VZCZCXRO1952
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2126/01 2020056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210056Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7532
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

217414
2009-07-21 00:56:00
09MEXICO2126
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
09MEXICO1993|09MEXICO2018
VZCZCXRO1952
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2126/01 2020056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210056Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7532
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002126 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY 
 REF: A. MEXICO 2018 
     ¶B. MEXICO 1993 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor James P. Merz. 
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Following its midterm elections victory, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),is planning an agenda 
that increasingly looks focused on the budget and addressing 
the country's economic problems.  The party will also pursue 
political reform efforts geared at limiting presidential 
powers, as well as a more "holistic" approach to addressing 
security challenges. The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly 
obstructionist course, but it will look to distinguish itself 
more from the National Action Party (PAN) and to undercut its 
counterpart when it can, which may involve more outreach 
toward the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD).  Nevertheless, 
the country's security and economic woes are not easily 
resolved, and failure to see any improvements could leave the 
party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against 
the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that 
cannot get things done. End Summary. 
 
 
Economic Issues Dominate PRI Planning 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Still in the planning stages, PRI's agenda for the 
next three-year legislative period will focus on the federal 
budget and deal with Mexico's economic recession, with an 
emphasis on job creation, poverty alleviation, and 
infrastructure projects.  Outgoing PRI Deputy Samuel Aguilar, 
who will take a job in the party's National Executive 
Committee (CEN) once the new Chamber of Deputies convenes in 
September, told Poloffs on July 16 that he expects the first 
year of the period to be consumed by efforts to ameliorate 
the economic crisis -- the PRI already has announced its 
intent to pass a new Emergency Economic Law to offset the 
impact of financial woes (ref a) -- and the 2010 budgeting 
process. 
 
¶3. (C) In gearing up for the 2010 budget debates, the PRI 
hopes to chair the budget committee (as well as the foreign 
relations, social development, agricultural, and finance 
committee in addition to others it already controls). 
Aguilar, who currently sits on the budget committee, said the 
party will look to control the federal government's 
proclivity to "overspend," echoing public comments by PRI 
leaders that they would try to make modest budget cuts for 
the coming year.  More importantly, Aguilar noted that the 
party will look to devolve a greater portion of the budget 
and control over spending to state governments, of which the 
PRI now controls 19 of 31.  Aguilar argued that the budget 
has been too highly centralized in the federal government, 
which has done an inadequate job of distributing funds. 
Finally, Aguilar cited growing unemployment rates as a key 
challenge currently facing the country and argued that the 
GOM should target resources toward sectors that maximize job 
creation, such as big ticket infrastructure projects. 
 
Security...It's Still About the Economy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Complaints about President Calderon's security 
strategy have dominated the press over the past several days, 
with PRI Chamber and Senate leaders grumbling about the need 
to review the government's law-and-order approach and other 
opposition parties questioning the utility of continued 
military deployment in the counterdrug fight.  Aguilar argued 
that Calderon's approach is one-sided, with an emphasis on 
arrests of cartel leaders rather than a more holistic method 
to attack the problem.  The PRI will look to distinguish its 
security approach from Calderon by focusing more on abuse 
prevention, anti-violence education programs in schools, and 
social development/job creation.  The PRI also will advocate 
the greater use of intelligence, as Aguilar complained that 
Calderon's approach is not narrow or focused enough when 
selecting targets.  Nevertheless, repeating what Poloff has 
heard from other PRI contacts (ref b), Aguilar indicated that 
the PRI is not looking to pull the military out of the 
streets in the short-term -- he does not expect such a 
measure would pass in Congress -- but instead argued that the 
 
MEXICO 00002126  002 OF 003 
 
 
military's current role cannot be considered a long-term 
solution.  He fears that the military's reputation as one of 
the country's most respected institutions is being tarnished 
by its domestic policing role and the increasing number of 
human rights complaints that have ensued. 
 
Limiting Presidential Powers 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Political system reform will also be high on the 
agenda, with the fundamental goal of reducing the power of 
the presidency.  The PRI wants to focus the debate away from 
electoral reform, according to Aguilar, and he opined that 
the new electoral regime survived its "trial by fire" in the 
recent midterm vote.  Based on conversations with other PRI 
contacts, it is likely the party will look to implement 
measures granting Congress the power to appoint, or at least 
approve, Cabinet ministers, as well as give the legislature 
more authority in regulating the deployment of the military 
domestically.  Mexico expert Jeff Weldon, a professor at the 
Technological Autonomous Institute of Mexico (ITAM) noted 
that the PRI will also try to pass legislation to break up 
the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) and the 
Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) and pass their 
authorities to the states, which would give PRI governors a 
key tool in managing political support networks and 
maintaining incumbency. 
 
