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2009-07-08 17:31:00
09MEXICO1993
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7367
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
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TAGS: ECON MX PGOV PINR PREL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001993 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 
TAGS: ECON MX PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MEXICO'S PRI CONSIDERING NEXT STEPS AFTER ELECTION 
WIN  
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor James P. Merz. 
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) 
is now evaluating next steps and adapting its legislative 
approach to the new political reality following the July 5 
elections.  The party may be more proactive in shaping the 
congressional agenda and confronting the Calderon government 
on key issues.  Nevertheless, the PRI will still be 
constrained by the PAN-controlled Senate, as well as by the 
fact that its work with President Calderon and the PAN 
congressional bloc over the past three years has paid popular 
dividends.  The party will have to be careful not to overstep 
the bounds of responsible legislative behavior or risk 
squandering the electoral support it painstakingly sought and 
received in the July 5 mid-term elections.  End Summary. 
 
PRI Debating Next Steps... 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) PRI contacts tell us the party has been somewhat 
surprised by the degree of its success in the midterm 
congressional and state elections and is now in the process 
of adapting its legislative approach to the new political 
reality.  The final deputy count is not fully tabulated, but 
the PRI will likely end up with some 241 Chamber of Deputy 
seats. The party is hoping it will be able to consolidate an 
absolute legislative majority without entering into a formal 
coalition with its electoral partner, the Green Party of 
Mexico (PVEM).  Carlos Flores Rico, a well-connected party 
leader whose high placement on the plurinominal list assures 
him a slot in Congress, told Poloffs on July 7 that the PRI 
would prefer not to pursue a close alliance with the PVEM 
since it is squeamish about almost every PVEM proposal, 
especially reinstating the death penalty.  Suggesting the PRI 
has a list of names in mind, Flores Rico noted that the party 
will look instead to woo several disaffected National Action 
Party (PAN) and Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) deputies 
to formally defect into its camp. (Note: While some 
demoralized PRD legislators might view this offer as 
tempting, we highly doubt PAN deputies would be willing to so 
abscond from the party.) 
 
¶3. (C) With an absolute majority -- or at least a stronger 
plurality than expected -- in sight, the PRI is debating 
toughening its approach toward President Calderon and his PAN 
party.  Flores Rico confided that one current within the PRI 
is advocating for a more proactive, assertive stance in 
Congress vis-a-vis the Calderon government.  Obviously within 
that camp himself, Flores Rico argued that the PRI has ridden 
PAN coattails in Congress long enough, and needs to begin to 
distinguish itself from its opponents in the run-up to the 
2012 presidential elections.  He said the PRI should 
forcefully shape the congressional agenda and debate in the 
next three years.  Conversely, PRI President Beatriz Paredes, 
long rumored to have made a quiet "non-aggression" pact with 
President Calderon and likely to assume the role of leader of 
the PRI Chamber bloc, prefers a more conciliatory approach. 
Flores Rico insinuated that the PRI will be more insistent 
once Congress convenes in September regardless of which side 
wins the debate and that only the degree of assertiveness 
will vary. 
 
...And Considering Its Legislative Agenda 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The PRI is also looking to develop a more concrete 
legislative agenda.  Flores Rico said (and Poloff agreed) 
that the lengthy party platform is vague and speaks in 
generalities, and that the PRI has yet to fully hone a more 
specific congressional outline.  Despite an apparent dearth 
of detailed plans, both he and Paredes in her public 
statements confirmed that the party will be heavily focused 
on dealing with Mexico's faltering economy through social 
development projects, poverty reduction efforts, and what 
Paredes called the creation of a new "Economic Emergency Act" 
to ameliorate the negative impact of the crisis and 
unemployment.  Flores Rico also unequivocally dismissed the 
possibility of significant fiscal or energy reform over the 
next three years.  Earlier conversations with the PRI's 
Director of International Relations, Ceslo Delgado, also 
 
MEXICO 00001993  002 OF 002 
 
 
suggest that the PRI will look to improving the lot of 
Mexico's rural sector, perhaps by taking another look at 
agricultural-related portions of NAFTA. 
 
¶5. (C) The party's security strategy may diverge somewhat 
more markedly from the PAN's over the next three years, as 
well, with a purported greater focus on social and 
institutional development rather than what Flores Rico 
claimed to be the administration's narrow law and order 
approach.  He acknowledged that the continued domestic 
deployment of the military in the counternarcotics fight will 
remain necessary in the short-term , but said that the PRI 
will also advocate for greater attention to "soft side" 
programs such as domestic demand reduction and judicial 
reform.  Flores Rico complained that the GOM touts its 
success in capturing easily replaceable mid-level cartel 
operatives but has yet to arrest any cartel kingpins.  (Note: 
The GOM's record of high-level arrests since 2006 makes this 
claim patently false.)  Finally, he noted that the Merida 
Initiative is problematic in that it lacks sufficient funding 
and is too focused on the country's law enforcement apparatus 
and not enough on development issues. 
 
Party Reevaluates Pena Nieto 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) With the vote tally nearing completion, the PRI is a 
bigger winner in Mexico State than earlier reported, winning 
38 of 40 districts (it won only 7 districts by direct 
election in 2006) and making inroads into both PAN and PRD 
territory.  While a number of factors contribute to the 
party's unexpectedly large success there, Flores Rico said it 
has forced many in the PRI to reconsider Mexico State 
Governor Enrique Pena Nieto's political acumen.  Earlier this 
year, Flores Rico -- mirroring what Poloff has heard from a 
number of party members -- opined that most of the PRI 
considered Pena Nieto to be a pretty face with nationwide 
appeal, but lacking in substance and political savvy.  In 
contrast, Flores Rico said his ability to manage a 
competitive race in Mexico State and to prove himself a more 
than able campaigner and operative has significantly 
improved.  At least for now, Pena Nieto's position in the 
party is clearly rising.  The PRI's sweep of the Mexico State 
elections will also provide him with considerable influence 
in the Chamber of Deputies.  Flores Rico explicitly 
acknowledged that Pena Nieto was by far the biggest winner on 
July 5, but cautioned that the heir apparent still has three 
potentially treacherous years to navigate before the 2012 
presidential elections, which give the governor,s opponents 
ample time to scrutinize his official record and past 
personal history. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Early indications suggest that the PRI will be more 
assertive over the next three years as it looks to shape 
congressional debate and distinguish itself from the PAN. 
Particularly, the PRI will probably push an economic agenda 
that plays more to the middle and lower classes, in part as a 
genuine attempt to lessen the impact of the country's 
economic struggles but also to curry favor with key voting 
blocs in the run-up to the 2012 presidential campaign. 
Calderon's congressional defeat places the economic reform 
agenda and the federal budget firmly in the hands of the PRI. 
 Nevertheless, the party will still be constrained by the 
PAN-controlled Senate, as well as the reality that its work 
with President Calderon and the PAN congressional bloc over 
the past three years has paid popular dividends.  The party 
will have to be careful not to overstep the bounds of 
responsible legislative behavior or risk squandering the 
popular support it has fought for since its 2006 electoral 
debacle. 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
FEELEY