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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 20 TOKYO 001357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/16/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Move to oust Aso might accelerate, following defeats of 
LDP-backed candidates in three mayoral elections, sharp drop in 
public support (Sankei) 
 
(2) Poll on public attitude toward politics (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(3) Growing nuclear threat from North Korea: Full-scale discussion 
of capability to attack enemy bases urged (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) Foreign Ministry fears public opinion; Prime Minister must lead 
the denuclearization effort without leaving everything to the United 
States (Asahi) 
 
(5) Financial Services Agency to call for thorough identity 
verification in relation to DPRK sanctions (Nikkei) 
 
(6) Editorial: Monetary authorities of Japan, U.S., and Europe 
should give consideration to long-term interest rates (Nikkei) 
 
(7) Warning about three anti-U.S. stances - Part one of series 
"DPJ's risky 'fraternal' foreign policy" (Sankei) 
 
(8) Japan must formulate security policy in context of relations 
with Asia (Sekai) 
 
(9) Prime Minister's schedule, June 14, 2009 (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Move to oust Aso might accelerate, following defeats of 
LDP-backed candidates in three mayoral elections, sharp drop in 
public support 
 
SANKEI (Top Play) (Slightly abridged) 
June 16, 2009 
 
The candidate backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was 
defeated by the candidate endorsed by the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) in the Chiba mayoral election, following the LDP-backed 
candidates' defeats in the Nagoya and Saitama mayoral elections. The 
LDP has also seen public support of the cabinet of Prime Minister 
Taro Aso sharply dropping following the dismissal of Kunio Hatoyama 
from the post of internal affairs and communications minister over a 
dispute with between him and Japan Post. Aso has now been driven 
into a corner. LDP members have already started moving to speed up 
the party presidential election. If the LDP loses the Shizuoka 
gubernatorial election on July 5 and the Tokyo metropolitan assembly 
election on July 12, the "dump Aso" move might accelerate at one 
stroke. There are two cards left for Aso; cabinet reorganization and 
House of Representatives dissolution. Is there any secret ploy the 
prime minister might use to break out of his plight? 
 
Tokyo assembly election next month to determine administration's 
fate 
 
Attending an LDP executive meeting yesterday afternoon, Aso said 
with a sad look: "Mr. Hatoyama's resignation is regrettable, but 
postal service is a public asset, and it was necessary to bring the 
situation back to normalcy in order to prevent the government and 
Japan Post from being thrown into confusion." He then instructed 
participants to prepare themselves to fight to win in the Shizuoka 
 
TOKYO 00001357  002 OF 020 
 
 
gubernatorial election at all costs. 
 
In reaction to Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda quipping: "The 
margin was narrower than expected in the Chiba mayoral election," 
Executive Council Chairman Takashi Sasagawa argued: "Even for local 
elections, we should select candidates in a coolheaded manner. If we 
put up a hopeless candidate, the candidate will be defeated even by 
the rival who is neither good nor bad." 
 
The outcome of a local election, in which local circumstances are 
largely reflected, should not influence the outcome of a national 
election. But it has already been reported that the LDP will have a 
hard fight in the Shizuoka gubernatorial election and the Tokyo 
assembly election. The DLP leadership is increasingly irritated at 
the situation in which they remain unable to find a subtle scheme to 
turn around the tables. 
 
LDP Lower House member Taku Yamamoto set up a website of the 
association to move up the presidential election yesterday and has 
solicited views supportive of the frontloading of the election from 
general party members. If the party loses the Tokyo election, an 
increasing number of members of the ruling camp will inevitably 
begin to say, "It is impossible to fight under Prime Minister Aso in 
the Lower House election." That is why former secretary general 
Hidenao Nakagawa, a leader of the anti-Aso group, remains unruffled, 
just saying: "Everything should be decided after the Tokyo assembly 
election," If the LDP suffers a crushing defeat in the Tokyo 
election, Aso will have no choice but to stay on until the Lower 
House members' terms of office expire in September, but there is no 
guarantee that the party leadership will be able to assuage the 
dissatisfaction about Aso in the party. 
 
Some members have begun to call for significantly reorganizing the 
cabinet and replacing the three party executives, with the aim of 
stopping the tailwind for the DPJ after giving a boost to the 
administration and then suddenly dissolving the Lower House just 
before the Tokyo election. 
 
