VZCZCXRO1258
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0151/01 1801054
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291054Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6452
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0785
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1342
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1280

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000151 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, 
NSC FOR HAYES, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL, 
OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE
SUBJECT: OSCE 2009 ASRC SESSION II, STATES WELCOME 
INCREASED DIALOGUE ON EURO SECURITY 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 00147 
     ¶B. USOSCE 00150 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Session II of the 2009 Annual Security 
Review Conference (ASRC) on June 24 centered on arms control 
and CSBMs--in particular the status of CFE, CSBMs, Russia's 
European Security Initiative and the value of expanded 
dialogue. The keynote speakers, Klaus-Peter Gottwald of the 
German MFA and Russia's MGIMO Professor Kulebyakin, read 
familiar, but very different assessments of the causes behind 
the current impasse on CFE. Both, however, stressed the 
importance of the regime and expressed hope for progress 
through negotiations on the parallel actions package, 
positions that were universally supported around the table. 
Allied interventions noted the importance and complimentary 
relationship between of CSBMs and CFE, remaining on message. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Kulebyakin and Russia repeatedly referred to 
Russia's call for a European security treaty, but did not 
describe Russia's proposal in detail, which was in Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov's message from the previous day's 
opening round (reftels). Most interventions welcomed 
additional opportunities for dialogue on European security; 
Russia proposed another FSC Security Dialogue session on the 
future of arms control for this fall. End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Same Presentations, Different Venue 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) German MFA Disarmament and Arms Control Commissioner 
Gottwald read his statement verbatim. (Gottwald's statement 
was distributed as PC.DEL/478/09.) Closely following his 
remarks from the June 10 German MFA-sponsored meeting in 
Berlin on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in 
Europe," Gottwald underscored that arms control had played a 
key role in disarmament and confidence-building in an 
integrated security policy in the Euro-Atlantic area. He 
asserted that two of the three most important elements of 
European arms control (CFE and VD99) have suffered 
considerable damage in recent years and are in need of 
repair. He said that CFE is our greatest cause for concern 
and requires additional support and new (unspecified) 
structural elements. Gottwald linked nuclear and conventional 
disarmament, and opined that initial progress in U.S.-Russian 
bilateral strategic talks could pave the way for progress on 
conventional arms control. Finally, Gottwald predicted that 
military developments will have to be assessed to determine 
their security-related consequences; that basic calculations 
for force balance will have to shift from a quantitative to a 
qualitative focus. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In turn, Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (MGIMO) Professor Kulbyakin's keynote address, 
which he also read verbatim, seemed to be a cut-and-paste 
compilation of several official Russian statements and 
documents, including, inter alia, Russia's "aide memoire." 
(Kulebyakin's presentation was distributed under 
PC.DEL/479/09.) He recalled the hopes of Russian leaders in 
1980s and 90s, regretting that their optimism turned out to 
be "naive illusions." 
 
¶5. (SBU) He said that Russia's "suspension" of CFE was a 
logical response to CFE,s "balance principle being violated 
in the most brazen manner" due to three waves of NATO 
expansion and NATO armaments raised to levels far beyond 
those laid down under the 1990 treaty. He further cited NATO 
positioning itself as a "global corporate security 
organization operating outside the bloc's borders on its own 
discretion," and NATO's disregard for Russian calls for CFE 
 
USOSCE 00000151  002 OF 004 
 
 
legal norms to be brought into alignment with the current 
state of affairs as justifying the Russian actions on CFE. 
 
¶6. (SBU) As stated in Russia's aide memoire on CFE 
distributed in May, Kulbyakin noted that the parallel action 
package could become the basis for progress on ACFE, provided 
that the package adequately addressed Russia's concerns on: 
flank limitations, NATO force levels, concrete NATO actions 
on accession of new NATO members, definition of substantial 
combat forces and future modernization of the treaty after 
entry into force. He repeated Russia's offer to consider 
certain transparency measures regarding Moldova and the 
Trans-Caucasus, "with due account being taken of the actual 
circumstances in those regions." 
 
¶7. (SBU) The remainder of Kulebyakin's address covered 
familiar Russian criticisms of VD99.  He attempted to assuage 
pS concerns over opening VD99 and promoted Russian proposals 
for naval and international Rapid Reaction Force CSBMs. 
Kulbyakin refrained from re-reading Minister Lavrov's 
marketing pitch for a new European Security Treaty, but 
cautioned critics of Russia's proposal who cite its lack of 
specifics to put "everything in its proper order: first, 
questions of principle, followed by attention to detail." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kulbyakin closed by cautioning pS against taking 
unilateral actions that will create new dividing lines. He 
reiterated that Russia does not contemplate the dismantling 
of existing institutions or abandonment of agreements such as 
CFE, VD 99 or Open Skies. The OSCE must be one of the 
appropriate platforms for discussion of European Security, 
but not the only one. 
 
