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Viewing cable 09KABUL1778, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK FUNDING POLICE OFF THE BOOKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1778 2009-07-08 08:49 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2430
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1778/01 1890849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080849Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0029
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001778 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, S/CRS, INL/AP 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR FLOURNOY 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT 
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MASS AF
SUBJECT:  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK FUNDING POLICE OFF THE BOOKS 
 
REF:  Kabul 1643 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The International Police Coordination Board 
(IPCB) has learned that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) struck a 
deal with the MOI and Ministry of Finance (MOF) to privately fund an 
increase in the ANP in Faryab Province to coincide with Ring Road 
construction projects it is financing there.  The ADB will 
contribute $2.5 million for 500 new recruits who will be given two 
weeks of training by the ANP, with MOF providing an additional $1.5 
million.  None of the safeguards put in place by the International 
Community to professionalize the ANP (biometrics, ID cards, vetting, 
drug testing) will apply to this new group, which also does not fall 
under the Tashkil for MOI.  UNAMA offered to protest this move on 
behalf of the IPCB and IC and will approach Minister Atmar.  Since 
the IC has provided generous support to the MOI/ANP through the Law 
and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and the IPCB, the IC is 
frustrated that the MOI and MOF failed to be open and transparent on 
this private initiative.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) We have learned that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
recently (some time after April) reached an agreement with unknown 
parties in the MOI and/or ANP to fund the recruitment, training and 
employment of 500 new "ANP" for Ghormach District in Faryab 
Province.  The ANP Tashkil for Faryab is 1,289 and the HR rolls show 
more than 1,300 on duty already, so this force is clearly 
off-Tashkil and not therefore authorized by the central GIRoA 
budget. 
 
3. (U) Various reports from U.S. and international sources indicate 
the ADB is paying $2.5 million, routed through the Ministry of 
Finance, for what will essentially be a private security force 
sanctioned by the GIRoA as the ADB begins implementing construction 
projects in Ghormach.  The MOF is adding an additional $1.5 million 
to meet the $4 million financial requirement.  The recruits (some of 
whom have been referred to as former mujahedeen) were scheduled to 
receive a two-week training course from existing ANP forces and will 
be on duty for one year.  The latest development is that the German 
Police Project Team based out of RC-North has offered to provide 
more extensive training, not knowing the politics of the situation. 
 
4. (SBU) This partnership between the ADB and MOI was never vetted 
by or shared with the International Community, which funds all ANP 
remuneration through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 
(LOTFA).  The issue first came to our attention in an International 
Police Coordination Board (IPCB) meeting on June 17.  UNAMA offered 
to take the lead in raising this issue with Minister Atmar, and will 
report back to the IPCB.  The IC is united in thinking that we have 
fought too long and too hard to rid Afghanistan of its many 
unofficial security forces to now look the other way.  The Norwegian 
representative to the IPCB said that the Norwegians weren't aware of 
the ADB/ANP agreement, even though they lead the PRT in Faryab. 
IPCB members are frustrated with the lack of transparency on the 
part of MOI, especially after developing such a cooperative 
relationship with Minister Atmar during his nine-month tenure. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment.  Prior to learning of this ADB/MOI partnership, 
members of the IPCB and donors to LOTFA had full confidence in the 
level of trust that had developed between Minister Atmar and the IC. 
 As recently as the June 14 LOTFA Steering Committee meeting 
(reftel), the IC had banded together to raise a total of almost $42 
million to fund ANP growth in vulnerable provinces prior to the 
elections to support him.  The news of the ADB/MOI arrangement has 
undermined that confidence in Kabul. 
 
6. (SBU) The issue is complex because at the operational level there 
are elements of the IC that are trying to be of assistance in 
Ghormach.  We understand that U.S. military mentors in Faryab and 
German mentors in Balkh may be assisting the new recruits, and may 
have no idea of the broader policy issues that consume their 
embassies and military leaders in Kabul.  Ghormach is currently the 
only UNAMA-designated Integrated Approach district that is even 
partially working in terms of that flagship program. 
 
7. (SBU) International partners, especially CSTC-A, have spent 
countless man-hours mentoring MOI and helping develop the last few 
Tashkils, and cleaning up a human resources management system that 
was out of control and corrupt.  They created the Electronic Payroll 
System and Electronic Funds Transfer to professionalize the police 
force and prevent diversion of pay.  All ANP now get proper ID cards 
with biometrics, they are vetted to ensure only the right candidates 
are sent off to training, and they are drug tested.  The Minister 
appears to have undermined these efforts and returned to the bad old 
days when quasi-official security forces roamed the countryside with 
little control exercised by the central government, little training, 
and every possibility they will morph into a private militia under 
 
KABUL 00001778  002 OF 002 
 
 
the control of a local warlord.  End comment. 
 
EIKENBERRY