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PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0145/01 1701454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191454Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6432
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0773
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1330
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1268

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000145 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC-PC JUNE 17: GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA; OSCE 
UNSCR 1540 STRATEGY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The OSCE, EU, and UN co-chairs of the 
Geneva talks on Georgia lauded the ongoing discussions, but 
called for concrete results and limited institutionalizing of 
the process with detailed agendas and regular meetings, 
particularly in light of the closing of UNOMIG and the OSCE 
Mission to Georgia due to Russian vetoes.  The EU Monitoring 
Mission head commended Georgia for its MOU on troop movements 
near the administrative border, and urged Russia to 
reciprocate.  The OSCE Conflict Prevention Center director 
reported security in Georgia had deteriorated and regretted 
the closing of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and the withdrawal 
of the OSCE military monitors.  Russia claimed to be confused 
by the discussion: the Geneva co-chairs sounded reasonable, 
but delegations were just repeating the same old arguments. 
There would be no real progress in Geneva until the 
sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized as 
necessary outcomes of the process. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. called for further discussion support of 
its Food-for-Thought paper on next steps in OSCE 
implementation of UNSCR 1540 at the June 17 joint Forum for 
Security Cooperation-Permanent Council meeting.  Russia 
criticized some of the paper's proposals, finding they 
"invaded the competency" of the UN 1540 Committee or lacked 
any "added value," but clearly supported a Best Practice 
Guide and hoped that the first, U.S.-drafted chapter would be 
quickly adopted.  Italy, a co-sponsor of the 
Food-for-Thought, reminded that the 1540 Committee had 
invited regional organizations to assist with implementation 
of the resolution and that the Committee's 2009 Program of 
Work recommended some of the proposals contained in the 
paper. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The decision to hold a meeting of heads of 
verification centers on December 14, 2009, was adopted.  In 
the working groups, Belarus and Kazakhstan supported the 
Russian proposals for naval CSBMs modeled on the Vienna 
Document provisions for ground-based forces.  Italy 
questioned the practicability of the proposals and warned 
they would impose added financial burdens that would be borne 
unequally by participating States.  Several pS announced 
their support for the Turkish proposal to liberalize use of 
digital cameras and GPS devices, although Belarus opposes at 
least the GPS provisions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Support is growing for the German proposals for 
guidelines for briefings conducted during Vienna Document 
verification events, although Austria is concerned that the 
guideline could be used to refuse requests for information 
not mentioned in the guidelines.  The draft decision on the 
agenda and modalities for a special meeting in September to 
discuss review of the OSCE Document on SALW received 
immediate support from Finland, Ireland, the UK, and Belarus. 
 Several states, including the 
U.S., lack any instructions.  Please see paras 26 and 28. 
End summary. 
 
Geneva Talks on Georgia 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) At the June 17 joint Forum for Security 
Cooperation-Permanent Council meeting, the OSCE, EU, and UN 
co-chairs of the Geneva talks stressed that the process was 
 
USOSCE 00000145  002 OF 007 
 
 
working.  OSCE Special Representative Christopoulos 
highlighted the establishment of the incident prevention and 
response mechanisms as a tangible achievement, and added that 
the OSCE had played a critical role in facilitating the 
resolution of outstanding gas and water supply issues in 
Georgia. 
 
¶6. (SBU) EU Special Representative Morel lauded the Geneva 
process as the only forum in which all parties to the 
conflict were represented, and argued that this gave the 
process a unique role in resolving outstanding security and 
humanitarian issues.  Acknowledging that the situation 
remained "fragile" and that trust and confidence remained 
weak, Morel called for "creativity, flexibility, and 
pragmatism" and urged a step-by-step, progressive approach to 
stabilization and normalization, temporarily putting aside 
status issues and focusing instead on security arrangements. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Noting the need to ensure that the Geneva process 
was both credible and sustainable, UN Special Representative 
Verbeke urged concrete results, and encouraged all parties to 
look to the August 12 cease-fire agreement as the Geneva 
talks' foundation.  Verbeke urged renewed political signals 
showing all parties' commitment to the process, suggesting 
that presidents or ministers could convene to reiterate their 
support, and encouraged parties to consider "slightly 
institutionalizing" the process, perhaps by circulating 
background notes and introducing agreed, annotated agendas. 
Above all, Verbeke said, it was important to avoid 
re-negotiating every session as if it were the first.  He 
proposed regular meetings as a means of establishing a 
minimal procedural framework. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Verbeke argued that the Geneva process was now even 
more important given the expiration of the UNOMIG mandate and 
the impending closure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia.  He 
also made clear that the end of UNOMIG was not the end of the 
UN in Georgia, and asserted that the UN and the OSCE would 
continue to play active roles in Geneva, as their 
participation was not predicated on having field presence in 
Georgia, but was based on their identities as security 
organizations. 
 
