VZCZCXRO6548
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0810/01 1871439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061439Z JUL 09 ZDK CTG NUMEROUS SERVICES
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4043
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0077
RUEHSUN/USUN ROME IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000810 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PREL PREF ASEC SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: USAID/FFP DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S TRIP TO DARFUR 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 746 
 
KHARTOUM 00000810  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. From June 20-24, a USAID team comprising the visiting Deputy 
Director of the Office of Food For Peace (FFP), Washington and 
Sudan-based FFP Officers and a USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) Field Officer visited Darfur to meet with 
officials from the UN World Food Program (WFP) and other agencies, 
and to monitor food aid programs in South and West Darfur. 
 
¶2. Key conclusions/recommendations of the team include: (1) The loss 
of partners has forced WFP to undertake distribution themselves in 
many areas themselves or use partners with limited capability.  This 
has resulted in some programs that do not meet international 
(including WFP's own) standards of program quality.  Within Darfur, 
WFP should prioritize its efforts to build adequate implementing 
capacity, and the USG should continue to engage the government on 
facilitating expansion of existing partners and expediting the 
arrival of "new" NGOs, to help fill food assistance gaps. (2) WFP 
has made significant progress in expanding its food security 
monitoring and analysis systems and should continue to expand and 
refine these capabilities. (3) Despite being the agency with the 
deepest field presence, WFP cannot handle the policy, coordination 
and programmatic issues of population returns in the absence of a 
coordinated framework and way forward among UN Agencies, the 
Government of Sudan (GOS), donors, and other interested parties. 
The US and other donors should reinvigorate discussions with the UN 
and GOS to achieve a practical way forward on return policy that is 
consistent with international laws, standards and agreements and 
which outlines the conditions of international support for returns. 
End summary. 
 
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South Darfur 
------------ 
 
¶3. The USAID team visited South Darfur from June 21-23, meeting with 
state government officials in Nyala, including the Deputy Governor 
(Wali) and HAC Commissioner; the WFP South Darfur Area Office; and 
the UN and NGO Inter-agency Management Group (IAMG).  The team 
visited the WFP warehouse in Nyala - their largest in Sudan - and 
traveled by helicopter to Gereida on June 22 and to Kalma internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camp on June 23. 
 
¶4. The Deputy Wali and HAC Commissioner thanked USAID for its 
support to WFP and noted the continued importance of the food-aid 
program in South Darfur.  The Deputy Wali appealed for greater 
support for agricultural supplies, and argued that stability in 
South Darfur would allow more people to return to their villages. 
The FFP Deputy Director thanked the Deputy Wali for his hospitality 
and support.  On the subject of returns, the FFP Deputy Director 
noted that USAID supports returns of displaced persons to their 
homes around the world but, in most places, looks to international 
organizations such as the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) or the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
to certify that the returns are voluntary.  Further, the FFP Deputy 
Director noted that USAID holds WFP to high standards of program 
quality and accountability.  He asked the Deputy Wali to help ensure 
that WFP can select capable non-governmental organization (NGO) 
implementing partners to manage food-aid distributions.  The Deputy 
Wali thanked the team for the points, noting that he would take them 
under consideration, including the issue of IOM and UNHCR, which the 
Wali noted was tabled during the recent High-Level Committee 
mission. 
 
¶5. The WFP/South Darfur office briefed on its program, the largest 
of the three Darfur states with a maximum caseload of 1.3 million 
during the hunger gap.  The main challenges highlighted by WFP/South 
Darfur centered around the loss of NGO implementing partners 
following the March 4 and 5 expulsions.  CARE and Solidarites in 
particular covered a significant portion of the South Darfur 
caseload, including the Gereida IDP camp and hard-to-reach hotspots, 
such as Muhajeria.  According to WFP/South Darfur staff, reduced 
implementing partner capacity has complicated WFP's ability to 
verify population movements and accurately register new IDPs, 
setback WFP's plans to conduct blanket supplementary feeding in key 
locations in South Darfur, and highlighted many deficiencies with 
 
KHARTOUM 00000810  002 OF 004 
 
 
delivery systems, including the use of local relief committees. 
 
