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Viewing cable 09BEIJING2174, MEDIA REACTION: S&ED, NORTH KOREA, TAIWAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING2174 2009-07-30 09:23 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO9944
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2174 2110923
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300923Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5420
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS BEIJING 002174 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/CM, EAP/PA, EAP/PD, C 
HQ PACOM FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR (J007) 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: OPRC PREL ECON KMDR CH
 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: S&ED, NORTH KOREA, TAIWAN 
 
-------------------- 
  Editorial Quotes 
-------------------- 
 
1.  S&ED 
 
"The first S&ED ended: friendly atmosphere, few outcomes" 
 
The Shanghai-based Shanghai Media Group (SMG) publication, China 
Business News (Diyi Caijing) (07/30): "Yan Xuetong, Director of the 
Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, argued 
that although the S&ED has upped the level and format of the 
dialogue between the U.S. and China, so far the main goal of the 
dialogue - to prevent conflict - has not changed and cooperation is 
still a secondary focus.  The more ceremonious format of this round 
of talks actually demonstrated a greater distance between the two 
countries (less formal talks could be held if relations were 
closer).  Therefore, we should not expect the Sino-U.S. dialogue to 
achieve the same outcome as U.S.-Japan or U.S.-European dialogues. 
The U.S. does not view this as a dialogue between allies, but rather 
stressed the need to resolve the friction and disagreements between 
the two sides.  Obama's remarks to China, Russia, and the Arab world 
have a common feature: the use of language is very moderate and 
positive, but contains no substantive content.  Obama is very good 
at taking a soft approach, but seldom takes a strong stand on key 
issues.  Although claiming win-win cooperation, his real goal is to 
safeguard the interests of the United States and allow China to make 
more concessions.  Of course, he would never say this." 
 
2.  NORTH KOREA 
 
"Why doesn't the U.S. want to talk with North Korea directly?" 
 
The China Radio International sponsored newspaper World News Journal 
(Shijie Xinwenbao) (07/30): "The current sanctions against North 
Korea, based on UN Resolution 1874, are effective.  Meanwhile, the 
major countries involved in the Six Party Talks are proceeding with 
intensive multilateral and bilateral consultations around the DPRK 
nuclear issue.  All of these moves show North Korea that there is no 
way out if they insist on confrontation.  The U.S. did not directly 
respond to North Korea's hints at its openness to bilateral 
dialogue.  The implication then is that the U.S. will only engage in 
bilateral negotiations with North Korea within the framework of the 
Six Party Talks.  The possibility of a one-on-one meeting is low. 
The reason the U.S. insists on dialogue with North Korea within the 
framework of the Six Party Talks is due to the Obama 
Administration's re-evaluation of the North Korean nuclear issue. 
The Administration believes that the DPRK nuclear issue is a 
regional issue; that the prevention of nuclear proliferation is an 
obligation of all countries; and that the burden of the nuclear 
issue should not be borne by the U.S alone.  The Americans are wise. 
 If the U.S. engages in bilateral negotiations with North Korea, it 
will end up paying a high cost.  Instead, the U.S. wants the other 
major powers to pay part of the costs by using the framework of the 
Six Party Talks." 
 
3.  TAIWAN 
 
"The probability is low for Cross-Straits leaders to meet in the 
short-term" 
 
The China Radio International sponsored newspaper World News Journal 
(Shijie Xinwenbao) (07/30): "It is too early to draw a conclusion 
about the prospects for a meeting between the leaders of the two 
countries across the Taiwan Straits.  In fact, a lot of things can 
be done without their even meeting.  However, given that Hu Jintao 
and Ma Ying-Jeou are the top leaders of the two sides, a "Hu-Ma" 
meeting carries particular significance.  The development of 
Cross-Straits relations is a gradual process, which includes the 
building up of mutual trust and common understanding.  As long as we 
get down to business and do a good job, in due course a meeting of 
the Cross-Straits leaders will be a natural thing.  The development 
of Cross-Straits relations has its own inherent laws.  With the ever 
closer Cross-Straits exchanges and economic relations, it is 
inevitable that Cross-Straits relations will move towards 
reconciliation and integration." 
 
GOLDBERG