VZCZCXRO2035
OO RUEHSK RUEHSL
DE RUEHVEN #0144/01 1691005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181005Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6428
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1737
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000144 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN 
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG:  JUNE 16:  RUSSIA ACCUSES NATO OF 
"WARPED" UNDERSTANDING IN BERLIN 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  At the June 16 JCG plenary, Russia 
accused most of its CFE partners of demonstrating a distorted 
sense of the Russian position regarding CFE and the parallel 
actions package during the June 9-10 conventional arms 
control meetings in Berlin.  Russia singled out Canada and 
the Czech Republic for particular criticism.  Russia also 
characterized the current CFE situation as unbalanced, tipped 
in NATO's favor.  A lengthy debate ensued in which a series 
of responses left Russia isolated.  Separately, Belgium and 
the U.S., supported by 8 other delegations, criticized the 
Russian Federation's refusals of their recent CFE inspection 
notifications leaving Russia further alone.  End Summary. 
 
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Russia Concerned by "Warped" Understanding in Berlin 
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¶2.  (SBU) The Joint Consultative Group (JCG) met on June 16 
under the Chairmanship of Azerbaijan (Muradov).  Russian Head 
of Arms Control delegation Ulyanov immediately took the floor 
under general statements and conveyed surprise at the 
"warped" understanding of Russia's position shown by many 
CFE, and non-CFE states, at the June 9-10 Berlin meetings on 
conventional arms control.  Ulyanov was concerned that some 
countries reiterated Istanbul Commitments "as if we were back 
in 2005 and not 2009."  These countries, he said, were 
willing to abandon arms control for political interests that 
did not relate to CFE.  He hoped they would soon "come back 
to reality." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ulyanov assured the JCG that the Russian delegation 
in Vienna was ready and willing to answer any questions 
regarding its position or its Aide-Memoire distributed to the 
JCG on May 5.  It was unfortunate that some delegations did 
not resort to this opportunity.  He tried to invite dialogue: 
 "Don't be shy... ask questions!"  He emphasized that the JCG 
should be used for further talks, in particular, on Russia's 
paper. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Ulyanov noted that in Berlin the Canadian and Czech 
Republic delegations disagreed with the Russian position that 
NATO had only offered "vague promises."  There was nothing in 
the parallel actions package, or in any other document, that 
outlined specific requirements for NATO that would be in 
Russia's interest.  Instead, all language referring to NATO 
action was characterized by conditional words like "would," 
i.e., "NATO would strive to seek ratification..." Russia, 
however, had been singled out on several occasions with very 
specific activities that it MUST complete, for example, 
withdrawing Russian forces from Moldova and Georgia. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Without guarantees, Ulyanov stressed, Russia was 
left with "merely vague promises" on everything from 
ratification of A/CFE, to accession of the Baltic countries 
to the Treaty, to the definition of substantive armed forces, 
and so on. 
 
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Allied Responses 
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¶6. (SBU) Canada (Linteau) responded by reserving the right to 
reply at a future JCG plenary, but said its position remained 
to create the conditions necessary for entry into force of 
the Adapted CFE Treaty.  Canada also confirmed it remained 
committed to the U.S.-led, NATO-supported parallel actions 
package. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The Czech Republic (Reinohlova) reminded 
delegations that the Russian Aide-Memoire had come 14 months 
after the parallel actions package was presented officially 
to Russia.  There were many formulations in the Russian paper 
that required clarification.  Reinohlova, however, noted that 
in Berlin Russian MFA Director Antonov did not appear to 
"like questions."  She sought, in particular, clarification 
 
USOSCE 00000144  002 OF 004 
 
 
on paragraph 11 in the Aide-Memoire (provisional 
application).  Russia criticized NATO of "vague promises 
without guarantees," but what was NATO's guarantee that 
Russia would "as a gesture of goodwill consider the 
possibility of implementing some reciprocal transparency 
measures on a bilateral basis...prior to the provisional 
application or entry into force of the Agreement on 
Adaptation?" 
 
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Problem is Russia's Actions, Not Allied Misunderstandings 
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¶8.  (SBU)  The U.S. (Neighbour) attested to the readiness of 
Russia's Vienna delegation to answer questions from 
delegations regarding Russia's position on CFE, both in 
plenary and on the margins.  Neighbour pointed out that 
success in any negotiation depended, in part, on active 
listening and understanding counterpart positions.  Questions 
on CFE, therefore, were good, even if allegedly "warped or 
vague."  The "bad questions" were the ones not asked, leaving 
misunderstandings and missed opportunities.  Neighbour said 
that in Berlin, Allies had asked questions stemming from HLTF 
discussions in Oberammergau.  He reaffirmed that NATO 
countries sent a consistent, unified message in Berlin. 
Among other things, discussions in Berlin confirmed that 
there were first order issues that must be overcome in the 
existing bilateral channel, augmented with Allies, before 
discussions in other venues could be productive. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Neighbour went on to note that Allies understand 
well Russia's position -- the problem is Russia's actions. 
This included unilateral suspension of CFE implementation, 
not provided for by either the CFE Treaty nor customary 
international law.  This combined with Russia's military 
actions in Georgia, its deployment of forces in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and recognition of these Georgian regions as 
independent countries, had raised very serious concerns about 
Moscow's commitment to cooperative approaches to security and 
the CFE regime.   Russia's actions were inconsistent with 
core CFE principles and only served to complicate prospects 
for progress on fulfillment of Russia's Istanbul Commitments 
with respect to Georgia as well as CFE more broadly. 
Russia's position on adapted CFE and the parallel actions 
package further complicated the issue with its demands for 
major changes, such as to the flank regime, of the Adapted 
Treaty -- which Russia itself has signed and ratified. 
 
