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Viewing cable 09KABUL1925, POLLING CENTER CLOSURES AND RELOCATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1925 2009-07-20 08:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1368
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1925 2010852
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 200852Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0243
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KABUL 001925 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: POLLING CENTER CLOSURES AND RELOCATIONS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  DSRSG Peter Galbraith's July 18 extraordinary 
meeting that included Minister Of Defense Wardak, Deputy Minister Of 
Interior Sadiqi, IEC Chief Electoral Officer Dr. Najafi, IEC Chief 
Operations officer Hashem, ISAF Chief of Stability and Operations 
Admiral Borsboom, the UK Charge, the Canadian Ambassador, the EU 
Ambassador and Ambassador Carney was called to resolve the critical 
issue of determining which of the Independent Election Commission's 
(IEC) 6966 polling centers will open on August 20.  The Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) play a crucial role 
in determining an answer to this question - which has the potential 
to impact public perception of Pashtu enfranchisement and the 
success of the election.  MOI and MOD have the responsibility of 
surveying the viability of all polling center locations, but they 
have not completed the surveys of all these sites. The IEC is still 
waiting for a final list of which polling centers will open and 
which will be relocated.  The IEC is particularly concerned about 
1200 polling centers in troubled areas.  Galbraith's unrealized goal 
for the meeting was to resolve which of these 1200 polling centers 
in question should be relocated or cease to exist, and to carefully 
manage that decision.  End Summary. 
2. (SBU) Galbraith opened with a stern warning that of the 6966 IEC 
designated polling centers, 1200 are located in Taliban-occupied 
districts or insecure districts where ANSF cannot provide security, 
reducing the possibility of the centers opening on polling day. He 
explained that having over 1000 "ghost polling centers" that exist 
only on paper would seriously undermine the election process, the 
international community, and the UN's role in the election.  It is 
critical to resolve which of the 1200 polling centers will truly not 
open and those that should be relocated.  Unless the IEC carefully 
manages expectations and operates with full transparency, the public 
could perceive that the election failed due to the unopened polling 
centers.  The ghost centers could also lead to public confusion and 
greater opportunities for fraud.  The IEC's highly synchronized 
logistics plan is scheduled to begin shipment of election materials 
from Kabul on July 21. Thus an accurately surveyed final polling 
center list must be produced soonest. 
3. (SBU) Wardak replied that MOD and MOI are already addressing the 
problem and on July 16 had begun surveying all polling centers.  He 
asserted that 1550 polling centers have been surveyed and the MOD 
and MOI will finish their assessment of the remaining 4959 within a 
few days.  He added "in a few days we will have a clear picture and 
should be able to tell you which polling sites will open and how 
many will have to be relocated."  He also noted that Minister of 
Interior Atmar plans to use local community security through the 
tribal system to help secure questionable polling sites, as was done 
in the last elections.  Wardak recognized the negative impact the 
lack of an accurate polling center list has on logistical 
arrangements, but did not see it as a doomsday situation and asked 
the group to allow ANSF time to complete the surveys.  COMMENT: The 
IEC gave MOD and MOI a complete list of polling sites that required 
surveying on April 15. END COMMENT. 
4. (SBU) The IEC reiterated that their logistics plan begins July 
21.  To maintain the integrity of the process, all election 
materials must be carefully packed and labeled with precise 
destinations before they are shipped from the IEC's Kabul 
headquarters.   The IEC stressed that they have no flexibility and 
are already behind schedule making further delays problematic. The 
IEC noted that to the most insecure areas take the longest to 
transport and the IEC needs to send those shipments first - not last 
after those to more secure areas have already gone out.  The IEC 
need ANSF to complete the security surveys and/or decisions on 
tribal security solutions within the next few days.  COMMENT:  With 
such a track record of ANSF delay IEC is not giving an inch of 
flexibility, but, in fact can cope with some extra days delay. END 
COMMENT. 
5. (SBU) DRSG Galbraith reiterated that time is too short to have a 
vague solution.  He stressed that the IEC needs an exact list of 
polling sites that will open on July 21 and answers as to what will 
happen to the rest.  Ambassador Carney pointed out the urgent need 
to publically manage this information.  COMMENT: the IEC, aware that 
they need to be out in front of managing this crisis, have already 
begun to use Tolo TV to release information to the public that a 
portion of the polling centers in troubled areas will not open. END 
COMMENT.  Galbraith noted that the 1200, or 15% to 20% of the total, 
polling centers are located in sparsely populated areas and would 
not proportionally impact the population's ability to vote.  If 
managed correctly Afghans and internationals will be aware and would 
understand that the reality is the result of a worsened security 
situation.  Wardak agreed to do everything possible to finalize the 
surveys but would not commit to a date.  He thanked the 
international community for its support of the election.  Galbraith 
said that the meeting had been a "full and frank" exchange of ideas 
on a difficult and crucial subject.  He asked for the group to 
reconvene on July 23 to determine ANSF's progress on completing a 
final list of polling centers. 
EIKENBERRY