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RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #0947/01 2121325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311325Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4783
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4365
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8038
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9782
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000947 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV KGHG ECON KSCA BR
SUBJECT: KEY BRAZILIAN NEGOTIATOR SEEKS MODEST, SHORT-TERM, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AGREEMENT AT COPENHAGEN SUMMIT IN DECEMBER 
 
BRASILIA 00000947  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
(U)  THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) leads 
the Brazilian delegation to the ongoing climate change negotiations. 
 The key MRE negotiator on the delegation is Luiz Figueiredo 
Machado, who is also a Vice-Chair of one of the working groups under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  At a July 
21 meeting with the Deputy Chief of Mission, Figueiredo Machado 
outlined his view of a successful outcome for the UNFCCC's 
Copenhagen summit, which included developed countries taking on 
emission reductions targets, while developing countries would 
register their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). 
He voiced concern over Brazil and developing countries taking on 
binding commitments, primarily to avoid possibly impinging on 
economic growth.  He recognized that this approach did not provide 
for a long-term solution, and he expected that UNFCCC would begin 
negotiating of another agreement in 2020.  Figueiredo Machado 
repeatedly expressed concern about Brazil possibly upsetting other 
developing countries by getting out ahead of them in these 
negotiations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ENTHUSIASM ABOUT WORKING WITH THE USG ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At a July 21 lunch with the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), 
the Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations' (MRE) Director of the 
Environment Department and key climate change negotiator, Luiz 
Figueiredo Machado, expressed his enthusiasm for working with the 
USG in the ongoing negotiations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  He said he had positive 
interactions with U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern, 
and he looked forward to continuing this productive dialogue.  He 
also described the USG and Brazilian government as operating in a 
similar, transparent manner, even though they had their differences, 
their positions were clear.  Further, both the USG and the Brazilian 
government in these negotiations recognized that different countries 
can take different paths to reach a common goal.  In contrast, he 
commented the Europeans were difficult to work with, believing that 
the rest of the world should simply agree to pursue the chosen 
European path to climate change mitigation. 
 
PROTECTING GROWTH BY FIGHTING FOR A SHARE OF CARBON SPACE 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Figueiredo Machado made clear that a guiding principle for 
the Brazilian negotiating team was preserving their room for 
maneuver and expansion in the economic sphere.  He characterized the 
negotiations about greenhouse gas emissions as centering on access 
to "carbon space" (i.e., usage of carbon as an input for economy 
activity).  Given that there is a limited amount of carbon space 
that can be emitted worldwide without risking continued, or 
increasing, climate change, the world is constrained.  In that 
context, Figueiredo Machado views the debate as a zero-sum game, 
with each country fighting for its share of the limited global 
carbon space available.  Thus, he was as much concerned about the 
carbon space the United States and developed countries have used in 
the past as the carbon that China and India will be using in the 
future.  He commented, "It is not in our interest  that China uses 
our carbon space."  Consequently, he indicated that the results 
coming out of Copenhagen need to ensure that Brazil and developing 
countries have sufficient access to carbon space to allow for their 
future economic growth.  He stressed that in these negotiation all 
countries have the same economic self-interest, ensuring sufficient 
carbon space for their economy. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Explaining why the Brazilian government did not want to 
convert its domestic climate change goals to reduce deforestation 
into binding international obligations, Figueiredo Machado said that 
the government wants to reserve the right to selectively develop the 
Amazon in the future, should the conditions warrant.  The MRE does 
not want to constrain the government's options for developing the 
economy.  He lamented the continued demands by foreigners that 
Brazil preserve the forest exactly as is.  (NOTE:  Brazilian 
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has repeatedly lashed out at the 
perceived pressure from foreigners to just preserve the forests. 
Last year, Lula deflected these pressures exclaiming that "the 
Amazon has an owner."  END NOTE.) 
 
A MODEST, INCREMENTAL VISION OF SUCCESS AT COPENHAGEN 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Figueiredo Machado said that Brazil and the United States 
shared a "sense of urgency" about the problem of climate change. 
However, when he outlined his vision of successful result from the 
UNFCCC negotiations at the Copenhagen summit in December, he offered 
a modest, limited model.  He said Brazil sought binding commitments 
to cut emissions from the members of the Kyoto Protocol and also the 
United States.  For their part, Brazil and the developing countries 
would register their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
 
BRASILIA 00000947  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
(NAMAs).  This registry of NAMAs would be verifiable and the world 
could see the developing countries making their contribution to 
addressing climate change.  Machado tended to favor a non-binding 
agreement coming out of Copenhagen, though he could accept a binding 
agreement.  He explained out that if the agreement were a binding 
one, it would take years to enter into force as the members went 
through their respective ratification processes.  He preferred 
creating a framework that would allow each country the freedom to 
identify and follow its own path toward reducing emissions that is 
appropriate to its own circumstances. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The results from Copenhagen will be an incremental, 
interim measure, Figueiredo Machado stated.  The parties should 
narrow their focus to looking at what can be accomplished between 
2012 and 2020.  At that time, a new set of negotiations and a new 
generation of negotiators can take over and build on what has been 
accomplished.  He added that while it was fine for individual 
countries, like the United States, to chart a path with a 
longer-term focus, but that on a global scale there were too many 
unknowns for a long-term approach to work at this time.  By way of 
example, Figueiredo Machado said that domestically, he couldn't even 
ensure that Brazil could control its own deforestation over the next 
10 years.  (NOTE.  Over the MRE's objections, President Lula in 
December 2008 approved a domestic target for reducing the annual 
rate of deforestation by 70 percent from 2005 to 2017.  END NOTE.) 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE MAJOR ECONOMIES FORUM 
 
¶7. (SBU) Figueiredo Machado participated as part of the Brazilian 
delegation in the Major Economies Forum (MEF).  He commented that 
the MEF process had been good for sharing points of views, however, 
he objected to attempts to use the MEF as a separate negotiating 
process.  He stressed that Brazil and the other developing countries 
in the MEF had no basis for negotiating on behalf of all the other 
developing countries.  Brazil was concerned that any statement 
issued by the MEF could potentially drive a wedge between Brazil and 
the rest of the G-77. He was concerned that Brazil might be seen as 
agreeing to positions that the entire group did not support. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Figueiredo Machado's assistant, Jose Solla Junior, 
attended the working lunch.  Also, the Environment, Science & 
Technology, and Health (ESTH) Counselor and the ESTH Deputy 
Counselor participated in this event. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Brazilian negotiating stance remains, as Figueiredo 
Machado indicated, essentially a defensive one.  Brazil would like 
to see a consensus agreement come out of Copenhagen, regardless how 
modest or short-term in scope such an agreement might be.  At the 
same time, Brazil does not want to take on any binding commitments, 
even if based on Brazil's domestic climate change plan.  Basically, 
for Brazil's negotiators the goal is to do something modest now and 
then pick up the issue anew in 2020.  Interestingly, Brazil has not 
aggressively pressed for the United States or Europe to take on more 
ambitious measures in cutting emissions, possibly out of concern 
that this would open them up to reciprocal pressures to take on 
commitments.  Underlying Brazil's position is the sense that there 
is little to be gained by Brazil being more ambitious, yet doing so 
would have a political cost in its relations with its other 
developing countries and might even impair its economic growth.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL