our country; by this you would 
demonstrate to our people your kindness and the role of the 
United States.  I have solved the problem of Mr. Zeltser within 
a couple of minutes.  I am not forcing you to act in a couple of 
minutes -- maybe by the end of the year."  Turning to 
Congressman Smith, Lukashenka stated: "You have listened to a 
new point of view -- by those elected by the Belarusian 
people...[we] know that human rights criticism in the UN and 
OSCE is organized by the United States...you can buy any 
opposition paper in the kiosk downstairs [in the Presidential 
Administration]...if such information was presented in the U.S. 
press [as about me], the journalists would have been fined or 
imprisoned...our journalists can say anything they want." 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Lukashenka blamed the Russian mass media for an 
"information war" against Belarus, adding that "your embassy 
knows about this, but has not informed you".  "Our nation is 
concerned with vitally important issues...when the economic 
crisis broke out, Russia thought they could take us over."  In 
the same vein, Lukashenka complained further: "First, we asked 
[Russia] for $2 billion to strengthen our currency.  'Yes, $2 
billion, no problem.'  Russia had formed a huge reserve.  [But 
then] Russia made conditions that would lead to a loss of 
sovereignty; we would have become a part of Russia.  They told 
us that dairy products could be imported only if Russian 
investors could acquire the [Belarusian] producers...then the 
Russian media put pressure on Belarus to recognize South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia.  How did the U.S. react?  I ordered the MFA to 
meet with you and ask for your support.  What is $3 billion-$5 
billion to the U.S.?  On a daily basis you print one thousand 
times [sic] more.  You could have done this, come to us as 
heroes, people who supported us." 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Recovering somewhat, and heading towards his 
conclusion, Lukashenka hedged, explaining that "I do not say 
this to prejudice our relations with the Russian Federation; no 
country can replace them; we depend on them."  He said he wants 
to "make a balance" between the interests of the U.S. and 
Russia.  Finally -- long after the meeting was due to end -- he 
argued that "what human rights are possible when it's a question 
of the sovereignty of our country?" 
 
Chairman Cardin's Conclusion 
---------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Senator Cardin thanked Lukashenka for being generous 
with his time.  He told Lukashenka that he had been to 
Chernobyl, and added that Senator Durbin's question on energy 
security, environment, and economic issues was very timely: "The 
U.S. will be engaged on these issues."  Cardin rejected the idea 
that journalists in the United States are sent to jail, telling 
Lukashenka that there are no restrictions on the independent 
media in the U.S.  The Chairman agreed that it would be 
 
MINSK 00000217  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
important for the U.S. and Belarus to take more opportunities to 
understand each other, but he implored Lukashenka to make 
progress with human rights and democratic reforms.  In 
conclusion, Chairman Cardin expressed interest in continuing 
bilateral dialogue. 
 
Aftermath 
--------- 
 
¶22.  (SBU) After the formal session concluded, Lukashenka pulled 
Chairman Cardin aside for a brief discussion about strategic 
issues and perspectives.  Lukashenka was ebullient as the 
delegation departed, embracing a number of his U.S. guests and 
joking that Rep. Smith was the "number one enemy" of Belarus. 
 
¶23.  (U) Lukashenka carried through with his promise and signed 
the pardon for Mr. Zeltser, who was released on the evening of 
June 30 and returned to the United States July 1. 
 
Other Events 
------------ 
 
¶24.  (SBU) The CODEL also had a working lunch with nine leaders 
of civil society, had a brief press conference at Embassy Minsk, 
paid homage to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust at the "Yama" 
memorial, met with Jewish community leaders and toured the 
community museum, and laid flowers at Minsk's victory monument. 
Staff and spouses also participated in these events. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Luncheon guests included Alyaksandr Kazulin, 2006 
presidential candidate and former political prisoner; Viktar 
Karniyenka, Deputy Chair, "For Freedom" movement; Vintsuk 
Vyachorka, Deputy Chair, Belarusian Popular Front; Anatol 
Lyabedzka, Chair, United Civic Party; Zhanna Litvina, Chair, 
Belarusian Association of Journalists; Oleg Gulak, Chair, 
Belarus Helsinki Committee; Vital Rymasheuski, Co-Chair, 
Belarusian Christian Democracy Party; Sergey Kalyakin, Chair, 
Belarusian Party of Communists; and Artur Finkevich, Chair, 
"Young Belarus" movement and former political prisoner.  The 
lunch was abbreviated due to the long meeting with Lukashenka, 
but the delegation engaged the participants in candid 
conversation about the nature of human rights concerns.  The 
Belarusian guests made a positive impression on the CODEL; while 
noting some progress in some areas, they detailed others where 
progress is still needed.  They confirmed the CODEL's concerns 
about conditions for political parties and NGOs as well as for 
the conduct of elections. 
 
Atmospherics 
------------ 
 
¶26.  (SBU) The GOB was clearly under orders to make the CODEL's 
visit as smooth as possible.  The dignitary escort unit of the 
traffic police led the CODEL's motorcade from the Lithuanian 
border into Minsk, to all stops in Minsk, and back to Lithuania 
again.  At Victory Square, for the first time in 15 years, U.S. 
flags were paired with Belarusian flags -- in the shadow of Lee 
Harvey Oswald's former apartment -- as the delegation laid 
flowers on the Victory Monument.  Separately, the fact that 
Lukashenka devoted over two hours of his day to the CODEL -- and 
recovered a sense of joviality at the end of the meeting -- is 
not insignificant.  (Comment: At a July 2 wreath-laying ceremony 
with the diplomatic corps, Lukashenka greeted Charge very warmly 
and thanked him for the CODEL's visit.  End comment.) 
 
Embassy Comment 
--------------- 
 
¶27.  (SBU) Based upon his poor state of health, the USG has been 
seeking amnesty or a pardon for Mr. Zeltser since his arrest in 
March 2008.  The Embassy had recently received signals from the 
Belarusian Presidential Administration that his release would be 
achieved by the end of June.  We are very grateful to Chairman 
Cardin and the other members of his delegation for emphasizing 
the importance of Mr. Zeltser's release and securing a pardon 
from Lukashenka. 
 
Embassy Comment Cont'd 
---------------------- 
 
¶28.  (SBU) While Lukashenka continues to deny the significance 
of U.S. concerns about human rights in Belarus, his meeting with 
the CODEL raises two very important points.  First, he has heard 
first-hand and in detail from senior U.S. visitors that human 
rights reforms are essential and will not be dismissed by the 
U.S. for economic or strategic reasons.  Second, although he is 
likely playing to an audience as much in Moscow as anywhere 
else, Lukashenka and the high level of attention paid to the 
delegation confirmed tremendous interest in having a dialogue 
with the U.S., a point which gives us more leverage with him. 
While there are rarely any guarantees in Belarus, the desire for 
 
MINSK 00000217  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
continued, senior dialogue with the U.S. offers the hope that 
the GOB might avoid the sort of backsliding on human rights that 
would risk the chances for that dialogue to continue. 
 
¶29.  (U) This message has been cleared by CODEL Cardin. 
MOORE