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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM804, GOS REPORTEDLY ATTACKS JEM PRESENCE IN HASHABA, NORTH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM804 2009-07-01 14:19 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3813
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0804 1821419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011419Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4035
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000804 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS REPORTEDLY ATTACKS JEM PRESENCE IN HASHABA, NORTH 
DARFUR 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 788 
B) KHARTOUM 583 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: GOS forces targeting former SLA/Unity rebels now 
allied with JEM attacked the village of Hashaba on June 27-28, 
according to UN and rebel sources.  The attacks consisted of Antonov 
bombing followed by a ground assault.  The indigenous rebel force, 
comprised of two commanders, 36 men and three vehicles, appears to 
have been decimated.  The GOS forces have since withdrawn to Kutum, 
taking surviving rebels into custody.  The extent of civilian 
casualties in Hashaba is unclear.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Background Note: The area of Hashaba, approximately 50 
kilometers northeast of Kutum, has traditionally been controlled by 
SLA/Unity.  When veteran rebel figure Suleiman Jamous left SLA/Unity 
to join JEM in April 2009, a number of commanders loyal to him 
followed suit, creating tensions between SLA/Unity and JEM (Ref B). 
Many of these commanders relocated to JEM's base in Um Jaras, Chad, 
although a handful remained in their areas of control in Darfur, 
giving JEM an indigenous presence there. End background. 
 
3. (SBU) Among the former SLA/Unity commanders who switched 
allegiances to JEM were Yusuf and Suleiman Hassan, born and raised 
in Hashaba.  UN sources report that they commanded a small force in 
Hashaba consisting of 36 men and three vehicles.  The presence of 
JEM forces (through defection) in a core SLA/Unity area was too much 
for SLA/Unity Chairman Abdallah Yahia to bear, and, according to UN 
sources, he informed SLA/Minnawi of these JEM forces in Hashaba. 
This information was subsequently passed to the GOS, which took 
military action on June 27. 
 
4. (SBU) On June 28, SLA/Abdul Wahid Commander Adam Suleiman told SE 
Gration in Ndjamena that villagers in Hashaba reported a SAF Antonov 
had dropped 15 bombs in the town's market on June 27. (Note: 
SLA/Abdul Wahid maintains a presence west of Hashaba. End Note.) 
Salah Khawaja, a Field Commander with SLA/Unity in nearby Um Rai, 
similarly told UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) officers 
that on June 27 the GOS bombed Hashaba using an Antonov. Independent 
verification was not available; UNAMID sources told poloff on June 
29-30 that UNAMID had not yet verified with eyewitness accounts 
either the bombing or reports of damage. 
 
5. (SBU) SLA/Unity's Khawaja further stated on June 28 that  several 
dozen vehicles manned by GoS military and Janjaweed moved from the 
Kutum area and attacked Hashaba, arresting 11 people and killing 
many others.  UNDSS Officer Frazer King told poloff that Yusuf and 
Suleiman Hassan are now dead, as are all but 11 of their men, and 
their three vehicles were destroyed in attacks.  The GOS forces have 
reportedly withdrawn back to Kutum.  UNDSS believes that those 
arrested may have been taken to El Fasher for questioning. 
 
6. (SBU) Speaking with poloff from El Fasher on June 29, former 
Ceasefire Commission (CFC) representative and SLM/MM rebel Adam Ali 
Ware stated that the June 28 ground attack on Hashaba was aimed at 
unidentified insurgents who had set up check points in the area and 
levied taxes on locals there.  These insurgents were "not a well 
identified group," and alternately identified themselves with any 
number of rebel factions, he said.  Several were killed and a number 
of others were arrested, he said.  Ware said he had no knowledge of 
any bombing in Hashaba on June 27. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: The presence of JEM or JEM-aligned rebels in 
Darfur continues to be a source of conflict.  While Darfur-based 
rebel movements have virtually ceased hostilities with the GOS for 
many months, the Chad-based JEM's recent raids on Karnoi and Um 
Barro have succeeded in provoking a fierce GOS military response 
against any JEM presence in Darfur, even an indigenous one resulting 
from shifting allegiances.  The fate of Yusuf and Suleiman Hassan 
will make other insurgents think twice about joining JEM without 
re-locating to Chad, and could also affect JEM's future recruitment. 
 Given JEM's continued inability to capture and hold territory in 
Darfur, its claim to be the most powerful and representative 
movement in Darfur remains open to question. 
 
WHITEHEAD