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O 190642Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9640
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000286 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC ENRG MNUC IR IAEA PREL PINR KNNP KN SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/ELBARADEI UNPLUGGED:  DIRECTOR GENERAL'S 
BOARD INTERVENTION CHASTISES IRAN, REFLECTS ON NPT 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.   (SBU)  In a wide-ranging intervention following Iranian 
Ambassador Soltanieh's customary diatribe  at the conclusion 
of the Iran agenda item at the ongoing IAEA Board of 
Governors meeting, Director General (DG) ElBaradei took Iran 
to task amid the DG's "general reflections" on the health and 
well being of the NPT regime..   ElBaradei's off-the-cuff 
remarks, delivered in the tone of a private appeal to Iran, 
demonstrated his increasing propensity to speak as a free 
agent in the twilight of his tenure as Director General, but 
it also highlighted willingness to spotlight Iranian 
intransigence despite the outreached hand of the United 
States.   In particular, he rejected Soltanieh's assertion 
that the world is hearing the same old statements from those 
who claim to speak of "change," a clear reference to the 
United States.  Speaking in his stream-of -consciousness 
style , ElBaradei weaved in reflections on lessons learned 
from the DPRK  that underlined the need for dialogue with 
Iran and on other nuclear non 
proliferation issues.  The Director General appealed to Iran 
to seize the opportunity for engagement as he did in his 
introductory remarks, acknowledged the "gridlock" on the 
Iranian nuclear file (for which he largely blamed Iran) and 
insisted that the reason the Iran item is on the agenda of 
the Board "is because I put it there," in response to Iran's 
arguments that it be removed.    While we may disagree with 
several elements of ElBaradei's intervention, which took on 
the character and tone of a "lecture" by the Nobel Laureate 
to the Board, he effectively put Iran on the defensive and 
threw Soltanieh off his game.  Setting aside some of the 
overblown statements on familiar themes (for example, 
claiming the 2007 Iran work plan was successful in removing 
all questions about Iran's enrichment program and declaring 
he'd be "delighted" if the documents indicating nuclear 
weapons work in Iran were fake as in Iraq), ElBaradei made 
clear that issue before the Board were important issues "of 
war and peace" and Iran was only punishing itself by refusing 
to engage in a substantive discussion with him.  He also 
helpfully urged Iran to consider a "freeze -for- freeze" (an 
idea for which he took personal credit advocating for three 
years), and noted that Iran has no commercial need for 
enrichment.   The Director General extended his injunction 
for cooperation  to Syria, including beyond  strictly legal 
obligations by applying the Additional Protocol.  The overall 
message of ElBaradei's lecture to Iran was to "end the kabuki 
dance," as he put it and move forward. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Regarding other verification matters, ElBaradei 
remarked that the North Korean nuclear issue was an 
illustration of "how not to deal with verification issues," 
and showed that issues improved during periods of  dialogue. 
He also addressed Syria, noting that it was in Syria's best 
interest to cooperate with the IAEA on it investigation at 
the destroyed facility at Dair Alzour.  ElBaradei expressed 
hope for the future of the NPT, given President Obama and 
Medvedev's statements on the elimination of global nuclear 
weapons, and advocated for the universalization of the 
Additional Protocol and a multinational approach to the 
nuclear fuel cycle.  In addition, ElBaradei complained about 
the limitations the IAEA has with regard to access to 
satellite imagery, lack of independent capability to validate 
on environmental sample results, and an underfunded budget. 
End Summary and Comment. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
DG's Tutorial/Lessons-Learned on DPRK: 
"Dialogue the Only Way" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Before addressing the Iran issue, the DG used a 
simplified (and not altogether accurate) history of the DPRK 
case to undergird his coming argument for a solution in Iran. 
  ElBaradei noted that the DPRK issue had been before the 
IAEA and Board for 17 years.  He said this case illustrated 
"how not to deal with verification issues."  The DG said he 
saw the situation go from bad to worse and drew out the 
correlation that during periods of dialogue North Korea's 
nuclear ambitions were contained, such as during the Agreed 
Framework.  The DG observed that during periods of no 
dialogue, such as after the inspectors were kicked out in 
2003, there was more fissile material extracted for weapons 
and a nuclear test.  The situation got better during the 
dialogue of the Six Party Talks, but now this has ended and 
North Korea has conducted another nuclear test and announced 
a uranium enrichment program.  Undoubtedly with Iran in mind, 
the DG said "we need to talk to each other, not at each 
other" and that we "need to find a solution rather than call 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000286  002 OF 004 
 