If the Lower House is dissolved before the Tokyo election, however, 
the Lower House election will be set for either July 26 or Aug. 2. 
If the cabinet reorganization does not effectively work to surge 
public support rates and if the LDP loses the Tokyo assembly 
election, the party will face a stiff uphill battle in the Lower 
House election. In addition, the New Komeito, which is confident of 
victory in the Tokyo assembly election, is expected to raise strong 
opposition even if the LDP comes up with this plan. 
 
Asked by reporters last evening for his view of the recent sharp 
decline of public support for his administration, Aso replied: "The 
responsibility for the drop in public support rests with me. What I 
should do is to properly implement policy measures as we have done 
so far." Although the prime minister has kept silent about the 
timing for Diet dissolution, only a few options have been left for 
him now. 
 
(2) Poll on public attitude toward politics 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
June 14, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage) 
 
TOKYO 00001357  003 OF 020 
 
 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 30.6 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 33.4 
New Komeito (NK) 4.6 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2.8 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 0.9 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.3 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) --- 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.1 
Other political parties, groups 0.8 
None 24.6 
Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 1.9 
( 
Q: Are you satisfied with politics now? 
 
Greatly satisfied 0.4 
Somewhat satisfied 15.8 
Not very satisfied 62.4 
Not satisfied at all 20.3 
D/K+N/A 1.1 
 
Q: What do you think is problematical about politics now? Pick up to 
two. 
 
No future vision of Japan 17.2 
Public opinion not reflected 27.0 
Taxpayers' money wasted 63.0 
Government negligence like pension record keeping flaws 29.9 
Bureaucracy's excessive power 15.2 
Politics and money 16.9 
Diet malfunctions in political situation 14.8 
Political parties and politicians are only playing to the gallery, 
so they're untrustworthy 16.2 
Other answers (O/A) 0.9 
D/K+N/A 1.0 
 
Q: What would you like politics to tackle? Pick up to two. 
 
Economic stability, growth 43.9 
Social security, such as pensions, healthcare, and nursing 68.9 
Administrative, financial, political reforms 10.2 
Job security 15.8 
Diplomacy, defense buildup 6.4 
Education 16.2 
Declining birthrate 11.4 
Global warming, other global issues 9.3 
Safe society, such as food safety and crime prevention 12.2 
O/A 0.3 
D/K+N/A 0.7 
 
Q: To what extent do you trust politicians now? 
 
Greatly trust 0.5 
Somewhat trust 22.2 
Don't trust very much 61.9 
Don't trust at all 14.3 
D/K+N/A 1.1 
 
Q: To what extent do you trust bureaucrats? 
 
 
TOKYO 00001357  004 OF 020 
 
 
Greatly trust 0.9 
Somewhat trust 19.7 
Don't trust very much 54.7 
Don't trust at all 23.0 
D/K+N/A 1.7 
 
Q: To what extent do you look forward to the political parties now? 
 
Very much 2.9 
Somewhat 30.2 
Not very much 51.0 
Not at all 15.0 
D/K+N/A 0.9 
 
Q: What do you consider first when evaluating the political 
parties? 
 
Their leaders 6.1 
Their lawmakers 6.6 
Their images 13.7 
Their actual results 21.9 
O/A 0.3 
D/K+N/A 2.3 
 
Q: What kind of country would you like Japan to become? 
 
A political power 1.1 
An economic power 13.6 
A welfare nation 33.2 
A peace nation 34.6 
A cultural nation 3.9 
A scientific and technological advanced nation 5.2 
An ecological advanced nation 7.1 
O/A 0.3 
D/K+N/A 1.0 
( 
Q: What do you think about decentralization? 
 
Local matters should basically be left to local governments 71.1 
The central government should control local governments to a certain 
degree 24.0 
O/A 0.6 
D/K+N/A 4.3 
 
(Note) The total percentage is over 100 PERCENT  for multiple-choice 
answers. 
 
Polling methodology: For the survey, carried out by the Japan 
Polling Research Institute (Nihon Yoron Chosakai), a total of 3,000 
persons were sampled out of men and women aged 20 and over at 250 
locations throughout the country on a stratified two-stage 
random-sampling basis, so as to epitomize the nation's voting 
population of more than a 100 million. The survey was conducted by 
the Japan Polling Organization over a period of two days, June 6-7, 
on a face-to-face interview basis. Answers were obtained from 1,921 
persons, excluding those who could not be interviewed because of 
their having moved away or being on a trip, or for other reasons. 
The retrieval rate was 64.0 PERCENT . In the breakdown of 
respondents, males accounted for 48.4 PERCENT , and females 51.6 
PERCENT . 
 
