VZCZCXRO7055
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1871/01 1951648
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141648Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0156
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001871 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A 
STATE PASS USAID FOR SCAA/ASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: NIMROZ GOVERNOR SEEKS PRT AND A VISIT BY AMBASSADOR 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: During a courtesy call, Governor Ghulam 
Dastagir Azad and Ambassador Eikenberry discussed possible 
political implications and logistical requirements of a 
possible visit to Nimroz and the Governor's desire for a PRT 
in order to bring more reconstruction assistance.  Later that 
week, PRT Counselor, ISAF POLAD, and ISAF Stabilization Rear 
Admiral Borsbum met with IDLG Deputy Barna Karimi and 
Governor Azad to discuss the Governor's interest in a 
possible PRT and the security and political implications of 
the recent move of Delaram district from Farah back to 
Nimroz.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) When queried on Iranian President Ahmadinejad's 
possible reaction to a visit by the Ambassador to Nimroz, 
Azad replied that Afghanistan is a sovereign country and that 
he would be a good host.  The Ambassador agreed, and affirmed 
the Secretary of Defense's commitment to be supportive of an 
eventual PRT in Nimroz,  probably one led by a non-U.S. 
ISAF/NATO partner.  The Ambassador underscored that, while a 
non-U.S. led PRT might more pragmatic given the 223 km 
Iranian border with Nimroz, we consider Afghanistan a 
sovereign country and as such we base our actions on 
Afghanistan's preferences, not those of its neighbors. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Azad offered an overview of Nimroz, but prefaced it 
by saying that the Iranian people oppose Ahmadinejad and that 
any accusations of intervention by the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom is simply an attempt by his government to survive and 
place culpability on the West.  Azad said only 100 km of the 
212 km border with Pakistan is secured by Afghan Border 
Police (ABP).  There is no ABP presence on the remaining 
length of the Pakistan border and the entire length of the 
Iranian border.  Azad said that bad security in neighboring 
Helmand and Farah provinces affect Nimroz. 
 
¶4. (U) The Governor enumerated four major problems in his 
province:  Taliban, al-Qaida, narcotics traffickers from 
Helmand transiting through Nimroz, and the presence of 
Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers.  He said the 
people of Nimroz people support the government, which 
improves security.  The only exception, he said, is Khasharod 
district, which is a safehaven for insurgents who are not 
welcomed in other districts of the province.  According to 
Azad, the Khasharod people are mainly from the Noorzai tribe, 
which has traditionally been supportive of the Taliban. 
Khasharod is also the only poppy-producing district.  Nimroz 
is 99 percent Sunni and one percent Shia, which is comprised 
mostly of Hazara refugees returning from Iran.  Azad also 
described a long history of fighting against Arabs going back 
more than 1200 years. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Azad lamented that only Nimroz and Dai Kundi (in 
central Afghanistan) are not supported by PRTs. 
Additionally, although there are some non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Nimroz, Azad said there is little 
reconstruction being done in Nimroz, and even Iran had turned 
its focus to Herat after building some roads and electrical 
generators and a customs building in Nimroz four years ago. 
Azad added that Iran no longer helps Nimroz, but rather 
interferes by sending books with propaganda.  When pressed, 
Azad admitted that he had not talked to any other country 
about opening a PRT in Nimroz.  He noted that it appears to 
Afghans that the worse the security, the more assistance a 
province receives, citing Helmand, which is receiving 
millions of dollars.  He said the people of Nimroz see this 
on television or hear it on the radio and wonder what they 
did wrong.  The Ambassador acknowledged this was a problem. 
 
