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Viewing cable 09TOKYO1474, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/30/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO1474 2009-06-30 07:07 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO2130
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1474/01 1810707
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300707Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4187
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7282
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4951
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8754
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 2490
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5474
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0181
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6212
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5899
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/30/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Lack of unity in LDP; Aso denies replacement of three party 
executives (Asahi) 
 
(2) Gov. Nakaima denies he asked for 110-meter offshore relocation 
(Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(3) Dugong discovery not described in prelim report on environmental 
assessment (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(4) Japanese-version Nye Report needed (Sankei) 
 
(5) Simulation Report: No data suggesting alleged "deteriorating 
public safety," "increase in crimes by juveniles, foreigners," etc. 
- all media lies; Japan is still one of the safest countries in the 
world (Sapio) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Lack of unity in LDP; Aso denies replacement of three party 
executives 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
June 30, 2009 
 
Set off by turmoil over Aso's plan to change the three party 
executive officers, a rift has opened up even among senior Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) members and faction chairmen who have so far 
supported Prime Minister Aso. Former prime minister Abe and others 
suggest that Prime Minister Aso should try to turn the tables by 
exercising the right of personnel management, but Diet Affairs 
Committee Chairman Tadamori Oshima, former chief cabinet secretary 
Nobutaka Machimura and others are negative about Aso's use of the 
right. While Aso is rapidly losing support of his party, the LDP 
itself is also coming apart. 
 
Members supportive of Aso and against change of executive lineup: 
Give priority to unity, resigned to become opposition members 
 
Former secretary general Bunmei Ibuki admonished Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Kawamura, the prime minister's right hand, in the Diet 
Building yesterday for the recent turmoil over replacement of the 
party executive lineup, saying: "Don't make a fuss." Appearing on a 
TV program on June 27, Ibuki also expressed his opposition to the 
idea of changing the lineup, remarking: "With Diet dissolution just 
around the corner, the party must move ahead with a whole-party 
stance without changing the executive lineup." 
 
Ibuki, Machimura - chairman of the Machimura faction - and Oshima, 
all of whom are eight-term senior officials, have supported the 
straying Aso administration. Despite falling public support ratings 
for the Aso administration, they continued to say: "It is the prime 
minister who should dissolve the Diet," distinguishing themselves 
from anti-Aso forces, such as former secretary general Hidenao 
Nakagawa. 
 
However, Aso's idea of replacing the three party executive officers 
was a total surprise to them. If the three top executives, including 
Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda, are replaced, not only the three 
officers but also members in the factions which the three belong to 
will surely harbor dissatisfaction with Aso. In such a case, some 
 
TOKYO 00001474  002 OF 010 
 
 
might begin to call for changing the prime minister. Moreover, ideas 
are floating of installing to the post of secretary general Election 
Strategy Committee Vice Chairman Yoshihide Suga, a close aide to the 
prime minister, and Labor, Health and Welfare Minister Masuzoe, who 
has a high profile but has not enough experience as a House of 
Councillors member. 
 
On June 25, when Aso indicated the possibility of changing the party 
executive lineup during a speech at the Japan Press Club on June 25, 
Machimura made a phone call to Aso, in which he said: "Meeting only 
Mr. Suga is undesirable. You should not replace Secretary General 
Hosoda. If that is the case, you might lose our faction's confidence 
in you." 
 
This remark is to indicate that if the prime minister replaces 
Hosoda, who belongs to the Machimura faction, the largest faction 
might stop supporting Aso. Machimura further told Aso: "It is the 
prime minister who decides on when to dissolve the Lower House, but 
I think it would be better to dissolve the Diet at an early date." 
 
If Aso continues to delay the dissolution, moves to "dump Aso" might 
become full-scale, and the LDP may be torn apart. A senior Machimura 
faction member commented: "While being resigned to fall from power, 
we may have to face the election." This lawmaker has already kept in 
mind an "opposition party LDP," based on the judgment that it would 
be better to quickly hold the election, rather than to see the party 
disintegrate in midair. 
 
Anti-Aso members against change of executive lineup: Call for moving 
up presidential election 
 
Former secretary general Hidenao Nakagawa thrust a demand with Aso 
for his resignation in protest of his strategy of early Diet 
dissolution. On his homepage, Nakagawa revealed his eagerness to 
dump Aso, noting: "Dissolution despite dismal public support ratings 
is tantamount to 'dissolution with desperation and assault.' I 
absolutely oppose an early Diet dissolution aimed to contain moves 
to oust Aso." 
 
