VZCZCXRO0110
RR RUEHDBU RUEHKW RUEHMA RUEHSK RUEHSL
DE RUEHUNV #0296/01 1741126
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231126Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9708
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1680
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE
RUCNCRI/VIENNA CRIME COLLECTIVE
AFGHA/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0106
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1681

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000296 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR KCRM UN AF PK
SUBJECT: ASSESSING UNODC'S ANTONIO COSTA 
 
REF: STATE 057099 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000296  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Antonio Costa, Executive Director of the UN 
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is scheduled to roll out UNODC's 
annual World Drug Report with the Director of the White House Office 
of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske on June 24.  Costa 
is an ambitious and energetic leader of the UNODC who should be 
commended for making the UNODC more politically relevant and 
operationally effective.  Further, he is a strong partner in USG 
efforts to combat narco-trafficking in Afghanistan and breaking the 
heroin-insurgency link.  However, his record as a manager is mixed. 
He often fails to consult with member states before launching new 
policy or program initiatives.  UNODC staff complain privately that 
he is largely absent as a manager, but autocratic and micro-managing 
when he does get involved.  Finally, member states and UNODC 
officials all agree that his propensity for dramatic and provocative 
public statements does little to advance UNODC's substantive issues. 
 For the June 24 roll-out, it is entirely possible that Costa's 
Public Relations handler could give the event more glitz than 
substance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
World Drug Report 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Every year since 2004, UNODC has released the World Drug 
Report, a statistical and analytical study of the production, 
trafficking and consumption of controlled substances.  Costa is 
understandably proud of this document, calling it the most 
recognizable "brand" of the UNODC and the "gold standard" of 
reporting on drugs.  While member states do not always agree with 
the conclusions found in the report, USG considers the document a 
worthwhile exercise, especially in tracking consumption trends. 
(Note: Most recently, EU Member States did not agree with the 2008 
Report's assertion that the global drug problem had largely been 
contained. End Note.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Strategic Visions for 
Afghanistan Counternarcotics 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Costa is a strong USG ally on the issue of 
counter-narcotics in Afghanistan.  He was an early advocate of food 
assistance and visible development assistance to farmers.  He has 
long argued for the need to break the link between narcotics and 
insurgency, calling for ISAF action to destroy trafficking routes 
and markets, now a component of our AFPAK strategy.  And, like the 
USG, he sees Afghan drugs as a regional problem that must be solved 
regionally.  UNODC adopted this regional approach several years ago, 
as evident in its Rainbow Strategy, the Paris Pact initiative 
(50-plus partners), and the Triangular Initiative (Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iran).  UNODC recently sent a mission to Pakistan to 
identify its needs and to determine how UNODC could better 
contribute to solving the regional drug problem in Pakistan.  Tasked 
by G-8 chair Italy, UNODC will present a paper on a regional 
strategy at the June 26 G-8 Ministerial on Afghanistan.  Cognizant 
that UNODC is uniquely positioned to advance a potential 
counter-narcotics dialogue between Iran and the U.S., Costa and his 
staff have been diligent in briefing the Mission on its activities 
in and on Iran, although that country is still the weakest leg of 
the UNODC's regional approach. 
 
------------------------ 
High Marks for Political 
and Financial Savvy 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Costa is an energetic and charismatic leader who deserves 
much credit for making UNODC a more relevant agency in the 
counter-narcotics field.  Arriving in 2002, Costa found a UNODC 
beset with problems related to financial and governance 
mismanagement, political irrelevancy and largely unfocused mandates. 
 Seven years later, Costa has transformed UNODC into a dynamic 
technical assistance operation that is increasingly recognized 
across the USG as an important player on the counter-narcotics 
scene-especially in the area of demand reduction and Afghanistan 
opium.  As a testament to his leadership, voluntary contributions to 
UNODC have increased four fold in the past seven years from 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000296  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
approximately USD 60 million in 2001 to over USD 260 million in 
¶2008.  (Note.  USG contributed over USD 27 million in 2008.  End 
note.) UNCAC TOC 
 
