VZCZCXRO9033
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0811/01 1871447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061447Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4047
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0081
RUEHSUN/USUN ROME IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 000811 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SENSITIVE NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PREL ASEC KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR HUMANITARIAN UPDATE 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 746 
      B) KHARTOUM 802 
 
KHARTOUM 00000811  001.3 OF 005 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU)    The number of security incidents   involving the UN and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Darfur has remained stable, 
with no increases reported in recent weeks.  Nevertheless, the 
situation on the ground is unpredictable, with security remaining a 
primary concern for agencies.  (Note:  Security incidents typically 
decrease during the rainy season.  End note.)  As of mid-May, the UN 
reported that conflict among armed opposition factions, the Sudanese 
Armed Forces (SAF), and ethnic groups had displaced more than 
137,000 people in Darfur since January 2009 alone, bringing the 
total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to more than 2.7 
million. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The loss of key partners in all critical sectors has 
reduced the quality of humanitarian operations in some areas.  While 
programs have been able to continue utilizing local staff and 
augmented-assistance from government line ministries, USAID notes 
that program management, monitoring, and quality have decreased. 
Given reduced access to rural populations due to lack of agencies in 
these areas, as well as ongoing Government of Sudan (GOS) 
restrictions, combined with the current quality of humanitarian 
programming, relief agencies note that the humanitarian situation in 
Darfur could potentially deteriorate during the coming months of the 
hunger season.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Key Humanitarian Vulnerabilities in Darfur 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) Ongoing conflict, displacement, and insecurity continue to 
affect populations in Darfur.  As of mid-May, the UN reported that 
conflict among armed opposition factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF), and ethnic groups had displaced more than 137,000 people in 
Darfur since January 2009, bringing the total number of IDPs to more 
than 2.7 million.  Attacks on humanitarian workers and assets, while 
showing a decrease during the ongoing rainy season, continue to 
impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in 
need.  On July 3, the third incident of international NGO staff 
abduction in Darfur since the expulsions occurred in Kutum, North 
Darfur.  On July 3 at 2035 hours, six unknown armed assailants 
attacked the GOAL international compound in Kutum and kidnapped two 
GOAL international staff and one local guard.  According to initial 
reports, the assailants forced the staff into a land cruiser and 
drove west toward Amou, North Darfur.   Local security officials 
pursued the vehicle but were unable to overtake the assailants. 
Shortly thereafter, GOAL staff learned that the local guard had been 
released in Amou.  As of July 6, the whereabouts of the abducted 
international staff remain unknown.  To date, no contact has been 
made with the abductors and no ransom has been demanded. 
Intermittent SAF aerial bombing campaigns persist in rural areas. 
 
¶4. (U) The early March expulsion of 13 large international agencies 
and dissolution of three national NGOs revealed and/or resulted in 
several key humanitarian vulnerabilities in the aid operation.  In 
response, the humanitarian community has focused extensively on 
filling the gaps left by these organizations in the life-saving 
sectors of food, health and nutrition, and water, sanitation, and 
hygiene.  UN agencies and the remaining 65 to 70 smaller NGOs, in 
coordination with the Government of National Unity (GNU), have 
initiated numerous short-term measures and expanded existing 
programs and areas of operation to prevent a rapid deterioration of 
humanitarian conditions in northern Sudan.  Although current 
short-term measures have temporarily and quantitatively filled the 
majority of the gaps left by the expulsions, the initiatives are not 
intended to replace sustainable, longer-term programs to meet 
humanitarian needs.  In addition, relief agencies have begun to 
emphasize that gap-filling is only one piece of a much larger 
humanitarian picture, noting ongoing needs and existing 
vulnerabilities that were exacerbated by the expulsions. 
 
