VZCZCXRO6785
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2077/01 2080433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270433Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0394
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002077 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: CORRECTED: JULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1 
AS DEADLINE FOR PARING VOTING CENTER LIST 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: At a July 25 ministerial on election issues, the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Interior (MOI), ISAF, the 
UN, and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) agreed that August 
1 would be the final date to determine which of the nearly 7,000 
voting centers would not open.  The IEC has agreed to adjust its 
delivery schedule for ballots and other sensitive materials to 
accommodate the August 1 date.  Participants also agreed to step-up 
joint security planning to maximize the number of centers that could 
be opened; discussed the need to recruit more female searchers; and 
agreed on a media and messaging plan.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On July 25, SRSG Kai Eide hosted a short-notice meeting to 
identify a way ahead on the vexing issue of determining which of the 
nearly 7,000 intended voting centers will not be opened due to 
security concerns.  Ministers Wardak (MOD) and Atmar (MOI) were in 
attendance, as were NDS Director Saleh, ISAF commander Gen. 
McChrystal, IEC Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Barakzai, and major 
donor country ambassadors, including Ambassador Ricciardone. 
 
Voting Centers 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) As a prelude to the ministerial meeting, the working-level 
Security Operations Group (SOG) took place earlier the same day, 
which focused on the how many of the nearly 7,000 voting centers 
could be opened.  At that meeting, Afghan National Army Ops Chief MG 
Karimi reported: 
 
-- 5898 polling centers confirmed will open; 
 
-- 514 polling centers are still being surveyed/security assessed by 
ISAF and ANSF; 
 
-- 283 polling centers have been co-located with other polling 
centers; 
 
-- 211 polling centers will not open because they are in black 
districts 
 
-- 61 polling centers were scheduled to be in locations non-feasible 
and unrealistic locations (such as unreachable mountainsides.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) The afternoon ministerial meeting illustrated both the 
ministers' determination to come to grips with the voting center 
issue and the frequent disconnects within GIROA on fundamentals such 
as using consistent data.  Wardak and Atmar agreed on 548 as the 
number of centers that was feasible to open, rather than the 514 
noted at the earlier meeting.  Depending on military operations and 
security preparations for election day, that number could still 
change in either direction.  At Eide's suggestion, all agreed on 
August 1 as the deadline for a final report from MOD on how many 
polling centers could not be secured and would have to be co-located 
or merged with other centers in farther-away, safer locations. 
 
¶5. (SBU) A key consideration in this discussion was the IEC's 
schedule for transporting ballots and other sensitive materials to 
the centers, an operation that is underway since July 21.  The 
participants, including Barakzai, agreed that delivering these 
materials, for now, to the IEC's provincial centers and holding them 
there would provide the ministries until August 1 to make a final 
determination on how many centers would open, after which the 
materials would be transported to their final locations.  The 
participants will meet again on August 1 to review the list. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Gen. McChrystal asked how late the security forces could 
stage operations which might result in adding additional secured, 
held areas, thus enabling more centers to open by August 20.   The 
answer, all agreed, was August 10; after this date, there would not 
be enough time to ensure ballots could be delivered to such 
newly-opened centers.  McChrystal got agreement for an augmented 
group of MOD, MOI, and ISAF planners to begin meeting immediately 
and report by July 30 on the prospects for adding more centers as 
the result of operations. 
 
Community Policing 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Atmar noted that raising locally-recruited short-term 
community defense volunteers could be a significant factor in 
election security, in areas where the threat was not huge.  He said 
MOI and local governors were working with local tribal leaders and 
had already started recruiting such volunteers throughout the south 
and in Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Kunar, Nuristan, Wardak, Khost, and 
Paktika.  (Note:  At the SOG earlier in the day, MG Karimi said that 
there were still many questions on local volunteer community defense 
solutions:  a determination on authority underwhich the force would 
operate, if they would be paid and by whom, if they would be armed, 
 
KABUL 00002077  002 OF 002 
 
 
when they would demobilize, if they would be trained and if the MOI 
directive on ANP impartiality for the elections extends to this 
group.) 
 
Female Issues 
------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Ricciardone raised the need to recruit, train, and deploy 
female searchers, noting another attack was underway at that time by 
male terrorists disguised with burqas.  Atmar agreed there is a 
pressing need for more female searches at polling stations and urged 
the ministries represented to make a maximum effort to recruit more 
of them.  He promised that MOI could train them, but asked that IEC 
identify recruits over the next week.  (Note: Last week Minister of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) Zia agreed MRRD would 
take a leading role in this effort.  MRRD and IEC officials met 
today to work out details.  The Ministry Of Women's Affairs is also 
expected to support this). 
 
¶9. (SBU) NDS Director Saleh said his agency has received many 
reports indicating that in numerous villages, male heads of 
households and extended families intend to vote on behalf of the 
women in their group.  Barakzai flatly rejected such plans, noting 
proxy voting is expressly forbidden by the IEC and illegal under 
Afghan law.  The UNDP representative asked that NDS identify the 
locations of such reports, so UNDP could alert FEFA, the largest 
domestic observer organization, to lookout for such attempts in 
those areas. 
 
Media and Messaging 
------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Participants agreed on the desirability of a phased media 
strategy.  From now until August 10, security forces and responsible 
ministries would lead with the message that they will do everything 
possible to ensure as many registered voters as possible could vote. 
 After that date, local communities where voting centers would not 
open would be informed; still later, a nationwide message would 
explain the number of polling centers that could not be opened and 
why.  Eide stressed that in conveying that message, it should be 
noted that security was not the only reason for not opening all of 
the planned centers; there were technical reasons as well, ranging 
from movements of nomadic people to geographic obstacles.  Above 
all, no voting center should be described as "closed," but rather 
"not opening".  Ambassador Ricciardone noted that GIROA, IEC, UNAMA, 
and various countries naturally might have different perspectives on 
the issues, but urged that senior press officers should meet soon 
and frequently to identify and address discrepancies together, 
before the inevitable media dissection.  He also stressed that MOI 
and the IEC should quickly gain a grasp of the number and percentage 
of registered voters likely to be affected by the centers that would 
not open - if the percentage was as low as many believed it would be 
this should be an important feature of public messaging. 
 
EIKENBERRY