(3) Growing nuclear threat from North Korea: Full-scale discussion 
 
TOKYO 00001357  005 OF 020 
 
 
of capability to attack enemy bases urged 
 
YOMIURI (Page 11) (Abridged slightly) 
June 16, 2009 
 
By  Hidemichi Katsumata 
 
Unrestrained actions by North Korea, such as long-range missile 
launches, nuclear tests, and uranium enrichment, are continuing. 
Discussions calling for possessing the capability to attack enemy 
bases have surfaced to counter the growing threat. 
 
Japan has relegated its security to a deterrence strategy called the 
nuclear umbrella, which the U.S. extended during the Cold-War era to 
cover its allies. 
 
However, the trustworthiness of such a strategy has been greatly 
undermined by North Korea's missile launches and nuclear tests, 
which have been carried out repeatedly in defiance of warnings from 
the international community. 
 
As a result, Japan and the U.S. have introduced a missile defense 
(MD) system as a shield to protect themselves from ballistic 
missiles. However, there is no justification for putting too much 
confidence in the system, because three of 15 tests on Aegis 
vessel-based launches of SM-3 missiles failed to intercept missiles. 
Even though the accuracy of the MD system will improve, as long as 
there is even a slight possibility of the system failing to shoot 
down missiles, it is important to discuss possessing the capability 
to attack enemy bases to prepare for the threat of nuclear 
missiles. 
 
However, actually attacking an enemy base would not be an easy task. 
This reporter probed into the Gulf War (1991), in which Iraq 
launched numerous ballistic missiles, using data kept by the Defense 
Ministry. 
 
At that time, U.S. troops were monitoring Iraq using many military 
satellites, including an early warning satellite that detects the 
heat generated when a missile is launched, and imaging satellites, 
which can detect objects as small as 15 centimeters square, to 
destroy the ballistic Scud missiles that Iraq launched against 
Israel. 
 
However, since Scud missiles were fitted on launch platforms 
converted from mobile trailers, even if airstrikes by cruising 
missile Tomahawk or aircraft did not produce results, the launch 
platforms were already gone by the time such strikes were carried 
out. High-tech weapons, such as Tomahawks, reportedly worked poorly 
due to clouds, rain, smoke, and moisture. Their performance was 
insufficient when identifying targets or destroying them. At those 
times, the Special Air Service (SAS) of Britain rescued U.S. troops 
from the predicament. They penetrated into the Iraqi territory and 
guided precision-guided munitions fired by U.S. troops to Iraq's 
launch platfroms by irradiating the moving launch platforms with a 
laser. 
 
What about the case of North Korea? More than 100 ballistic Nodong 
missiles with a range of 1,300 kilometers that can be fitted with 
nuclear arms are deployed in North Korea, targeting Japan. Many of 
them are placed on mobile launch platforms. The remaining ones will 
reportedly be launched from semi-underground silos built in 
 
TOKYO 00001357  006 OF 020 
 
 
hollowed-out solid bedrock. The difficulty of striking moving launch 
platforms was provem in the Gulf War. Powerful bunker-buster bombs 
are needed to destroy such bedrock. The infiltration of a special 
unit must be considered. 
 
Since there are so many difficult issues, it is impossible for Japan 
to possess the capability to strike enemy bases on its own. It is, 
therefore, necessary for the government to ensure that the U.S. 
shares Japan's perception of the threat of North Korea's nuclear 
arms and confirm that in the event Japan were attacked by the North, 
the U.S. would retaliate without fail, based on the right to 
collective self defense. In the meantime, both Japan and the U.S. 
must speed up efforts to compile an operation program, premised on 
attacking enemy bases. Such issues as role-sharing between the 
Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces will be made clear through that 
process. This reporter believes that these are the only deterrence 
measures Japan can adopt at present. 
 
Regarding this issue, the government indicated its view more than 
half a century ago that the Constitution is not intended to mean 
that even if attacks by ballistic missiles, etc., are expected, the 
nation should do nothing. This type of approach is considered to be 
within the scope of self-defense. However, this issue has never been 
discussed until this time in which Japan is confronted with this 
worst-case scenario of North Korea starting to possess the 
capability to launch nuclear missiles. How can the security of our 
country be maintained? There is not much time left before an answer 
has to be formulated. 
 