--------------------------- 
Reduced Humanitarian Access 
--------------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00000811  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) The staff reduction caused by the expulsions has 
particularly affected humanitarian access to remote areas and 
contested locations, severely limiting early warning reporting. 
Without relief agencies present in these locations, information 
regarding current concerns is unavailable for areas that have 
typically presented some of the most significant humanitarian needs. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) In addition, many organizations continue to face procedural 
delays when attempting to expand programs to fill identified 
humanitarian gaps in particular locations.  Delays include refusing 
to approve technical agreements (TAs) and Sudanese government 
non-compliance with agreed travel notification procedures, 
particularly to locations in South Darfur.  NGO staff report that, 
despite the Ministerial Decree and recent statements by Presidential 
Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin regarding the sufficiency of travel 
notification for NGO travel rather than travel permits, security 
checkpoints throughout South Darfur continue to frequently, although 
inconsistently, demand travel permits for staff travel outside of 
Nyala.  One USAID partner notes that the frequent demands by 
checkpoint officials for travel permits have led the organization to 
opt for requesting travel permits rather than submitting a travel 
notification to ensure that staff may travel unimpeded to project 
sites.  In the USAID partner's view, harassment at checkpoints in 
South Darfur has increased since the announcement of the Ministerial 
Decree and Dr. Ghazi's visit.  Security officials in North Darfur 
have also inconsistently applied the requirement for travel permits 
despite the Ministerial Decree, most recently demanding seven-day 
advance notice and requests for approval for travel to Kutum town, 
North Darfur. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In addition, partners report that some of the delays in 
completing TAs result from the fact that state-level Humanitarian 
Aid Commission (HAC) officials, particularly in West Darfur, are 
demanding that NGOs include what the latter  deem to be an 
unsuitable national NGO partner in the TA.  NGOs note inconsistent 
application of this requirement, with some NGOs obtaining TAs 
without a national NGO partner, but other NGOs experiencing pressure 
from the HAC to accept national partners unilaterally chosen by the 
HAC.  On June 25, one of the pending TAs was signed by the West 
Darfur HAC, with the international NGO agreeing to find a national 
NGO partner, while two other pending TAs remained unsigned. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In Kalma camp, South Darfur, which remains one of the 
largest camps with continued humanitarian gaps following the March 
expulsions (ref. A), bureaucratic impediments employed by state 
authorities have prevented USAID partners Merlin and International 
Medical Corps (IMC) from fully commencing activities to fill the 
gaps left by expelled NGOs, nearly three months after the 
organizations submitted requests for approval to work in the camp. 
On June 22, USAID partner American Refugee Committee (ARC) began 
implementing water, sanitation, and hygiene activities in the camp 
after state and federal-level authorities finally approved ARC's TA 
on June 18.  However, while IMC has a signed TA for health 
activities throughout South Darfur, which in theory includes Kalma, 
the South Darfur Deputy Wali, or deputy governor, has refused to 
permit the organization to initiate health activities in one of the 
former clinics in the camp.  On June 29, Merlin received approval 
from the HAC to conduct health activities in the camp.  However, 
local officials have insisted that Merlin assume responsibility for 
both health clinics rather than only one.  The officials have also 
denied permission for Merlin to initiate nutrition activities, 
asserting that the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) may continue the 
Kalma nutrition program.  [Note: Since the expulsions, UNICEF has 
been providing salary support to former nutrition workers as a 
stop-gap measure to maintain services in the camp.  End note.] 
However, UNICEF emphasized that it is not an implementing agency 
and, thus, is unable to continue supporting the nutrition program in 
Kalma.  On July 2, UNICEF submitted a letter to the State Ministry 
of Health and the South Darfur HAC Commissioner requesting that 
authorities grant Merlin permission to implement nutrition programs 
in Kalma, as UNICEF support for the activities would soon cease.  On 
July 2, the South Darfur HAC requested that Merlin begin working on 
a technical agreement with the SMOH, including the health and 
nutrition project details needed to implement work in Kalma.  In 
addition, the HAC committed to discuss these issues at the next 
South Darfur High-Level Committee meeting scheduled for the evening 
of July 2. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000811  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Delayed Assessments and Reduced Reporting 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Independent assessments are critical to shaping and 
targeting humanitarian operations.  However, NGOs and UN agencies 
are often denied access to populations to undertake assessments, 
particularly in outlying locations and politically sensitive areas. 
When assessments are undertaken, the GNU HAC often does not permit 
public release of the assessment results.  (Note: Humanitarian 
agencies faced challenges in conducting assessments and sharing the 
results long before the NGO expulsions.  For example, the HAC has 
obstructed the release of the Darfur Nutrition Assessment since 
October 2008.  End note.)  With fewer relief agencies present 
throughout Darfur, accurate and timely assessment information needed 
to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those most vulnerable is 
lacking. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Diminished Quality of Humanitarian Programs 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The loss of key partners in critical sectors has reduced the 
overall quality of humanitarian operations.  While programs have 
been able to continue utilizing local staff and augmented assistance 
from government line ministries, USAID notes that program 
management, monitoring, and overall quality have decreased.  Failure 
to replace short-term, stop-gap measures with the technically-sound 
programs that existed prior to the March 4 expulsions has reduced 
humanitarian effectiveness.  This, in turn, increases the chances of 
a humanitarian deterioration by the end of 2009-particularly during 
the rainy season and concomitant hunger gap. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Reductions in program quality include intermittent 
staffing of health and nutrition facilities, lack of oversight and 
monitoring for technical quality, decreased capacity for 
verification activities, and limited coverage of remote and 
contested areas.  In addition, without NGOs present that possess the 
capacity to monitor distributions of food and relief commodities, 
humanitarian agencies note that the most vulnerable populations may 
be marginalized, and the potential exists for misdirected 
assistance. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In the health and nutrition sector, relief agencies 
indicate that the mere presence of a clinic does not necessarily 
fill the gap left by expelled organizations. The clinics, which are 
now primarily run by the Ministry of Health (MoH), typically lack 
adequate drugs and adequately-trained and motivated staff.  In 
addition, relief agencies note that beneficiaries sometimes avoid 
accessing health services, even if in a nearby clinic, due to 
concerns that the health workers will not provide impartial, 
appropriate care.  Many conflict-affected populations remain 
suspicious of government-sponsored assistance; thus, over-reliance 
on MoH-run facilities only appears to fill gaps, but does not 
address the underlying concerns and needs of beneficiaries. 
 
