VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0273/01 1631317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121317Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9572
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000273 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA 
NA-20 BAKER/LOONEY/, NA-20.1 KOONTZ 
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25 
HUIZENGA/VOLGER, NA-243-GOOREVICH/BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR, 
LAMONTAGNE 
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
 
SUBJECT: IAEA GIVES SOME INSIGHT INTO THE NEW 2010-2013 NUCLEAR 
SECURITY PLAN 
 
REF: (A) UNVIE 143 (B) UNVIE 65 (C) UNVIE 74 
 
¶1. (SBU)SUMMARY:  The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) is 
making a good faith effort to involve Member States in developing 
the next Nuclear Security Plan (NSP) for 2010 - 2013. A draft 
outline discussed initially June 4 and 5 follows the new 
organization structure ONS put forward in the draft IAEA budget for 
2010-2011 (REF A-C).  The plan outline has a regional focus; 
however, it needs to be updated with more detail and emphasis on 
IAEA's role in nuclear security over the long term.  Ambassador 
conveyed to ONS chief Nilsson and representatives of major donor 
states June 5 that ONS must define its "niche" in global nuclear 
security activities with a succinct statement of mission, must build 
Member State "ownership" of the program by emphasizing its 
geographic reach, and must make the case for financial resources to 
retain good staff and sustain their work.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)On June 5, several key sponsors of the Nuclear Security Fund 
attended a meeting convened by the Secretariat, to discuss the 
outline draft of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013. The 
meeting was chaired by Office of Nuclear Security Director, Anita 
Nilsson.  Nilsson stressed that the plan puts emphasis on the need 
for a capability to deal with nuclear security at the regional and 
international levels - not just at the state level - and that it 
should be a long-term, and not an ad-hoc, effort.  Nilsson also 
underscored the insufficient set of internationally accepted 
guidelines when it comes to nuclear security.  Consistent with the 
Director General's program and budget proposal for 2010-11, the ONS 
plan is structured into four program areas: a comprehensive 
information platform for monitoring and communications; the 
establishment of global nuclear security regions, an area which also 
includes R&D; nuclear services packages that follow a modular 
approach, i.e. can be put together by individual states as they see 
fit; and risk reduction.  The goal of the plan is that ONS can 
better tailor its services to the circumstances and needs in 
recipient countries. 
 
U.S. PRIORITIES 
--------------- 
¶3. (SBU)In response to Ms. Nilsson's presentation, Ambassador 
Schulte identified three prerequisites for the success of the NSP. 
Firstly, he said ONS had to identify how the IAEA nuclear security 
program is part of a broader international effort that includes the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UNSCR 1540, border 
training through UNODC and the OSCE, and other elements.  The IAEA's 
comparative advantage lay in propagating a global nuclear security 
culture, including through cooperation in training programs and the 
issuance of guidance documents, as well as supporting efforts 
towards sustainability.  Ambassador Schulte stressed that the NSP 
should not be too ambitious or broad in its aims and that the role 
of the IAEA should be defined more clearly.  He questioned the 
Agency's need to include security-specific R&D and noted that 
providing detection equipment was a task that certain Member States 
were likely to be have vastly more resources for than would the 
IAEA. Second, he urged member-state ownership beyond the group of 
donors; and finally, it is important for the IAEA to have resources, 
in the regular budget, in order to avoid unpredictability. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ambassador indicated that the NSP should reinforce the 
message that Nuclear Security is a core function benefitting all 
Member States.  Expanding the sense of program "ownership" beyond 
major donors to the low-income states (G-77 plus some in Eastern 
Europe) receiving 75 percent of ONS program activity was crucial. 
He advocated associating ONS activity with the Global Partnership 
and emphasizing nuclear security as an essential context and 
confidence-builder for both disarmament and the expansion of 
peaceful uses. The plan must reflect that services and benefits are 
available to all.  Thirdly, in terms of the resources, Ambassador 
cautioned member states that the only way to avoid unpredictability 
for the plan is through "a real increase in the Agency budget." 
 
MEMBER STATES COMMENT ON PRIORITIES AND PLAN STRUCTURE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶5. (SBU)Germany expressed its readiness to "fully cooperate" in the 
development of the NSP. Echoing statements by the U.S., Germany 
urged that the Secretariat give donors feedback on where their 
contributions are needed the most.  New Zealand stressed that 
transportation security deserves special attention, and mentioned 
that the lack of comprehensive inventories of material in some 
Pacific and Asian countries, for example, can be a hurdle to 
achieving long-term nuclear security. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU)The United Kingdom promised more detailed comments once 
London reviews the document.  In the meantime, it proposed that 
smart indicators be built into the reporting stage of the process, 
so as to have a clear picture of the progress before the final 
assessment. The U.S. seconded this recommendation and added that 
this should also apply to the sustainability aspect of the plan. 
Likewise, Canada expressed support for the U.S. emphasis on ONS 
fitting itself into broader international efforts.  On format, 
Canada suggested that the Plan's section C, on drivers, be expanded 
to include, among others, the international threat environment, and 
that there be more linkage between sections F, on providing nuclear 
security, and G, on risk reduction and security improvement. 
 
¶7. (SBU)In reply to Germany's request for more details about the 
proposed Nuclear Security Support Centers, Nilsson described these 
as centers of excellence that would fulfill three purposes: 
technical backup for, among others, instrument maintenance and 
assistance with readings; coordination of national development of 
objectives and processes in countries with larger-magnitude 
programs; and boosting capacity/attaining economies of scale at a 
regional level in areas such as nuclear forensics for which 
individual nations may lack means. 
 
THE NEXT STEPS 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) This meeting was the first IAEA consultation on the NSP. 
A second informal consultation, based on a more detailed draft plan, 
is expected to take place at the end of June, after which the 
Nuclear Security Advisory Group (AdSec) would be extended an 
invitation to provide input.  An open-ended meeting with a larger 
audience will take place by the end of July.  The document presented 
at that meeting will be a near-final version of the NSP.  The final 
document will be available in the beginning of August, so that it 
may be discussed in the General Conference. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) A more comprehensive NSP should be available within a 
couple weeks for USG comment.  As ONS proceeds in drafting, the 
Mission will focus on working with ONS to ensure the plan reflects 
USG priorities and a clearly defined and delimited role for the IAEA 
within global nuclear security efforts. 
 
SCHULTE