¶6. In terms of filling gaps created by the expulsions, WFP has yet 
to find adequate NGO distribution partners in many parts of South 
Darfur, including Gereida and Kass.  However, WFP has met with an 
advance team from CARE/Switzerland to discuss the capacity of the 
new organization to assume responsibility for the work of expelled 
NGO CARE/US.  WFP also is discussing significantly expanding the 
operations of one existing national agency, the Sudanese Popular 
Committee on Relief (SPCR), including significant capacity building 
and training to ensure that SPCR meets WFP's technical standards. 
In addition, WFP noted its concern regarding IDP returns, 
particularly as IOM has been barred from working in South Darfur. 
[Note: GOS restrictions on IOM operations are in contradiction to 
the MOUs signed by the GOS in 2004 and 2006.  End note.] 
 
¶7. On June 23, the team traveled by helicopter to Gereida, which 
hosts the largest IDP camp in Darfur with an estimated population of 
135,000.  WFP assumed direct responsibility for food distributions 
from CARE following the expulsions in March.  Humanitarian programs 
- particularly food aid - have had a tumultuous history in Gereida 
due to the frequent changes in implementing partners.  Before CARE, 
under the ICRC system, IDPs were registered but did not receive the 
standard ration cards that WFP usually provides.  CARE had not yet 
begun to issue the cards before the organization's expulsion. 
Without the cards, WFP is having difficulty avoiding beneficiary 
exclusion or inclusion errors - namely, ensuring both that all those 
eligible for food aid receive it, and that only intended 
beneficiaries are recipients .  These problems were admitted freely 
by WFP and readily visible to the USAID team visiting the camp. 
 
¶8. WFP staff in Gereida noted that they are working to upgrade the 
Gereida operation into an official sub-office within its management 
structure, rationalize the registration lists, and convert the 
distribution system to one that relies on household ration cards, 
thereby ensuring appropriate targeting.  These changes will help 
address both inclusion and exclusion errors, and also assist with 
building the capacity of the Food Relief Committees (FRCs) in the 
camp. 
 
¶9. On the final day in South Darfur, the team visited Kalma IDP Camp 
just outside of Nyala town.  Most NGOs working in Kalma camp were 
expelled on March 4. The GOS has allowed only one new NGO - 
USAID/OFDA partner American Refugee Committee - to fill water, 
sanitation, and hygiene gaps in the camp beginning on June 22,. 
Two other USAID/OFDA partners continue to await permission from 
state-level officials to begin activities in Kalma (reftel).  While 
in Kalma, the team toured nutrition activities being undertaken by 
former Action Contre la Faim (ACF) local staff, now supported 
directly by UNICEF.  The team observed that the nutrition services 
are continuing to run efficiently, utilizing supplies that were 
saved from the stocks of expelled NGOs.  As a stopgap measure, the 
team was impressed with the ability of the staff to continue 
operations in the center.  Without any direct program management, 
however, the team remains skeptical of the continued feasibility of 
this program, particularly once supplies begin to dwindle. 
 
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West Darfur 
----------- 
 
¶10. From June 23-24, the USAID Team traveled to El Geneina, West 
Darfur, and held meetings with the Wali of West Darfur and the WFP 
West Darfur Area Office.  WFP briefed the team on its programs in 
West Darfur, including the short-term measures WFP has put in place 
to cover the gaps of expelled NGO partners, which comprised 70 
percent of the caseload for the state.  The team also visited two 
IDP camps located in El Geneina town - Abu Zar and Riyad. 
 
¶11. The Wali of West Darfur thanked the team for visiting his state 
and conveyed appreciation for WFP's excellent performance in the 
wake of the March NGO expulsions.  Noting that the security 
situation in West Darfur "is stable," and that there is a "high 
degree of cooperation between state agencies and the humanitarian 
community," the Wali asked that WFP's budget be expanded so that it 
can engage in sectors other than direct delivery of food aid, 
including returnee support, education, and the provision of 
agricultural inputs.  The FFP Deputy Director asked the Wali to 
assist WFP in four areas:  1) ensuring that WFP has adequate 
partners to undertake distributions; 2) coordinating early with WFP 
 
KHARTOUM 00000810  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
on returns to ensure that they are voluntaQand sustainable; 3) 
ensuring that WFP can undertake headcounts to accurately determine 
the caseload; and 4) ensuring that assets are returned to WFP 
partners when/if they return under affiliate names so that programs 
can quickly resume.  The Wali thanked the team for this information, 
and noted that all of the assets from expelled NGOs are "in the safe 
hands of the state," and will be handed back to NGOs when they 
return. 
 