- - 
CFE 
- - 
 
¶9. (SBU) Nearly every intervention reaffirmed the importance 
of CFE and the need to work on the basis of the Parallel 
Action Package to bring ACFE into force. Gottwald remarked 
that CFE is an "absolutely essential pillar of European 
Security," while Spain (Batanzos Roig), Greece, the 
U.S.(Neighbour), Lithuania (MFA Director of Tran-Atlantic 
Cooperation and Security Policy Department -- Leskevicius) 
and Poland (Gradzinski), Kazakhstan, Russia (Ulyanov), 
Armenia (Kirakossian), Georgia (Garprindashvili) and Belarus 
all confirmed the key role CFE has played since 1990. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Poland (Gradzinski) cautioned that the current 
state of affairs, where one state is not fully implementing 
its commitments, can not continue indefinitely. Gradzinski 
said that loss of CFE would mean the loss of transparency and 
confidence, as well as the loss of information. Greece 
cautioned that no arms control regime can function 
effectively with the existence of "black holes" within its 
area of application. Lithuania (Leskevicius) recounted how 
the consequences of CFE's erosion go beyond the boarders of 
States Parties. He lamented the fact that its bilateral CSBM 
with Russia, which included information exchange on 
Kaliningrad, had been a casualty of Russian suspension. 
Leskevicius also confirmed Lithuania's intent to join A/CFE, 
repeating that Lithuania is ready to begin discussions on 
accession as soon as ACFE enters into force. He said that 
Lithuania "wishes to be firmly anchored into the solid 
European arms control structure." Leskevicius and Gradzinski 
emphasized that the parallel actions package represents the 
only credible way to move forward on ACFE. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) submitted that the real 
obstacles preventing the Adapted CFE Treaty from entering 
 
USOSCE 00000151  003 OF 004 
 
 
into force have been Russia's unilateral "suspension" of the 
CFE, its lack of respect for host nation consent, and 
non-fulfillment of all of its Istanbul commitments. He also 
reiterated the U.S. commitment to working with Russia on the 
basis of the Parallel Actions Package to find a solution that 
takes account of all treaty partners and allows all to ratify 
ACFE. Greece welcomed Russia's aide memoire and said it sees 
merit in exploring an update to A/CFE after it enters into 
force. Kazakhstan noted it was reviewing Russia's Aide 
Memoire and said Russia's proposal for provisional 
application was particularly interesting. Kazakhstan also 
opined that the JCG could play a supplemental role in A/CFE 
negotiations. Armenia's Kirakossian called for enhanced 
accountability and mechanisms to ensure compliance. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) echoed Kulebyakin's assessment of 
the Parallel Action Plan, calling on Western Allies to 
intensify work on CFE on the basis of the package, and noting 
that Russia's aide memoire provides a vision for a way 
forward. He cited examples where Russia and its partners had 
overcome significant obstacles in 1990's to agree on CFE as 
proof that, given political will, Russia and its NATO 
partners could overcome any difficulty. 
 
- - - 
CSBMs 
- - - 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov reiterated Russian views on the need to 
update VD99, to pursue Russian proposals on Naval and Rapid 
reaction Force CSBMs, and to conduct an internal inventory of 
current politico-military instruments available to the OSCE. 
Kazakhstan said it could support any measure that enhanced 
transparency. Noting what he characterized as the "dubious 
implementation of certain CSBMs," Armenia (Kirakossian) said 
there was a need for an enhanced role for hard security and 
to increase the effectiveness of the FSC's toolkit. Poland 
(Gradzinski) said that while soft security could assist in 
political solutions to security problems, soft measures could 
not replace CSBMs.  Participating States must find a way to 
ensure CSBMs are "all weather" measures, and they should 
concentrate their efforts on conflict prevention measures. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted that despite acute 
challenges, overall implementation of VD99 has generally gone 
well. He recalled that although Russia regularly calls for 
updating VD99, Russia's robust application of verification 
activities dwarf the activity of any other pS. Finally he 
urged partners to make clear specific concerns, recognizing 
that many such issues have already been discussed within the 
FSC and not led to agreement. The U.S. also urged continuing 
efforts to address concerns stemming from 21st century 
threats, but said this can be accomplished without needlessly 
detracting from VD99, which is working well. 
 
- - - - - - - 
Euro-Security 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶15. (SBU) Spain (Batanzos Roig) recognized five possible 
areas of convergence on Europeans security--the central role 
of the OSCE; the primacy of existing principles, 
organizations and agreements; the necessity of a 
multi-dimensional approach, the need to adjust mechanisms to 
address regional and sub-regional security issues; and the 
importance of CFE. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reiterated its characterization of 
European Security as in a state of crisis. He explained that 
Russia's focus on hard security is based on unfavorable 
 
USOSCE 00000151  004 OF 004 
 
 
trends in this area. Comparing hard and soft regimes, Ulyanov 
noted that some 80 conventions and agreements under the 
Council of Europe relate to the human dimension of security, 
while the collection in Europe's pol-mil sphere includes only 
three. Of the latter, CFE is in crisis, VD99 is outdated and 
functions at less than 50 percent effectiveness, and only one 
third of the Treaty on Open Skies works as designed. Finally, 
citing the "rearming of Georgia," Ulyanov lamented that other 
politico-military aspects of security are not fully 
implemented. Ulyanov stressed the importance Russia attached 
to a legally binding European Security Treaty. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Expanded Dialogue 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17. (SBU) Nearly every delegation commented favorably on the 
June 10 German MFA-sponsored meeting in Berlin on "The Future 
of Conventional Arms Control in Europe". Spain (Batanzos 
Roig), and Lithuania (Leskevicius) thanked Germany for their 
relentless efforts, while Kazakhstan welcomed the meeting. 
Poland (Gradzinski) proclaimed, "The main objective--to 
revitalize dialogue--was achieved." Spain thanked Germany and 
said it expected that Corfu would result in consensus on how 
to proceed with dialogue on European Security. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) hailed Germany's "pan-European 
summit in Berlin" as an example of ways in which pS can 
expand dialogue. He proposed that pS maintain momentum by 
holding a special FSC session in November on the "Future of 
Conventional Arms Control." Ulyanov also suggested that the 
FSC begin drafting a ministerial decision for Athens, tasking 
the FSC to intensify its work in the area of arms control. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted that in Berlin, the 
Allies sent a consistent and unified message regarding CFE, 
which among other things, stressed the need to address first 
order issues before other venues for negotiations to solve 
the impasse can be productive. 
Scott