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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0298/01 1741439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231439Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9712
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000298 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN AND IO 
DOE FOR NA-24 - LOCKWOOD, MENDELSOHN, O'CONNOR, 
MCLELLAND-KERR 
NRC FOR OIP - SCHWARTZMAN 
NRC FOR SCHEINMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP AORC TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD OF GOVERNORS: SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION 
REPORT, ROUTINE VERIFICATION AGENDA ITEMS 
 
REF: A. UNVIE VIENNA 292 - JUNE BOARD ON DPRK 
     ¶B. UNVIE VIENNA 193 - JUNE BOARD ON IRAN 
     ¶C. UNVIE VIENNA 289 - JUNE BOARD ON SYRIA 
     ¶D. UNVIE VIENNA 281 - JUNE BOARD ON IRAQ 
     ¶E. UNVIE VIENNA 279 - JUNE BOARD ON BUDGET 
     ¶F. STATE 61325 - BOARD INSTRUCTION CABLE 
     ¶G. UNVIE VIENNA 253 - JUNE BOARD PREVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
¶1. (U) This cable reports on discussion of the routine 
safeguards agenda items from the Board of Governors: item 5a 
(Conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional 
protocols), 5b (the Safeguards Implementation Report for 
2008) and 5c (Staff of the Safeguards Department to be used 
as Agency Inspectors.  Discussion of safeguards issues in the 
DPRK (item 5c), Iran (item 5e), Syria (item 5f) and Iraq 
(discussed under item 5b) is reported in REFS A-D. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Under item 5b the Safeguards 
Implementation Report for 2008 (SIR), the Board welcomed 
Egypt's cooperation to resolve safeguards issues reported in 
2005 and looked forward to the resolution of an issue arising 
from discovery of enriched uranium particles in 2007 and 
2008, which are not readily explained by Egypt's previous 
nuclear material declarations.  The NAM took the opportunity 
to portray as inadequate the Secretariat's respect for 
confidentiality of safeguards information.  Cuba also raised 
questions about the propriety of Department of Safeguards use 
of cost-free experts (CFEs).  DDG/Safeguards Olli Heinonen 
rebutted the Cuban concerns.  Many delegations commented on 
the importance of universal adherence to comprehensive 
safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, on the need 
to improve efficiency and broaden cooperation with state 
systems of accounting and control for nuclear material, and 
on the importance of upgrading the Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory.  A few also commented on the format of the SIR, 
arguing for greater transparency in reporting on state-level 
safeguards implementation.  Malaysia offered a remarkably 
positive intervention.  The Board took note of the SIR and 
agreed to release the Safeguards Statement and Summary and 
Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary.  (Note: 
Public release of these portions of the SIR constitutes the 
first formal Board release of a document describing the 
Agency's investigation and preliminary conclusions in Syria.) 
 The Board also approved an Additional Protocol for Serbia 
and a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional 
Protocol for Rwanda and took note of the list of new and 
departing inspectors.  End Summary. 
 
SIR/Egypt 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Egypt welcomed the SIR's conclusion that issues 
reported in 2005 had been resolved and expressed satisfaction 
with the Secretariat's cooperation to resolve them, but 
expressed "surprise" that the Secretariat had referred 
publicly to a restricted document and had done so 
inaccurately.  (Note: This was a reference to IAEA EXPO 
Director Vilmos Cserveny's premature reference to the 
Egyptian issue in a statement at the May NPT PrepCom.  The 
"inaccuracy" in his statement was wording to the effect that 
the detection of HEU and LEU particles in 2007 and 2008 were 
linked.  End Note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Similar to the U.S. statement (see para 5), the EU 
statement welcomed "the fact that Egypt has clarified issues 
relating to its past undeclared activities reported to the 
Board in 2005," and that those issues "are no longer 
outstanding."  The EU statement looked forward to resolution 
of issues raised by the HEU and LEU particles.  Australia's 
statement described the SIR reporting on Egypt as "a welcome 
exercise in transparency," and noted that "steps have been 
taken to ensure that the Egyptian SSAC has sufficient legal 
authority to fulfil Egypt's obligations under its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement."  Australia also said 
ongoing work on the HEU and LEU particles was "a matter of 
continuing interest to the international community" and 
"look(ed) forward to further information from the Secretariat 
on the resolution of this issue."  (Comment: Privately, Egypt 
expressed satisfaction with the U.S. and EU statements, but 
expressed displeasure with the Australian statement reference 
 
 
to "continuing" international interest.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Text on Egypt in U.S. statement on the SIR: 
 
