VZCZCXRO6193
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHBO #2359/01 2052313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 242313Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9925
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 9046
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2546
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7843
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3959
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8539
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0029
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 002359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM PINS BR EC CO VT
SUBJECT: URIBE AUTHORIZES CORDOBA PARTICIPATION, OPENS DOOR 
FOR HOSTAGE RELEASES 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 1374 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 1338 
     ¶C. BOGOTA 0319 
 
Classified By: DCM Brian A. Nichols, Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) President Uribe reversed his previous position and 
announced on July 8 that Senator Piedad Cordoba was 
authorized to participate in Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) hostage releases, with the stipulation that 
the FARC's remaining 24 uniformed hostages be released 
simultaneously.  Representatives of the Catholic Church met 
with Peace Commissioner Frank Pearl the night before the 
announcement and requested the policy change.  Immediately 
after the announcement, Father Dario Echeverri received 
information from an intermediary that the FARC would accept 
the conditions but had added impossible demands that the 
Government of Colombia (GOC) recognize the existence of an 
armed conflict and the FARC as a legitimate belligerent. 
Cordoba later publicly claimed she had requested a meeting 
with President Uribe to discuss her participation, but Pearl 
told us she had submitted no such request and that the 
fabrication was typical of Cordoba.  Meanwhile, the Church 
continues its efforts to mediate, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plans to stay above the 
fray until its logistical assistance is required.  End 
Summary. 
 
GOC AUTHORIZES CORDOBA PARTICIPATION 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (U) In a press conference on July 8, President Uribe 
announced that Senator Piedad Cordoba was authorized to 
participate in hostage releases, adding that the FARC must 
immediately release all remaining 24 uniformed hostages along 
with the remains of three other hostages who died in FARC 
custody.  The GOC later defined "simultaneous" to mean a 
consolidated decision to release the 24 in a specified period 
of time, and clarified that Cordoba's authorization only 
allowed her to be present at hostage releases--not to 
mediate.  The announcement was surprising because of Uribe's 
prior insistence that only the ICRC and the Catholic Church 
were authorized to facilitate such releases (reftel A). 
Cordoba's participation has been a key demand of the FARC in 
order to continue with their announced release of soldiers 
Pablo Moncayo (held since December 1997) and Josue Calvo 
(held since April of this year). 
 
¶3. (C) Father Dario Echeverri of the National Conciliation 
Commission told us on July 16 that representatives of the 
Commission had met with Peace Commissioner Frank Pearl the 
night before Uribe's announcement and requested Cordoba's 
participation, believing the FARC would not engage without 
it.  According to Echeverri, the GOC agreed to the request 
because the "drip" of hostage releases had become the real 
problem--not Cordoba.  Pearl told us separately the GOC was 
open to contributions from anyone who could help and that the 
GOC had decided to give Cordoba another chance. 
 
POSSIBLE FARC COUNTER DEMANDS NON-STARTERS 
----------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) Echeverri noted that he had received a call hours 
after Uribe's announcement from Henry Acosta, a politician 
with FARC contacts.  Acosta told Echeverri that the FARC 
would accept the conditions if the GOC would recognize the 
existence of an armed conflict and the FARC as a legitimate 
belligerent.  Echeverri said he told Acosta that the first 
condition may be workable because it was more of a technical 
issue, but that the second condition would be impossible and 
would "shut the door" on any progress.  These conditions have 
not been made public. 
 
PUBLIC POSITIONING CONTINUES 
---------------------------- 
¶5. (U) On July 20, the FARC Central Staff Secretariat posted 
a letter to Cordoba dated July 19 on ANNCOL (a website 
regularly used by the FARC to publish communiques) welcoming 
her participation in receiving the hostages when the time 
 
BOGOTA 00002359  002 OF 003 
 
 
came and saying they were waiting for further information 
from the President detailing logistical considerations for a 
"humanitarian exchange" of prisoners.  The letter also stated 
that the FARC would begin preparations to release Pablo 
Moncayo, Josue Calvo, and the remains of others.  The 
President's press secretary told the media that the Church, 
ICRC, and Cordoba remained authorized to participate in 
"liberating" the hostages, and he reiterated the government's 
call for the release of all 24 uniformed hostages.  After a 
meeting with Church leaders on July 20, Cordoba announced 
that she had not met with the FARC, but that she had received 
word that proof of life evidence for unnamed hostages was en 
route. 
 
