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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000269
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR IVO DAALDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: SECRETARY CLINTON: YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE
NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Madam Secretary:

¶1. (C) This is the first high-level NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
meeting since the August 2008 Georgia crisis, when NATO
suspended meetings of the Council. During the Foreign
Ministerial last March, you succeeded in convincing your NATO
colleagues to resume NRC deliberations - a decision
subsequently reaffirmed at the April Summit. The Corfu
meeting comes at a critical time in our attempt to rebuild
relations with Russia - just one week before the Moscow
Summit. A major objective of this meeting is to ensure that
the improvements in bilateral relations are reflected in the
NATO-Russia relationship as well. Moscow has yet to match
its more positive attitude towards the United States in its
attitude towards NATO. This gap is worrying to many Allies,
and we should seek to close it. Indeed, if we ignore it,
Allies may come to fear that we are willing to sacrifice
their interests in order to advance our bilateral relations
with Moscow.

¶2. (C) Of course, the choice is not ours alone to make.
While most Allies view NATOs relationship with Russia as a
political priority, Moscow regards its relations with NATO as
less important than its relations with Washington. At this
point, Russia sees re-engagement with NATO as necessary to
normalize its relationship with the United States and other
key western countries. It is not yet clear whether it is
interested in a real, constructive relationship with the
Alliance as a whole. One immediate objective of your
meeting, therefore, will be to ascertain the degree to which
Moscow is interested in forging a strong, cooperative
relationship with NATO.

Alliance Management
-------------------

¶3. (C) No issue divides the Alliance more than Russia. Most
East European Allies fear being swept up by Russian military
and economic assertiveness and doubt NATOs commitment to act
in the event of a bilateral conflict with Russia. Canada and
the UK sympathize and often side with this group. All of
them are deeply concerned about NATOs inability to confront
Russia in a unified manner. On the other hand, most West
European countries, led by Germany, believe Russia is a
critical partner and believe NATO must avoid actions that
Moscow might see as provocative. Our decision earlier this
year to seek to bridge the differences between these two
groups of Allies is succeeding. We were able to build a
fragile consensus that engagement with Russia would be based
on seeking cooperation with Moscow in areas of mutual
benefit, while committing to frank discussion with Russians
about issues on which we disagree. This consensus, however,
does not resolve the underlying differences that divide the
Alliance - some Allies will focus on the need for
cooperation; others on the need for frank disagreement. In
Corfu, Allies will expect you to take the lead in elaborating
the Allied vision for reengagement with Russia and the NRC,
and to do so in a balanced manner.

¶4. (C) Allies applaud the improvement in U.S.-Russian
relations and support the U.S. taking the lead in bilateral
talks with Russia in order to inform and advance discussions
in NATO and the OSCE. However, they expect to be consulted
before such talks take place, as well as being briefed on the
results. In that regard, we appreciate Washingtons
agreement to send an inter-agency team to NATO on June 29, as
well as Rose Gottemoellers decision to brief the NAC
immediately after the Summit. These briefings will help
counter a growing suspicion that Washington is content with
its improved bilateral relations and is willing to let
NATO-Russia relations languish. We must dispel this notion
by sending a strong signal of our commitment and readiness to
engage Russia in the NRC.

Russia - To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate...
--------------------------------------------

¶5. (C) Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov will be looking for
two deliverables from this meeting. First, he wants to sweep
away all of the diplomatic consequences from the Georgia
crisis in order to lock in the current reality in Georgia; in
many ways, NATO is the final step in this process and
symbolically important to Moscow, given NATOs desire not to
discuss the crisis with Moscow last August. Second, FM
Lavrov will seek agreement for a clear signal to restart
mil-to-mil cooperation. Beyond this, it is unclear whether
Moscow has any interest in deepening cooperation with NATO or
engaging in a constructive dialogue. All indications are
that Lavrov will blast NATO Allies for their support for
Georgia, as well as for refusing to accept Russias call for
an emergency NRC meeting during the crisis. We should
carefully pre-coordinate a concise - yet strong - response on
Georgia with Allies (perhaps delivered by the German or
French Foreign Minister) so that our real differences over
Georgia do not completely monopolize the NRC meeting and
eclipse a more fruitful discussion on the areas of possible
collaboration. This Ministerial will set the future course
of the NRC - any hope of future cooperation with Russia will
require a constructive dialogue and positive decision at the
meeting itself.

Practical Cooperation
---------------------

¶6. (C) This meeting provides the opportunity to steer NRC
cooperation toward U.S. priorities of mutual benefit. In the
past, NRC resources have been squandered in moribund working
groups that have produced little result. We should seek to
advance cooperation in areas of past success -- specifically
Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics -- and
explore new areas of mutual benefit, including counter-piracy
and missile defense. Even though arms control and
nonproliferation seem a natural fit for the NRC, there has
been little progress to date. Our administrations
recommitment to these areas may change that. More generally,
you should appeal to your NRC colleagues to inject new energy
and vitality into each of these priority areas, underscoring
that the United States, Allies, and Russia should look to the
NRC as a practical vehicle for pragmatic cooperation on
issues of mutual concern.

Deliverables
------------

¶7. (C) Although the meeting itself will be seen as a visible
political signal of NATOs re-engagement with Russia, we hope
to achieve several other deliverables in Corfu. While
Russian insistence on unacceptable "political" language might
prevent a final agreement before Corfu, NRC nations have been
hard at work negotiating a document on the practical aspects
of taking the NRC forward, including through the adaptation
of NRC structures to address new areas of mutual concern. We
also hope to get political agreement to restart
military-to-military cooperation, something Moscow has said
would require a "political mandate" from Foreign Ministers.
As a concrete result of such a decision, we anticipate that
Moscow will announce that it is accepting NATOs invitation
to contribute a ship to Operation Active Endeavor, the
Alliances modest Article 5 counterterrorism operation in the
Mediterranean. In addition, we hope that you will be in a
position to announce U.S. ideas on how to move forward with
the NRCs Cooperative Airspace Initiative, a program of
cooperation in the fields of airspace surveillance and air
traffic coordination designed to strengthen capabilities
required to deal with situations in which aircraft are
suspected of being controlled by terrorists.
HEFFERN