VZCZCXRO4462
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2019/01 2040917
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230917Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0334
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002019 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: MINIMIZING ELECTION FRAUD 
 
REF: A. Kabul 1140 
¶B. Kabul 1148 
¶C. Kabul 1902 
¶D. Kabul 1848 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  Candidates, Afghans and the international community 
have ongoing concerns that fraud - actual or perceived - will 
undermine the integrity of election results. They are concerned 
about voter registration irregularities, the potential for 'ballot 
stuffing,' and tampering with results. The Independent Election 
Commission (IEC), the UN, the international community, and Afghan 
government institutions have designed election procedures and taken 
other steps to reduce fraud and increase confidence in the election 
process,  More can still be done.  Minimizing fraud will require 
sound election procedures, effective management, strong electoral 
institutions and robust election observation.  End Summary. 
 
Registration Irregularities 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The IEC reported a total of around 17 million registered 
voters, with 12.5 million registered for the 2004/2005 elections and 
4.5 million for the 2009 elections.  Both voter registrations were 
marred with irregularities.  Observer groups reported fraud and 
procedural flaws in the last registration process, including: 
registration of voters under 18; multiple registrations; 
distribution of blank registration forms and proxy registration of 
women by male relatives.  These registration abuses have the 
potential to alter the results of the election and seriously 
endanger the credibility of the process. At least one candidate has 
stated that he/she stands ready to challenge the results of the 
elections because of the flaws in female voter registration. 
 
¶3.  (U) In some provinces, local IEC officials ignored the physical 
presence requirement for voter registration and issued voter ID 
cards for women whose male family members registered them in 
absentia.  Provinces where this practice was widespread recorded 
women's registration rates significantly higher than the national 
average of 30 to 40 percent.  For instance, eight Provinces - 
Daikundi, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Kapisa, Laghman, Paktika and 
Panjsher - showed average female registrants close to 50 percent. 
Five other provinces showed averages of more than 50 percent: 
Badghis (54 percent), Paktia (64 percent), Khost (67 percent), Logar 
(67 percent), and Nuristan (71 percent). 
 
¶4. (U) Sound election procedures, including the use of indelible ink 
to mark the finger of voters, and the integrity of election 
officials, observers and agents can help prevent these additional 
registration cards from becoming fraudulent votes and limit proxy 
voting. 
 
Election Day 
------------ 
 
¶5. (U) Across Afghanistan, polls will open on August 20 at 7:00 AM. 
After a security check, at the door of each polling station an 
Identification Officer will check each voter's registration card and 
fingers to confirm they have not yet voted.  Once confirmed, the 
voter will move to another IEC official who will check that the 
card's information matches with the individual, ink the voter's 
finger, punch the card with a triangular hole to prevent reuse in 
this election, and record the name and card number in a voter 
registry.  The voter will then move to the ballot paper issuer who 
stamps two ballots in the back - one presidential and one provincial 
- and hands them over to the voter.  Stamping the back of the ballot 
provides an additional anti-fraud measure to prevent fake ballots 
from entering the system.  The voter then proceeds to the voting 
screen, marks each ballot with a pen and walks to the two ballot 
boxes to deposit them in the appropriate box.  The ballots and boxes 
are color coded - green for presidential candidate, brown for 
provincial council candidates. 
¶6. (U) To prevent one person from voting multiple times, it is 
especially important that the ink is high quality and procedures for 
applying it make it very difficult to remove. The IEC has dispatched 
two experts to test the ink in China and they will hand carry 
additional samples to be tested at Kabul University. 
¶7. (U) When voting ends, polling station staff will reconcile 
ballots and tally results at the polling station.  The tally report 
has one original and four copies.  The original tally report is put 
in a tamper evident, numbered bag for transfer to the national tally 
center in Kabul; one copy is posted at the polling station, two are 
given to candidates agents and one is put in the ballot box.  The 
manager will then reseal the ballot box.  The manager and security 
forces will accompany the sealed ballot box to the provincial 
capital. 
¶8. (U) Opportunities for 'ballot stuffing', invalidating ballots and 
altering results reports will be limited by the presence of 
observers and party agents.  An efficient counting process ensures 
that observers and agents are able to remain until the process is 
 
KABUL 00002019  002 OF 003 
 
 
complete to help prevent fraud.  To that end, the U.S. Interagency 
Election Team has proposed to UNDP a more secure and streamlined 
procedure for reconciling, classifying and counting ballots.  Since 
party agents will also receive copies of tally reports, election or 
security officials will be deterred from changing tally reports as 
they are transferred from the polling station to Kabul. 
 
¶9. (U) Additional procedural changes would further increase the 
integrity of the process by reducing the risk of final results being 
modified after the counting operation is complete.  We have proposed 
to UNDP to seal the tally reports with a sticky, transparent tape 
that would make it more difficult if not impossible to modify the 
results. 
 
Tally Center 
------------ 
¶10. (U) Well-planned procedures and operations at the Tally Center 
in Kabul are also critical for fraud prevention.  The IEC has not 
yet completed procedures or operations plans for the Tally Center 
and the Interagency Election Team stands ready to assist in 
reviewing and working with UNDP and IEC to make sure that reliable 
anti-fraud measures are put in place. The Interagency Election Team 
has already advised UNDP on operational structure and procedures 
regarding the Tally Center. 
 