Friends and Foes 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly obstructionist 
course over the next legislative period, but it almost 
certainly will look to distinguish itself more from the PAN 
and to get blows in against its "adversary" when it can. 
Aguilar noted that the PRI has been highly supportive of the 
PAN over the past three years, but that the high rates of 
voting coincidence between the two parties will change. 
Aguilar did not confirm rumors of a Senate alliance between 
the PRI and PRD, but said the party will attempt to divide 
the PAN and PRD to prevent them from forming a bloc. 
Moreover, the PRI may increasingly look to the PRD for 
support, as Aguilar noted it is the easier party to 
manipulate. 
 
¶7. (C) In addition to greater PRI-PRD cooperation, the PRI 
also has formalized, more or less, a congressional pact with 
the Green Party (PVEM), with which it ran in an electoral 
alliance in over 60 districts.  Beatriz Paredes and Jorge 
Emilio Gonzalez, PRI and PVEM party presidents respectively, 
met on July 19 and agreed that the PRI's 237 deputies and the 
PVEM's 22 will coordinate in the Chamber, bringing the bloc 
to over the 250 majority to 259.  Leaving aside the PVEM's 
campaign proposal to reinstate the death penalty, the two 
have said they will work together on economic, social, and 
security issues, and may once again ally for the 2010 local 
elections.  While the pact does not significantly alter the 
balance of power in Congress, it, like the PRI's potential 
outreach to the PRD, is another sign of an attempt to 
distance itself from the PAN. 
 
Internal Party Dynamics 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Even as PRI governors and other party leaders jockey 
to see which PRI faction controls what Chamber commission, 
the party is already gearing up for a series of local 
elections next year in key PRI states, including Chihuahua, 
Durango, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Puebla.  The party 
will try to capitalize on its electoral momentum coming out 
of the midterms and hopes to prove that its recent success is 
not merely a punishment vote against the PAN and the Calderon 
government for the country's security and economic 
challenges.  Aguilar said that the local PRI political 
machinery has served and will continue to serve them well; he 
explained that PRI operatives are assigned to certain 
districts during campaign season, where they maintain close, 
practically door-to-door contact with voters. 
 
¶9. (C) These campaign techniques served Mexico State Governor 
Enrique Pena Nieto well during the recent legislative and 
local contests.  Aguilar said Pena Nieto has a crack team of 
 
MEXICO 00002126  003 OF 003 
 
 
political operatives assembled to campaign throughout the 
state and, due to their talent, even across the country as 
needed.  Pena Nieto campaigned in rural districts and 
literally went door-to-door, which greatly impressed voters. 
Moreover, Pena Nieto has won a great deal of support from his 
constituency, according to Aguilar, from his decision to sign 
a list of campaign promises in front of a notary, many with 
which he has apparently complied.  A certified list of 
accomplishments apparently resonates with voters, 
particularly given businessman and security activist 
Alejandro Marti's very public call on candidates to do the 
same in the run-up to the midterm election. 
 
¶10. (C) With about 43 Mexico State deputies represented in 
the Chamber through direct election and plurinominal 
selection, Pena Nieto will control the largest PRI bloc.  His 
proxies will probably be placed on key commissions.  His 
ally, Emilio Chuayffet, a former governor of Mexico State, is 
likely to be the coordinator of the PRI group in the Chamber 
should party president Beatriz Paredes choose not to assume 
the role, according to Aguilar. Press has speculated that 
Francisco Rojas or Rogelio Cerda Perez, both from Nuevo Leon, 
may also be on the short list. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) While the party is still formulating specific 
proposals -- the congressional bloc will soon convene to 
discuss its 61st legislative agenda -- the PRI's general 
approach and focus for at least next session seems to be 
coalescing.  It is likely to be less generous toward the PAN 
and perhaps a bit more friendly toward the PRD, but with an 
eye to distinguishing itself as the party capable of 
proactively confronting the country's problems.  The PRI 
stands to score points with a more assertive economic agenda 
(targeted at least in part at securing support from key 
constituencies) and "softer side" security proposals.  It 
will have to manage carefully its public relations campaign. 
The country's security and economic woes are not easily 
resolved, and failure to produce improvements could leave the 
party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against 
the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that 
can't get things done. 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
FEELEY