(4) Foreign Ministry fears public opinion; Prime Minister must lead 
the denuclearization effort without leaving everything to the United 
States 
 
ASAHI (Page 17) (Excerpts) 
June 13, 2009 
 
Soichiro Tahara, journalist 
 
North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on the morning of 
May 25. It was the North's second nuclear test after the one in 
October 2006. Furthermore, the country seems to be aiming at 
launching a long-range ballistic. 
 
The North test fired a long-range ballistic missile on April 5 in 
the name of a satellite. The country also declared that the 
Six-Party Talks were unnecessary and that it would reopen its 
nuclear facilities and then conducted its second nuclear test. Why 
does North Korea repeat acts that irritate other countries, 
especially China and Russia, its supporters? 
 
General Secretary Kim Jong Il is clearly hoping for bilateral talks 
with the United States instead of the Six-Party Talks. 
 
President Obama announced even before taking office that he would 
actively pursue dialogue with all countries. This made Kim Jong Il 
believe that Obama would approach North Korea at an early time. But 
preoccupied with the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan issues, Obama 
did not pay attention to North Korea. Frustrated, Kim Jong Il 
conducted missile and nuclear tests in order to grab his attention. 
 
In response to the missile tests, Japan strongly called for a UN 
Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on the North. But in 
 
TOKYO 00001357  007 OF 020 
 
 
the end, the Security Council adopted a nonbinding presidential 
statement due to China's reluctance. All countries expressed anger 
with the nuclear test, and a UN Security Council resolution was 
expected, although China was likely to fiercely oppose the adoption 
of strong economic sanctions. Attention was focused on how well the 
United States would be able to persuade China. 
 
But U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner traveled to Beijing 
from late May through early June to hold talks with President Hu 
Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and other Chinese leaders. If the U.S. 
was to ask China to fall in step with other countries about imposing 
severe sanctions on North Korea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
should have flown to Beijing. The purpose of Geithner's visit to 
China was probably to "ask" Beijing to purchase U.S. government 
bonds and so on. 
 
Around that time, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg was in 
Tokyo insisting that the United States, Japan, and South Korea must 
play a central role in realizing an extremely harsh sanctions 
resolution. This clearly conflicted with Geithner's act. 
 
On June 10, seven UN members -- the five permanent UNSC members plus 
Japan and South Korea - reached a final agreement on a draft 
sanctions resolution on North Korea. It said, "UN member states are 
urged to conduct inspections," an expression with no binding power, 
in line with China's assertion. Member countries are also asked in 
the resolution not to shift funds and assets leading to nuclear 
development and also not to extend financial aid except for 
humanitarian and development purposes. In other words, the United 
States made major compromises to China. 
 
In my view, the United States thinks that Kim Jong Il's health 
condition is unexpectedly bad from information that Kim Jong Il's 
third son, Kim Jong Un, has been picked as the next leader and that 
the North conducted its latest nuclear test in connection with this 
situation. I also think the United States remains unable to 
determine the capability of Kim Jong Il, or of North Korea rather, 
as the party concerned. If so, I think it is Japan's time to play a 
role. 
 
On April 5 in Prague, President Obama declared that the United 
States will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear 
weapons, while referring to its moral responsibility as the only 
nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, namely on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The declaration was epochal. 
 
The United States is the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear 
weapon, and Japan is the only country to have suffered atomic bombs. 
That is why Japan and Prime Minister Taro Aso, by teaming up with 
President Obama, should strongly call upon the nuclear powers for 
denuclearization and nuclear abolition. 
 
Simply put, North Korean nuclear weapons are not really a threat to 
such nuclear powers and the United States, China, and Russia, but 
are a serious threat to Japan. Furthermore, it is said that 150 - 
320 Nodong missiles are in a condition to be launched at Japan at 
any time. 
 
In addition, Japan needs nearly 1 trillion yen to normalize ties 
with North Korea for the economic recovery of that country. Well 
aware of it, Kim Jong Il must be waiting for money from Japan. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001357  008 OF 020 
 
 
A Japanese prime minister flew to Pyongyang twice to hold long talks 
with Kim Jong Il. Such has not been done by any other countries. I 
wonder if it is right for Japan and Prime Minister Aso to leave 
negotiations with China and North Korea entirely to the United 
States. 
 