Early this year, Nakagawa revealed his anti-Aso stance, but at that 
time, junior members refrained from joining him while just watching 
the situation. But this time, Aso has already said that the 
dissolution is in the not-so-distant future," Nakagawa believes that 
junior members will have no choice but to rise to action. 
 
In actuality, "Aso-dumping moves" never stop, as seen from the 
activity by Lower House member Koichiro Shimizu, one of the 
so-called Koizumi children, to gather signatures for holding a 
confidence vote in the prime minister. A person close to Nakagawa 
said: "There are few people who think it would be desire to hold an 
election under Prime Minister Aso." 
 
The view is gaining influence that Diet dissolution will be delayed 
to sometime after the Tokyo assembly election as Aso remains unable 
to replace the three party executive officers. A lawmaker close to 
Nakagawa said: "The next reaction will come after the Tokyo assembly 
election." Anti-Aso forces are aiming to prevent "dissolution with 
desperation" until the current Diet session adjourns on July 28 and 
to hold a party presidential election after the end of the session. 
 
To front-load the party presidential election, approval from a 
majority (216) of all Diet members and prefectural federation 
 
TOKYO 00001474  003 OF 010 
 
 
representatives is necessary as long as the prime minister does not 
decide to step down. Lower House member Taku Yamamoto of the 
Machimura faction announced he has already collected signatures from 
108 party members. He is resolved to step up efforts to gather 
signatures before the end of the Diet session. 
 
Even so, if Aso suddenly decides to dissolve the Lower House, there 
will be no time for a presidential election. A mid-ranking Diet 
member said: "In such a case, I will carry out my own election 
campaign, separately from Prime Minister Aso's campaign." 
 
Now that the LDP is going deeper into confusion, more than 20 
Koizumi children met at a Japanese restaurant near the Diet Building 
last night. Former prime minister Koizumi also attended the 
gathering and encouraged them by saying: "Don't rely on the party. I 
would like you to work out (a strategy) by yourself and fight the 
election independently." 
 
Pro-Aso supportive of change of executive lineup: Driven into corner 
with strategy of dissolution disrupted 
 
Election Strategy Committee Vice Chairman Suga deplored the present 
state of the LDP in a speech yesterday: "In the LDP, calls are 
growing for an election under someone other than Prime Minister Aso. 
That is really lamentable." 
 
Although Suga is in his fourth term, he is viewed as the closest 
aide to the prime minister. He has been in the forefront since he 
was appointed as internal affairs and communications minister in the 
Abe cabinet. His influence has been increasing remarkably. 
 
Now that former finance minister Shoichi Nakagawa and former 
internal affairs and communications minister Kunio Hatoyama, both of 
whom are friends of Aso, have left his cabinet, Suga is playing a 
key role, along with former prime minister Abe, in mapping out Aso's 
Diet dissolution strategy. Suga and Abe also succeeded in persuading 
Aso to decide to keep Nishikawa in the post of Japan Post president, 
although Aso was in favor of replacing Nishikawa. Many party members 
see Suga and others suddenly suggested the idea of replacing the top 
executive lineup in an attempt to increase their influence. The idea 
of "secretary general Suga" has also cropped up. 
 
Not only anti-Aso forces but even factional chairmen and party 
executives who have supported unpopular Prime Minister Aso have 
begun to voice opposition to the idea of changing the party 
executive lineup. Seeing their stance, an official who once served 
as secretary general said: "Their opposition probably is stemming 
from their sense of alarm that the post of secretary general might 
be assumed by a junior member, like Mr. Suga. Lawmakers close to Aso 
are still placing expectations on a "secretary general Suga." But 
one cabinet minister flatly said last night: "Mr. Abe and Mr. Suga 
have certainly lost in the game. The Aso LDP has been completely 
ended. He is already a lame-duck." 
 
Once Aso's strategy on Diet dissolution and personnel changes 
collapses, Abe and Suga, who have given instructions on the 
strategy, will unavoidably be driven into a corner. 
 