The SIR indicates that a number of issues that had been 
previously reported to the Board with respect to Safeguards 
in the Arab Republic of Egypt have been resolved and are no 
longer outstanding.  We welcome the Agency's work in 
addressing the issues, we welcome the cooperation shown by 
Egypt in helping to resolve them, and we look forward to 
similar cooperation in resolving any additional questions 
arising from the results of environmental sampling.  We would 
further note that the resolution of questions is necessarily 
a part of any verification system, and the transparency 
provided by the SIR's reporting contributes to understanding 
and confidence of the international community in the workings 
of the safeguards system. 
 
End text. 
 
Leaks of Safeguards Information 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Cuba, speaking for the NAM, focused on the issue of 
safeguards confidentiality, complaining that the Secretariat 
had made public statements about the contents of a restricted 
document in a public meeting in New York.  (This was another 
reference to the mention of Egypt in the IAEA presentation at 
the NPT Preparatory Committee in May.)  The NAM statement 
continued with a more generalized complaint about "leakage" 
of safeguards confidential information, and asked the DG to 
identify measures to prevent future leaks, such as a "code of 
conduct" for the Secretariat, and to reinforce existing 
measures to deal with "violators" of that code.  Russia 
echoed this by noting that leaks tended to politicize 
safeguards issues and undermine confidence in safeguards. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a later national statement, Cuba pointed to the 
fifteen cost-free experts (CFEs) in the Safeguards Department 
and argued that the use of CFEs compromises the independence 
of the Agency, which is especially important for safeguards. 
In a response at the end of the SIR discussion, DDG Heinonen 
replied that CFEs were only fifteen of over eight hundred 
safeguards staff members; that they had the same 
confidentiality requirements as regular staff members; worked 
mostly in technical support areas such as equipment, 
information technology and training; and were needed for 
their specialized expertise. 
 
Israel on Syria 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In a muted SIR intervention intended as a preview of 
its more ardent statement under the Syria agenda item (REF 
C), Israel requested deletion of text (citing only the 
paragraph numbers rather than the substance) referring to 
Israel's attack on Dair Alzour in Syria, saying it was not in 
line with longstanding IAEA practice.  (Note:  Israel made a 
similar intervention under the Annual Report agenda item and. 
 There was no response to either intervention.  The practice 
to which Israel was referring is the usual omission of 
country names, while in this case Israel is mentioned 
specifically.) 
 
SAL and Budget 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Several delegations spoke of the importance of the 
Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and the Network of 
Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) in Member States for analyzing 
safeguards samples, mostly focusing on environmental samples. 
 Japan noted its contribution of 6.91 million Euros, of which 
approximately 4.5 million Euros would go toward the 
acquisition and installation of an ultra high sensitivity 
secondary ionization mass spectrometer (to be used for 
particle analysis at SAL).  The NAM cited the importance of 
expanding the NWAL to include developing countries.  Brazil, 
China and the ROK noted that they had labs seeking NWAL 
qualification and the ROK announced a USDOL 300,000 
contribution to SAL.  Malaysia supported the SAL budget 
request and announced that it was establishing a laboratory 
over the next five years that it hoped would be accredited as 
 
part of the NWAL.  France noted the need for a balance 
between SAL and the NWAL, and said it was seeking 
qualification of one of its labs for nuclear material 
analysis.  (Note: Unlike environmental samples, where the 
IAEA relies heavily on Member State NWAL labs, the IAEA 
analyzed virtually all of the roughly 500 nuclear material 
samples in its own Nuclear Material Laboratory at SAL and the 
On-Site Laboratory at Rokkasho, Japan.  The only NWAL lab 
currently qualified to analyze nuclear material samples is 
the Trans-Uranium Institute at the EU Joint Research Center 
in Karlsruhe, Germany.)  Heinonen welcomed the interest in 
establishing new labs, but noted that this was expensive and 
the Agency had no funds to help Member States. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Switzerland noted that 10.5 million Euros remained 
unspent in 2008 and were carried over to 2009, and asked 
whether the funds would be spent.  Heinonen said that most of 
the unspent funds were due to delays in major projects at the 
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and the MOX plant in Japan and 
for safeguards at Chernobyl.  Heinonen noted that most of the 
funds would be spent in 2009.  (Note: Roughly 3.5 million 
Euros of these funds have been allocated for construction of 
the Clean Lab Extension to house the mass spectrometer being 
purchased with funds provided by Japan.  Germany meanwhile 
has developed a new talking point, arguing that 2008 actual 
expenditures should be the base for any proposed budget 
increase.  This would take the Agency well below ZRG.) 
Commenting on the increase in extrabudgetary resources, 
Argentina asked whether this would lead to a distortion in 
safeguards implementation, implying that the IAEA would be 
serving the interests of donors rather than of all Member 
States. 
 
