VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0259/01 1561001
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051001Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1354
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9541
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000259 
 
STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA - COCKERHAM, RAGSDALE 
ISN/NESS - BURKART 
DOE FOR NA24, NA-241 - SIEMON/O'CONNOR/LAMONTAGNE; NA-243 - 
GOOREVICH; NA-242 - MALLIN 
NRC FOR NMSS - AQUILAR, MARSHALL; OIP - SCHWARTZMAN, MDOANE 
DOD FOR ELBERT, KILLIAN, HOWE 
PASS TO BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY FOR PEPPER 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IAEA OTRA KNNP TRGY AORC
SUBJECT:  IAEA/SAFEGUARDS: HIGHLIGHTS OF 2009 U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM 
ANNUAL REVIEW MEETING 
 
REF:  STATE 48677 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The U.S. Support Program (USSP) annual review meeting with 
the IAEA Department of Safeguards (SG) highlighted the new and 
ongoing 2008-2009 SG R&D Programme projects for which U.S. and other 
Member State support has been or will be requested.  The overarching 
theme was the on-going shift from accountancy-based safeguards to 
"information-driven safeguards," which is seen as essential for 
positioning the Agency to provide more credible assurances about the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities.  Discussions included 
strategies for planning, training, and recruiting to achieve the 
systemic, cultural and technological change needed to facilitate 
this shift. Other key themes included implementing knowledge 
management approaches to compensate for the high turnover due to 
retirement and the IAEA's rotation policy; developing or acquiring 
new tools and systems for information collection, analysis (a 
linchpin for "information-driven" safeguards), management; new 
inspection tools to help the IAEA detect unreported materials and 
activities; and automating remote inspections.  The common theme 
evident in discussions with all IAEA SG divisions was human 
resources-related, i.e., issues associated with recruiting, 
training, and retaining quality staff members.  (Comment:  Despite 
inquiries from the U.S. delegation, it remains unclear why SG did 
not make a human resource focus a bigger priority in its 2010-2011 
Program and Budget proposal.)  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (U) The USSP meets annually with IAEA Safeguards Department (SG) 
officials and staff to exchange information about the status of 
major SG projects to which the U.S. contributes substantially 
through direct and "in-kind" support.  In this year's May 18 - 20 
meeting, SG participation consisted mainly of support division staff 
members, who are principally in charge of Safeguards R&D tasks.  The 
U.S. delegation consisted of the Subgroup on Safeguards Techical 
Support, SSTS (made up of representatives from the Departments of 
State, Energy, Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 
which makes the funding decisions for the USSP; representatives from 
the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, which administers the day-to-day operations of 
the USSP and monitors USSP tasks; one representative from NNSA's 
Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22); 
contractor representatives from various DOE laboratories and the 
private sector; and UNVIE MsnOffs.  Some of the laboratory 
representatives gave technology briefings, which were well attended 
by Safeguards staff.  This cable reports highlights of the meeting; 
the full agenda and presentations are available from ISPO (POC: 
Susan Pepper, pepper@bnl.gov). 
 
--------------- 
Opening Remarks 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Opening remarks were made by UNVIE Ambassador Schulte; Olli 
Heinonen, Deputy Director General for Safeguards; Nikolai 
Khlebnikov, Safeguards Technical Support (SGTS) Director; and 
William O'Connor, DOE/NNSA, Chair of the SSTS.  Ambassador Schulte 
opened the meeting by emphasizing U.S. commitment to continued 
extrabudgetary support and plans for making a significant increase 
in the IAEA regular budget.  He spoke of strengthening safeguards, 
including via the need for universal adherence to the Additional 
Protocol, and via "information-driven safeguards." 
 
¶4. (U) Heinonen also cited information-driven safeguards and the 
need for tools to detect undeclared activities.  He said the new 
tools have to work differently than before to address the expanding 
Safeguards missions, to manage Safeguards data and to equip new 
facilities coming under safeguards.  Inspection planning should be 
targeted toward keeping inspectors on the ground where needed, but 
automating many of the routine elements of inspection and moving 
toward remote inspection activity as much as possible, noting that 
the unpredictable timing of remote inspections enhanced their value 
as deterrents to cheating. 
 