(2) Gov. Nakaima denies he asked for 110-meter offshore relocation 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Abridged) 
June 30, 2009 
 
TOKYO 00001474  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
The Okinawa prefectural assembly met yesterday to hold a 
question-and-answer session, with eight prefectural assembly members 
from the opposition parties taking the platform. In the session, 
Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima denied that he negotiated behind 
the scenes with then Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura over 
the offshore installation of an alternative facility for the U.S. 
military's Futenma airfield. "I have never asked the government to 
move it 110 meters," he stated. 
 
This April Machimura told the Ryukyu Shimpo in an interview that the 
government should approve the Futenma replacement facility's 
offshore move within a range of 55 meters for possible changes to 
the Futenma relocation plan within the bounds of an environmental 
impact assessment. Machimura also revealed that in his 
behind-the-scenes negotiations with the governor, he was about to 
reach a settlement on revisions to the Futenma relocation plan 
within the limits of an environmental assessment. On this matter, a 
senior official of the prefectural government had explained that 
Okinawa Prefecture sought two-stage revisions (within a range of 110 
meters) but failed to reach a settlement with the government. 
 
Meanwhile, Nakaima, in his statement on the government's plan to 
carry out its environmental assessment, called on the government to 
conduct a multiple-year survey of dugongs. This survey, however, was 
left out of the government's preliminary report on its environmental 
assessment. In this respect, Kenji Chinen, director general of 
Okinawa Prefecture's cultural and environmental affairs department, 
indicated his view, saying: "If the prediction and assessment based 
on the results (of the environmental assessment) are appropriate, it 
can be taken as the same as having substantially conducted a 
multiple-year survey." 
 
(3) Dugong discovery not described in prelim report on environmental 
assessment 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 31) (Abridged) 
June 30, 2009 
 
This April, the Okinawa Defense Bureau, an outlet in Okinawa 
Prefecture of the Defense Ministry, sent in a preliminary report to 
Okinawa Prefecture on its assessment of a potential impact on the 
environs of an alternative facility to be built for the U.S. 
military's Futenma airfield. This preliminary report, however, did 
not describe the discovery of a dugong in waters off the coast of 
Nago City's Henoko district, while it is described in the 
Environment Ministry's fact-finding report and in the Defense 
Ministry's environmental assessment plan, sources revealed 
yesterday. 
 
What was not described in the Defense Ministry's preliminary report 
is the fact that a dugong wandered in the sea on March 7, 2005 from 
the offing of Ginoza through the offing of Henoko for 7 hours and 11 
minutes. This fact is described in the Environment Ministry's report 
that outlined findings from its wide-area survey of dugongs and sea 
weed beds from 2001 through 2005. Furthermore, the Okinawa Defense 
Bureau's environmental assessment plan, which was sent in to Okinawa 
Prefecture in August 2007, describes it, citing data from the 
Environment Ministry report. 
 
The Save the Dugong Campaign Center (SDCC) sent an open letter of 
inquiry to Okinawa Defense Bureau Director General Ro Manabe and 
 
TOKYO 00001474  005 OF 010 
 
 
Environment Minister Tetsuo Saito for their explanations. 
 
(4) Japanese-version Nye Report needed 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Abridged slightly) 
June 30, 2009 
 
Keiko Chino, special reporter 
 
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, known to be 
well-versed in Japanese affairs, stated (on June 25) about Japan's 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs: "The opposition Democratic Party of Japan has 
expressed skeptical positions about the Japan-U.S. security 
alliance. (The current domestic political uncertainty and 
realignment) could cause friction in the alliance." The Sankei 
Shimbun reported this on June 27 as part of a dispatch from 
Washington. 
 
 
Nye's concern was expected. I, too, held concern in a different 
sense on recent congressional confirmation testimony by Kurt 
Campbell, who has been nominated as assistant secretary of state for 
East Asian and Pacific affairs. 
 
Campbell did not pose any questions about the DPJ or Japan's 
political situation. Conversely, I sensed from Campbell's policies 
and his replies a deep knowledge about, trust in, and discretion for 
the Asia Pacific region, especially Japan. 
 
In view of his predecessor, Christopher Hill, who failed in North 
Korea policy, I thought that Campbell was perfectly cut out for the 
post. But that is the very reason why I am concerned about Japan. 
Can Japan really draw on this opportunity? 
 