Efficiency 
---------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Many delegations spoke of the importance of 
efficiency in safeguards implementation.  Key themes were the 
savings already achieved through "integrated safeguards" 
(estimated by the Secretariat to be 800 person days of 
inspection per year) and anticipated implementation of 
integrated safeguards spreads; the improvements in efficiency 
to be achieved through greater cooperation with state and 
regional systems of accounting and control; and the 
efficiency gains achieved through technical measures such as 
remote monitoring.  Argentina noted the importance of 
effectiveness and efficiency, but said more work needed to be 
done on efficiency.  (Note: There was very little discussion 
of the importance of measures to improve safeguards 
effectiveness, though some of the aforementioned items would 
also contribute to effectiveness as well as efficiency.)  In 
particular, Argentina and Brazil touted cooperation with 
ABACC, and Brazil noted the importance of avoiding 
duplication of effort between ABACC and the IAEA.  The EU 
statement noted cooperation between the IAEA and EURATOM, but 
focused on extending integrated safeguards to additional 
types of facilities (centrifuge enrichment plants, spent fuel 
conditioning facilities and geological repositories). 
 
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Board approved a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) for Rwanda, 
and an AP for Serbia.  Serbia spoke of its firm commitment to 
the NPT, its adherence to various international nuclear 
instruments, its efforts to strengthen its nuclear 
legislation (thanking the Secretariat for its help in that 
regard), and its plans to establish an independent nuclear 
regulator.  The U.S. statements on agenda items 5a and 5b 
addressed the need for universal adherence to CSAs and APs 
and called for states to revise their Small Quantity 
Protocols, and noted the entry into force of the U.S. AP in 
January.  Many other delegations (speaking on item 5b only) 
noted the importance of expanding adherence to comprehensive 
safeguards agreements, Additional Protocols and revised Small 
Quantity Protocols.  Egypt raised the usual double-standard 
argument (aimed at Israel), emphasizing the importance 
comprehensive safeguards and that the continued existence of 
unsafeguarded nuclear activities rendered the Agency's work 
incomplete.  In a remarkably positive intervention, Malaysia 
described its preparations for implementing the Additional 
 
Protocol, including allowing access outside material balance 
areas, issuing multiple entry visas, and conducting outreach 
and training for national authorities and stakeholders. 
 
Transparency 
------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) Many delegations welcomed the conclusions in the 
Safeguards Statement.  A few commented on the format and 
content of the SIR, with most recognizing incremental 
improvements from previous years.  Canada described the SIR 
as a "report card" and called for more detailed 
state-specific reporting.  The U.S. statement noted the need 
for more information on the results of safeguards activities 
as opposed to just enumerating those activities.  Switzerland 
noted the importance of clarity in the SIR, and questioned 
whether reporting separately on five groups of countries 
based on their different safeguards undertakings served that 
end.  Heinonen noted that next year most countries would be 
under integrated safeguards, and the Secretariat was 
considering restructuring the SIR to be more transparent.  He 
welcomed suggestions from the SAGSI (the Standing Advisory 
Group on Safeguards Implementation) and from Member States. 
 
Member State Support Programs 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Several countries' interventions addressed 
safeguards implementation in their countries and on 
activities of their Member State Support Programs.  Finland 
focused on safeguards issues for spent fuel repositories, 
both in Finland and Sweden.  Germany noted the role of the 
German Support Program in development of the Next Generation 
Safeguards System.  The ROK described its support for 
monitoring systems to be used at CANDU type reactors.  France 
noted that new safeguards measures were being applied at the 
four gas centrifuge enrichment plants operating or under 
construction in Europe.  The French support program had 
provided assistance to the Safeguards Department's Trade and 
Technology Analysis Unit. 
 
¶15. (U) Copies of the SIR statements made by Australia, 
Canada, China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the NAM, South Africa, Switzerland and the 
UK, as well as the U.S. statement as delivered, were emailed 
to ISN/MNSA (Jonathan Sanborn). 
PYATT