EU Monitoring Mission 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) EU Monitoring Mission Head Haber commended the 
Georgian government for its adherence to the obligations of 
its MOU on troop movements, noting that all minor infractions 
had been corrected, adding that as long as the MOU was 
observed, no Georgian offensive action against the separatist 
regions was possible.  Haber urged Russia to reciprocate in 
order to boost confidence in the region and lower tensions. 
Haber acknowledged that the EUMM's coordination with Russian 
forces had improved, thanks in part to frequent use of the 
hotline established under the incident prevention and 
response mechanism for South Ossetia, but said freedom of 
movement across the administrative boundary lines remained an 
obvious problem, and criticized Russia for refusing to 
provide access to the separatist regions. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Haber concluded that the end of UNOMIG and the OSCE 
Mission to Georgia would deprive the region of years of 
 
USOSCE 00000145  003 OF 007 
 
 
experience and expertise, as well as valuable monitoring of 
the situation north of the Abkhaz administrative boundary 
line.  In the short term, however, the EUMM would not be 
affected, as the three bodies' mandates had been conceived 
independently, and the EUMM would continue to operate. 
 
CPC on OSCE in Georgia 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) OSCE Conflict Prevention Center Director Salber 
noted that OSCE monitors had lately assessed the overall 
security situation in the region as increasingly tense, 
particularly near Perevi, and said Russia's deployment of FSB 
border guards to the administrative boundary lines would 
undermine stability and complicate cross-boundary movements. 
Salber lamented the failure of participating States to extend 
the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, and regretted 
that the departure of the Mission's monitoring officers would 
deprive the region of uniquely military expertise, noting 
that the EUMM was largely staffed by civilian police.  Salber 
said the monitors' operations were severely curtailed and the 
forward monitoring base at Karaleti closed June 6), but the 
monitors will continue to patrol and report as long as 
possible. 
 
Russia Responds to EU and Allies 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The EU, through its Czech (Reinohlova) presidency, 
the U.S. (Scott), Turkey (Begec), Norway (Vik), and Canada 
(Gregory) expressed support for the Geneva process and again 
called for Russia to honor its commitments under the August 
12 and September 8 agreements.  Russia (Azimov) responded 
that it was left with "confused impressions."  On the one 
hand, Azimov said, were the relatively balanced statements 
from the five ambassadors who had addressed the Council, 
while on the other were the same old arguments from the 
delegations around the table.  As all were probably "weary" 
of all this, Azimov urged delegations to look to the future, 
bluntly stating that there was no longer a single Georgia, a 
reality all parties should take into account. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Azimov expressed sadness at the closure of UNOMIG 
and the OSCE Mission to Georgia, but said Russia had done its 
best to avoid this outcome, but had been rebuffed "by others" 
despite presenting "mutually acceptable solutions.  Azimov 
declared that Russia would like to maintain international 
observers in the region, but said this must be worked out 
with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities, something 
that "would not be a matter of bargaining in any way." 
Azimov said Russia believed the Geneva process was important, 
but described its "main purpose" as the working out of 
security guarantees for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including 
legally binding non-use of force agreements and an embargo on 
arms for Georgia.  Azimov closed by stating Russia would 
continue to ensure security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and 
would take up "further measures" if necessary: Russia was not 
interested in further conflict, but must protect the two new 
"states." 
 