I believe that Japan should hold talks with North Korea and that 
Japan is more qualified than any other countries to negotiate with 
the North. 
 
Regrettably, there are no substantial talks between Japan and North 
Korea at present. Why do the Japanese government and the Foreign 
Ministry not try to embark on full-fledged talks (with North 
Korea)? 
 
When former U.S. President George W. Bush decided to delist North 
Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in October 2008, I asked a 
senior Foreign Ministry official, "Isn't it a betrayal of Japan?" 
North Korea had pledged that it would reinvestigate the fate of the 
eight Japanese abductees it earlier announced dead without offering 
any concrete grounds, but the country did not fulfill its 
responsibility. That was why I asked that question. 
 
In response to my question, the senior official cautiously said: "In 
pushing ahead with talks with North Korea, the United States had two 
challenges. One was to nail down the issue of denuclearization. The 
other was Japan-DPRK relations, namely the abduction issue. But for 
them, denuclearization was the main topic. Their stance was to 
discuss the abduction issue as much as possible. They think they 
have given enough time to Japan, I think." 
 
In mid-January 2007 in Berlin, talks were held between then U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean 
Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. Japan had over one year since 
then to hold talks with North Korea but the country did not do so, 
and the United States probably lost its patience. 
 
The official continued: "We of course tried to hold talks, but we 
could not find prospects for holding talks in a way that was 
acceptable to the Japanese public." 
 
What do his words "we could not find prospects for talks in a way 
that was acceptable to the Japanese people" mean? 
 
What the Foreign Ministry was really afraid of was not North Korea 
per se but Japanese public opinion. 
 
Simply put, talks that are acceptable to the Japanese public are to 
confirm that the eight abductees are still alive and to bring them 
back to Japan. 
 
Regarding that such is next to impossible, the Japanese government 
might think that it is safer not to conduct full-fledged talks with 
the North. 
 
A senior official made an interesting account: "Prime Minister 
Koizumi's visit to North Korea ended up working completely against 
Pyongyang's plan and the Japanese delegation's wishes. Kim Jong Il 
admitted the abductions of Japanese nationals and offered an 
apology. He also apologized for the spy ships. The North also 
allowed five abductees to return to Japan and presented data on the 
remaining eight. They hoped that this would help ease Japan's anger 
 
TOKYO 00001357  009 OF 020 
 
 
with the North, thereby opening the door for normalization talks 
with Japan. But in reality, Japanese people's sentiment toward the 
North deteriorated. And Japan completely lost its confidence." 
 
I think this is what really lies at the bottom of the Foreign 
Ministry. Koizumi's trip to North Korea has been a trauma. 
 
On May 19, Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone announced, "The 
ministry's position is that the Japanese abductees are all alive in 
North Korea." As long as Japan holds this view, North Korea will not 
accept Japan's call for talks. 
 
Japan should hold talks with the United States, China, and North 
Korea. But in reality, Japan, fearing public opinion, remains unable 
to enter into full-fledged talks with the North. It is disgraceful 
that Japan effectively leaves talks with China and North Korea to 
the United States. 
 
The United States had information on the North's latest nuclear test 
in advance. But regrettably, I understand that the United States did 
convey that information to Japan. Furthermore, according to a 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) executive, China has rejected Japan's 
request for telephone summit talks since North Korea's nuclear test. 
And there have been no bilateral talks with North Korea. 
 
Prime Minister Aso should fly to the United States right away to 
learn what President Obama really wants to do with North Korea, and 
then to visit China to hold talks with President Hu Jintao, and 
finally to fly to Pyongyang to directly negotiate with Kim Jong Il. 
 
(5) Financial Services Agency to call for thorough identity 
verification in relation to DPRK sanctions 
 
NIKKEI (Page 4) (Abridged) 
June 16, 2009 
 
At a news conference on June 15, Finance Services Agency 
Commissioner Takafumi Sato said that in relation to financial 
sanctions on North Korea, "we are considering asking banking 
institutions to thoroughly verify identity and report suspicious 
transactions without fail." With regard to sanctions on the DPRK, a 
meeting of the G-8 financial ministers agreed over the weekend that 
effective financial sanctions in accordance with the UN Security 
Council resolution should be implemented. 
 