The next general election is close at hand. If the results of 
opinion polls are true, a change of administration is also 
imminent. 
 
Focused only on a possible change of government through the next 
general election, the ruling and opposition parties have almost 
completely forgotten to discuss their visions for and the modalities 
of the state. There have been almost no debates on foreign and 
security policies. Those matters were skipped in the recent 
party-heads debate. The DPJ's draft policies lack specifics as 
well. 
 
What are the policies toward the Indian Ocean, piracy off Somalia, 
Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, and North Korea? If the continuity 
of foreign and security polities is disrupted because of a possible 
power shift, the United States' trust in Japan will also waver. 
Tangible and intangible losses from it will be immeasurable. 
 
The concern expressed by Nye is probably only the tip of the 
iceberg. His concern can be paraphrased as public discontent with 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and public anxiety over the DPJ. 
I believe this is the right time to consider a Japanese-version 
Armitage-Nye Report based on Nye's concern. 
 
The so-called Nye report, which is officially titled "The United 
States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership" was issued 
in October 2000 immediately before the presidential election. Ahead 
 
TOKYO 00001474  006 OF 010 
 
 
of an anticipated close race between the Democratic and Republican 
parties, a nonpartisan study group consisted of Republican Richard 
Armitage, Democratic Nye, and others sent out a message through the 
report that whichever wins the presidential race, U.S. security 
policy toward Japan will not change. 
 
The Armitage report and "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right 
through 2020," which is commonly called Armitage Report 2 now form 
the unwavering foundation of Japan-U.S. relations of the 21st 
century. 
 
Elections are unpredictable. Even so, Japan as a mature nation needs 
to send the message that regardless of the results of the election, 
the foundation of the nation's security policy will remain 
unchanged. 
 
Nonpartisan discussions are indispensable to serve as the basis for 
security policy. Debates are underway in Japan. But in many cases, 
they seem to be unilateral or complacent debates strictly among 
like-minded members. It can be said that they have only a weak sense 
of being involved with security affairs. 
 
For a Japanese-version Armitage-Nye report, debates across party 
lines and the process to formulate policies are essential, as in the 
United States. The question is whether there is the groundwork to 
support them? 
 
Incidentally, the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management 
(MIGM) established by the late Konosuke Matsushita for nurturing 
Japanese leaders just celebrated its 30th anniversary. Of 237 
individuals who completed the institute, 101 have entered politics, 
70 joined the business world, and 39 education, research, or the 
media. My expectations for the groundwork grew as I listened to 
vibrant speeches and presentations by MIGM-trained opposition and 
ruling party lawmakers and students during the anniversary event. 
 
(5) Simulation Report: No data suggesting alleged "deteriorating 
public safety," "increase in crimes by juveniles, foreigners," etc. 
- all media lies; Japan is still one of the safest countries in the 
world 
 
SAPIO (Pages 12-14) (Full) 
July 8, 2009 
 
Koichi Hamai, professor at Graduate School of Law, Ryukoku 
University 
 
When did people start claiming that the public safety situation in 
Japan is deteriorating? Certainly there are reports on vicious 
crimes in the newspapers and on TV every day. However, few people 
know anybody close to them who has been a victim of a vicious crime. 
Has the "myth of Japan's safety" disintegrated? We asked Koichi 
Hamai, who is an expert on crime statistics. 
 
According to a survey conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2006, 84.3 
percent of the people thought "Japan's public safety has 
deteriorated in the past 10 years." The mass media, politicians, and 
many learned persons invariably precede their statements with, "With 
crimes becoming more vicious recently..." on the assumption that the 
public safety situation has deteriorated. The "myth of Japan's 
safety" which every Japanese person used to believe in has now been 
replaced by the "myth of deteriorating public safety." 
 
TOKYO 00001474  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
This change came about as a result of two incidents - the subway 
sarin gas incident in 1995 and the Sakakibara incident of 1997. 
 
The subway sarin gas incident brought home the fact that crime, 
which used to be "something that is surely happening somewhere, but 
has nothing to do with me," is something that can happen in daily 
life. It can probably be said that after this incident, the "myth of 
Japan's safety" fell apart. Two years later, the Sakakibara incident 
sparked people's apprehension about crimes, resulting in widespread 
talks about the increasingly younger age of criminals and the 
growing viciousness of crimes. Eventually, since the Okegawa stalker 
incident of 1999, the "theory of deteriorating public safety" became 
common wisdom. 
 