UNSCR 1540 at the OSCE 
---------------------- 
 
 
USOSCE 00000145  004 OF 007 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) The U.S. (Scott) called for discussion in both the 
FSC and Permanent Council, through its Security Committee, on 
OSCE support for further implementation of UNSCR 1540.  Scott 
noted the expertise available on non-proliferation in the 
OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit and the CPC's Borders 
Team.  Scott highlighted the specific proposals made in the 
U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought paper that proposes an OSCE 
UNSCR 1540 strategy.  This includes an information exchange 
on national implementation efforts, identification of 
technical assistance resources in the OSCE, a Best Practices 
Guide, and continuing reporting on implementation.  Scott 
observed that while "some in the room" doubted the capacity 
of the OSCE to contribute, the UN 1540 Committee had 
specifically asked regional organizations like the OSCE to 
help with implementation. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted it was one of the 
"initiators" of 1540 and generally welcomed the efforts of 
the U.S. and other co-sponsors of the FFT paper to further 
implementation of the resolution. These efforts, however, 
should: not interfere with the competence of the 1540 
Committee; not exceed the actual requirements of the 
resolution; be based on a recognition that the OSCE's 
potential is not that great; and contain clear added value. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ulyanov, turning to the FFT paper, said it was 
"rather raw," raises several questions, and needs substantial 
further work.  Addressing the specific proposals, he said: 
 
- information exchange: Where is the added value in the 
proliferation of reports already provided to the Committee in 
New York?  Discussion of just a few would overwhelm the 
Security Dialogue; how would we handle 56 reports?  How would 
these discussions further implementation?  In any case, the 
reports are beyond the competence of the OSCE, dealing with 
WMD, associated delivery systems, and export controls.  There 
were no experts on the delegations or even the Secretariat on 
these matters. 
 
- identification of technical assistance resources: Similar 
concerns apply to this proposal.  Why should pS submit this 
information to the OSCE instead of directly to the 1540 
Committee, although it is important for pS to help others who 
need it. 
 
- Best Practices Guide:  No disagreement with this proposal; 
the Guide would be useful. 
 
- continuing reports on implementation: This misrepresents 
the requirements of UNSCR 1810, which calls for continued 
efforts by states who have not yet reported to the Committee; 
yet there are none of these at the OSCE.  Follow-up reports, 
per 1540 and 1810, are purely voluntary. 
 
- sharing work between the FSC and the PC Security Committee: 
This has dubious value as the work of implementing the 
resolution "requires a single master."  The FSC can always 
call on the ATU or Borders Team, if they actually have any 
expertise. 
 
- enlisting the OSCE field missions: It was "unclear" that 
the field missions had any contribution to make. How much 
would it cost to involve them in the work of implementing 
 
USOSCE 00000145  005 OF 007 
 
 
1540?  Who will pay?  Will the mandate of the missions need 
to be changed? 
 
- partnership with other IOs: The 1540 Committee has already 
made direct contact with the IAEA, NATO, OPCW, and Interpol, 
among others.  Why should the OSCE then duplicate these 
efforts. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Ulyanov said he had already shared his doubts with 
the U.S. and now awaited a response.  He was open to other 
ideas on 1540, subject to the caveats he had provided. 
Useful work was still needed, he added, and the U.S. Best 
Practices Guide should be completed and adopted soon. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The UK (Cliff), a co-sponsor of the FFT paper, 
supported further work as outlined by the U.S. and planned to 
take the strategy forward under its chairmanship of the FSC 
in the autumn.  Italy (Negro), on behalf of the co-sponsors, 
said in the working group that there was no intention to 
trespass on the "competency of the 1540 Committee" but 
instead to fulfill the mandate in UNSCR 1810 for regional 
organizations to engage actively with the Committee to share 
lessons learned and cooperate on the implementation of the 
resolution. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Negro said that the proposals contained in the FFT 
were not very detailed yet, but were meant to be points of 
departure for further work.  He noted, with regard to 
Ulyanov's and others' concerns about extending the mandate of 
the field missions, that they already had some guidance in 
the OSCE Principles of Nonproliferation (1994). 
 
HOV Meeting 
----------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The decision to hold a meeting of heads of 
verification agencies on December 15 was adopted without 
comment. 
 
