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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #1028/01 1941155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131155Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1243
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 9098
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6490
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0452
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7665
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4711
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0539
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5042
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6348
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7328
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2091
RHMFIUU/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFIUU/NAT DRUG INTEL CTR JOHNSTOWN PA
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIB/CNC LINEAR WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1818
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS LA PAZ 001028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL/LP, WHA/PPC, WHA/AND, WHA/MEX 
LAC/SA USAID 
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS AND NDDS 
CUSTOMS FOR LA OPS, INTELLIGENCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PHUM KDEM EAID BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: 2008-09 COUNTERNARCOTICS PERFORMANCE MIXED 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Morales Government,s 2008-2009 
counternarcotics performance continues to be mixed, with 
slowly rising eradication levels and increased seizures in 
interdiction, but with legislative reform on hold until after 
the December 2009 presidential elections.  UNODC,s recent 
coca survey results indicate an overall six percent increase 
in coca cultivation despite GOB eradication efforts and a 
nine percent increase in total potential cocaine production. 
Embassy La Paz continues to have a regular working 
relationship with the Government of Bolivia (GOB) on 
counternarcotics issues.  However, the GOB,s approaches to 
controlling coca cultivation are inconsistent and heavily 
influenced by political considerations.  End Summary. 
 
Coca Cultivation 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Evo Morales, who remains president of the 
Chapare Coca Federations, continues to rely heavily on his 
cocalero (coca farmer) support base to reinforce his hold on 
power and force &change8 in Bolivia.  President Morales is 
promoting a coca cultivation regime that allows each 
registered coca grower up to one cato for cultivation.  (In 
the Chapare, a cato means a maximum of 1,600 square meters of 
 
coca and in the Yungas 2,500 square meters.)  GOB efforts to 
hold the line at one cato per registered coca grower in the 
Chapare are increasingly being met with resistance, however, 
as more communities find that coca production is a lucrative 
business and desire more than the 1,600 square meter limit. 
Senior GOB officials estimate about 40 percent of the Chapare 
coca growers oppose the Morales regime,s policy. 
 
¶3. (SBU) GOB legal agreements with coca growers during the 
last three years have allowed significant increases in licit 
coca cultivation. In September 2008, the GOB signed an 
agreement with the Yungas coca growers that allows for at 
least 26,000 licit hectares in the region. (Note: a hectare 
is approximately 2.47 acres.  End note.)  New coca plantings 
are established in the Isiboro-Secure and Carrasco National 
Parks, even though such plantings are illegal, as well as 
inside of indigenous territories. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On January 25, 2009, Bolivian voters approved a new 
constitution backed by the Bolivian government and ruling 
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Article 384 states 
that the coca leaf is part of the country's cultural 
patrimony and heritage and contributes to the country's 
bio-diversity.  This constitution is expected to encourage 
even greater coca cultivation.  Some experts believe it may 
further encourage social groups to oppose incineration of 
seized coca by counternarcotics police. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although the GOB did not begin eradication until 
mid-February this year (in agreement with the USG because 
eradication results are usually low for December and January 
and therefore not cost effective), it is expected that the 
GOB will exceed the minimum goal of 5,000 hectares in 2009. 
However, an analysis of eradication efforts and coca 
cultivation over the past year indicates that re-planting has 
exceeded eradication, with the net result showing an increase 
in coca cultivation. The United Nations Office of Drug and 
Crime (UNODC) figures show 30,500 hectares of coca, while 
unofficial Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) figures show 
32,000 hectares. In 2008, the GOB eradicated 5,484 hectares, 
and in 2007 6,269 hectares. According to the Bolivian Law 
1008, and as agreed to in the Letter of Agreement, the GOB is 
mandated to eradicate between 5,000 hectares to 8,000 
hectares of coca each year.  The GOB regularly meets the 
minimum requirement, but has yet to show consistency in 
reaching higher eradication levels. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Even though the GOB has a written policy regarding 
social control of illicit and excess coca production and 
cocaine production, it has not been effectively implemented. 
Licit coca market data from the GOB, as well as DEA coca 
yield data for the Chapare, show that over 99 percent of all 
coca grown in the Chapare is sold to drug traffickers. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GOB,s Joint Task Force (JTF) data shows that 
for 2009, only 22 hectares of coca were eradicated where 
maceration pits were found. Initial social control 
eradication was low (0.9-2.7 hectares/week), but recent 
social control eradication increased to around 5.5 
hectares/week in the Chapare. This effort represents one 
percent of the total eradication effort for 2009, but shows 
that the GOB make some attempt and is sometimes willing to 
apply sanctions when coca growers violate President Morale,s 
coca growing and usage norms. 
 