¶12. (SBU) In addition, dependence upon UN agencies and government 
line ministries, particularly in the health, nutrition, food, and 
water, sanitation, and hygiene sectors, to conduct direct 
implementation of programs is unsustainable.  Such dependence risks 
creating gaps in assistance or deterioration of program quality due 
to the limited duration of stop-gap funding and unavailability of 
staff for adequate monitoring.  USAID believes that donors will be 
reluctant to fund programs in which quality and capacity for 
targeting are questionable. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Lack of Verification for Population Movements 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Although limited displacement continues in Darfur, the 
Sudanese government is strongly encouraging IDP returns.  However, 
the GOS continues to restrict the work of the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the primary organization with the 
mandate to verify the appropriateness and voluntary nature of 
returns (ref B).  In 2004 and 2006, the GOS and IOM signed memoranda 
of understanding outlining the principles, roles, and 
responsibilities for voluntary IDP returns and affirming IOM as the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000811  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
lead agency in verifying population movements and assessing related 
needs.  However, GOS bureaucratic impediments, particularly in South 
Darfur, are preventing IOM from fully performing this critical role. 
 Security officials have denied IOM access to areas of reported 
population movements, prevented IOM from participating in 
interagency assessments, and impeded staff travel both to state 
capitals and rural areas.  Without a capable and trusted agency 
present to conduct verification activities, humanitarian 
organizations are often called upon by the GOS to provide immediate 
assistance to "returnees" without confirmation that the population 
movements were voluntary and appropriate. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Obstruction of Protection Activities 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Of all sectors affected by the March NGO expulsions, the 
protection sector lost the most NGO capacity, with six out of the 
thirteen  expelled international organizations directly involved in 
protection-related activities and two of the three dissolved 
national NGOs previously implementing protection programs.  Relief 
agencies have raised significant concerns that the decreased 
presence of NGO international and local staff has left many parts of 
Darfur vulnerable to under- or non-reporting on human rights issues 
and other abuses.  Humanitarian partners note that the mere presence 
of NGO staff in an area should be considered a critical form of 
protection for IDPs and other conflict-affected populations. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In addition, the Sudanese government continues to obstruct 
the work of the UN global cluster lead for protection, the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  In 2007, UNHCR 
planned to expand its operation to include protection and camp 
coordination and camp management (CCCM) activities in North and 
South Darfur from its primarily refugee-based focus in West Darfur. 
Despite signing a letter of understanding with UNHCR acknowledging 
UNHCR's role in protection throughout Darfur, the GOS continues to 
delay full approval for UNHCR activities, and, until recently, 
prevented UNHCR staff from traveling to South Darfur.  [Note: 
Although UNHCR states that it theoretically does not need permission 
to commence protection and CCCM activities, in practice, GOS 
agreement is essential to facilitating all of the necessary 
bureaucratic procedures for full operation, including permission to 
travel. End note.] 
 
------- 
Comment 
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¶16. (SBU) While the UN and the Sudanese government's quantitative 
assessments of gap-filling may appear impressive on paper, with 
nearly 100 percent coverage of all of the major life-saving sectors, 
NGOs and UN staff on the ground paint a less rosy picture of the 
quality and sustainability of these interventions, as well as the 
percentage of the overall humanitarian needs being fully addressed. 
The stop-gap measures have prevented a sharp deterioration in 
humanitarian indicators in Darfur.  However, a clear picture of the 
humanitarian conditions in Darfur is unavailable due to reduced 
access and coverage following the NGO expulsions, as well as 
diminished humanitarian capacity for reporting and assessments. 
USAID notes that the humanitarian situation in Darfur remains 
tenuous, with signs of potential improvement with the small-scale 
returns occurring, but significant ongoing vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, it is essential that the international community not 
lose sight of the pre-expulsion needs in Darfur by focusing only on 
the quantitative filling of gaps left by the expulsions. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Special Envoy's initiatives to reinvigorate the peace 
process in Darfur and improve security conditions, if successful, 
would shift, but not obviate the need for humanitarian interventions 
there.  Displaced- population returns due to improved security 
conditions would require needs-verification in areas of return as 
well as provision of assistance in locations where NGOs currently 
lack a presence.  IOM is willing to work with the GOS to facilitate 
the government's goal of reducing camp populations and returning 
IDPs to villages of origin. However, this process must be undertaken 
in cooperation with the organization so that it can verify returns 
are voluntary and orderly, as well as assess returning populations' 
needs for assistance.  Providing appropriate interventions in areas 
of return and ensuring that returnees do not go back to camps due to 
 
KHARTOUM 00000811  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
lack of services is in the Sudanese government's interest.  In 
addition, timely commencement of UNHCR activities in North and South 
Darfur is critical to providing populations, whether returning or 
remaining in camps, with adequate protection in the not-yet-stable 
environment that characterizes Darfur. 
 
WHITEHEAD