¶12. WFP provided a detailed briefing on the last round of dataQollection and analysisQom its new Food Security Monitoring System 
(FSMS).  The FSMS is housed in WFP and jointly implemented under a 
tripartite agreement with FAO and the State Ministry of Agriculture 
in West Darfur.  The purpose of the FSMS is to provide WFP and its 
partners a more substantive analysis of the food security situation 
in areas of ongoing WFP programs.  WFP expects the FSMS to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the impact of food aid on populations, 
allowing WFP to make more regular, informed programmatic decisions 
regarding food aid modalities/activities, timing, and duration of 
interventions.  WFP provided examples of how FSMS analytical tools 
have influenced programming decisions, including an adjustment in 
the duration of its seasonal support activity from five to four 
months during the hunger gap. 
 
¶13. WFP also briefed the team on its priorities for 2009 and 2010, 
noting that its central focus now is to improve the quality of 
general food distributions.  [Note: More than 80 percent of WFP's 
programming in Darfur is general food rations provided to IDPs.  End 
note.]  As in South Darfur, WFP has assumed direct responsibility 
for conducting food distributions in some critical areas, most 
notably in Zalingei and Mornei, following the NGO expulsions.  WFP 
has also expanded its agreement with the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC) 
to cover food aid distributions in the large Geneina town camps. 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶14. The team concluded that: 
 
a. WFP has drawn on its strong logistics operations to distribute 
food to most beneficiaries during the past two months despite the 
expulsion of four of their primary NGO implementing partners. 
 
b. The loss of partners has forced WFP to undertake distribution in 
many areas themselves or use partners with limited capability, 
resulting in some programs that do not meet international (including 
WFP's own) standards of program quality. 
 
c. WFP's increased involvement in direct distribution has revealed 
weaknesses, as noted by WFP and observed by the USAID team, in 
NGO-managed programs prior to March 4, which WFP is now trying to 
address within new and existing NGO agreements and with the aid of 
the new FSMS. 
 
d. WFP has made significant progress in expanding its food security 
monitoring and analysis capabilities but is only in the early stages 
of implementation.  WFP will not be able to take full advantage of 
the information without integrating its data with data from other 
agencies.  The NGO expulsions have delayed the full rollout of the 
FSMS, and WFP is now relying more on state line ministries for data 
collection. 
 
e. As the agency with the deepest field presence, WFP is on the 
frontlines of the issue of returns, having been called upon first by 
the GOS to provide assistance. But it cannot address the policy, 
coordination and most programmatic aspects of the issue on its own, 
without other UN Agencies, donors, and others parties having a 
coordinated policy framework; IOM and UNHCR certifying returns are 
voluntary; and all UN agencies and NGOs providing programmatic 
support. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
¶15. Based on the visit, the team recommends the following: 
 
a. Within Darfur, WFP should prioritize its efforts to build 
adequate implementing capacity.  This includes both building the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000810  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
capacities of NGO partners to meet basic standards of assessment, 
targeting, and monitoring, as well as augmenting WFP operational 
staff to provide these functions where adequate NGO capacity does 
not exist.  As WFP formulates its 2010 operation, efforts to expand 
WFP programming into other activities should not come at the expense 
of WFP's core emergency programming in Darfur. 
 
b. The USG should continue to engage the government on facilitating 
expansion of existing partners, and the arrival of "new" NGOs, to 
help fill food assistance gaps.  In this regard, it must be ensured 
that WFP be given sufficient latitude by the GOS to choose 
implementing partners on the basis of technical capacities. 
 
c. WFP should continue to expand and refine the FSMS by integrating 
data collection into the field-level agreements with implementing 
NGOs and integrating food security data with the UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) nutrition database. 
 
d. The US and other donors should reinvigorate discussions with the 
UN and GOS to achieve a clear and practical way forward on returns 
policy and the conditions of international support for return. 
 
The FFP Deputy Director has cleared this message. 
 
WHITEHEAD