Eradication 
 
¶8. (SBU) Eradication figures for 2009 are modest, with 2,691 
hectares eradicated through July 1.  For 2009, the amount 
eradicated is 13.5 percent less than in 2008.  About seven 
percent of coca eradicated occurred in the Yungas, an 
increase from the 4.8 percent in 2008.  The GOB is 
eradicating close to 25 hectares daily in the Chapare and one 
to two hectares in the Yungas.  At this rate, the GOB may 
surpass last year's eradication results.  However, 
eradicating 5,000 to 6,000 hectares will not result in a net 
reduction of coca cultivation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Eradication in Bolivia,s national parks, where all 
coca is illegal, proceeds at a slow pace. For 2009, no 
eradication has occurred in the Isiboro-Secure National Park 
and only 36 hectares in the Carrasco National Park.  UNODC,s 
report shows a cultivation increase between 2007 and 2008 of 
13 percent for a total of 2,063 hectares in both National 
Parks. 
 
The Legal Framework for Coca Trade 
 
¶10. (SBU) As mentioned above, Article 384 of the new Bolivian 
Constitution can be read as empowering and encouraging coca 
growers to cultivate beyond legal limits, since the State is 
now tasked with "protecting" the coca leaf as part of its 
cultural patrimony and heritage. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The GOB continues to struggle with the overall 
regulation of licit coca sales.  The GOB does not have 
sufficient control of licit coca sales.  Although some 
regulations are documented, the GOB has no dedicated staff to 
review and enforce these regulations.  Regulation has further 
been complicated by the issuance of thousands of licenses for 
retail sales directly to coca growers.  In some cases, those 
who are found in violation of the laws regarding illicit coca 
sales only lose the coca with no sanctions imposed on them. 
 
Interdiction 
 
¶12. (SBU) Since the expulsion of DEA in November 2008, the 
GOB has attempted to demonstrate that it can successfully 
operate without DEA,s assistance.  During the first few 
months of 2009, interdiction results were up. Compared to 
2008, the number of operations increased by 17 percent; 
seizures of coca leaf increased by 18 percent, base labs 21 
percent, marijuana  287 percent, HCl labs 37 percent, and 
seizures of liquid and solid precursors by 94 percent and 24 
percent.  Cocaine seizures are about the same as in 2008, 
currently at 12.2 metric tons.  There remains a concern, 
however, that the statistics may show a gradual decline 
through the remainder of the year.  When compared to  2008 
data, statistics for 2009 begin a slight decrease in 
virtually all interdiction categories. Seizure of marijuana 
is the only category that shows a real increase when compared 
to the previous year.  Several categories that show an 
increase in seizures include marijuana, cocaine HCL 
crystallization labs, and precursors. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Bolivian counternarcotics police (FELCN) 
continue to seize cocaine laboratories, but it is unclear 
whether these operations are effective and efficient.  FELCN 
arrested workers in these seizures, but not the 
organizational leaders associated with the labs. 
Sophisticated drug processing equipment and several mega-labs 
were seized, but almost no cocaine. Before their expulsion 
last November, DEA noted a significant increase in the use of 
mobile Colombian-style drug laboratories throughout Bolivia, 
and a rapid decline in the use of the traditional Bolivian 
stomping maceration pits. DEA data showed an increase from 31 
to 64 percent of Colombian-style drug labs between the first 
and third quarters of fiscal year 2008.  DEA noted some 
changes in drug trafficking developments in Bolivia, 
including the increasing production of refined cocaine HCl in 
Bolivia, widespread HCl production in small laboratories 
using new technology and equipment, and the increasing 
sophistication of Bolivian drug trafficking organizations. 
When combined with the systematic increase in coca 
cultivation and implementation of new legal and political 
coca expansion policies and programs, the end result is more 
cocaine. 
 