(6) Editorial: Monetary authorities of Japan, U.S., and Europe 
should give consideration to long-term interest rates 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 14, 2009 
 
A meeting of finance ministers from the Group of Eight (G-8) 
countries was held in Lecce, Italy, on June 12-13. A joint statement 
issued at the close of the meeting noted: "There are signs of 
stability in the global economy," in part due to the effects of the 
fiscal and financial policy measures taken since last fall. The 
appearance of positive signs for the global economy should be 
welcomed, but there is also a new source of concern - the recent 
rise in long-term interest rates. 
 
In trade last week, the yield on 10-year government bonds, an 
indicator of 10-year U.S. long-term interest rates, briefly surged 
 
TOKYO 00001357  010 OF 020 
 
 
to the 4 PERCENT  level for the first time in about eight months. 
The yield on Japan's newly floated 10-year government bonds also 
marked its highest level in seven and a half months at 1.56 PERCENT 
. European bond yields have also been on the rise. 
 
There are two major causes for the rise in long-term interest rates. 
One is a change in views among market players of the future of the 
economy. In the wake of the outbreak of the global financial crisis 
set off by the Lehman shock last fall, market players began to 
harbor concern that the global economy might continue to sink deeper 
into recession. Long-term interest rates also dropped sharply, 
reflecting apprehension that the global recession could be 
prolonged. 
 
In the early spring, however, positive signs began to appear in 
economic indicators of the U.S. and other countries. Also because 
the U.S. took proactive measures to stabilize its financial system 
and provide financial assistance to leading automakers, the 
observation that the global economy has emerged from its worst 
period has been gradually spreading. 
 
The second cause is the issuance of large amounts of government 
bonds to cover the decrease in tax revenues and the increase in 
government disbursements to cope with the economy's downward tumble. 
Not only Japan but also the U.S. and European countries have floated 
large amounts of government bonds, so some are worrying about a 
possible downgrade of bonds. The recent rise in interest rates stems 
from both positive and negative factors - economic turnaround and 
deteriorated balance between supply and demand as a result of large 
amounts of government bonds issued and concerns about future 
financial conditions. 
 
Since last fall, various countries have increased government 
spending to prevent the economy from further worsening. This was 
proper policy coordination. Even so, we should interpret the recent 
rise of long-term interest rates as a message from the market 
warning that unless efforts are made to restore fiscal health even 
after the economy perks up, it will be dangerous. 
 
The joint statement at the G-8 meeting referred to the need for 
considering exit strategies for winding down extraordinary policy 
measures. The G-8 countries supposedly took this warning from the 
market into consideration. 
 
The global economy is emerging from its worst period, but it has yet 
to return to a recovery track. The labor markets of Japan and the 
U.S. are still reeling, and the U.S. and Europe have not completely 
resolved their financial system problems. When exit strategies are 
considered, full consideration must be also be given to economic 
conditions. It is imperative to accurately read the messages sent by 
the market. 
 
(7) Warning about three anti-U.S. stances - Part one of series 
"DPJ's risky 'fraternal' foreign policy" 
 
SANKEI (Pages 1, 3) (Full) 
June 16, 2009 
 
"If the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) presents all its policies at 
once, they might be perceived by the U.S. Congress and the Obama 
administration as anti-U.S. You should be careful." 
 
 
TOKYO 00001357  011 OF 020 
 
 
The word "anti-U.S." resounded in the quiet room like an emergency 
alarm. This was at a meeting between senior DPJ officials and U.S. 
experts on defense and security who are knowledgeable about Japan on 
the morning of December 19 at a room in the Imperial Hotel in 
downtown Tokyo. 
 
Participants from the DPJ included (then) Secretary General Yukio 
Hatoyama, (then) Deputy President Naoto Kan, and (then) Vice 
Presidents Katsuya Okada and Seiji Maehara. Two heavyweights 
affiliated with the U.S. Democratic Party, former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye and John Hamre, president of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (former deputy 
secretary of defense); former National Security Council director for 
Asia Michael Green, who was in charge of policy toward Japan during 
the former Republican Bush administration; and former Assistant 
Secretary of State James Kelly attended from the U.S. side. 
 