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Russia Claims Authorship Rights 
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¶10.  (SBU)  Ulyanov, in reply to the Canadian, Czech 
Republic, and U.S delegations, restated his argument that CFE 
was a "Cold War relic."  He expressed displeasure that the 
current CFE Treaty maintained a bloc-to-bloc approach and so 
had "lost all connection with reality."  Ulyanov then 
referred to Canada's earlier statement that the parallel 
actions package was a U.S./NATO plan.  He stressed that in 
fact the document was a "U.S.-Russia draft, with Russian 
proposals making up more than 1/3 of the draft."  For the 
remainder of the JCG meeting, Ulyanov resorted to calling the 
parallel actions package the "U.S.-Russia plan," implying 
that NATO's voice had been left out.  Ulyanov also said 
Russia would soon submit to the JCG a document outlining the 
legal rationale for its "moratorium" of CFE. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The UK (Gare) reminded the Russian Federation 
that any agreement reached would be "promises for promises." 
Gare hoped that a legally-binding treaty would be a 
guarantee, but suspension of it by one State Party had proven 
that wrong.  She pointed out that the very countries Ulyanov 
alluded to as "not committed to arms control" are the same 
countries that continue to implement the CFE Treaty without 
fail.  On the contrary, the one country that accused others 
 
USOSCE 00000144  003 OF 004 
 
 
of lacking commitment was the very country that had 
unilaterally suspended CFE implementation.  She also 
confirmed that it was clear the Alliance had had substantial 
input into the U.S.-Russia bilateral process. 
 
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Istanbul Commitments are Part and Parcel of Package 
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¶12.  (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) stressed that no matter how 
hard Russia tried to erase the Istanbul Commitments from 
memory and their linkage to Adapted CFE, it would be 
impossible for entry into force "while Georgia is around this 
table."  Guduata cannot be forgotten.  Romania (Matei) did 
not agree with Russia's assessment that an "artificial link" 
had been forged between political commitments and arms 
control in 1999.  Matei said that the political commitments 
were "part and parcel" of the package.  Moldova (Cuc) said 
the parallel actions package provided "many answers" on 
fulfilling Istanbul Commitments and for moving forward. 
Russia (Ulyanov) shot back that the A/CFE Concluding Act was 
binding but that the attached political statements were not 
part of the Treaty and therefore not binding. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  The U.S. (Neighbour) noted its agreement with 
Romania's characterization of the Istanbul Commitments as 
"part and parcel" of A/CFE, and underlined that the Istanbul 
Commitments were an integral part of a "package deal" at 
Istanbul.  He pointed to Allied proposals in the parallel 
actions package as the solution for all and the best way 
forward.  Germany (Schweizer) helpfully said that specific 
points from the parallel actions package could not be 
disaggregated.  He also stressed that the way forward would 
not be legally-binding, yet; it would be a political 
commitment.  Schweizer also noted that delegations should 
bear in mind other commitments that had been reached since 
¶1999. 
 
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Russia Criticized for Latest Noncompliance 
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¶14. (SBU) Belgium (de Brandt) "deplored" Russia's refusal of 
its intent to conduct a CFE inspection on June 2.  The U.S. 
(Neighbour) supported Belgium and called attention to 
Russia's refusal on June 11 of a U.S. inspection 
notification.  Neighbour added that NATO Allies, including 
the U.S., had offered a set of constructive and 
forward-looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues. 
 He urged Russia to work cooperatively with us and other 
concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the 
parallel actions package.  Belgium and the U.S. were 
supported in statements by 8 other delegations ) the UK, 
Turkey, Romania, Italy, Czech Republic, Portugal, Germany, 
and France.  Russia did not reply. 
 
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NATO-T 
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¶15.  (SBU)  At the request of the U.S. chair (Neighbour), on 
June 15 The Netherlands (Kleinjan) provided a readout of the 
June 9 meeting in Berlin in which Russia and several NATO 
Allies participated.  Germany (Schweizer) provided a factual 
account of the June 10 Berlin meeting.  The U.S. chair warned 
the Allies that Russia would criticize their positions in 
Berlin at the JCG the next day.  Turkey (Begec) questioned 
whether delegations would deliver statements at the opening 
of the Annual Security Review Conference on June 23, 
particularly in response to Russian FM Lavrov's remarks.  The 
Czech Republic (Kyrian), Canada (Linteau), and the U.S. 
(Wright) said their delegations were preparing opening 
statements that would address the conference in general but 
not specifically reply to Lavrov. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000144  004 OF 004 
 
 
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Next Meeting 
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¶16.  (U)  NATO-T and JCG meetings on June 22 and 23, 
respectively, have been cancelled in light of the Annual 
Security Review Conference.  The next JCG Plenary will be on 
June 30 under the chairmanship of Azerbaijan.  The NATO-T, 
chaired by the U.S. for the month of June, will take place on 
June 29. 
Scott