The alleged evidence for this theory is the trend of cases of 
assault and infliction of bodily injury and the arrest rate. From 
this, it would seem that the number of cases is rising rapidly while 
the arrest rate has been declining. Taking this at face value, the 
impression is that the police have become unable to solve cases. 
 
However, it is absurd to say that people could suddenly become 
violent from a certain point onward. The statistics are obviously 
irregular. The simple truth of the matter is that after the Okegawa 
case, the police have put much more effort into helping victims and 
have come to positively accept cases of violent crimes, so this has 
pushed up the number of recognized cases. 
 
In 2001, the random killing of children at the Ikeda elementary 
school connected with Osaka Kyoiku University made safety measures 
at schools a social problem. The kidnapping and murder of a 
schoolgirl on her way home from school in Nara in 2004 extended the 
scope of safety measures to encompass entire local communities. 
Through media reporting on this case, people came to share the 
perception that anybody can potentially become a victim of crimes. 
 
Occurrence of murder in Japan is one-fifth that of the U.S. 
 
A careful analysis of the available statistics shows that it could 
hardly be said that "public safety has deteriorated rapidly." The 
trend of figures on recognized cases of murder shows that murder has 
been on the decline consistently since the latter half of the 1950s. 
Furthermore, these figures include attempted murders, so the number 
of genuine "recognized cases of murder" is even less. 
 
Demographic data on the causes of death for "number of deaths by 
homicide" and the number of children dying by homicide shows that 
objectively speaking, the number of deaths by homicide - including 
children - has been declining annually, even though there have been 
active anti-crime patrol activities to deal with suspicious 
characters on the assumption that the safety of children is at 
risk. 
 
It is true that 600 people are murdered in Japan each year, which is 
an average of almost two people each day. Somebody gets killed 
somewhere on any given day. However, this is an exceptionally small 
number compared to the other advanced countries. According to the 
"White Paper on Crime" (2008 edition), Japan ranks lowest among the 
five advanced countries (France, Germany, UK, the U.S., Japan) in 
terms of the occurrence of murders per 100,000 people, far below the 
other countries. In the 2006 survey, the occurrence rate in Japan 
was 1.1, with 2.6 for the UK, 3.0 for Germany, and 3.2 for France. 
 
TOKYO 00001474  008 OF 010 
 
 
The figure for the United States was 5.7, which was five times that 
of Japan. Even in terms of the ratio of victims of violent crimes, 
Japan was overwhelmingly low. However, such figures have never been 
cited when discussing public safety problems in Japan. 
 
Age of criminals not lower, but higher 
 
When talking about the worsening public safety situation, people 
always claim that the age of juvenile delinquents is becoming lower, 
while crimes are becoming more vicious. However, there are no 
statistics to support such a claim. 
 
In terms of the age of arrested murder suspects, statistics show 
that the number of persons arrested has continued to decline since 
the 1960s and that the main reason for the decline is the drop in 
the number of arrested young people in their teens and 20s. The 
number of suspects in this age bracket declined sharply from 1960 to 
1970 and has remained flat since then. It is obvious that these 
figures contradict the mass media's fuss about the increase in 
juvenile delinquency and increasing viciousness of crimes. 
 
As for the younger age of juvenile delinquents, the so-called 
"delinquency curve" statistics show a completely opposite trend. 
These statistics shows the year of birth of delinquents aged 12 to 
20 who were arrested and taken into custody for offenses. The peak 
of the age of delinquency tends to be higher the more recently a 
young person was born. This means that the age of juvenile 
delinquency is becoming higher, not lower. 
 
Therefore, the age of criminals is not becoming lower and crimes 
have not become more vicious, and the current trend is expected to 
continue into the future. The reason for this trend is the low birth 
rate and the aging society. 
 
From the point of view of developmental criminology, since the 
number of energetic youth more prone to commit crimes is declining, 
and the number of older people less likely to commit offenses is on 
the rise, the overall trend in criminal activities is that the 
occurrence of crimes will be reduced. 
 
Along with juvenile delinquents, foreigners are also cited as 
culprits for the deteriorating public safety situation. 
 
