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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM829, CHIEFS OF MISSION TOLD GOS IS COMMITTED TO DOHA TALKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM829 2009-07-12 04:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4999
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0829/01 1930454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120454Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4075
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000829 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CHIEFS OF MISSION TOLD GOS IS COMMITTED TO DOHA TALKS 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 786 
B) KHARTOUM 372 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The GOS is committed to continuing the stalled 
Doha peace talks with the so-called "Tripoli Group" of Darfuri rebel 
factions, as well as increased participation from civil society 
groups, GOS lead negotiator Dr. Amin Hassan Omer.  This message was 
delivered in Arabic and English at a hastily-convened MFA briefing 
for Chiefs of Mission and other senior diplomats.  Local media, 
including several Sudanese television networks, covered the entire 
meeting.  Blaming the collapse of the Doha talks squarely on what he 
claimed was the "intransigence" of the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), Omer stressed that the GOS is, nevertheless, determined to 
pursue a cessation of hostilities and reach agreement on a political 
framework necessary for a comprehensive peace settlement for Darfur. 
 End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On July 6, more than three weeks after the  suspension of 
bilateral peace talks in Doha between the GOS and JEM, the Sudanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned Khartoum's diplomatic 
community to a hastily- arranged briefing on the talks' status.  The 
DCM and Poloff attended the briefing, which was chaired by lead 
negotiator, Minister for Youth, Sport and Culture Dr. Amin Hassan 
Omer and heavily covered in its entirely by local media, including 
Sudanese television networks.  Omer began the briefing by saying 
that while many aspects of the Doha talks' collapse had already been 
covered in the media, the GOS was eager to make clear to the 
international diplomatic community its intention to continue 
negotiations in Doha to find a peace settlement for Darfur. 
 
3. (SBU) Omer stated that while the GOS is keen to pursue an 
immediate cessation of hostilities linked to a draft political 
framework, JEM has remained focused squarely on the issue of 
prisoner release throughout the latest round of talks in Doha.  I 
an attempt to move forward, UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Djibril 
Bassol had pushed for a concurrent approach in which the prisoner 
release issue was addressed while at the same time asking the two 
parties to submit ideas on a draft political framework.  According 
to Omer, JEM refused to discuss either a cessation of hostilities or 
framework without a release of prisoners. But the GOS is loath to 
release prisoners without a cessation of hostilities, he said, for 
fear those released b would reengage in JEM's armed attacks against 
the government. 
 
4. (SBU) Omer noted that the February 17 Goodwill Agreement between 
the GOS and JEM calls for a timetable for prisoner exchange, rather 
than an immediate release.  "But JEM was not talking about a 
timetable, just a release," he said.  (Note:  The half-brother of 
JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim is among the combatants detained by the 
GOS. End Note.)  Refusing to budge, JEM then suggested a suspension 
of the talks until July, he said, which led to the resulting 
stalemate. 
 
5. (SBU) The GOS is, nonetheless, excited about the prospects for a 
parallel track of negotiations with the so-called "Tripoli Group" of 
rebel factions (Ref B).  Omer noted that Joint Chief Mediator 
Bassole and his team have received some "good indications" that 
under Libyan auspices, the Tripoli Group will soon achieve a common 
negotiating platform and be ready for discussions with the GOS in 
Doha.  Though conceding that these movements "are not engaged in any 
real fighting" against the GOS, they were at least present in 
Darfur, he said, unlike the Chad-based JEM. He also noted that the 
Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) continues to pursue the 
Paris-based Abdel Wahid Al Nur, despite his now legendary refusal to 
engage in peace talks before his lengthy demands for security are 
met. 
 
6. (SBU) Omer also told the Chiefs of Mission and other senior 
diplomats that the GOS is strongly urging the Joint Chief Mediator 
and his team to engage with civil society actors, and bring them to 
Doha in a consultative capacity.  These non-combatants possess a 
degree of political sophistication often found lacking in rebel 
armed movements, and the presence of civil society leaders is 
"another way to put pressure on the movements," said Omer.  Omer 
concluded that lasting peace in Darfur will be possible only through 
engaging with civil society, reaching agreement with a broad 
spectrum of Darfuri rebel movements and finding ways to promote 
reconciliation between Chad and Sudan 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment: Omer's account of the suspension of the Doha 
talks is entirely consistent with that of JMST, which has 
characterized GOS conduct in Doha as generally very constructive in 
contrast with that of JEM.  The question remains, however, whether 
the GOS has the political will and commitment to take any real 
 
KHARTOUM 00000829  002 OF 002 
 
 
actions to improve the situation on the ground in Darfur.  The 
extensive media coverage of the Arabic/English briefing would seem 
to indicate that the latter was meant as much for domestic 
consumption as for the international community.  The failure of last 
Fall's Sudan People's Initiative, which also received massive media 
coverage, demonstrates how the regime publicly promises much in 
regard to engaging Darfuri civil society leaders, but then delivers 
very little.  Apart from SLA/Abdul Wahid, the myriad of Darfuri 
rebel groups has no broad, popular constituencies, and in the case 
of the Tripoli Group, no military strength either. For this reason, 
government concessions linked to talks with respected civil society 
leaders may represent an alternative path forward while efforts to 
broker a ceasefire continue. 
 
WHITEHEAD