VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #1411/01 2031017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221017Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3245
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS CAIRO 001411 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA (IRWIN) AND PM (ARCHETTO) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT:  COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING 
ON MK 54 LIGHTWEIGHT TORPEDO IN VIEW OF FUTURE PROCUREMENT TO 
SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSION 
 
REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST (09-319) 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Description.  In ref (a), the Government of Egypt (GOE) 
submitted a Letter of Request (LOR) for a classified briefing for 
the MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo (LWT).  The primary mission of the MK 
54 LWT is ship and force self defense against submarines.  This 
torpedo would eventually replace the MK 46 Mod 5A Surface Warfare 
(SW) Torpedo in the Egyptian Navy (EN) inventory and potentially 
replace other torpedo systems in EN vessels.  The EN is currently 
also searching for a replacement for the Chinese and British Made 
LWT in the Hainan Class Fast Attack (Anti-Submarine) Craft. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Reason the purchaser desires the articles and services. 
The EN already possesses the US made MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT. 
According to NAVSEA briefings to the EN the MK 46 LWT will be phased 
out of the USN inventory and become increasingly unsupportable in 
the next 15 years.  The EN needs to develop a long range replacement 
for the MK 46 LWT. LWT are primarily a self-defense weapon critical 
to the Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission of the EN. The EN is 
considering LWT from other countries including German and British 
made weapons. 
 
¶3. (SBU) How the articles or services would affect the recipient's 
force structure.  The MK 54 LWT would not significantly change EN 
force structure but provide the EN with a more modern and 
supportable variant of an existing weapon. The MK 54 incorporates 
digital electronics in the seeker head and fire control system but 
retains the same warhead and propulsion as the existing MK46 LWT. 
The MK54 is produced in an export variant. 
 
¶4. (SBU) How the articles or services would contribute to both the 
U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals.  The MK 54 LWT is 
currently being fielded in the USN and will be supported as the only 
LWT in the USN inventory for the foreseeable future. Having a common 
torpedo would potentially increase interoperability and ensure that 
EN systems and maintenance infrastructure were supported in the case 
of a need for shared assets or combined operations. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or 
services requested.  THE EN currently maintains an inventory of one 
hundred fifty-four (154) MK 46 Mod A (SW) LWT.  These torpedoes are 
currently fully supported by the USN.  However, this support will 
decrease over the next 15 years and the current technology will be 
obsolete by the early 2020's.  The classified brief is the first 
step in procuring a follow-on weapon. No other LWT is US made or in 
the USN inventory. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a 
new warfighting capability to the nation or region.  Combatant 
Commander's concurrence will be provided separately. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations. 
We do not anticipate negative reaction from neighboring countries. 
The MK 54 torpedo is a defensive weapon and would not present a 
significant increase in EN Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, 
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles.  The EN has 
a history of being able to account for, safeguard, operate, 
maintain, and support the MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT they currently 
possess.  They employ the MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT from two different 
platforms. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the United 
States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. 
trainers in country.  There would be a limited amount of both 
in-country and U.S. based training for this eventual purchase.  All 
the operators and maintenance personnel would need to travel to the 
United States for initial training.  The training received in the 
United States is only preliminary training and must be followed up 
with in-country training.  No negative reaction from any neighboring 
country with regards to the training would be expected.  Egypt 
currently does extensive training in the United States.  There are 
also several Follow-on Technical Support teams for Ex-USN assets 
already in country. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might 
be required as a result of providing the article.  The impact of 
U.S. presence required by this acquisition in Egypt will be minimal. 
 There is already a heavy American footprint in Egypt supporting the 
US weapon systems Egypt currently possesses.  Permanently assigned 
teams of long- and short-term contractors are in country already. 
The amount of US personnel required in country for the purchase of 
 
 
the MK 54 LWT would be an extremely small portion of the overall 
footprint and go virtually unnoticed. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the 
proposed acquisition.  Egypt plans to use Foreign Military Financing 
to cover all the costs associated with the acquisition, transport, 
supply, infrastructure, and training for the purchase of the MK 54 
LWT.  Egypt will only be able to make the purchase if the amortized 
payment schedule can fit within the FMF budget for Egypt.  Further, 
Egypt will budget to fully cover the Total Package Approach for this 
acquisition and maintain the Total Package Approach for the other 
GoE programs. 
 
 ¶12. (SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed 
acquisition.  None. 
 
¶13. (SBU) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced 
warfighting technology and the SAO's plan for compliance 
verification.  The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt has a 
robust Golden Sentry Program.  The Golden Sentry Program 
representative and Security Assistance Officer (SAO) responsible for 
the program will coordinate for review and maintenance of required 
documentation.  All parties will maintain serial number logs of all 
components within or transferred from the inventory and will conduct 
the mandated inspections as required.  This coordination will ensure 
that historical copies of all EUM inspection results and customer's 
physical security and accountability control plans remain on file. 
The Egyptian military currently has 154 MK 46 Mod A LWT in country. 
Egypt has maintained accountability and security of these weapons 
without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date.  The GOE has 
expressed the willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability 
and security of these new aircraft, and the Office of Military 
Cooperation will conduct End Use Monitoring of all required 
components if this request is approved. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve transfer of 
the article and justification.  The country team endorses the 
Egyptian procurement of MK 54 LWT.  The MK 54 is a robust, modern 
lightweight Torpedo produced in an export version that would enable 
the EN to continue long-term use of a US Anti-Submarine (ASW) 
weapons system and would allow for maintaining situational awareness 
and influence in the EN ASW program.  This eventual purchase would 
also better enable Egypt's ability to engage in coalition operations 
as the number of other US allies, friends and partners who possess 
the MK54 increases.  This provides inherent interoperability which 
benefits both the United States and the Government of Egypt.