Sound Procedures and Effective Management 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (U) In addition to designing good procedures, effective 
recruitment, training and management of poll workers is important 
for fraud prevention.  The IEC, with the support of IFES, will train 
close to 170,000 workers using a training 'cascade' format.  On July 
18, the training of 10 regional and 160 provincial trainers started. 
 This phase of the training will last until July 25 and be followed 
by the training of the 3,046 District Field coordinators until 
August 6.  From August 12 until August 18, 160,000 poll workers and 
managers will be trained to complete the training process.  In 
addition, the MOI will separately train 14,000 female searchers to 
staff half of the polling stations which are devoted to women 
voters.  Recruitment of women poll workers is difficult. 
 
Internal IEC Audit 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (U) The Interagency Election Team is supporting the IEC in 
development and implementation of plans for a comprehensive audit 
process aimed at limiting potential fraud, from bogus registration 
cards and polling staff collusion.  On Election Day, IEC auditors 
would proactively sample and check ballot boxes once they arrive at 
provincial centers, after having been counted, especially in areas 
deemed highly vulnerable to fraud.  The IEC could then choose to 
void results of these locations if the evidence warrants it. 
Interagency Election Support Team staff are working on procedures 
for the audit with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures 
Department and with UNDP-ELECT. 
 
¶13. (U) In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process 
would dissuade potential fraud, Post will help the IEC develop Q 
public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling 
station workers.  This process was used with some success in Iraq. 
 
Observation 
----------- 
 
¶14. (U) The presence of observers and political agents in polling 
stations is an integral part of fraud prevention efforts. Plans for 
a significant international and domestic observation presence are 
coming together.  Last week, the European Union officially launched 
its observer mission to the Afghan elections, which will deploy 86 
observers around Afghanistan, including 50 short-term observers, 
down slightly from earlier figures.  Post is negotiating grants with 
four implementers that would put over 250 long-term and short-term 
observers into the field. 
 
¶15. (U) The domestic observer organization FEFA plans to deploy 400 
Afghan long-term observers and 7600 Afghan short-term observers 
which they hope will cover 65 percent of polling stations.  To 
achieve geographic distribution, we will rely in some cases on 
military support, including PRT support, and we are making these 
arrangements through ISAF.  Ref C provides further information on 
observation plans. 
 
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) The ECC is also a key safeguard against fraud. The ECC is an 
independent Afghan body established under Article 52 of the 
Electoral Law to adjudicate all challenges and complaints related to 
the electoral process.  The ECC has its headquarters in Kabul and 
 
KABUL 00002019  003 OF 003 
 
 
will be represented in each province of Afghanistan by the 
Provincial Election Complaints Commissions (PCCs).  Each PCC 
consists of three provincial Commissioners and one support officer. 
Eight of the provincial offices will have additional legal and 
investigative capacity to assist the provincial offices when 
required.  The ECC is separate from, and independent of, the IEC. 
Its provincial office establishment is behind schedule and we are 
working with the ECC to overcome problems delaying the effort. 
 
¶17. (U) In a press conference on June 21, ECC Chairman Grant Kippen 
announced that a total of 148 complaints have been received.  Forty 
six relate to the Presidential Race.   Common themes in these 
complaints are:  accusations of past criminal activity by the 
candidates; conflict of interest (public official improperly 
campaigning for a candidate; and misuse of state resources.  Of the 
148 complaints, the ECC has adjudicated over 40, which resulted in 2 
Provincial Council candidates being disqualified  (one from Nimroz, 
one from Kunan).   Also, one individual was fined for attacking the 
dignity of a presidential candidate on a broadcast TV program. 
Other decisions dismissed cases for lack of evidence, or for falling 
outside of ECC jurisdiction.  The ECC referred three cases to the 
attorney general for investigation.  A summary of the complaints 
shows that most complaints were filed in Kabul Province (38). 
Separately, the ECC received 36 complaints directly.  Badakhshan is 
third with 11 total complaints.  Takhar has seven.  Nangahar and 
Kunar have six.  Kunar has four.  Nine provinces had zero 
complaints, including Wardak, Paktiya, Paktika, Laghman, Nuristan, 
Badghis, Zabul, Panjshir, and Daikundi. 
 
¶18. During a visit to the ECC by Ambassador Carney on July 15, 
Kippen said he Expected the pace of investigations to be much 
greater after August 20 than before, and said ECC has requested 
additional funding from the donor community in Kabul to provide 
support for a stepped-up pace of investigative trips from Kabul. 
 
¶19. (U) Kippen said IFES will provide six election experts to the 
ECC who will look at strengthening ECC investigative capabilities. 
Amb. Carney offered to look into providing USAID Air flights if the 
ECC needs to get to a location quickly in order to investigate a 
significant complaint and the ECC cannot arrange transportation 
itself.  Ref D provides additional information. 
 
EIKENBERRY