VZCZCXRO9785
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2104/01 2110411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300411Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0431
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002104 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT:  PRT Mazar-e-Sharif: Sar-e-pul Provincial Assessment 
 
REF:  Kabul 1735 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Security throughout most of Sar-e-pul province remains 
relatively good, but has worsened in areas bordering neighboring 
Jowzjan and Faryab provinces.  Almalek village of Sayyad district 
has been ground zero for Mullah Nadir's insurgent gangs, who 
continue to exploit the weaknesses of the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF), particularly their inability to coordinate operations 
across provincial borders with their counterparts in Faryab and 
Jowzjan.  Despite a rocky start to his tenure, Governor Chayabi has 
established productive working relationships with his administration 
and provincial council members.  One of the least developed 
provinces in the country, Sar-e-pul has not finalized its provincial 
development plan and is struggling to attract reconstruction 
projects from the national development budget and from donors. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The story emerging over the past several months has been 
the emergence of Mullah Nadir and his roving gangs of armed men as a 
destabilizing force in the northwestern part of the province. 
Nadir, a Tajik criminal who has been on the run ever since murdering 
an Afghan policeman two years ago, uses Almalek village, Sayyad 
district, as his operating base.  He has spent time in Pakistan and 
is believed to be receiving support from the Taliban.  ANSF 
officials hold him accountable for the March  murders of the 
district governor, police chief, and nine policemen from adjacent 
Qush Teppeh district in Jowzjan province.  Mullah Amrullah, a Nadir 
associate, has reportedly reconciled with the government.  The 
provincial intelligence chief said that he will be keeping an eye on 
him to make sure he is not playing both sides. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Two ANSF-led operations supported by ISAF since then were 
unsuccessful largely due to the lack of effective cross-border 
cooperation with the Jowzjan and Faryab ANSF.   Consequently, this 
has provided a morale boost to Nadir, who enjoys freedom of movement 
precisely because the undermanned Afghan National Police (ANP) are 
unable to man and support a check post there without fear of being 
overrun by Nadir's armed gangs.  Both Chayabi and his deputy believe 
that the ANP's morale has bottomed to the point where they are too 
scared to fight the insurgency in Sayyad.  The recent deployment to 
Sar-e-pul of a company of 120 Afghan National Army soldiers to help 
provide election security is an encouraging development, but they 
are expected to stay only for a few months. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The security picture throughout the rest of the province is 
incomplete.  There have been two IED finds along the paved road 
connecting Sheberghan, Jowzjan province, with Sar-e-pul's provincial 
center.  Apart from another IED found in Sancharak district last 
February, there have been no other reported significant security 
incidents either there or in the districts of Sozma Qala and 
Gosfandi since the beginning of 2009.  Balkhab district, home to 
large pockets of ethnic Hazaras, remains calm.  Little is known 
about the smuggling networks which are widely believed to be intact 
in the province despite assertions to the contrary by Chayabi.  The 
Swedish PRT, operating from its safehouse in Sar-e-pul's provincial 
center, is only collecting intelligence in the northern-most part of 
Kohistanat district - the most remote in the province.  There, 
insurgents are spilling over not only from Sayyad district but also 
from Belcharagh district in Faryab province and seeking refuge in 
the mountains.  The attempted assassination by of the Kohistanat 
district governor earlier this spring attests to deteriorating 
security conditions in certain parts of the district. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Sar-e-pul's provincial elections officer is an experienced 
IEC hand, yet he worries about the safety of voting centers in 
Almalek, Chartut and other trouble-prone villages of Sayyad district 
because of their poor security.  The Sar-e-pul police chief is 
worried by the police manpower needed to support the 136 voting 
centers province-wide.  With only 500 men in the force, he will need 
support from Kabul or from the Afghan army in order to place, on 
average, ten policemen per voting center, for a total of 1,360 men. 
As per an order from the Ministry of Interior, Sar-e-pul's ANP will 
recruit 100 ANP soldiers and send them to work in Kabul. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Sar-e-pul's ANSF are making the transition, albeit not 
seamlessly, from the Joint Provincial Coordination Center to the 
Provincial Operations Coordination Center (OCC-P).  The Afghan 
National Army brigadier general who arrived to head the center will 
have to learn how to forge teamwork among his 37-man staff of ANA, 
ANP, and NDS (national intelligence) personnel.  U.S. 
military-funded MPRI trainers will train the OCC-P staff for two 
weeks, and the U.S. Police Mentoring Team (PMT), newly arrived to 
the province, will provide follow-on mentoring.  INL-funded Dyncorps 
 
KABUL 00002104  002 OF 003 
 
 
mentors continue to work with provincial police staff on such 
systems as personnel and logistics, but the mentors' effectiveness 
is hampered by their contractual restrictions on travel.  Without 
accommodations in Sar-e-pul, the mentors must make day trips from 
Mazar-e Sharif.  A round-trip takes six hours, which does not leave 
much time for quality mentoring.  The European Union Police (EUPOL) 
has not assigned personnel to work in the province, but the Swedish 
PRT's police liaison officer helps out when he can. 
 