------------------------ 
Low Marks for Management 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) However, Costa gets a very mixed review for his management 
of UNODC in recent years.  Because overhead funds have not kept pace 
with program contributions UNODC is currently experiencing a 
financial crisis that threatens its ability to continue 
implementation of its various mandates.  The financial crisis is 
also affecting internal UNODC hiring and human resource decisions. 
Nearly two dozen Vienna and field-based jobs, have been or will be 
cut in the months ahead to make ends meet.  Nevertheless, many UNODC 
interlocutors have privately complained to Missionoff that Costa is 
largely an absent manager on these issues, focusing instead on 
travel around the world and on attempting to launch high-profile 
initiatives.  These interlocutors--many of whom are quite 
senior--point to the fact that it took Costa over four months to 
brief member states on the crisis as evidence of his disengagement. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Member states have been unhappy with Costa's persistent 
efforts to expand UNODC's mandates, to make policies on his own 
rather than to execute member states' policies.  This habit was 
exemplified by his attempts in 2008 to launch two splashy 
initiatives (UN.ARMS on firearms and UN.GRACE on anti-corruption), 
which failed because of strenuous member state objection.  Costa has 
also openly criticized member state and UNODC work to implement the 
two prominent global anti-crime conventions - the UN Convention 
Against Corruption and the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime -- whereas the U.S. and many other member states 
view this work as the cornerstone of the UN's anticrime activities. 
  Officials within UNODC also find themselves disagreeing with Costa 
on issues related to policy and priorities.  For example, while 
Costa continues to push for the adoption of a Global Plan of Action 
to Combat Human Trafficking, his own anti-human trafficking office 
is against it.  Similarly, Costa's repeated calls for a cybercrime 
convention conflict with the private statements of his experts on 
the issue, who lament that they "can't control the man."  (Note: 
USG disagrees with Costa on both issues.  End note.)  And when Costa 
does become involved in an issue, he tends to be very autocratic. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Costa's energy and enthusiasm often compels him to act in 
ways contrary to member states' positions.  Many delegations 
complain that he forgets that the UNODC is driven by policy 
directions from the member states through decisions in the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ).  Some delegations attribute 
this to the fact that he has been the Executive Director for too 
long, while others ascribe it to his personality and outlook.  For 
example, Costa recently wrote an op-ed for the New York Times where 
he encouraged the United States to accede to and implement the 
Firearms Protocol of UNODC's Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.  UNVIE asked Costa to correct some legal and 
factual mistakes found in the draft which he sent to the mission for 
comments.  We also reminded Costa that he worked for member states, 
not the other way around. However, Costa responded that he was "the 
conscience of member states" and therefore felt obliged to speak 
out, even if his position did not represent member states'consensus. 
 Mission shares many of these concerns, and continues urging Costa 
towards greater prudence. 
 
------------------------- 
No Stranger to the Camera 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Costa loves publicity.  And he loves sound-bites, the more 
dramatic the better.  Often, however, he is more interested in drama 
than in the soundness or consequences of his statements.  For 
example, in attempting to push for a cybercrime convention, Costa 
referred to the internet as a "weapon of mass destruction."  When 
discussing the changing dynamics of human trafficking, he stated 
that "women are the new pimps."  His comment to journalist 
advocating that we flood Afghanistan with heroin in order to force a 
collapse in opium prices and a fall in poppy production was sound 
economics but awful policy.  He described the extremely divisive 
issue of "harm reduction" as a "tempest in a teapot."  Such 
statements, made with little or no warning to member states, or even 
to his own staff (and sometimes not even to his own speechwriter), 
certainly serve to provoke reaction, but does not help to advance 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000296  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
substantive dialogue or decisions.  Based on this pattern, we fear 
that for the June 24 rollout of the World Drug Report, Costa's PR 
handler could well give the event more glitz than substance. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Looking to Extend His Term 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Costa's term at UNODC is scheduled to expire in May 2010 
but he is privately lobbying member states and the UN Secretary 
General (SYG) for an extension to the end of 2011.  While he 
privately told a senior USG official that the decision to extend his 
term is solely in the hands of the SYG, he has taken advantage of 
Italy-sponsored international meetings in the last few months to 
campaign for his extension.  Gianfranco Fini, president of Italy's 
Chamber of Deputies (lower house of Parliament), and formerly Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, is considered to be Costa's 
political godfather, and undoubtedly instrumental in Costa's 
appointment to the UNODC in 2002.  However, Italian influence in 
UNODC, previously without parallel (an Italian has held Costa's 
position since the mid-1980's), is waning due to cuts in its 
international development assistance funds, including an 80 percent 
cut in contributions to UNODC. We have also heard speculation within 
UNODC that the SYG may want to shake up national monopolies of 
senior UN positions.  As a matter of general policy on term limits 
for senior UN officials, the U.S. does not support an extension of 
Costa's term (Reftel).  The UK shares our view for the same reasons. 
 However, the recently departed French Ambassador advocated support 
("lest we get someone worse"), and the Italian Mission in Vienna 
said Italy would definitely back Costa. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Costa is a friend of the United States, and has partnered 
well with us on our highest priorities in Afghanistan.  However, his 
energies do need to be channeled carefully.  His June 24 visit to 
Washington is another opportunity to do so.  End Comment. 
 
 
PYATT