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PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0847/01 1871104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061104Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4637
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9716
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7966
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4284
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0158
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0309

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000847 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, NEA AND NP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019 
TAGS: MNUC PREL BR
SUBJECT: AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRAZIL AND EXPORT DEVELOPMENT 
BANK OF IRAN 
 
REF: BRASILIA 477 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4(d) 
 
¶1.  (U)  The June 30 edition of Isto e magazine carried a 
story titled "Secret Agreement between Brazil and Iran" which 
reported on a memorandum (text in paragraph 3 below) of 
agreement between the Brazilian Ministry of External 
Relations (MRE) and Iran aimed at promoting economic 
cooperation and trade.  The agreement was made in March 2009 
during preparations for President Ahmadinejad's potential May 
visit that was later cancelled.  Iran was represented by the 
Export Development Bank, an institution named by the Treasury 
Department in 2008 as supporting proliferation activities. 
The article reports that the contact with Iran is seen by the 
MRE as purely commercial in response to demand from Brazilian 
business to work with Iran.  MRE director for trade promotion 
Rodrigo de Azevedo Santos is quoted as saying that Brazil 
will uphold any UN sanctions.  MRE Iran desk officer Azeredo 
Santos told Poloff that the text obtained by Isto e was 
genuine but that the document had no status because it had 
not yet been signed. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Embassy Comment: This agreement is consistent with 
President Lula and Foreign Minister Amorim's approach to Iran 
of looking for engagement, supposedly as a means of gaining 
influence that could moderate Iranian behavior.  Even though 
the GOB was embarrassed by the negative reaction to the 
invitation to President Ahmedinajad earlier this year, plans 
for commercial cooperation have proceeded.  The MRE office 
responsible for the agreement was instructed to promote trade 
with Iran, not consider the political implications of the 
relationship.  While the agreement itself contains little 
more than a promise to look into future cooperation, the fact 
that it was prepared with an entity of proliferation concern 
is significant. Because the Export Development Bank is not 
named by the UN sanctions, MRE could believe it has a green 
light to move forward.  Other parts of the Brazilian 
government may not, however, share the eagerness to expand 
commercial contacts with Iran. As Isto e put it, quoting 
Salvador Raza of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 
"to have the right to make an agreement does not mean it's 
legitimate to do it." 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Text of Agreement as obtained from Isto e: 
 
Financial and Banking Committee 
Date: March 25, 2009 
Place: Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia. 
 
During the meeting of high Excellency Iranian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Dr. Motaky, with the Brazilian 
Officials, the Committee on Financial and Banking relations 
between Brazil and Iran was held in 
Brasilia at the Ministry of External Relations. The focus of 
the meeting was on the development of mutual 
financial co-operation and on the discussion on how to 
overcome the main obstacles facing economic cooperation 
between 
Brazil and Iran. 
 
The meeting was directed from Brazilian party by Counsellor 
Rodrigo de Azeredo Santos, Head of the Trade Promotion 
Programmes Division of  the Ministry of External Relations, 
and, from Iranian party, by Dr Kourosh Parvizian, Managing 
Director of Export Development Bank of Iran. 
 
Meanwhile, by presenting and exchanging of points of view of 
two parties the following topics were mutually 
agreed by the representatives of Brazilian and Iranian 
delegation: 
 
1) To discuss the possibility of establishing financial 
mechanisms to facilitate export and import of goods and 
services by both countries, including re-exporting operations 
of Brazilian and Iranian goods and services to third 
countries. 
2) To study investments in joint projects in both countries 
and the establishment of joint companies to expand the mutual 
 
BRASILIA 00000847  002 OF 002 
 
 
economic co-operation. . 
3) To sign a MOU between the Central Banks for exchanging 
information on regulatory issues of the financial systems of 
both countries. 
4) To organise technical and banking committees to establish 
and facilitate banking cooperation between Brazil and Iran. 
5) To determine a date for the banking delegations to visit 
both countries to finalise fundamental issues of banking 
co-operation. 
6) To reach effective progress in the issues above mentioned 
before the Joint Economic Commission meeting. 
End text 
SOBEL