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Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA276, CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA276 2009-06-15 14:32 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXRO8981
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0276/01 1661432
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151432Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9579
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000276 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC MNUC PREL TRGY IR IAEA KNNP SY KN
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
1.   (SBU)  Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Congressman 
Henry Waxman (D-CA) challenged IAEA DG ElBaradei's assessment 
of the threat Iran poses to Israel in a  May 26 private 
meeting.  ElBaradei used the opportunity to reiterate his 
views about international fuel banks, explain the IAEA's 
authority on weaponization-related issues, complain about the 
IAEA's lack of and limits placed on funding,  and express 
criticism of what he sees as past U.S. policy failures on 
Iran, DPRK, and Syria.  In a separate meeting, Tibor Toth, 
Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
of the CTBTO, explained the role of the CTBTO's verification 
and monitoring system and encouraged the U.S. ratification 
and entry into force of the Treaty.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
DG ElBaradei Repeats Same Lines 
from Press Interviews 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  During a meeting with Congresswoman Lowey and 
Congressman Waxman on May 26, IAEA Director General (DG) 
ElBaradei and DDG Management David Waller discussed the 
IAEA's role in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and 
current verification issues.  ElBaradei largely repeated 
similar points from his recent strand of press interviews. 
He said that more countries are becoming interested in 
nuclear power and the IAEA is there to help them achieve it 
in a safe and secure manner, recognizing  that one way to 
strengthen the NPT was through a multinational fuel cycle and 
fuel bank.  ElBaradei noted that an international fuel bank 
would make it difficult for countries to justify having their 
own nuclear fuel cycle program.  ElBaradei welcomed President 
Obama's comments about nuclear disarmament in Prague. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Regarding nuclear verification in Iran, ElBaradei 
made some provocative comments, noting that the IAEA was 
wrongly criticized for "missing it", bwhen in fact, Tehran's 
construction of the Natanz centrifuge complex had  not been a 
violation of its safeguards agreement since Iran was not 
within 180 days of introducing nuclear material.  ElBaradei 
also stated that he did not believe Iran really had intended 
to "hide" the Natanz facility since it was so large.  He 
argued that the trouble started when Iran "breached" its 
safeguards obligations by not reporting some past experiments 
with nuclear material.  Downplaying that Tehran "may have" 
conducted some "studies" in the past, ElBaradei said that the 
IAEA does not see a nuclear weapons program in Iran today and 
that he doubts Iran will cooperate  further with the IAEA on 
outstanding issues until it has a broader policy dialogue 
with the U.S. 
 
4.  (SBU)  ElBaradei criticized U.S. policy for failing on 
Iran, but indicated he has hope for the U.S. with its new 
"willingness for openness," and implored the U.S. to make 
some kind of "grand bargain" for a win/win outcome.  He 
believes Iran wants nuclear technology for respect, energy, 
and an "insurance policy" to be seen as a regional power and 
to be recognized by the U.S.  He noted that this issue will 
take time, and it is important for both Iran and the U.S. to 
realize they need each other, especially on issues related to 
Afghanistan, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinians, etc. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Responding to Congresswoman Lowey's questions 
about the IAEA's authority to monitor/investigate 
weaponization-related activities, ElBaradei said that the 
IAEA's authority is limited to those activities involving 
nuclear material, which excludes delivery systems and 
weaponization activities.  He then said the Additional 
Protocol (AP) would essentially allow the IAEA to go 
everywhere, although the IAEA cannot make guarantees on the 
absence of covert activities.  Both Lowey and Congressman 
Waxman asked if there were other mechanisms that would help 
the IAEA perform or broaden its verification duties. 
ElBaradei used this opening  to complain about how 
"shamefully unfunded" the IAEA was; how Member States put 
conditions on funding for nuclear security ; how the IAEA 
needs to have a new environmental sampling laboratory; and 
how the IAEA needs access to satellite imagery. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Lowey asked what one should do about a country 
-Iran-that wants to annihilate Israel.  ElBaradei replied 
that although he knows Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad says a 
lot of offensive things, he personally does not speak Farsi 
and is not sure that Ahmadi-Nejad's comments were translated 
correctly.  Waxman asked if Iran having a nuclear weapon 
would drive others in the Middle East to pursue such 
capabilities.  ElBaradei responded that he did not think so, 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000276  002 OF 002 
 
 
since Iran would not use a nuclear weapon on a neighbor. 
Lowey then commented that officials in Egypt, UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, and Jordan have all expressed concern during meetings 
with her over Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.  ElBaradei 
explained that he was much more worried about the Taliban 
being so close to Islamabad, since Pakistan actually does 
have nuclear weapons.  Responding to Waxman's question about 
Iran's desire for nuclear weapons, ElBaradei stated that his 
gut feeling was Iran would like to have nuclear weapons 
technology, but would sit on it, as "Japan and Brazil" did. 
Waxman then noted the importance and/or fear that other 
countries would have if Iran was a "virtual" nuclear weapons 
state.  ElBaradei replied that was why it is important to 
negotiate, using both pressure and incentives, and have a 
tight inspection regime.  He said the U.S. a generation ago 
achieved a paradigm-break with China and should do so now 
with Iran. 
 
7.  (SBU)  ElBaradei also criticized the U.S. for 
"mismanaging" the North Korean nuclear issue, commenting that 
North Korea has the "trump card"-nuclear weapons-and will use 
it to gain concessions.  Unlike Iran, ElBaradei stated that 
North Korea could be bought off, and that the international 
community should not allow the "human tragedy"-the starving 
people-to continue, especially since the targeted sanctions 
have not hurt the regime. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Waxman asked ElBaradei why he was so critical of 
Israel and the U.S. for Israel's attack on the Syrian nuclear 
reactor, given that Israel and Syria still are in a state of 
war.  ElBaradei replied that he does not support the use of 
unilateral force, and the IAEA should have been given a 
chance to do its job, but now the IAEA is stuck an 
"impossible task" of ascertaining what the Syrians were 
constructing.  Waxman asked what the IAEA would have done it 
if had been informed of the Syrian activities before the 
attack.  ElBaradei said the IAEA would have gone to the 
Syrians first, gotten cooperation, and confirmed whether or 
not Syria was building a reactor. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DPRK Example to Explain CTBTO Monitoring System 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
9.  (SBU)  The Codel also met with Ambassador Tibor Toth, 
Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization 
(CTBTO), on May 26.  Toth explained the functioning of the 
International Monitoring System (IMS), the verification 
system of the CTBT, using the recent alleged nuclear test by 
the DPRK as an example of how the system functioned.  Toth 
stressed the improvements made in the system in the last ten 
years and noted the importance of continued U.S. engagement 
on the technical side.  He also spoke of the importance of 
U.S. ratification to catalyze the entry into force of the 
Treaty.  The Codel toured the Operations Center of the PTS, 
where all IMS stations are continuously monitored. 
 
10. (U) Note: The CODEL had the opportunity to review this 
message. 
SCHULTE