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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001899 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: MINOR CANDIDATES ADD COLOR AND CONFUSION TO THE 
AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
REF: KABUL 1682 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY: By nearly all informal observations, 
President Karzai holds a sizable lead over his closest 
competitors in the lead up to the Aug. 20 election.  If 
Karzai is unable to secure 50 percent of the vote in the 
first round, it will likely be due to the high number of 
candidates splitting the vote ) currently 41 ) and not 
because of the strength of any one opposition candidate.  But 
despite this potential as a group to affect at least the 
first round of the election, and notwithstanding the argument 
that a variety of candidates might indicate the growing 
vibrancy of Afghan democracy, few candidates represent 
credible choices or have attracted support from any 
influential political leader or segment of civil society 
outside their own organizations.  Afghans suspect most 
candidates had ulterior motives for registering such as a 
Karzai government post, and view them as a distraction to the 
larger campaign.  Many believe most candidates will 
ultimately drop out of the race before election day, though 
it is unclear how many and where their support may go.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Separating the Major and Minor Candidates 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.    (SBU)  We expect President Karzai, former Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Abdullah, former Finance Minister Ashraf 
Ghani, and Lower House Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni to win 
measurable support in first-round balloting.  These four 
candidates have the best chance to win double-digit support 
and compete with each other for a place in a possible second 
round runoff should no candidate win 50 percent of the vote 
in the first round.  They are also among the only candidates 
to have significant campaign infrastructure ) regional 
offices, staff, and support from other Afghan politicians 
(though Ghani lags in the latter category). 
 
-------------- 
Who Are They? 
-------------- 
 
¶3.    (SBU)  Beyond these four candidates, a handful of the 
37 others may attract limited or localized support.  Lower 
House MP Ramazan Bashardost (Kabul, Hazara) was one of the 
highest vote getters in the 2005 parliamentary election and 
enjoys a certain degree of popular appeal among Kabul's 
working poor, though his erratic behavior in Parliament 
limits his broad-based credibility.  Former Karzai advisor 
Hedayat Amin Arsala and former communist party apparatchik 
Habib Mangal enjoy moderate name recognition and are familiar 
with national policy debates, while Persian Gulf-based 
businessman Sayed Jalal Karim has invested heavily in 
campaign advertising.  Lower House MPs Mullah Salaam Raketi 
(Zabul, Pashtun) and Abdul Qader Imami Ghori (Ghor, Tajik) 
have existing constituencies that may carry over into support 
for their presidential campaigns, though are unlikely to 
attract support elsewhere. 
 
¶4.    (SBU)  With her promise to revive the policies of 
1970's era former president Daoud Khan, Lower House MP Shahla 
Atta is one of the few candidates to present voters with a 
concise campaign theme.  Some segments of Afghan society 
recall Khan's government fondly, but it is questionable 
whether Atta ) who won with a tiny percentage of the vote ) 
can translate her vague promise to emulate Khan into votes. 
Neither Atta nor a second female candidate, Ferozan Fana, has 
received support from women's groups or other female 
politicians for their campaigns. 
 
¶5.    (SBU)  The remaining 30 candidates range from former 
government officials (1990s-era Minister of Defense Shanawaz 
Tanai and former Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet) to 
expatriate candidates who have spent much of the last 30 
years outside of Afghanistan (Besmullah Sher and Mohammed 
Sarwar Ahmadzai).  Few of these individuals have opened 
multiple campaign offices, recruited staff, or held more than 
a few campaign rallies although many claim they are holding 
back because "people forget you" if it's more than a month 
before the election.  Some have invested in posters and 
advertised heavily in Kabul, but few Afghans are familiar 
with their biographies or platforms if they exist.  Most 
relish the attention they receive as presidential candidates, 
eagerly participating in television and radio debates, but 
few offer concrete details regarding policy positions. Many 
Afghans view these candidates as distractions from a more 
serious campaign.  In a June press conference, Independent 
Election Commission (IEC) Chairman Ludin criticized the 
"illegitimate" candidacies of several unnamed candidates ) a 
remark viewed by most Afghans as inappropriate not because of 
 
