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Viewing cable 09DUSHANBE865, TAJIKISTAN: LINKS BETWEEN FOOD INSECURITY AND POLITICAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DUSHANBE865 2009-07-20 12:11 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dushanbe
VZCZCXRO1541
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0865/01 2011211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201211Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0549
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0025
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0123
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0185
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0102
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1176
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000865 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, AGRICULTURE FOR FAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM EAGR ECON PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: LINKS BETWEEN FOOD INSECURITY AND POLITICAL 
INSTABILITY 
 
REF: A. A: DUSHANBE 774 
     B. REF  B: DUSHANBE 845 
     C. REF  C: O/I FROM DESK TO DUSHANBE, JULY 14, 2009 
 
DUSHANBE 00000865  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Tajikistan faces serious ongoing food 
insecurity, and the situation may worsen as the year progresses. 
 While the link between poverty and political instability is not 
simple, experts here agree that a decline in the availability of 
food in Tajikistan will contribute to political instability in 
the region.  As families face more problems putting food on the 
table, they will find it more difficult to resist the easy 
profits of the drug trade.  The trade in Afghan poppy is known 
to be the major source of income for Afghan terrorists.  While 
there is no evidence yet to suggest that food insecurity is a 
factor behind recent anti-regime activity in Tajikistan itself, 
some are concerned that new food problems in traditional 
opposition areas may fuel conflict.  End summary. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Food Problems May Go from Bad to Worse 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
2. (U) Tajikistan faces ongoing problems with food security and 
rising prices (reftel).  Some experts are concerned that the 
situation -- already precarious for many Tajiks, 53% of whom 
live under the poverty line, according to the World Bank -- may 
worsen before the year's end.  This spring's heavy rains and 
related natural disasters may result in low fall harvests, 
making it more difficult for families to buy the food they need 
to last them through the coming winter.  At the same time, as a 
result of the ongoing financial crisis, Tajik families are 
receiving lower remittances from relatives working abroad, 
primarily in Russia.  Already money transfers are down over 35% 
compared to last year.  Tajikistan is more dependent on 
remittances than any country in the world; the loss of this 
economic lifeline could be disastrous for individual families 
and the country as a whole.  The loss of jobs in Russia presents 
a double-whammy: families are not only losing a crucial source 
of income, but they have to feed more mouths as newly unemployed 
workers return home. 
 
 
 
3. (U) Prices are rising as well.  Despite deflationary 
pressures, the consumer price index in Tajikistan has risen by 
2.8% since the beginning of the year, including 2.1% on food. 
Food prices are almost 10% higher than at this time last year. 
The price increases have not been distributed evenly across all 
products.  Wheat flour and vegetable oil have decreased in price 
while potatoes and pulses have increased.  The single biggest 
price rise has been in the Rasht Valley -- an opposition 
stronghold during the civil war that has seen a recent uptick in 
violence -- where potatoes are now 190% more costly than they 
were last month. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
Lack of Food May Fuel Drug Trade 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) While the link between poverty and political 
instability is neither simple nor easy to measure, local experts 
here say that a decline in food availability in Tajikistan poses 
a threat to regional security.  A primary pathway is through the 
drug trade, which is known to support terrorist activity in 
Afghanistan.  Tajikistan is the main route for taking Afghan 
poppy north into Russia, and the country seizes more drugs than 
the other Central Asian states combined.  With an average income 
of less than US $70 per month, a single drug shipment represents 
 
DUSHANBE 00000865  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
an almost unimaginable profit for many Tajiks.  The difficulty 
is exacerbated by the fact that Tajikistan's 1,344-km border 
with Afghanistan is rugged and difficult to patrol. 
Furthermore, although U.S. assistance is making progress in 
training border guards, conscripts continue to be underpaid -- 
earning as little as $3 a month -- and undernourished.  Many of 
those on front line border posts spend most of their time 
scavenging for food, leaving relatively little time and energy 
to patrol the border.  For those facing difficulty simply 
putting food on their plates, we frequently hear that 
involvement in the drug trade, even if it is turning a blind eye 
in exchange for a small consideration, can be difficult to 
resist. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
And May Fuel Local Violence as Well 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Although some Tajik migrant workers are remaining in 
Russia in the hopes of finding new work, others are returning 
home.  Last winter we noticed that migrant men made their 
seasonal return without the gifts and savings they have brought 
in the past, leaving their families to face the most difficult 
season without this critical assistance.  The worsening economic 
climate has frayed tempers: a few months ago we witnessed a 
shoving match break out at a food distribution between returning 
migrants and local authorities over how the food was 
distributed. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Many of the areas hardest hit by the drop in 
remittances and rising prices were opposition strongholds during 
the civil war.  For example, the former Food for Peace program 
worked in the Rasht Valley, where according to reports an armed 
group -- including fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan -- is 
currently operating (ref B).  Recent skirmishes in and around 
the town of Tavildara, south of Rasht, have begun making 
international news, causing some to speculate that Tajikistan 
may be entering a period of renewed instability.  In mid-July, 
police officers manning checkpoints along the road through the 
Rasht valley came to the local office of USAID food assistance 
implementer Mercy Corps and asked to be given food in exchange 
for "guarding" their offices.  Mercy Corps declined to take part 
in the nascent protection racket.  (Comment: It is unlikely the 
police officers would have approached an International NGO with 
this request unless they were motivated by actual lack of food. 
It is noteworthy that this comes in mid-summer when food is much 
more available than in winter.  Hungry law officers potentially 
could complicate an already tense situation in the area.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) According to Michael Jones, the UN Resident 
Representative in Tajikistan, who has worked for twenty-five 
years on food aid, the link between food insecurity and 
political instability, while complicated and difficult to 
measure, is nevertheless taken for granted by most experts. 
Indeed, he said, he has worked in numerous countries where 
governments deliberately sought to quell anti-regime activity by 
delivering food assistance to targeted regions.  He said that a 
carefully-crafted food distribution program might achieve the 
same results in Tajikistan.  Such a program he said, should 
require buy-in from beneficiaries, whether cash payments or 
in-kind work contributions, and work toward self-sustainment by 
providing beneficiaries with skills and inputs for future 
income-generating activity.  Tajikistan is lucky in some ways, 
he said, because the abundance of rivers provides a ready source 
of energy and irrigation water for agriculture.  Agricultural 
development is important not only as a source of income, but to 
reverse the current trend in which Tajikistan produces less and 
less of its own food needs. 
 
DUSHANBE 00000865  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: While no strong evidence has yet emerged to 
directly link food insecurity with the spate of anti-regime 
attacks in Tavildara and elsewhere, the government's failure to 
ensure that its citizens are adequately fed could fuel the 
violence, by adding another grievance to longstanding complaints 
about being excluded from power and giving anti-regime forces a 
rallying cry and message for recruitment.  For this reason, 
observers here worry that the growing  poverty in these regions 
may be a factor that heightens the conflict.  Less tenuous is 
the relationship between poverty and involvement in the drug 
trade.  While the key factors there are supply in Afghanistan 
and demand in Russia, the involvement of Tajik middlemen helps 
terrorism and instability in the region. 
 
End comment. 
JACOBSON