Naval CSBMs 
----------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) asked delegations to comment in 
detail on the first section of its naval CSBMs paper, 
proposing an information exchange modeled on the Vienna 
Document provisions for land-based forces.  Kazakhstan 
(Asanov) supported the paper, although it lacked final 
instructions. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Italy (Negro) was not ready to discuss in detail 
the paper, but for the time being would refer to its 2008 
comments.  Negro said these included questions about 
provisions for activities in international waters.  For 
instance, who would be the receiving state when vessels were 
outside territorial waters?  The area of application proposed 
by Russia was too broad, he added, and would include the Red 
Sea and North Atlantic, not waters "adjacent to the OSCE 
area."  Negro said the Russian measures lack reciprocity, 
which is a major attribute of extant CSBMs that apply to all 
pS.  There would also be additional costs associated with the 
Russian proposals. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Austria (Eischer) wondered what kind of information 
 
USOSCE 00000145  006 OF 007 
 
 
would be expected from land-locked state lacking naval 
forces.  Geyvandov replied that, as with ground forces, some 
pS would simply provide "nil" reports.  As to the unequal 
burden of reporting note by Italy, Geyvandov said this, too, 
was the case with current Vienna Document reporting.  He said 
Russia was prepared to reconsider the area of application if 
pS found it too broad. 
 
Digital Cameras and GPS 
----------------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) reported that use of GPS 
devices on its territory was strictly controlled and it 
routinely denied request for GPS use by visiting inspector; 
it could not support at least the GPS provisions of the 
Turkish paper that would liberalize use of digital cameras 
and GPS devices in Vienna Document verification activities. 
Austria, Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Kazakhstan 
Canada, and Georgia supported the proposal. 
 
VD99 Briefing Guidelines 
------------------------ 
 
¶25. (SBU) Serbia, Italy, and Turkey announced support for 
Germany's proposed guidelines for Vienna Document 
verification briefings by military commanders.  Belarus 
generally supported, but said it would provide some edits to 
Germany.  Greece and France reported they had earlier 
provided edits to Germany, but lacked final instructions. 
Austria (Eischer) feared that the guidelines might be 
interpreted as bright-line norms and would inhibit the free 
exchange of information in the spirit of the Vienna Document. 
 Germany (Schweizer) replied the guidelines were just that 
and should not prove a constraint in pS wanted to provide 
more information.  The guidelines would not be politically 
binding. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Subject to additional edits expected from Belarus, 
the proposal is gaining broad support.  Mission understands 
that the U.S. remains unopposed so long as the guidelines 
remain voluntary. 
 
Review of OSCE SALW Document 
---------------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) The chair of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW 
(Schweizer, Germany) repeated his call for adoption of the 
draft decision on the agenda and modalities of a special 
meeting in September to discuss review of the OSCE Document 
on SALW and related decisions, as required by the 2008 
Ministerial decision.  Schweizer said the agenda reflected 
the influence of the third Biennial Meeting of States on the 
UN Program of Action on SALW in 2008.  The decision is needed 
soon to begin preparations for the meeting.  Germany, 
Ireland, Belarus, and the UK, under whose FSC chairmanship 
the meeting would occur, echoed Schweizer's urgency.  Finland 
(Kangaste) supported the draft decisions, and is considering 
helping to finance the meeting and sending a moderator.  In 
response to the chair's (Georgia) question, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Canada, and the U.S. reported they lacked instructions. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Mission understands that the U.S. is not opposed to 
the meeting and will not block consensus unless instructed 
 
USOSCE 00000145  007 OF 007 
 
 
otherwise.  This is likely to move forward at the FSC on July 
¶1.  COMMENT: As was the case with the March 2009 cyber 
security workshop, active participation by U.S. experts as 
moderators and keynote speakers may be the most effective way 
of influencing the outcome of the meeting.  End comment. 
 
Departures 
---------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) Brigadier Marjan Grabnar of Slovenia announced his 
departure from Vienna after five and a half years at the OSCE. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶30. (U) The next regular meeting of the FSC will be on July 
¶1.  The Annual Security Review Conference will be held on 
June 23 and 24. 
Scott