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Viewing cable 09KABUL1731, Security Key in Ghazni Election Planning

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1731 2009-07-02 11:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4884
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1731/01 1831116
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021116Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9915
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001731 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT:  Security Key in Ghazni Election Planning 
 
1. (SBU) Begin Summary.  Overt candidate campaigning is occurring in 
Ghazni, but is relatively muted due to the prevailing security 
situation.  Ghazni City - the largest population center and the 
provincial capital - is the most active area.  In the countryside, 
residents appear to want to vote, but those in the Pashtun districts 
seem daunted by insecurity and enemy threats.  Hazaran residents say 
the elections will be rigged and their votes will not count. 
Activity to date among the major election stakeholders is mixed; the 
local Independent Election Commission (IEC) office is active, but 
the Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) chiefs are involved to 
varying degrees.  Voter turnout in the Pashtun districts is expected 
to be low unless security improves, whereas Hazarans will vote in 
force due to better security in their districts.  A number of 
sources believe Karzai's camp will conduct the most fraud. 
Meanwhile, enemy forces appear to be threatening Ghazni's residents 
not to vote.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CAMPAIGNING OCCURING IN GHAZNI CITY 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Campaigning has begun in Ghazni City but is muted, with a 
few posters of President Karzai posted in roundabouts and on walls 
along city street.  About 1,000 people rallied in support of 
President Karzai in late June.  The peaceful rally, organized by 
Hajji Faisil - a key advisor to Governor Usmani, the head of 
Ghazni's reconciliation program, and the District administrator for 
Deh Yak district - was reportedly attended by Pashtuns, Tajiks and 
Hazarans. 
 
3. (SBU) Former Kandahar and Ghazni Governor Assadullah Khalid, is 
said to be campaigning for President Karzai in Ghazni and the three 
neighboring provinces of Paktiya, Paktika and Khowst.  One PC member 
told PRT State Rep that Khalid will "spend lots of money" in those 
provinces.  Khalid made a surprise visit to Ghazni in early May, 
before Governor Usmani was summoned to Kabul for a May 17 hearing. 
Multiple sources indicate that the major Hazaran parties, Hezb-e 
Wahdat and Harakat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan, have opened offices in 
Ghazni City.  Other parties that have opened campaign offices in 
Ghazni City include Jamiat-e Islami, Hezb-e Mardum-e Musilman 
Afghanistan, and Hezb-e Eqtedar-e Mili.  There are reportedly three 
political campaign offices that are reaching out to Ghazni's youth: 
one is run by a young activist, Jamay, who is frequently seen with 
Governor Usmani; one by Barad Khan, and the third by Faisil Karim 
Panawal, a self-described security advisor to the Governor. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MIXED REACTIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Public attitudes towards the elections vary, particularly 
depending on where one resides in Ghazni province.  Among the 
Hazaran residents of Malistan and Jaghori districts, presidential 
candidate Ramazan Bashardost is very popular.  Ghazni's PC member 
from Jaghori said that there is "hot competition" between him and 
President Karzai there.  Despite Bashardost's popularity, most 
Jaghori residents expect Karzai will win, either because people will 
buy votes for him, or because prominent Hazarans will declare their 
support for him (and thus encourage the people to vote for Karzai). 
These prominent Hazarans include former Hazaran warlord Mohaqqeq, 
current Second Vice President Karim Khalili and Dr. Mudabir.  One 
Hazaran PC member told PRT State Rep she believes President Karzai's 
men will bribe local election officials to stuff ballot boxes for 
Karzai.  Regardless of whether they believe the elections will be 
rigged, most Hazarans indicate they intend to vote, and have little 
concern about security at the polling centers in their districts. 
 
5. (SBU) In contrast, interviews conducted by PRT representatives in 
the Pashtun districts suggest that while Pashtuns also want to vote, 
they are less certain that they will, especially if the security 
situation does not improve before August 20.  PRT and Task Force 
White Eagle personnel have heard from local contacts that Taliban 
are warning residents of these districts that they will be killed if 
they vote.  According to one anecdote, registered voters were forced 
to eat their voter registration cards.  Other sources claim that 
Taliban have taken people's voter registration cards from them, so 
that they cannot vote.  The consensus view is that the security in 
Ghazni's Pashtun districts is far worse than in the Hazaran 
districts, as enemy forces have infiltrated these districts and 
operate among the public with impunity.  Virtually everyone with 
views on the elections believes that actual voter turnout in the 
Pashtun districts will be low unless security improves. 
 
----------------------------------- 
LOCAL IEC OFFICE ENGAGED AND ACTIVE 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
KABUL 00001731  002 OF 002 
 
 
6. (SBU) Ghazni's local IEC office staff and Provincial Election 
Officer (PEO), Abdul Boree Rahimi, are professional, engaged, and 
have been making the necessary preparations for the elections. 
Civic educators are already operating in most of Ghazni's 19 
districts, with the exception of Nawa, the southernmost district 
which is controlled by enemy forces.  On June 16, PEO Rahimi 
reported that District Field Coordinators were being trained and 
would deploy to the districts within 10 days.  A tour of the IEC's 
rented office space on the outskirts of Ghazni City revealed an 
office buzzing with activity.  The logistics officer had movement 
plans on his wall reflecting UNDP ELECT's latest plan to get 
election materials out to the districts.  Staff worked behind desks 
in various rooms outfitted with furniture and computers supplied by 
the PRT.  The communications officer showed the PRT his radios, and 
requested assistance in loading the frequencies into them.  Rahimi 
is young, but clearly in charge of the local IEC office, and 
protective of its independence. 
 
7. (SBU) Since his arrival in Ghazni in early May, Rahimi has been 
open to meeting with PRT and Task Force White Eagle representatives, 
either at the base or in his office.  He has also attempted a number 
of times to reach out to Ghazni's security chiefs.  According to 
Rahimi, he has had the most success in this effort with Ghazni's new 
Chief of Police, General Sherzai, and the NDS Chief.  He has had 
less success in engaging with the local ANA kandak commander, and 
asked the Task Force and PRT's assistance in facilitating a meeting 
with him. 
 
EIKENBERRY