The report issued by the Koizumi cabinet's "Ministerial Council on 
Crime Prevention" in 2003 called for controlling crimes by juveniles 
and foreigners in order to restore public safety in Japan. The 
reasoning was: "The massive influx of foreigners has resulted in the 
degeneration of Japanese values and morals" and "The dysfunction of 
family and local communities has resulted in diminished morals among 
children." 
 
What is the situation. statistically speaking? The number of crimes 
by foreigners is indeed on the rise, but overall, they are mostly 
minor offenses, such as violation of the Immigration Law and theft. 
Furthermore, in terms of the involvement of Japanese (including 
permanent resident foreigners) and foreigners in robberies, the 
proportion of foreigners among vicious criminals is very small, and 
there is no basis for saying that this proportion is growing. 
 
Of course this does not mean that Japan can be optimistic regarding 
the issue of crimes by foreigners. There is no denying that the 
police need to take special measures and this is indeed an important 
 
TOKYO 00001474  009 OF 010 
 
 
matter, but this is another issue. 
 
"Theatrical reporting" making one passing case seem a constant 
phenomenon 
 
An overview of the crime statistics in Japan shows that there is 
nothing to suggest that the public safety situation is 
deteriorating. Why, then, are people worried about deteriorating 
public safety? 
 
I conducted a nationwide survey in 2006. To the question: "Do you 
think there has been an increase in crimes in the past two years?" 
the respondents were asked to answer both "in Japan as a whole" and 
"in your local community." While about 50 percent answered that 
"crimes have increased significantly" for Japan as a whole, the 
figure was only about 4 percent for the local community. Most 
respondents felt that "public safety in my community has not 
deteriorated particularly, but the situation is deteriorating 
somewhere else in Japan." 
 
One reason for this phenomenon is media reporting. The Cabinet 
Office's 2006 survey mentioned earlier showed that the sources of 
information on public safety and crimes are: number one - TV, radio, 
95.5 percent; and number two - newspapers, 81.1 percent, which are 
way ahead of number three - conversation with family and friends; 
38.4 percent. This means that people's perception that public safety 
is deteriorating has been affected significantly by the message sent 
out ceaselessly by the media that "crimes are increasing and 
becoming more vicious" and "the police alone are unable to deal with 
them." 
 
The phenomenon in which there is a widespread impression that public 
safety is deteriorating based on a few isolated incidents, 
regardless of whether crimes are actually being committed, is called 
"moral panic." This process begins when the media starts issuing an 
onslaught of reports on similar incidents, sending out the message 
that "crimes are on the rise and are becoming more vicious" and that 
"the police are unreliable." On the other hand, when the culprit in 
the incident happens to be a juvenile, the media cry out about the 
"unfathomable darkness of his mind" and "moral degeneration." If the 
criminal happens to be a foreigner, then they stir up the sense of 
alarm that "they are coming after Japan." Specific incidents are not 
reported as special cases, but are taken up as the symbol of the 
society's abnormality as a whole. 
 
However, if this were a sense of panic caused by a temporary spike 
in media reporting, it should subside with time and be forgotten by 
everyone eventually. However, the media have been dramatizing crimes 
and building public opinion on them. The audience, who become 
convinced, then turn their criticism to the government or 
administrative authorities who seem to be doing nothing. As a 
result, the administrative authorities take some stopgap measures to 
be on the safe side in light of the criticism, and crimes are 
perceived as a constant phenomenon and become a permanent fixture. 
In other words, theatrical media reporting creates permanent social 
"myths" out of transient issues. This is also what happened with the 
"myth of deteriorating public safety." 
 
The factors contributing to good public safety conditions in Japan 
up until now are that delinquency is normally resolved by age 20 and 
adults are less likely to commit crimes, and that social structures 
such as the employment system make the coexistence of small 
 
TOKYO 00001474  010 OF 010 
 
 
businesses possible. Deregulation and structural reforms have 
eliminated the good old Japanese tradition of "mutual help," and 
this has not only made it difficult to rehabilitate juvenile 
delinquents, but is also causing an increase in crimes by older 
people due to poverty and social isolation at present. We should 
think about what needs to be done to maintain good public safety 
conditions in Japan based on facts. 
 
ZUMWALT