 
¶5. (U) Heinonen and the Divisions of Safeguards Information 
Management (SGIM) and Safeguards Concepts and Planning (SGCP) are 
working to organize departmental processes and procedures, IT 
systems, and other tools to optimize the information-driven 
safeguards approach.  Jill Cooley, Director of SGCP, in her 
presentation on the State Level Approach, acknowledged that the 
Secretariat is still at the stage where the term "information-driven 
safeguards" (IDS) may mean different things to different people. 
She said that to her, IDS is the use of all available SG-relevant 
information to "plan, conduct, and evaluate activities and identify 
follow-up actions."  This works in a continuous feedback loop to 
update the evaluation of each State. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Khlebnikov underscored the USSP as the oldest, largest and 
most comprehensive support program.  He emphasized the need for R&D 
efforts to develop safeguards equipment needed to fully automate 
remote inspections; the need to develop software to manage the 
increased amount of information that is being collected; and the 
need to standardize and fully integrate equipment.  (Comment: Fully 
automated inspections and other information management tools would 
help the Safeguards Department cope with significant increases over 
the last two decades in the amount of nuclear material and the 
number of facilities under Safeguards, and with its expanded 
missions, e.g., information analysis and planning under the 
Additional Protocol.  See reftel for further discussion of this 
issue.  End Comment.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
USSP Safeguards Equipment Developments 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) SG officials and staff were clearly appreciative of the 
sustained USSP support for equipment development, expertise, and 
training.  The USSP-supported roadmapping workshops that bring 
together SG customers with technology developers and suppliers are 
an effective way for SG managers and staff to assess needs in a 
targeted area, systematically categorize the problems and identify 
technology gaps -- as well as promising solutions -- and recommend 
steps forward.  SG officials did express concern, however, over the 
negative impact that unexpected developments with U.S. contractors 
can have on completion of Agency tasks.  For example, recently, a 
U.S. contractor experienced a loss of key personnel resulting in a 
six month delay in the development of the Next Generation 
Surveillance System (NGSS), an important IAEA project, which is a 
joint venture of the USSP and the German Support Program. 
 
¶8. (U) Heinonen and other IAEA officials thanked the USSP for its 
generous support to development of the NGSS, a project that will 
cost the USSP over $3 million, and other containment and 
surveillance activities, and they expressed appreciation for U.S. 
flexibility in working with the IAEA.  (The USSP has historically 
developed containment and surveillance equipment that meets unique 
IAEA communication security and tamper indication requirements, 
because other users with similar needs are rare.  The vendors for 
this equipment must be ready to serve small markets successfully.) 
They believe this type of support will always be needed to maintain 
effective accountancy-based safeguards. 
- 
¶9. (SBU) The IAEA and the USSP noted a number of successes that were 
marked at the annual Task Review Meeting in April.  However, 
O'Connor noted that a number of tasks are experiencing technical 
problems and administrative delays that have the attention of the 
SSTS and the USSP.  Steps are being taken, when possible, to 
facilitate the completion of these tasks. 
 
¶10. (SBU) O'Connor emphasized that the USSP continues to monitor 
progress and requirements associated with the IAEA's Safeguards 
Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in order to help ensure a coordinated 
U.S. support effort.  The USSP recently approved funding for 
continued development of the SAL Laboratory Information Management 
System (ILIMS).  USSP funding was also approved for consultant David 
Swindle to act as an independent consultant to the IAEA's project 
"Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services" 
(ECAS).  IAEA officials noted their appreciation for Mr. Swindle's 
contribution and judged he is uniquely qualified to assist the IAEA 
on this critical issue.  (Note:  Because many of the ISPO and SSTS 
delegates had never visited SAL, a half-day tour of the laboratories 
was provided.  SAL officials presented an overview of SAL facilities 
 