¶6. (U) Azad offered possible points of economic potential in 
Nimroz.  First, he said the Kamalhan Dam should be completed, 
only 47 percent was completed during the Soviet occupation. 
He also described the province as agriculturally rich, but 
hampered by a lack of water and developed irrigation systems. 
 He said many people complain that the United States and the 
International Community are ignoring Nimroz, and they believe 
that conditions will improve when a PRT brings assistance and 
reconstruction money for the province.  The big difference 
between Nimroz and other provinces, according to Azad, is a 
high level of education.  Without offering concrete data, he 
said that there are schools for girls and boys alike, and 
that women sometimes drive.  He characterized the people of 
the province as supportive of democracy and stability.  For 
this reason, he said, the province is perfect for 
reconstruction and development. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ambassador promised to consider a trip to 
Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz, after the elections.  Azad 
enumerated several possible ways to there.  The landing strip 
 
KABUL 00001871  002 OF 002 
 
 
there can support both fixed wing and rotary craft, and is 
only about 10 minutes from the Governor's compound.  The 
Afghan commercial airline Pamir flies to Zaranj from Kabul 
twice per week.  The road from Deleram - newly paved by the 
Indians - requires a two hour drive, while the ride 190 km 
ride from Farah city to Zaranj is about five hours by car on 
the unpaved road. The Ambassador suggested that we might look 
for opportunities for historical restoration projects in the 
province using the Ambassador's Fund. 
 
¶8. (SBU) During a meeting later the same week between 
Governor Azad, Deputy IDLG Director Barna Karimi, PRT 
Counselor, ISAF Stabilization Chief Rear Admiral Borsboom, 
and ISAF POLAD, the Governor requested a PRT.  He said that 
if the close proximity of Zaranj to Iran proved too 
political, he would recommend placing a PRT in Khasharod, 
pointing out it has existing infrastructure, electricity, and 
is only an hour from the capital on the paved road.  Azad 
expressed his expectation that security in Khasharod and 
Delaram would improve with a PRT, as would reconstruction 
funding.  Azad said development and reconstruction assistance 
for the province would be needed for housing, employment, 
education and health for refugees flowing in from Iran.  He 
also reiterated that completion of the Kamalhan Dam and 
development of canals would be a priority for Nimroz 
citizens.  Borsboom emphasized that the first step into 
Nimroz for the coalition will be the biggest step, and 
suggested that a minimum amount of security - either ANA or 
ISAF - would be required before a PRT could be created.  Azad 
noted that in a meeting earlier that week, Minister of 
Defense Wardak had promised an ANA kandak for Nimroz (there 
is no ANA presence in the province currently), but had not 
given a timeline.  Borsboom suggested that the creation of a 
PRT should be connected to MOD plans for the first kandak, 
and that aligning the entities would build mass and momentum 
for the first step into Nimroz. 
 
¶9. (SBU) RADM Borsboom told Azad that the RC-South Commander 
would like to meet to discuss elections and development 
issues that arose as a result of the June transfer of Delaram 
district from Farah Province (in RC-West) to Nimroz.  Azad 
responded that since Delaram had been part of Nimroz during 
the last election, those who voted previously hold 
registration cards saying "Nimroz," and the IEC has made 
arrangements for new registrants to vote for the presidential 
and provincial council candidates in Nimroz.  He expressed 
confidence that no new registrants would be disenfranchised 
by their registration in Farah.  Azad reported that 
campaigning in the province has started, and that there are 
31 candidates (including five women) competing for nine 
provincial council seats. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The POLAD noted that a meeting between Azad and the 
RC-South Commander could help bring Nimroz into the broader 
stability strategy for Afghanistan as a whole.  Borsboom 
acknowledged that the administrative transfer of Delaram from 
Farah complicates planned Commander's Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) projects, and stressed that creativity would 
be necessary.  Barna Karimi agreed to coordinate first steps 
in Kabul. 
 
¶11. (U) Biographical note:  Azad reported that he graduated 
from the medical faculty in Nimroz University in 1987 (1356) 
and became a refugee only three years later.  He worked for 
many years as a doctor for UNHCR.  He has been the Governor 
of Nimroz for five years. 
EIKENBERRY