KABUL 00001899  002 OF 003 
 
 
any inaccuracy, but because of the chairman's sensitive 
position as an impartial arbiter in the elections. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Afghans Suspicious of Candidate Motivations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.    (SBU)  Afghans suspect some of the candidates 
registered for the election in order to win government 
offices in Karzai's next administration, or, conversely, to 
pursue personal vendettas against Karzai.  In fact, many 
Afghans also believe several candidates are on the verge of 
ending their bids and will endorse one of the major 
candidates in exchange for political favors.  Press reports 
on July 17, confirmed by the Embassy, indicate that a group 
of 23 candidates have met to discuss forming a "council" and 
electing one of themselves to continue the race.  Defense 
Minister Wardak announced in an early-July security briefing 
with foreign diplomats that he believed 30 candidates would 
drop out of the race "this week," which did not occur.  Most 
serious political observers doubt the number will be that 
high or that the announcements will be so closely timed, but 
most do expect there to be fewer than 41 candidates actively 
campaigning by election day. 
 
¶7.    (SBU)  There have been some candidates who have already 
shown a willingness to end their campaigns.  According to 
media reports, candidate Nasrullah Barialai Arsalee appeared 
in mid-June at a pro-Karzai campaign rally in Nangarhar. 
Arsalee, a relative of several prominent Karzai supporters, 
including Karzai's campaign manager, seemed to be the 
archetypical non-serious candidate running for ulterior 
motives even before the appearance at the Karzai rally. 
However, IEC contacts report that Arsalee later sent the IEC 
a letter denying the media reports and insisting he was still 
an active candidate.  Separately, Republican Party Chairman 
Sebghatullah Sanjar, a key Karzai campaign advisor, told 
PolOff that candidate Mullah Ghulam Mohammed Rigi had run out 
of money while campaigning in Herat and sent out word to the 
major campaigns that he would endorse any candidate who would 
pay for him to get back to Kabul.  In addition to Arsalee and 
Rigi, the candidates most frequently accused of being secret 
Karzai supporters or imminently ready to end their campaigns 
include Mohammed Hakim Torsan, Basir Ahmad Behzan, and Alhaj 
Abdul Ghafor Zori. 
 
¶8.  (U) In discussions with Embassy offs, minor candidates 
often complain about lack of access to the media and the 
inaccessible cost of travel and its impact on their campaign. 
 However, in the same conversations, the candidates will 
disregard services that exist to address these issues.  The 
Electoral Media Commission (EMC) has sponsored TV and radio 
roundtables and private media outlets have stepped up to 
schedule additional roundtables without funding from 
candidates or the EMC.  State-run RTA offered all candidates 
a 20-minute interview, which despite RTA,s bias towards 
Karzai, some candidates have taken advantage of and described 
as fair.  Few minor candidates have made use of the ANA air 
transport offered to candidates free of cost.  Post is 
exploring avenues for additional funding of candidate airtime 
and a possible transport mechanism (septel), with the goal of 
addressing and neutralizing possible post-election 
complaints. 
 
-------------------------------- 
A Survey of Some Minor Campaigns 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Dr. Ferozan Fana, widow of an Aviation Minister 
assassinated in 2003, denies media reports that she is 
running in order to pressure Karzai to pay out a pension she 
believes is owed to her family following her husband's 
murder.  She maintains she is the victim of a rumor campaign 
that targets female candidates (many Afghans also eagerly 
gossip that Atta, the other female candidate, poisoned her 
husband to escape an abusive relationship) and "street thugs" 
who only vandalize female candidate posters (in fact, poster 
vandalization appears to affect all candidates fairly 
equally, at least in Kabul).  Fana insists her campaign's 
true motivation is national reconciliation, and claims she 
has met with insurgent leaders who have promised that 250,000 
Taliban soldiers will lay down their arms and rejoin the 
government on the day she becomes president.  Fana reports 
that she has negotiated with the Japanese government to 
provide "jobs and dome houses" for returning Taliban as an 
enticement to quit the insurgency. 
 