¶14. (SBU) For 2009, there is a notable increase in drug 
trafficking-related violence and murders, particularly in the 
city of Santa Cruz and the Bolivia-Brazil border region. 
FELCN police arrested more Colombians during the first six 
months of 2009 for drug trafficking, further raising concerns 
of a significant Colombian cartel presence, especially in 
relation to mega-lab seizures that occurred this year.  Since 
DEA,s expulsion, the scarcity of drug trafficking 
intelligence is apparent in arrests of only lower-level 
Bolivian drug traffickers combined with the inability to 
arrest the foreigners (Brazilians, Colombians, Mexicans) 
behind some of the larger drug trafficking rings  (REFTEL A). 
 GOB public statements that between 30-50 percent of all the 
cocaine that leaves Bolivia actually comes from Peru still 
requires verification. 
 
¶15. (SBU) To further combat narco-trafficking, in April the 
Bolivian government created the Unit of the Integrated Battle 
Against Drug Trafficking (UELIC) and appointed General Miguel 
Vasquez, a former general of the Bolivian National Police, to 
be in charge of the office.  Government Minister Alfredo Rada 
reported that the UELIC will have a $20 million budget, but 
it is unclear if this funding will continue year after year. 
Some of this funding will contribute to the $8 million in 
economic incentive payments for GOB CN project personnel. 
UELIC will coordinate with other Vice Ministries in 
counter-narcotics work. Vasquez has compared UELIC to the 
NAS, and makes reference to his office as the &Bolivian 
NAS8. Vasquez says that UELIC would finance those areas not 
covered by NAS under the LOA, and that financial 
contributions are complementary. The unit will have a staff 
of approximately eight people, including accountants, an 
auditor, financial analysts and monitoring and evaluation 
experts. 
 
 
Alternative Development 
 
¶16. (SBU) Despite challenging bilateral relations, the 
Integrated Alternative Development (IAD) program remained on 
track in 2008, achieving most of its planned targets and 
exceeding some.  During the last 12 months ending in March 
2009, exports of key products derived from the Tropics of 
Cochabamba and the Yungas region of La Paz reached 40 million 
USD, up from 34 million USD achieved the year before. 
Farmers received 28 million USD in sales generated from 
products directly supported by IAD programs up from  16.5 
million USD in 2007.Six hundred thirty-three kilometers of 
roads were maintained or improved, and ten bridges were 
constructed in the two regions, helping producers bring more 
goods to market. Over 5,300 hectares of farmland were either 
newly planted with alternative crops, or made more 
productive, and approximately 600 hectares were placed under 
forest management plans.  In FY 2008, 13,432 families 
benefited from support for productive activities or social 
infrastructure (e.g., access to potable water, school 
improvements, health centers, etc). 
 
¶17. (SBU) In the same period, approximately 3,800 people 
(over 1,000 families) in the Yungas benefited from access to 
improved drinking water supply thanks to the IAD supported 
construction of five new water systems.  More than 1,500 
people benefited from the construction of new latrines and 
access to improved sewage systems in the Yungas of La Paz. 
USAID support is also helping improve the quality, 
productivity, and marketability of Bolivian coffee, thus 
increasing the incomes of approximately 4,000 coffee 
producers, mainly in the municipality of Caranavi. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Significant progress has been made over the past 
two years in initiating productive activities in the Yungas 
municipality of La Asunta, a region historically resistant to 
any effort on the part of the Bolivian Government to reduce 
coca production and pursue alternative development.  While 
relatively modest, USAID's investments since 2006 have helped 
raise appreciation for both public goods (e.g., bridges) and 
productive activities which help diversify the region,s 
economy.  As previously mentioned, the GOB reached a coca 
control agreement with the La Asunta federations and since 
then has been working to expand voluntary eradication in the 
prioritized zones.  Demand for alternatives, especially in 
those districts where voluntary eradication has begun is high 
and a plan is being implemented to support those products 
considered to have the greatest potential (coffee, stevia, 
rice, honey, poultry, and bananas).  Some notable social 
investments made over the past two years in La Asunta 
include: two foot bridges of significant scale; youth 
leadership training for 250 high school seniors; and one 
school and classroom additions for two other schools. 
 
¶19. (SBU) In the Chapare, following the actions of the coca 
leaders to "expel" USAID from the region in December 2008, 
USAID and the GOB reached formal agreement to phase out 
activities in an orderly fashion.  All infrastructure 
investments (e.g., bridges, markets, kindergarten, and 
dormitory for a technical college) with the exception of one 
bridge in Villa Tunari, are completed.  There remains 
considerable interest in both social and productive support 
but there are no plans to continue social investments beyond 
June 2009. 
 
