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Viewing cable 09KABUL2018, MINOR CANDIDATE COALITION CONTRADICTORY AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL2018 2009-07-23 09:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4460
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2018/01 2040916
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230916Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0332
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002018 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: MINOR CANDIDATE COALITION CONTRADICTORY AND 
UNFOCUSED 
 
REF: KABUL 1930 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Minor presidential candidates Dr. Mohammed 
Nasir Aniss, Bashir Bizhan, and Hedaiat Amin Arsallah 
separately confirmed to us recent rumors and media stories 
about a coalition of presidential candidates calling itself 
"The Coordination Council of the Presidential Election 
Candidates."  Arsallah told Ambassador Eikenberry on July 22 
that between 20-24 candidates have met to discuss the 
possibility of selecting a single candidate to remain in the 
race; he asserted that other coalition members would drop out 
and rally behind the selected lead for the remaining 
four-weeks of the campaign period.  While candidates claimed 
this was for the good of Afghanistan, Arsallah said for some 
the purpose was financial gain, noting the group was now 
negotiating with Abdullah on that basis.  Each candidate 
outlined the same basic  "coalition" concept, but the 
numerous incongruent messages suggest there is little 
cohesion or future.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Coming Together for Afghanistan? 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In a July 20 meeting, Aniss, a medical doctor 
without prior political experience, offered his perspective 
on the coalition of candidates and their intentions; an issue 
he first mentioned at a July 15 lunch with the Ambassador 
(reftel).  Aniss said that no one candidate could win the 
election on their own - even Karzai - and said early 
recognition of this limitation is a strength.  For that 
reason, and because Aniss saw a second round of polling as 
divisive for Afghanistan and "a waste of money," he had 
initiated meetings with other candidates with similar 
platforms.  He asserted only four other candidates came to 
the first meeting, but by the most recent seventh meeting 25 
were in attendance. 
 
3.  (SBU) Aniss explained that the candidates would work 
together to develop a criteria for a president and choose who 
amongst themselves is the best match.  Once agreed on, all 
but the chosen candidate would drop out of the election, 
providing the new campaign their active support.  He 
suggested that each of the eliminated candidates would travel 
to a province and act as a surrogate, garnering support for 
the group cause and putting coalition candidate among the top 
three, alongside Karzai and Ashraf Ghani.  Arsallah, however, 
believed he should be anointed because, as he told Ambassador 
Eikenberry on July 22, he had the "highest" chance among the 
presidential candidates in the coalition. 
 
4.  (SBU) Aniss said that he had invited Karzai to 
participate in the coalition on three separate occasions but 
had not received a response.  He noted that Karzai would not 
automatically be the chosen candidate, but commented that 
many candidates were not well known and were running low on 
funds.  Arsallah claimed to be an old friend of Karzai, 
noting that Karzai had sent his people to negotiate for his 
support.  He said Afghanistan needed change, and regretted 
that Karzai was no longer a solution because he aligned 
himself with former warlords that were "incompetent, corrupt, 
and cruel." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Or To Increase Personal Standing? 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) On July 21, Bizhan, a long-time opposition party 
activist well-known as a critic of the United States and the 
media spokesman for the coalition, portrayed a different 
perspective to us.  He said candidates knew the elections 
would not be free, fair or transparent so they had come 
together - with Bizhan as the organizer - with the intent of 
nominating a single candidate from amongst themselves and to 
dissuade fraud.  He described three types of candidates 
registered in the election: A) those known to the public - 
such as Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Sayed 
Jalal, Mirwais Yaseni and Hedayat Amin Arsala - but tainted 
by their connection to government and therefore corruption; 
B) those with little local power, funding or strategy, but 
wishing to force attention to themselves; and C) Bizhan - in 
a category by himself.  However, Bizhan separately claimed to 
the media that two of the candidates he decried - Arsala and 
Abdullah - were part of the coalition.  The one candidate 
Bizhan was firm that the coalition would never support was 
Karzai. 
 
6.  (SBU) Bizhan asserted that he was the only candidate that 
had a strategy, support from many groups - although he did 
not identify any - and separation from the problems of the 
Karzai government.  Bizhan claimed his strength came from his 
 
KABUL 00002018  002 OF 002 
 
 
continued opposition to the post-Taliban government and the 
"illegal" presence of international forces in Afghanistan. 
He believed the public perceives Karzai, Abdullah and Ghani 
as liars due to their affiliation with "a corrupt slave 
government."  He posited that due to his credibility thanks 
to long-time opposition, if he were to decide to support the 
United States and the presence of international forces, the 
people would listen.  Contradicting statements he has made to 
the media that the coalition will have to decide on a lead, 
Bizhan repeatedly asserted that he was the "only possible 
candidate" the group could align behind. 
 
------------------------------- 
Or For the Money or Publicity? 
------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) A former Jalal and current Abdullah campaign worker 
provided an alternative reason for the coalition; alleging 
that the group had come together to negotiate with better 
known candidates as a block.  The campaigner said a member 
had approached both Jalal and Abdullah offering group support 
for cash payoffs of the members who drop out of the race.  He 
claimed the individuals had demanded up to USD 100,000 for 
some candidates to drop out, while others had small 
price-tags; he reported both Jalal and Abdullah had refused 
the offer. 
 
8.  (SBU) Arsallah said his campaign was running out of money 
because he did not have Karzai's government funds, Abdullah's 
foreign "donations", nor the mafia support given to other 
candidates.  (COMMENT: We have heard this statement in one 
form or another from all the candidates except Abdullah and 
Karzai, including Yaseni.  End Comment).  He estimated Karzai 
spent between 85-90 million USD in the last two weeks.  Local 
media reports on the coalition have not been favorable; one 
typical remark from a Tajik MP called the coalition 
"hopeless" and publicity-seeking.  The disparate views 
highlight the lack of coordination, messaging and support 
among candidates - even those that claim to be working 
together. 
EIKENBERRY