Unclear picture of the future 
 
Nye, who was the first to issue the "warning" about the DPJ being 
seen as "anti-U.S.," stared at Hatoyama, Kan, and his colleagues and 
raised three specific issues, instead of issuing them a yellow 
card: 
 
(1) Immediate discontinuation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's 
(MSDF) refueling support mission in the Indian Ocean; 
(2) Review of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) ; 
(3) Scrapping of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment plans, 
including the relocation of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and 
the relocation of Futenma Air Station 
 
All these were part of the DPJ's campaign pledges, which had been 
included in its latest policy collection, the "Policy Index 2008." 
 
According to a participant in the meeting, Nye stressed: "If you 
don't want to be perceived as anti-American, you should discuss 
specific issues after presenting a total package of proposals for 
Japan-U.S. cooperation." While he talked calmly, it was obvious that 
that his opinion incorporated a warning to the DPJ for its anti-U.S. 
stances. 
 
The problem, though, is that no one has any idea what the future of 
the Japan-U.S. alliance might be under a DPJ administration. 
 
Kan and his colleagues explained, "The Japan-U.S. relationship will 
remain the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security policy under 
a DPJ administration." The meeting ended in about 45 minutes. Yet, 
six months after that, a participant on the U.S. side still asks: 
"Would it really be all right if the DPJ were to run the Japanese 
government?" 
 
Leaving the umbrella partially 
 
This individual has been asking Hatoyama, Okada and others every 
time he met them after the December meeting about what contribution 
could Japan make on the Afghan issue, which is of great importance 
to the Obama administration. Yet, the response from Hatoyama and the 
others, according to that person, "has been mostly vague, and it 
remains unclear what they intend to do." 
 
Not only is the future picture of the alliance unclear; there are 
even dangerous elements in the DPJ's plans for a new administration 
 
TOKYO 00001357  012 OF 020 
 
 
that may destroy the alliance from its very foundation. 
 
In the July issue of Sekai, Okada talks about "partial coverage by 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella." He asserts that Japan should: (1) make 
the U.S. pledge it will not use nuclear weapons for a preemptive 
strike; (2) build a consensus on making the use of nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear states illegal; and (3) present a framework for 
a denuclearized zone in Northeast Asia. 
 
Since the war, Japan has consistently relied on the expanded 
deterrence (nuclear umbrella) provided by the U.S. as the ultimate 
means to guarantee its security and survival. The U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty (security alliance) incorporates all the political, 
foreign affairs, military, and security aspects of this 
relationship. However, with North Korea's repeated nuclear tests, 
there is indeed a growing nuclear threat from North Korea and 
China. 
 
The reason why Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been 
emphasizing that the U.S. "guarantees Japan's security" each time 
North Korea conducts a nuclear or missile test is because she wanted 
to maintain the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. What does Okada 
mean by venturing out from the nuclear umbrella at a time the 
umbrella for Japan and the ROK needs to be reinforced? 
 
Disintegration of Japan-U.S. alliance possible 
 
A defense expert pointed out: "Expanded deterrence is the very 
essence of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. If you are in favor 
of such, you should accept the Security Treaty, if not, Japan should 
embark on its own nuclear armament or opt for unarmed neutrality." 
The expert warned that the very foundation of the Japan-U.S. 
security arrangements may be jeopardized. What lies ahead if Japan 
tries to leave the nuclear umbrella after the refueling operation in 
the Indian Ocean is discontinued, the USFJ realignment plans are 
scrapped, and SOFA is revised? One thing for sure is that the 
Japan-U.S. alliance will disintegrate. 
 
The birth of a genuine anti-U.S. administration that will implement 
the "set of three anti-U.S. stances" that Nye had warned about is 
fast approaching. 
 
Let us take a closer look at the foreign and security policies of 
the DPJ under Hatoyama, whose slogan is "fraternity (yuai)." 
 
The United States' concern is that it is unable to tell whether a 
new Hatoyama administration will adopt the "Tomiichi Murayama model" 
or the "Roh Moo Hyun model." 
 
After becoming prime minister, Murayama, who was chairman of the 
Japan Socialist Party, made statements in the Diet accepting the 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as constitutional and vowing to maintain 
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Making an about-face from his 
previous position that the SDF was unconstitutional, he came to 
recognize the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of Japan's 
foreign policy. 
 