 
Law Enforcement and Judicial Institutional Development 
 
¶20. (SBU) Beginning in December 2007 and continuing for a 
year through December 2008 NAS, DEA, the GOB and numerous 
regional partners worked together on a &priority legislation 
project8 to strengthen existing CN, money laundering and 
terrorist financing laws in Bolivia. The new legislation was 
submitted to the Congress for review in the latter part of 
2008 and remains there as of this date. High level GOB 
officials have told NAS that there will be no decisions 
regarding this matter until after the December 2009 
Presidential elections. 
 
¶21. (SBU) In January 2009 NAS signed a new memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) with the GOB Attorney General which 
provides for continued support to the counternarcotics 
prosecutor program in Bolivia.  The MOU includes agreement by 
the Attorney General to reestablish the use of polygraph 
examination for all prosecutors and assistants in this 
program. (NOTE: In November 2007 the Attorney General 
prepared and distributed an administrative notice ceasing the 
use of the polygraph exam within the NAS/DEA program claiming 
it was in violation of the Bolivian constitution.)  However, 
the GOB,s UELIC office has expressed interest in developing 
its own polygraph program with the assistance of NAS. 
 
¶22. (SBU) In May 2009 the Ministry of Government officially 
requested that NAS provide the GOB with administrative and 
technical support in the creation of a &special technical 
investigative unit8 to initiate its own polygraph program 
and to address the continuing corruption issues within the 
counter narcotics police forces working in the Chapare and 
Yungas.  No further development has occurred. 
 
¶23. (SBU) In February 2009 the Ministry of Government sent 
the National Police Commander a directive advising that BNP 
officers not attend US-sponsored training abroad. This 
directive was made at the same time of an ongoing corruption 
case involving several MAS party officials and a subsequent 
attempt by the GOB to deflect blame in the case to a former 
BNP officer.  This officer, during his police career, had 
attended a number of USG-sponsored training courses, and was 
now being identified as a &US-trained spy8 that was 
responsible for the corruption within the GOB institution. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The NAS sponsored law enforcement training program 
in Bolivia continues and is very successful. In 2008 
approximately 3,000 BNP officers received both basic and 
advanced training courses to assist in their professional 
development.  In addition, the NAS BNP program has developed 
an extensive human rights training initiative that involves 
&Use of Force Policy8; Trafficking in Persons; and Gender 
Equality within the National Police. In conjunction with the 
BNP command and GOB Congress, NAS is currently involved in 
rewriting existing police regulations and GOB laws in these 
areas. 
 
¶25. (SBU) The Department of Defense sponsored CN training 
courses have dramatically declined since FY 2007.   At the 
end of calendar year 2008, the GOB military informed 
USMILGROUP that they were directed to not enroll in any 
training that included doctrine .  USMILGROUP continues 
efforts to engage with the Bolivian military and other law 
enforcement entities. 
 
¶26. (SBU) CN funding for DOD is comprised of funds from the 
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army.  Funded courses 
include pilot training, maintenance training, logistics 
training and law enforcement courses.  In FY 2007, USMILGROUP 
CN funding paid for 18 law enforcement specific courses at 
183,000 USD.  In FY 2008, this dropped to 23 courses at 
157,000 USD.  Due to poor relations with Bolivia, in FY 2009, 
MILGROUP funded no law enforcement courses.  Plans for FY 
2010 will only include funding for non-law enforcement 
courses, such as pilot training. 
 
 
Comment 
 
¶27. (SBU) Although the GOB instituted its own CN office to 
complement USG foreign assistance funding, the Bolivian 
Government,s performance on CN programs has shown little 
advancement from last year. The eradication pace is steady 
but will not achieve net reduction of coca cultivation given 
significantly increased planting across the country.  A 
bright spot is in alternative development, where the 
Integrated Alternative Development (IAD) program is still on 
track and has benefited many.  Interdiction efforts by the 
GOB are continuing without the presence of DEA.  The GOB has 
carried out several operations with considerable publicity 
and as evidence of their ability to act without DEA 
assistance.  Key legislative reforms are at a halt until 
after the Presidential election.  In sum, the GOB 
demonstrates mixed CN results.  The expulsion of the DEA in 
December 2008 had a deleterious effect on the CN program.  In 
the absence of an effective multi-national replacement for 
the DEA as promised by the GOB subsequent to the expulsion, 
post is unable to state that GOB CN cooperation has improved 
in the past year. 
CREAGAN