¶10.   (SBU)  Candidate Haji Rahim Jan Shirzad helped run 
Karzai's 2004 campaign in Pakistani refugee camps, but now 
claims he will "defeat Karzai in a landslide, if the vote is 
fair" ) a presumptuous boast for someone with almost zero 
 
KABUL 00001899  003 OF 003 
 
 
name recognition in polls and no significant campaign 
finances.  Some Afghan political observers believe Shirzad is 
disappointed that his work on Karzai's earlier campaign did 
not lead to a government job, and has entered the race to 
attract an offer from Karzai.  But Shirzad insists he is a 
major political player ) to prove this, he once called on 
PolOff carrying two trash bags full of documents dating back 
to the 1980s he claimed were thousands of registration 
applications for the political party he founded in a 
Pakistani refugee camp during the Soviet occupation. 
 
¶11.   (SBU)  Abdul Jabar Sabet has been running for the 
presidency since mid-2008 when he left his position as 
Attorney General after a scuffle with Karzai over corruption 
charges. Despite his former high-ranking position, Sabet 
struggles to maintain credibility as a candidate, thanks in 
part to an infamous video posted to YouTube that appears to 
show him drunkenly dancing at a Kabul wedding party.  As the 
official campaign season began, Sabet told PolOff he was 
dedicating his campaign to raising awareness of corruption in 
the Karzai administration.  PolOff observed that many Afghan 
voters were eager to hear candidates propose solutions to 
address the country's problems and were not only interested 
in reviewing the current government's mistakes.  Sabet 
promised to hand over a platform "soon," but later only 
followed up with another request for a meeting so that he 
could describe "the other catastrophes Karzai has caused our 
country."  Sabet concluded the request with a plea to exclude 
other Afghans from any subsequent meetings with the Embassy 
so that he could "be completely honest" in his remarks. 
 
¶12.   (SBU)  Dr. Mohammed Nasir Aniss, like many candidates, 
insists he is running only because of the urging of his 
"thousands of supporters."  Aniss, 41, belongs to an 
un-registered organization of like-minded individuals who 
want to see greater attention focused on Afghanistan's youth. 
 Aniss claims his organization refuses to register with the 
government or even give itself a name because "Afghans 
distrust organized political parties and other groups."  In a 
June conversation with PolOff, Aniss contradicted himself 
regarding whether he saw his candidacy as the beginning, or 
end, of his political career.  At one point, Aniss vowed to 
start campaigning for the 2014 election the day after this 
year's election, should he lose, though at other times said 
he was eager to return to his medical work as soon as 
possible. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
As a Group, Minor Campaigns Could Impact Election 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶13.   (SBU)  According to various polls and election models, 
Karzai holds a significant lead over his nearest competitors. 
 As of mid-July, it seems unlikely that absent a 
consolidation of the major opposition campaigns, any 
candidate will come near Karzai's expected vote total. 
However, if all or most of the 41 candidates remain in the 
race (with election materials already being printed, all 41 
should be on the ballot), Karzai may still not reach the 
simple majority required to win an outright victory.  Even if 
the 30-plus minor candidates capture an average of just 0.5 
percent each, that combined total of 15 percent could prevent 
Karzai from securing 50 percent even if his closest 
competitor finishes as much as 25 points behind him. 
 
¶14.   (SBU)  Minor campaigns for the most part do not 
represent significant and coherent political groupings, due 
to Afghanistan's fractured history and mistrust of political 
parties dating back to the Soviet era.  Those campaigns' 
bases typically include small-scale tribal groupings or very 
limited networks that have not articulated messages that 
resonate with the public.  The second-tier candidates have 
distracted from a more serious debate over the future of 
Afghanistan by drawing media focus away from substantive 
issues and toward the dozens of sometimes eccentric 
personalities running for the office.  Halfway through this 
presidential campaign, we are increasingly sympathetic to 
those Afghans who have proposed changes in the electoral law 
that would raise the bar for candidate registration.  More 
stringent requirements, in terms of signatures and 
registration fees, would result in fewer obscure campaigns 
and give more serious candidates space to articulate their 
platforms to voters. 
EIKENBERRY