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Viewing cable 09USOSCE138, FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09USOSCE138 2009-06-04 15:44 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission USOSCE
VZCZCXRO0732
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0138/01 1551544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041544Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6415
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0767
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1324
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1262
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000138 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS 
 
REF: A. 98 STATE 156529 
     B. FALLON-SILBERBERG JUNE 2 EMAIL 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. 
reacted skeptically to Russia's renewed call for naval CSBMs 
in the OSCE "maritime area."  The U.S. said the measures were 
unnecessary given Russia's ready access to naval exercises in 
international waters and the high level of routine 
cooperation among the Russian, U.S., and other navies. 
Germany suggested existing CSBMs, the Global Exchange of 
Military Information and Vienna Document Chapter IV on 
"contacts," provided ample scope for further transparency and 
confidence-building in the naval theater.  In the Security 
Dialogue, Finland described the history and outcome of 
"Multinational Experiment Five" conducted by the U.S., 
several other countries, NATO, and the EU to test new 
approaches to crisis management. 
 
2. (SBU) In the working groups, Britain and Russia are 
preparing a revision of their Best Practices Guide for Vienna 
Document Chapter IV "contacts" visits.  The U.S. provided 
textual edits to the draft decision to hold a meeting of 
heads of verification in December 2009.  Turkey's 
Food-for-Thought paper on liberalizing use of digital cameras 
and GPS during Vienna Document inspections received some 
tentative support.  The chair will soon distribute a draft 
decision on the agenda and modalities of a special meeting in 
September 2009 to review the OSCE Document on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons.  Sensing tacit support, Germany requested its 
proposal for an annual assessment of Code of Conduct 
implementation be issued as a draft decision.  Slovenia and 
Norway joined the list of co-sponsors of the U.S.-authored 
Food-for-Thought paper on an OSCE strategy for implementation 
of UNSCR 1540.  End summary. 
 
Allies Nix Russian Naval CSBMs 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) France (Simonet) reported Russia's renewed proposal 
for naval CSBMs was being seriously studied in the capital, 
but also confirmed its opposition to the concept.  Simonet 
suggested Russia's concerns might be answered by "improved" 
information exchange on naval forces (under the GEMI) without 
the creation of separate CSBMs.  The UK (Hartnell) also 
reported analysis in capital, but warned it was unlikely to 
change its opposition to the proposal.  Germany (Schweizer) 
said that it was not prepared to reject in principle the 
Russian proposal, but still needed to find the added value in 
it when the OSCE already had the GEMI and Vienna Document 
Chapter IV contact visits that could facilitate transparency 
for maritime forces. 
 
4. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour), drawing from standing guidance 
(ref A), did not see any need for naval CSBMs, noting the 
proposal has been repeatedly rejected because of a high level 
of stability in the maritime environment and Russia's failure 
to identify a maritime regional security problem that 
required additional measures.  Neighbour said that naval 
activities usually occur in international waters where there 
are no bars to observation, unlike military activities on the 
ground that occur on sovereign territory and require 
international agreements to allow access by observers. 
Neighbour noted that NATO Allies have engaged with Russia on 
naval issues, including maritime search and rescue. 
 
USOSCE 00000138  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) responded that the proposal for 
naval CSBMs will remain on the table.  Ulyanov said he would 
wait for other delegations to receive further instructions 
and hoped for a more focused discussion.  He wanted to hear 
"specific" reasons for rejecting naval CSBMs.  It was true 
the GEMI provided for exchange of some naval information: why 
could participating States (pS) not go farther?  Ulyanov said 
the U.S. position was unclear.  Did the U.S. believe naval 
CSBMs were not needed because there was nothing of interest 
in naval activities?  This was not so.  Did existing CSBMs 
for ground forces reflect, for example, some particular U.S. 
concern over artillery in the OSCE area?  Why did the OSCE 
insist on maximum transparency on land but not on water? 
 
6. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) repeated that artillery and 
other ground-based forces were situated on sovereign 
territory and could not be accessed without OSCE transparency 
measures, unlike naval forces in international waters that 
can be easily observed by other vessels or aircraft.  Ulyanov 
replied that the U.S. had not explained its concern over 
artillery as reflected in existing CSBMs.  Besides, Russia's 
proposals envisioned more than just observation of naval 
forces. 
 
7. (SBU) Latvia (Nilsons) said its general position was that 
new proposals must have added values for the Euro-Atlantic 
region and need to be examined in the context of existing 
commitments and obligations.  Under the current 
circumstances, Nilsons said, when a "major commitment is not 
being observed," there was a low prospect of success for new 
obligations.  Ulyanov warned it was wrong to try to link 
different issues: this could be "a slippery path for Riga." 
 
8. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) offered unconditional support 
for Russia's proposal, citing a "serious transparency gap" in 
the naval area. 
 
Multinational Experiment Five 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Finnish Captain (navy) Erkki Platan and Lieutenant 
Colonel Mikko Lappalainen described the history and outcome 
of Multinational Experiment Five (MNE5), an "extensive 
research and development" effort to develop new crisis 
management concept conducted by a "community of interest" 
that included Finland, Sweden, the U.S., and other NATO 
members.  The 2006-2008 MNE5 sought improved methods in 
conducting interagency and multinational planning and 
enhancing civil-military cooperation through better 
information sharing and logistics planning.  A multinational 
steering group, managed by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, led 
interagency delegations from 16 countries, NATO, and the EU 
trough an "effects-based approach" to multinational 
operations in an African crisis scenario.  Participants 
focused on the implementation of new approaches. 
 