Governance 
---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Governor Chayabi, a former mujahideen commander from Takhar 
province, made his debut on the governance stage last August to less 
than rave reviews.  After a rough first few months, which saw him 
alienate his own deputy and the Provincial Council, Chayabi seems to 
be settling into the job.  Fortunately, he has heeded advice from 
his own advisor about the importance of consulting with other 
members of his administration and the Provincial Council (PC) before 
making key decisions.  Since then, he has improved relations with 
both groups and has even instituted an "open door" policy for anyone 
from the province wishing to meet him.  As a mujahideen commander, 
Chayabi had a history of narco-trafficking from Takhar province to 
Tajikistan.  Although allegations of his continuing involvement in 
illicit activity occasionally surface, no smoking gun has been 
uncovered to implicate him. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Provincial Council, as in most other provinces, has 
struggled to find its voice and role at times.  Led by Mr. Azizi, 
who is also the provincial head of the Junbesh Party, the PC is now 
on better terms with the governor after a rocky start to their 
relationship.  Governor Chayabi seems to have made amends for his 
early missteps and has since accepted invitations to lunch with PC 
members in their office.  All but one of the council members intend 
to run again in this year's PC elections. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The three-decades-long conflict between ethnic Arabs and 
the Pashtun Esaqzai tribe edged closer to resolution after Kabul 
authorities, with the governor's intervention, hammered out an 
agreement to resolve long standing land disputes between the two 
tribes before addressing the more complicated pending murder cases. 
Still, the road to final resolution is fraught with obstacles.  The 
release of convicted criminal Kamal Khan, who leads the Arab faction 
along with his brother, Member of Parliament Haji Payenda Khan, 
satisfies one of the agreement's conditions.  However, the 
government is insisting on conducting a land survey to demarcate 
government-owned lands - a move both sides oppose for fear they will 
lose lands they have claimed illegally.  The dispute is still 
pending with the National Reconciliation Committee, led by Meshrano 
Jirga (upper house) leader Mojeddedi. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Sar-e-pul achieved poppy free status in 2008, entitling it 
to $1.5 million in Good Performers Initiatives (GPI) projects. 
Among those projects are a provincial meeting hall in Sar-e-pul 
center and two schools.  During a July visit to the province, 
Minister of Counter Narcotics Khodaidad announced that Sar-e-pul has 
again been declared poppy-free and will thus receive another $1 
million in 2009 GPI projects.  The Provincial Development Committee 
(PDC) has decided that its 2009 GPI allocation should be used to 
asphalt roads in the provincial center.  (NOTE: The minister's 
announcement was premature, as the U.N. Office of Drug Control has 
not yet released its province-by-province assessment of poppy 
cultivation. END NOTE)  Governor Chayabi harbors no illusions that 
the ANP has stamped out all poppy cultivation in his province, and 
expects that due to the abundant rains this past spring, farmers 
will once again resort to planting poppy next year. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Progress has been made on the DIAG (Disbanding of Illegal 
Armed Groups) process.  Sancharak, Gosfandi, and Sozma Qala 
districts are DIAG-compliant.  Balkhab is the next district slated 
to undergo DIAG. 
 
Development 
----------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Sar-e-pul is among the least developed provinces in 
Afghanistan.  According to UNAMA's development assistance 
coordination officer in the north, who cites statistics from the 
Ministry of Finance, the total planned and committed government and 
donor spending per capita in Sari Pul province is around $50 
(compared with $600 per capita in Kabul and $400 in Helmand 
province).  The southern districts of Balkhab and Kohistanat remain 
largely inaccessible during the winter months due to poor road 
conditions.  Chayabi is under pressure from residents to attract 
development projects from donors and the central government, but so 
far has been unsuccessful.  Natural gas and oil deposits are among 
the province's natural resources, but they remain unexploited. 
Sar-e-pul's 5-year Provincial Development Plan (PDP) is still a 
 
KABUL 00002104  003 OF 003 
 
 
draft.  Only two of 80 projects from its PDP have been completed: 
the construction of an office for the provincial attorney and the 
rehabilitation of a health clinic.  The vast majority of projects on 
the draft PDP have not attracted donor funding.  Approximately 75 
percent of Sweden's development assistance to Afghanistan goes to 
support national-level programs.  SIDA, the Swedish government's 
development agency, is funding a project to gravel 20 kilometers of 
road between Sar-e-pul center and Sozma Qala district. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Prior to its termination in June, USAID's Local 
Governance-Community Development (LGCD) project focused on four 
priority districts: Gosfandi, Sozma Qala, Balkhab, and Sancharak. 
Vocational training projects planned in those districts have been 
cancelled.  USAID is planning to construct a district center in 
Sancharak district with the funding mechanism not yet determined. 
 
EIKENBERRY