 
each other names," and that "dialogue is the only solution." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Continuing his tutorial, he asserted that "we need 
to reflect on what is the right track."  He said there is a 
sense of cynicism about the NPT because of the perception 
that it is not being "implemented in a balanced way."  But 
now, the situation has "completely changed."  Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev have agreed to work toward a nuclear-free 
world, which makes realistic the hope that the NPT can now 
start to be implemented in a "wholesome way" that will reach 
the "NPT's ultimate goal of disarmament."  To buttress the 
case for such hope, the DG cited new attitudes toward the 
FMCT and CTBTO, as well as work towards smaller nuclear 
arsenals.  He concluded this portion of his comments by 
expressing the view that the world should not consist of 
"haves and have-nots." 
 
 
------------------------------- 
DG Addresses Iran Issue Head On 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In an unusual intervention, Director General (DG) 
ElBaradei concluded the Iran agenda item (to be reported 
Septel) at the Board of Governors meeting on June 17 by 
offering what he called "general reflections" on several IAEA 
and NPT-related issues.  He touched on Iran, DPRK, Syria, 
budget, fuel assurances, and the need for strengthened 
safeguards (Additional Protocol, transparency), but the 
central target of his interjection was Iran.  He clearly put 
the onus on Tehran to take advantage of the "new engagement" 
opportunity.   At times, ElBaradei addressed the Iran issue 
as if he were having a private, closed-door conversation with 
Iranian officials and was clearly looking directly at 
Ambassador Soltanieh.  Responding to Soltanieh's claim that 
the Board is hearing the same message from the U.S. and 
others that has previously heard, the DG acknowledged that 
indeed there has been much repetition over the past 4 years, 
but he noted and regretted that such repetition arises from 
the fact that the situation in Iran is in gridlock. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  ElBaradei explained that the "confidence deficit" 
about Iran began when Tehran failed to report the import of 
nuclear material as well as enrichment-related experiments 
that had been performed at the Kalaye Electric workshop.  He 
said these failures created problems for both the IAEA and 
the international community and caused the Iran nuclear file 
to be treated as "non-routine."  Responding to Iran and NAM 
requests to  remove the Iran issue as an agenda item from the 
Board meetings, ElBaradei emphasized that he was the one to 
put the issue on the agenda, that he would continue to do so, 
and that it was "no one else's business." 
 
---------------- 
The Four Pillars 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Addressing Iran's argument that its nuclear file 
was illegally referred to the UNSC, ElBaradei described four 
pillars to the NPT regime-the IAEA, the UNSC, multilateral 
dialogue, and bilateral dialogue-all of which must work 
together to address and resolve  issues, including Iran. 
ElBaradei expressed the view that recently the UNSC has shown 
used "sticks" through the adoption of sanctions, but that 
more must be done to move away from this pattern; the UNSC is 
also supposed to be a place for solving issues through 
dialogue.  He argued that when there is dialogue, only then, 
will there be movement on the issues. 
 
-------------------- 
Work Plan Not So Bad 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Recalling that the IAEA received a great deal of 
criticism over the Iran "work plan" adopted in August 2007, 
ElBaradei claimed that the IAEA accomplished a major 
achievement-through the "work plan"-with regard to Iran's 
uranium enrichment program.   He said that even the UNSC 
"paid tribute" to the IAEA's success.   (Comment:  This 
observation conveniently ignores the fact that, as the DG has 
reported several times, the IAEA is not in position to offer 
any assurances about the absence of undeclared uranium 
enrichment activities in Iran.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  ElBaradei also appealed to Iran to implement the 
Additional Protocol (AP) and Code 3.1.  He told Iran that 
setting aside UNSC requirements and obligations, the IAEA 
needs Iran to implement the AP so that the IAEA can make sure 
"things don't happen as they did in the past."  Directing his 
comments directly to Soltanieh, the DG argued that Iran 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000286  003 OF 004 
 
 
should implement the AP and Code 3.1 if they hope to build 
confidence. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
"Freeze-for- Freeze" and "New Air "from 
Washington" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Stating that Iran's uranium enrichment-related 
activities were at the crux of it problems, ElBaradei 
emphasized to Iran that no one was questioning its rights to 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and noted how suspension 
would help build confidence.  Recalling how he has been 
championing the "freeze - for-freeze" idea for severall years 
ElBaradei cited the "new air from Washington," there was no 
need for Iran to continue to rush to build enrichment 
capabilities, especially since the world already knows Iran 
has the technology to do so.  He said that "no one loses 
anything" with a "freeze-for- freeze," especially since Iran 
has no immediate need for commercial enrichment.   He also 
said that Iran is only penalizing itself, and this rut cannot 
continue, especially as "people are starting to make fun of 
the situation." 
 