and capabilities; briefly discussed the ILIMS project, and gave a 
walking tour of the Clean Lab, the SIMS Lab, and the Nuclear 
Materials Laboratory.  End Note.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) SSTS Member Steve LaMontagne (NNSA) provided two briefings 
on DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the 
first an overview of the NGSI program plan, funded in FY2009 with 
$42 Million, and the second an overview of selected technology 
projects.  (Comment: Although the IAEA has been briefed a number of 
times on the NGSI program and senior IAEA safeguards officials 
attended a formative NGSI meeting last fall, a question remains in 
the minds of IAEA officials -- as well as in Mission -- as to how 
NGSI will interact with the Safeguards Department, and in particular 
the relationship between NGSI and the USSP in that regard.  Mission 
looks forward to working closely with DOE/NNSA, the USSP, and the 
IAEA to develop a process forNGSI and USSP interactions with the 
Secretariat that ensures a well-coordinated and effective channel 
for advancing U.S. strengthened safeguards priorities.  End 
Comment.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Human Resources and Knowledge Management 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) In 2008, the USSP responded to IAEA requests and sponsored 
eighteen cost free experts (CFEs) and ten junior professional 
officers (JPOs).  The USSP provides this support to the IAEA to 
assist with short-term projects in areas where the IAEA does not 
have in-house expertise or to enable experienced staff to address 
more complex issues.  During their assignments the CFEs and JPOs 
also gain valuable experience in IAEA tools and methods and new 
technologies.  The USSP was happy to hear that the IAEA recognizes 
this value and expertise; for example, during the last year the 
Agency hired four of the CFEs and JPOs into regular IAEA staff 
positions. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Many of the SG presentations highlighted issues associated 
with recruiting, training, and retaining quality staff members, and 
preserving key knowledge before a staff member leaves.  An acute 
shortage of staff is in the information analysis area.   Jacques 
Baute, director of SGIM, stated that this is not only a numbers 
issue, but finding, or in his word, "brewing," the right mix of 
skills and expertise.  SGCP initiated a pilot knowledge management 
exercise, based on which it will develop a more comprehensive effort 
to capture the knowledge of retiring staff.  The SG training section 
has undertaken a study with the French Support Program to 
characterize the soft-skill competency profiles for inspectors in 
the various jobs of procedure-based activities, complementary 
access, and reporting.  Many of the skills can be improved by 
training, but others are innate and difficult to teach.  For these 
innate skills, the IAEA needs to use improved recruiting techniques 
to find suitable candidates.  In wrap-up discussions, USSP officials 
declared that they will follow up with SG officials to find out more 
about the skills and expertise now needed and envisioned for 
Safeguards. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
IAEA and USSP Strategic Planning Efforts 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) SG reported on its long-term strategic planning exercise, 
which was initiated in 2008 and planned for completion at the end of 
¶2009.  To date, the only product is a review of the external 
environment that may affect the future of IAEA safeguards.  Thus, 
relatively little has been accomplished on this important task. 
(DDG Heinonen, who initiated the long-term strategic planning effort 
and is heavily invested in producing a useful outcome, told MsnOff 
that the first phase of the report is due to him in early June.) 
There is also some unease with the fact that Member States have not 
been engaged in the process, and it is unknown how much of the plan 
might be shared with them. (Comment:  Mission notes related U.S. 
efforts, that would benefit from improved coordination, including 
USSP Strategic Planning and elaboration of NGSI.  Further, Mission 
fears that lack of communication in this area might make future 
Member State cooperation and buy-in to the strategic plan more 
 
difficult, and will be working with the appropriate safeguards 
officials to help facilitate appropriate member state insight.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶15. (U) O'Connor informed the IAEA that the SSTS and ISPO are also 
currently involved in strategic planning and working toward a more 
results-based approach.  A one-day meeting was convened on May 21 to 
discuss and incorporate some results of the USSP Annual Meeting into 
the strategic plan, and to define short-term goals and action plans. 
 The discussion also took into account Heinonen's stated priority to 
devote more resources to strengthening the effectiveness of efforts 
to address undeclared activities; some such resources might be 
generated by improving the efficiency of routine safeguards 
activities.  USSP priority areas -- all of which are consistent with 
the IAEA focus on undeclared activities -- are Human Resources, 
Quality Management Improvement, Information Management, Training, 
and Concepts and Approaches. 
 
----------------------- 
U.S. Delegation Comment 
----------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) USSP officials were pleased with the outcome of the meeting. 
 Overall, the meeting was very useful for the exchange of 
information and the maintenance of contacts for effective 
implementation of USSP projects to the IAEA.  The SSTS was 
particularly impressed with the quality of the presentations from 
and interaction with SGIM.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
SCHULTE 
 
 
 
 
 
           UNCLASSIFIED