10. (SBU) A seminar hosted by Finland at the conclusion of 
MNE5 discussed development of more comprehensive approach to 
crisis prevention and management based on national best 
practices and multinational approaches.  MNE6, planned for 
2009-2010, will focus on complex crises that include 
"irregular actions," non-permissive environments, and 
transitions of responsibility from military to civilian 
 
USOSCE 00000138  003 OF 005 
 
 
actors and from multinational programs to local authorities. 
 
11. (SBU) In response to questions from Germany and Austria 
about an OSCE role in the MNE process, Platan said that OSCE 
SYG Perrin de Brichambaut participated in the comprehensive 
approach seminar in Helsinki and the OSCE would likely be 
invited to participate in MNE6.  Answering UK and Swedish 
requests for examples of practical application of MNE lessons 
learned, Platan said that some of the concepts developed 
through the MNE for operations planning, intelligence, 
information sharing, and logistics were already being used in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan by NATO and EU forces. 
 
Contact Visits 
-------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Hungary (Haupt) announced successful Vienna 
Document Chapter IV contact visits to a military facility and 
airbase and the demonstration of new equipment, ambulance and 
CBW variants of the BTR-80 vehicle, in May.  Sixty-six 
representatives of 32 participating States, the OSCE Conflict 
Prevent Center, and the RACVIAC Center for Regional Security 
attended. 
 
Contacts BPG 
------------ 
 
13. (SBU) The UK announced that it was preparing with Russia 
a revised draft of the Best Practices Guide for Vienna 
Document Chapter IV contact visits. 
 
HOV Meeting 
----------- 
 
14. (SBU) The U.S. proposed, per ref B, edits to the text of 
the draft decision to hold a heads of verification meeting on 
December 14, 2009: 
 
- deletion of "in order to prepare subjects for discussion at 
that meeting" from the preamble paragraph that reads 
"Recognizing the advantages to holding a Heads of 
Verification Center meeting outside the framework of the AIAM 
in order to prepare subjects for discussion at that meeting." 
 
- substitution of "on improving implementation of VD99" for 
"on further ways and means to improve implementation of VD99" 
in operative paragraph 3 that currently reads "Exchange of 
views on further ways and means to improve implementation of 
VD99." 
 
The draft decision will remain on the working group agenda. 
 
Digital Cameras and GPS 
----------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Germany and Sweden gave tentative support to 
Turkey's Food-for-Thought paper to permit during Vienna 
Document inspections the use of digital cameras and GPS 
devices (FSC.DEL/124/09).  Russia (Ulyanov) reported that the 
paper was being studied by Moscow but it might take some time 
before guidance was developed.  Russia had no firm views as 
yet, one way or the other.  Ulyanov suggested an important 
use for the GPS devices would be determining the coordinates 
of the inspectors within the area of inspection.  He also 
 
USOSCE 00000138  004 OF 005 
 
 
suggested using different nomenclature to describe the "GPS 
devices," as that phrase "created the impression that only 
U.S. models" are used.  Turkey (Begec) replied it would 
consider amplifying the list of uses for GPS and alternate 
language for "GPS devices" to describe what was meant to be a 
generic description. 
 
SALW Review 
----------- 
 
16. (SBU) The chair of the Informal Group of Friends of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons (Schweizer, Germany) reported that he 
had prepared a draft decision for the chair on the agenda and 
modalities of a September 2009 special meting to review the 
OSCE Document on SALW.  Schweizer warned the decision would 
need to be adopted before the summer recess at the end of 
July if the meeting were to occur in September.  He called 
for substantive discussion on the decision at the June 17 
working group in light of the expected absence of many 
delegates from the June 10 working group because of the 
conventional arms control meetings in Berlin.  The chair 
(Georgia, Giorgadze) said he hope to distribute the decision 
by June 5. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
17. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) announced that it inferred from 
the absence of comment "tacit support" for its proposal for 
annual assessment of Code of Conduct implementation 
(FSC.DEL/437/07/Corr.1).  Schweizer said he would ask the 
chair to issue a draft decision.  Russia (Ulyanov) confirmed 
that it was considering the proposal, noting that the 
criterion of "added value applies not just to naval CSBMs." 
 
UNSCR 1540 
---------- 
 
18. (SBU) Croatia, France, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia have 
become co-sponsors of the U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought 
paper on an OSCE strategy for UNSCR 1540 
(FSC.DEL/25/09/Corr.3).  The U.S. (Silberberg) called for 
further discussion of the paper and hoped other pS would join 
the existing co-sponsors.  Silberberg reminded delegations of 
1540 Committee chairman Urbina's address to the FSC in 
December 2008, encouraging the OSCE to provide leadership of 
regional implementation efforts, including low cost steps 
such as Best Practices Guides, lists of technical assistance 
experts, and national points of contact. 
 
19. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reported it had, as promised, 
consulted with the U.S. over the OSCE 1540 strategy and tried 
to point out factual errors and weaknesses in the text. 
Ulyanov asked if "complete information" will be included in 
the paper.  Silberberg replied that another approach would be 
to address Russia's concerns in more specific proposals to 
implement some of the measures suggested in the strategy, 
such as the technical assistance roster.  Italy (Negro), 
responding to Turkish concerns over the strategy's proposal 
to use OSCE field missions to assist 1540 implementation, 
assured that any involvement of the missions would not exceed 
their mandates as determined by the pS.  Negro added that the 
FFT was ultimately meant to lead to specific FSC decisions. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000138  005 OF 005 
 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
20. (U) The next FSC meeting will be on June 10. 
Scott