VZCZCXRO6732
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0866/01 2080443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 270443Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4141
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000866 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, THE HAGUE 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SPLA: Deterring External Threats While Addressing Internal 
Insecurity 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a July 23 meeting with Special Envoy to Sudan 
Scott Gration, the Government of Southern Sudan's Minister of Sudan 
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Affairs Nhial Deng Nhial and the 
SPLA Chairman of the General Staff James Hoth Mai provided their 
assessment of the security threats facing Southern Sudan.  The two 
argued that the National Congress Party and the Sudan Armed Forces 
pose a threat that requires the South to seek rough military parity 
and thus encourage the North and South to keep their focus on 
political negotiation.  Hoth in particular defaulted to the SPLA's 
desire for expensive weapon systems such as advanced armor and 
high-level air defense.  Both officials contended that there are 
available sufficient resources to handle the South's internal 
security threats. 
 
SPLA STRENGTH NEEDED TO DISCOURAGE MILITARY SOLUTION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.   (SBU) In his opening remarks, Nhial characterized the South as 
facing both internal and external security threats.  Although the 
South's internal threats have "intrinsic factors," he argued they 
are also in part "offshoots" of the external threat posed by 
Khartoum.  In the absence of a "strategic alliance" between the 
North and South, Nhial believes that relations are likely to 
degenerate into armed conflict.  He argued that scenarios of future 
North-South violence are not farfetched, citing possible 
flashpoints, to include preparations for clean elections and 
negotiations over the necessary threshold for southern secession in 
the coming referendum. 
 
¶3.   (SBU)  Nhial was quick to insist that the South "will not be 
the first" to make use of military power, stressing that President 
Salva Kiir and his government remember the pain of war and recognize 
the need for peace to launch development in the South.  Hoth spoke 
enthusiastically about the CPA, saying that "we have never had such 
a settlement," and Nhial noted that the international community's 
spotlight on the CPA has been helpful. 
 
¶4.   (SBU) Nhial argued that the best way to avoid conflict is to 
ensure rough parity between Sudan's two armed forces: "the imbalance 
must not become so great" that either partner might be tempted to 
cease negotiating and pursue a military option.  He insisted that 
strengthening the SPLA did not amount to an abandonment of efforts 
to make unity attractive but, rather, would ensure that unity cannot 
be imposed.  Hoth added that the South had learned lessons from 
recent history - he cited Rwanda and Kuwait - in which the 
international community had only been able to assist in the 
aftermath of major violence, not prevent it.  Citing increasingly 
sophisticated military equipment in the North, Hoth and Nhial made a 
general pitch for assistance in securing an air defense system for 
the South.  Nhial argued that the international community is 
"duty-bound" to help prevent indiscriminate bombing of civilians. 
 
INTERNAL THREATS ALSO A PROBLEM, BUT IN-HAND 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.   (SBU) Nhial argued that the southern government has the 
resources and policies needed to deal with its internal problems of 
law and order, but it is proceeding with a degree of caution that is 
being incorrectly interpreted by "some" in Sudan as a sign of 
weakness or lack of capacity.  On the other hand, Hoth added that he 
had been confused by conflicting themes of criticism coming from the 
international community, which he said objected to the SPLA's past 
efforts at forcibly disarming civilians but then criticized the 
government for not doing enough to protect people from armed 
inter-tribal violence. 
 
¶6.   (SBU) Hoth reported that the current civilian disarmament 
efforts, recently re-launched in Lakes State on a voluntary basis in 
cooperation with local chiefs, have netted 3,000 guns with 
relatively little violence.  Citizens recognize the threat posed by 
excessive civilian armaments, he argued, and have been helping their 
chiefs and the security forces locate hidden weapons.  Nhial noted 
that disarmament will come to the other priority states of Warrab, 
Jonglei, and Eastern Equatoria once the dry season returns.  Nhial 
conceded that the southern police lacked the mobility and 
communications capacity needed to carry out this campaign, but he 
argued that the trade-offs of budgeting made it impossible to 
prioritize their development at the expense of the SPLA's. 
 
¶7.   (SBU) Hoth returned to the issue of military parity, defending 
Sudan's right to decide to purchase advanced tanks, adding, "that 
is, if these existed."  He insisted that air defense systems were 
needed to protect the civilian population of the South from 
 
KHARTOUM 00000866  002 OF 002 
 
 
bombardment in the event of renewed conflict.  Gration replied that 
from a military point of view armor was not the best solution to 
South Sudan's defensive needs.  He pointed out that even a 
militarily advanced country such as the US could not guarantee 
complete protection of its civilian population from aerial attack. 
Point defense of some installations is possible, but any attempt to 
set up a saturated air system in South Sudan would be cripplingly 
expensive and of questionable utility. 
 
PROGRESS ON ABYEI, ASSISTANCE NEEDED IN MALAKAL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.   (SBU) In conclusion, Nhial praised Gration for his efforts to 
promote a peaceful acceptance of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal's 
ruling on that region's borders.  He argued that the parties will 
have cleared an important hurdle if the NCP is "really on board" 
with the ruling, but that they will still want to keep Abyei from 
seceding if the South does.  On Malakal, Hoth reported agreement at 
the Joint Defense Board to relocate the town's Joint Integrated Unit 
elements outside city limits, but he requested U.S. assistance in 
establishing the relocated facilities.  Nhial made a similar request 
for assistance with the SPLA general headquarters' shortage of 
office space.  Gration asked the SPLA to make a list of the 
assistance that they want the U.S. Government to consider 
providing. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.   (SBU) There remains a limited realization in Juba that the most 
immediate threat to the security of the South at this time is 
internal conflict between its populations.  Advanced or heavy 
weaponry is of no use in handling such a threat: only a 
well-trained, disciplined, and mobile infantry or riverine force can 
effectively tackle this problem, including disarmament of civilians 
and/or tribal militias.  As for T-72 tanks that might not exist, 
recent news reports in both the local and international press have 
removed this fig leaf from the SPLA once and for all. 
 
The Special Envoy has cleared this cable. 
 
 
WHITEHEAD