VIEWS FROM THE CORDOBA CAMP 
--------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Alberto Cienfuegos, a key Cordoba advisor and member 
of Colombians for Peace (CFP), told us that he believed a 
release could happen rapidly but that logistics remained a 
challenge.  The FARC only has confidence in the participation 
of the governments of Venezuela and Brazil--in that order. 
He noted that the FARC nearly aborted the last hostage 
release because of the GOC monitoring flights.  Furthermore, 
communications between CFP and the FARC have dramatically 
slowed, according to Cienfuegos, since the deaths of Ivan 
Rios, Raul Reyes, and Manuel Marulanda last year.  Cienfuegos 
said his group communicates effectively to the FARC through 
the media and used to expect replies in as little as two 
weeks.  Responses from the insurgents now take as long as six 
months. 
 
¶7. (C) Cienfuegos told us he believes the announcement was 
not spontaneous and that Uribe had been "cooking" it up for 
some time.  He argued that there are four reasons behind the 
Uribe announcement.  First, Uribe is trying to avoid a debate 
on "war and peace" and the legitimacy of the Democratic 
Security policy.  Second, Uribe took the "pulse of Congress" 
and realized that he needed to strengthen his support ahead 
of upcoming debates about the reelection referendum and 
recent political scandals.  Third, Cienfuegos claims that the 
FARC were considering releasing hostages to the Government of 
Ecuador.  Fourth, Cienfuegos said Uribe was feeling the 
pressure of international opinion, particularly from other 
Latin American nations where Cordoba has been "received like 
a head of state." 
 
CORDOBA MEETING REQUESTS ONLY MEDIA POSTURING 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) For her part, Cordoba told the press shortly after the 
July 8 announcement that she had requested a meeting with 
President Uribe to discuss hostage releases and other issues. 
 She continued her media campaign a week later, stating that 
a total of five hostages could be released within a month, 
but that she wanted to discuss the possibility with Uribe. 
Commissioner Pearl told us that the GOC had not received any 
requests for meetings from Cordoba, adding that "she is not 
telling the truth," which he characterized as typical of her. 
 He also stated that he saw no value in the GOC speaking with 
Cordoba, and that he had directed the Church to speak with 
her when necessary. 
 
¶9. (C) Aldo Civico (protect), from Columbia University's 
Center for International Conflict Resolution, told us that 
Cordoba was not a bridge, but rather an obstacle to the 
long-term peace process.  She is using her participation as 
an instrument for opposition.  Civico added that if she had 
respected the mechanism, it could have been used for a 
broader humanitarian accord, but that was now not possible. 
 
¶10. (C) Still, both CFP and the Church expect Pearl will 
eventually speak with Cordoba on the issue. Cienfuegos told 
us he believes that Pearl will meet with her to try to 
convince her that she should not act as a mediator.  He said 
that Cordoba and CFP will not react in a confrontational 
manner but will be "very serene."  Echeverri also expects a 
Pearl-Cordoba meeting, but pointed out that the Church does 
not want Uribe himself to meet with the Senator because it 
would be politically risky for him.  ICRC Delegation Head 
Christophe Beney told us on July 21 that he had already 
recently tried to bring Pearl and Cordoba to the 
 
BOGOTA 00002359  003 OF 003 
 
 
table--without success. 
 
CHURCH EFFORTS CONTINUE, BUT RED CROSS WARY 
------------------------------------------- 
¶11. (C) Echeverri told us the Church has offered Vatican 
involvement in the peace process.  He said that the Vatican 
would play a more political role than the humanitarian one 
currently held by the Colombian Church and could step in when 
appropriate.  The Church has also been trying to get a 
message concerning Church mediation to the FARC's leadership, 
but has gotten no response.  Echeverri told us that Church 
has had problems in recent months receiving timely responses 
from the FARC for unknown reasons.  He is now planning a 
personal mission to deliver the message to the two FARC 
leaders, but fears he may be wasting time and resources 
without advance confirmation they will receive him. 
 
¶12. (C) The ICRC's Beney told us that the ICRC will not 
mediate negotiations concerning the conditions of hostage 
releases.  He reiterated his point from April (reftel B) that 
both sides are playing games and that the process has become 
too politicized for the ICRC to intervene.  When appropriate, 
the ICRC is prepared to provide logistical support, as it did 
in collaboration with the Brazilians in the February hostage 
releases.  Beney also noted that the February release showed 
that the ICRC had recovered some trust after Operation Jaque 
(reftel C).  Still, the group does not have contact with the 
FARC Secretariat, and contact with many regional and local 
FARC leaders remains tenuous. 
Brownfield