----------------------------------- 
Need to Share the "Alleged Studies" 
Documents 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  With regard to the "alleged studies"-the green 
salt diagram, the missile re-entry vehicle design, and the 
high explosives work-ElBaradei commented that the IAEA has 
shared "some" of the information it has, but not "all." 
ElBaradei noted that he understands the sensitivities with 
"sources and methods,"  but Iran at least deserves copies of 
the material for "due process."  Pointing to DDG Safeguards 
Olli Heinonen and Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts, ElBaradei 
explained that there was enough substance in the "alleged 
studies" information to make "these guys" concerned, so Iran 
must engage in substantive discussions on this matter "of war 
and peace."  He said that he would be "delighted" if the 
documents were "fake" as in the case of Iraq, but the IAEA 
needs Iran's help in getting to the bottom of the issue.  He 
also noted that while the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies 
concluded that Iran stopped its weapons program in 2003, 
"others" (NFI) do not agree, and the "IAEA just does not 
know."   Again directing his gaze at Soltanieh, he said, "you 
need to talk to me, and you have not done that." 
 
------------------------------------- 
In Syria's Best Interest to Cooperate 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  On Syria, the DG recalled some Member States have 
said that the IAEA should not go beyond the obligations of 
the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).  (Comment: 
During the Syria agenda item that followed, a number of NAM 
countries reiterated that countries should not be asked to 
cooperate beyond their legal safeguards obligations.  End 
Comment).  The DG agreed that the authorities under the CSA 
are limited and then spoke directly to Syria saying "if you 
want to prove allegations are not accurate, the best thing to 
do is to be transparent" and added that it is in Syria's best 
interest to do so.  ElBaradei indicated that he has deplored 
Israel "more than once," noting  that , "not many of you did, 
I did."  In spite of this, he said that Syria also has an 
obligation and he hoped that the the issue of legalities 
would not result in this issue never being removed from the 
Board's agenda. 
 
------------- 
IAEA's Limits 
------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  In addition to explaining why both Iran and Syria 
need to extend additional transparency to the IAEA, ElBaradei 
commented that the IAEA has limited authorities and lack of 
independence when it comes to acquiring satellite imagery and 
validating environmental sampling.  The DG referred to the 
ongoing budget debate and thanked the U.S. specifically for 
its leadership and for the recent 10 million USD increase in 
voluntary funding. 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Need for Universalization of the 
Additional Protocol 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  ElBaradei explained-using the Iraq example-that 
without the AP, the IAEA has no credible verification 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000286  004 OF 004 
 
 
mechanisms to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in any given country, and 
that it is regrettable that currently there are over 100 
countries with a CSA, but no AP.  He said he cannot say a 
country is "absolutely clean" without the AP. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Fuel Assurances and Multinational Approach 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  ElBaradei noted that unfortunately more and more 
countries are seeking or are at least interested in their own 
uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities; he said a 
multinational approach is needed and the Russian 
International Enrichment Center (with commercial 
participation by other states) was a first step in the right 
direction.   He noted that as more states develop enrichment, 
we will have more states with a "1-2 month security margin" 
(a reference to short breakout timelines for 
enrichment-capable states).  The DG continued, "It is up to 
you if that is the kind of world you want." 
 
------------------------------- 
Don't Tell Us How to Do Our Job 
------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  In closing, ElBaradei responded to the EU, 
Australia, and Canada's calls for either a briefing or an 
annex in the next DG's report on Iran that would include the 
IAEA's assessment on possible military dimensions (PMD) (to 
be reported in Septel).  He emphasized that the IAEA writes 
its own reports and it is the Secretariat's business as to 
what is or is not included, "we are not co-managing 
safeguards."  He then asked Heinonen if he had anything to 
add.  Heinonen responded that the IAEA will carefully study 
the EU and Australian suggestions, especially on the 
outstanding issues, and will respond as appropriate in a 
timely manner.  ElBaradei then concluded by announcing that 
his interjection was not meant to provoke discussion or 
comment.  (Comment:  Thus discouraged, no one save Soltanieh 
responded.  Careful to note that he was not "commenting," he 
just wanted the Board to bear in mind that before the issue 
was referred to the UNSC, Iran was able to cooperate more. 
Once referred to UNSC, the Iranian Majles passed a law 
forbidding AP cooperation and Iran stopped implementing Code 
3.1) 
SCHULTE