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Viewing cable 09CAIRO1352, SUDAN: SLA-MINAWI ADVOCATES FOR CONTINUING U.S. ROLE IN DARFUR REF: A. CAIRO 1306 B. CAIRO 470 C. CAIRO 339 Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs Donald A. Blome for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CAIRO1352 2009-07-14 12:25 2011-02-16 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO6797
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1352/01 1951225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141225Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3189
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1336
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2019 
TAGS: PREL SU CD EG
SUBJECT:SUDAN: SLA-MINAWI ADVOCATES FOR CONTINUING U.S. ROLE IN DARFUR REF: A. CAIRO 1306 B. CAIRO 470 C. CAIRO 339 Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs Donald A. Blome for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(C) Key Points: -- Abdo Hashim Ali, Foreign Affairs Advisor to Sudanese Government and Darfur rebel leader Minni Minawi, praised the "John Kerry Initiative" to bring new NGOs to Darfur and is "satisfied" with the efforts of S/E Gration to obtain a ceasefire in Darfur. He hoped for additional steps, but encouraged the USG to be more inclusive and not engage with the JEM to the exclusion of all other factions. -- Ail believes the efforts of former Sudanese PM Al Sadiq Al Mahdi to unify the Sudanese opposition to the NCP will not succeed because Al Mahdi is "not a problem solver." SLA Minawi hopes to open its office in Egypt by the end of July 2009. -- The Government of Egypt (GoE) is helping improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and should finish the digging of 30 wells in Darfur by the end of the month. Egypt also promised to dig 40 more wells, provide humanitarian aid, and educational scholarships for IDPs to study in Egypt. Egyptian medical convoys expanded the capacity and presence of "good" medical services in Darfur, but provision of services is "inconsistent" because teams deploy for only one to two month stints. -- SLA-Minawi rejects the Sudan census and plans to boycott April 2010 elections unless the basis for electoral representation changes.

2.(C) Comment: Minawi regrets signing the Abuja Agreement with the Government of Sudan (GoS) because he has never been integrated into the Government of National Unity. He wants his wing of the SLA to be included in future negotiations on Darfur. The establishment of a permanent office in Cairo is an attempt to gain a regional ally in pursuit of this goal. End Comment. --------------------------------------------- --------- U.S. Initiatives Welcomed, but No Bilateral Agreements --------------------------------------------- ---------

3.(C) Abdo Hashim Ali told us on July 7 that SLA-Minawi welcomed USG initiatives on Sudan. He praised the "John Kerry Initiative" to bring new NGOs to Darfur to fill the capacity left by the 13 expelled NGOs. He hoped that there would be more similar steps forthcoming. Ali is "satisfied" with the efforts of S/E Gration to obtain a ceasefire in Darfur, but he told us that Minawi is concerned that the U.S. is "engaging with the JEM to the exclusion of all other factions." He said that the focus on the JEM sent the message to other factions that if they fight, they will be rewarded by the USG with similar benefits. Ali stated that there should be "no bilateral solutions to Darfur." He told us that Chadian President Deby is not interested in a deal with Sudan, and pointed to Deby's absence from the AU Summit as evidence that N'djamena was not committed to an agreement. Ali encouraged continued U.S. engagement despite the lack of tangible progress. He said that Darfuri groups feared that S/E Gration was now focusing on South Sudan and not Darfur. ----------------------------- Al Mahdi not a Problem Solver -----------------------------

4.(C) Ali said that former Sudanese PM Imam Al Sadiq Al Mahdi was working to unify theSudanese opposition to the NCP Government and bunish his credentials as the leader of the Umma Paty. He said the Umma Party agreement with the JEM was a step in Al Mahdi's plan (reftel A). Ali aserted that the deal was important for JEM because the group "wants to become the SPLM of Darfur" and represent the region in all agreements. He said that SLA-Minawi had seen a proposed Umma-SPLM initiative and was expecting to receive its own document from Al Mahdi. However, Ali believes that Al Mahdi's initiatives will fail because the "Imam is good at networking, but not at problem-solving. ---------------------------- Egyptian Contribution Valued ---------------------------- CAIRO 00001352 002 OF 002

5.(C) Ali told us that the SLA-Minawi valued working with the GoE. He stated that the GoE would finish digging 30 wells in Darfur by the end of the month, and had promised to dig 40 more wells, provide humanitarian aid, and educational scholarships for IDPs to study in Egypt. Ali stated that Egyptian medical convoys supported by the Arab Doctor's Union had expanded the capacity and presence of medical services in Darfur. He said that quality of care was "good," but the provision of medical services was "inconsistent" as medical teams would only deploy for one to two month stints. Ali told us that SLA-Minawi had still not opened its Cairo office because Mohamed Nour, who was named office director, had to clear up business issues in Saudi Arabia before relocating to Cairo (reftels B-C). He hoped that the office would be open by the end of July 2009. -------------- Darkness Ahead --------------

6.(C) Ali said that Minni Minawi sees "only darkness ahead for Sudan." He told us that SLA-Minawi rejects the Sudan census as the basis for the April 2010 elections. Ali stated that "Darfuri groups will not be held hostage to the Naivasha agreement," and they plan to boycott the elections unless the basis for electoral representation changes. He thought that Umma Party and JEM would also boycott the election because they had declared the government to be illegitimate. Ali said that a decision to use the 1993 census and estimate population growth until 2010 could convince Darfuri groups to participate in the electoral process. He believed that if elections are held there must be international observers to guarantee fairness or there will be a repeat of events in Iran or Zimbabwe. SCOBEY