VZCZCXRO6575
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2074/01 2071616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261616Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0387
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002074 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: ULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1 
AS DEADLINE FOR PARING VOTING CENTER LIST 
 
¶1. Summary: At a July 25 ministerial on election issues, MOD, MOI, 
ISAF, the UN, and the IEC agreed that August 1 would be the final 
date to determine which of the nearly 7,000 voting centers would not 
open.  The IEC agreed to adjust its delivery schedule for ballots 
and other sensitive materials to accommodate the August 1 date. 
Participants also agreed to step up joint security planning to 
maximize the number of centers that could be opened; discussed the 
need to recruit more female searchers; and agreed on a media and 
messaging plan.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  On July 25, SYSRG Kai Eide hosted a short-notice meeting to 
identify a way ahead on the vexing issue of determining which of the 
nearly 7,000 intended voting centers will not be opened due to 
security concerns.  Ministers Wardak (MOD) and Atmar (MOI) were in 
attendance, as were NDS Director Saleh, ISAF commander Gen. 
McChrystal, IEC Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Barakzai, and major 
donor country ambassadors.  Amb. Ricciardone represented the U.S. 
 
Voting Centers 
-------------- 
 
¶3.  As a prelude to the ministerial meeting, earlier in the day 
occurred the regular weekly meeting of the working-level Security 
Operations Group (SOG), which focused on the how many of the nearly 
7,000 voting centers could be opened.  At that meeting, ANA Ops 
Chief MG Karimi gave the following report: 
 
--5898 polling centers confirmed will open; 
 
-- 514 polling centers are still being surveyed/security assessed by 
ISAF and ANSF; 
 
-- 283 polling centers have been collocated with other polling 
centers; 
 
-- 211 polling centers will not open because they are in enemy 
controlled territory; 
 
-- 61 polling centers were scheduled to be in locations that were in 
ravines, on the sides of mountains etc and are just not feasible. 
 
¶4.  The ministerial meeting that afternoon illustrated both the 
determination of ministers to come to grips with the voting center 
issue and the frequent disconnects within the GIROA on such 
fundamentals as using consistent data.  Rather than the figure of 
514 centers which remained to be determined if it was feasible to 
open, Wardak and Atmar agreed the number was 548.  Depending on the 
ebb and flow of military operations and security preparations for 
election day, that number could shrink further, or it could 
increase.  At Eide's suggestion, all agreed that August 1 would be 
the deadline for a final report from MOD on how many polling centers 
could not be secured and would have to be co-located or merged with 
other centers in farther-away, safer locations. 
 
¶5.  A key consideration in this discussion was the IEC's schedule 
for transporting ballots and other sensitive materials to the 
centers, an operation that is now underway.  The participants, 
including IEC's Barakzai, agreed that delivering these materials, 
for now, to the IEC's provincial centers and holding them there 
would enable the ministries to have until August 1 to make a final 
determination on how many centers would open, after which the 
materials would be transported to their final locations.  The 
participants will meet again on August 1 to review the list. 
 
¶6.  Gen. McChrystal asked how late the security forces could stage 
operations which might result in adding additional secured, held 
areas, thus enabling more centers to open and be equipped with 
ballots by August 20.   The answer, all agreed, was August 10; after 
this date, there would not be enough time to ensure ballots could be 
delivered to such newly-opened centers.  McChrystal got the group's 
agreement for an augmented group of MOD, MOI, and ISAF planners to 
begin meeting immediately and report by July 30 on the prospects for 
adding more centers as the result of operations. 
 
Community Policing 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  Atmar noted that raising locally-recruited short-term community 
defense volunteers could be a significant factor in election 
security, in areas where the threat was not huge.  He said MOI and 
local governors were working with local tribal leaders and had 
already started recruiting such volunteers throughout the south and 
in Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Kunar, Nuristan, Wardak, Khost, and 
Paktika.  (Note:  At the staff-level Security Operations Group 
earlier in the day, MG Karimi said that there were still a lot of 
unanswered questions on local volunteer community defense solutions: 
 Under whose authority would a community defense force operate? 
 
KABUL 00002074  002 OF 002 
 
 
Would they be paid?  And by whom?  Would they be armed?  When would 
they demobilize? Would they receive training?  Would the MOI 
directive on ANP impartiality for the elections extend to this 
group?). 
 
Female Issues 
------------- 
 
¶8.  Ricciardone raised the need to recruit, train, and deploy female 
searchers, noting another attack was then underway by male 
terrorists disguised with burqas.  Atmar agreed there is a pressing 
need for more female searches at polling stations and urged the 
ministries represented to make a maximum effort to recruit more of 
them.  He promised that MOI could train them, but asked that IEC 
identify recruits over the next week.  (Note: Last week Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development Minister Zia agreed MRRD would 
take a leading role in this effort.  MRRD officials and IEC 
officials met today to work out details.  Ministry Of Womens Affairs 
is also expected to support this). 
 
¶9.  NDS Director Saleh said his agency has received many reports 
indicating that at many villages, male heads of households and 
extended families intend to vote on behalf of the women in their 
group.  IEC's Barakzai flatly rejected such plans, noting proxy 
voting is expressly forbidden.  The UNDP representative asked that 
the NDS identify the locations of such reports, so UNDP could alert 
FEFA, the largest domestic observer organization, to be on the 
lookout for such attempts in those areas. 
 
Media and Messaging 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  Participants agreed on the desirability of a phased media 
strategy.  From now until August 10, the message would be that 
security forces and responsible ministries would be doing everything 
they could to ensure as many registered voters as possible could 
vote.  After that date, local communities where voting centers would 
not open would be informed; still later, a nationwide message would 
explain the number of polling centers that could not be opened and 
why.  Eide stressed that in conveying that message, it should be 
noted that security was not the only reason for not opening all of 
the planned centers; there were technical reasons as well, ranging 
from movements of nomadic people to geographic obstacles.  Above 
all, no voting center should be described as "closed," but rather 
"not opening".  Amb. Ricciardone noted that GIROA, IEC, UNAMA, and 
various countries naturally might have different perspectives on the 
issues, but urged that senior press officers should meet soon and 
frequently to identify and address discrepancies together, before 
the inevitable media dissection.  He also stressed that MOI and the 
IEC should quickly gain a grasp of the number and percentage of 
registered voters likely to be affected by the centers that would 
not open - if the percentage was as low as many believed it would be 
this should be an important feature of public messaging. 
 
EIKENBERRY