On the other hand, the late President Roh Moo Hyun became 
increasingly populist, anti-U.S., and leftist after his 
inauguration. Alarmed by this, the U.S. tried to prepare for a 
setback in the U.S.-ROK alliance by subtle adjustments in the U.S. 
military strategy and troop deployment through the realignment of 
 
TOKYO 00001357  013 OF 020 
 
 
the U.S. forces in Korea. 
 
Overall picture unclear 
 
The main reason why it is difficult to tell whether the DPJ will 
shift from its anti-U.S. stance or reinforce this tendency is 
because of the party's foreign and security affairs policies. The 
policies, says James Przystup, senior research fellow at the 
National Defense University, are "as many as there are party members 
and are incoherent: You cannot really tell which will be 
implemented." 
 
Even Seiji Maehara, one of the DPJ's foreign and security policy 
experts, admits that the overall picture is unclear: "From the 
American point of view, they know Maehara; they know (Akihisa) 
Nagashima; they know Okada; but they do not know the DPJ." 
 
Maehara and Nagashima are close to Assistant Secretary of 
State-designate Kurt Campbell and other experts on Japan who believe 
that the alliance is important. Their picture of the alliance is 
slightly different from Hatoyama's and Kan's conception of the 
Japan-U.S. security arrangements. They understand the significance 
of the nuclear umbrella and differ with Okada on the "framework for 
a denuclearized zone." In addition to the differences between 
Maehara and Nagashima on the one hand and Okada on the other, 
Hatoyama and Kan also differ in their policies. 
 
Hatoyama once called for a "security treaty without permanent 
stationing of American troops" and presented a plan for relocating 
most of the U.S. forces now in Japan outside of the country. He 
would ask them to come to Japan's rescue only in an emergency. Kan 
has also advocated a relocation of U.S. military bases to other 
countries. 
 
Foreign affairs commentator Yukio Okamoto is very critical of such 
thinking. He issues a strong warning: "This is like telling your 
wife I don't want to see you anymore and driving her out of the 
house, but then ordering her to 'come back and take care of me when 
I get sick'." "Such an attitude of taking only the good part will 
damage trust between Japan and the U.S." 
 
Meanwhile, a case study of what would happen if Hatoyama became 
prime minister is being discussed in the DPJ. 
 
Appearing on a TV program in late May, Keiichiro Asao, defense 
minister in the DPJ's "Next Cabinet", said: "Based on the campaign 
pledges, he will first announce the immediate discontinuation of the 
refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Second, the USFJ 
realignment plans, including Futenma relocation, will be scrapped." 
When asked about the DPJ administration's policy on the refueling 
mission, he responded immediately: "We will withdraw (the MSDF)." 
 
Nicholas Szechenyi, deputy director of the CSIS Japan chair, 
predicts that "it will be very unfortunate for Japan and the U.S." 
if the Hatoyama administration stops the refueling mission and 
abandons the USFJ realignment plans. 
 
Giving up on Japan? 
 
There is also the question of the SOFA and host nation support. 
Okada told the press at a news conference on June 12: "In addition 
to the location of U.S. military bases, which is a legacy of the 
 
TOKYO 00001357  014 OF 020 
 
 
postwar regime, other bilateral problems exist, such as the need to 
review the SOFA and host nation support." A drastic review of SOFA 
and host nation support is a major election pledge of the DPJ. 
 
However, there is a long history behind the operation of the SOFA 
and the providing of host nation support. Since this also affects 
relations with NATO, the ROK, and other allies, U.S. government 
officials and people like Michael Green are seriously concerned. 
 
No matter how hard the DPJ advocates a "true Japan-U.S. alliance" in 
its policy manifesto, it is not hard to imagine how the U.S. side 
will react in this context. One can safely say that the "set of 
three anti-U.S. stances" -- cancelling the refueling mission, 
revising the SOFA, and scrapping USFJ realignment -- are key to 
gauging the DPJ's true intent regarding the future of the bilateral 
alliance. 
 
Yuki Tatsumi, who looks at the bilateral relationship from a think 
tank in the U.S., points out that his most serious concern about a 
DPJ administration taking over in Japan is that: "They have not 
thought seriously about what the option of independence from the 
U.S. really means." 
 
The U.S. is promoting greater strategic cooperation with countries 
in Asia and the Pacific other than Japan, such as the ROK, 
Australia, and Singapore. While the possibility of the U.S. giving 
up on Japan and strengthening relations with other allies and 
cooperative countries instead is not high, if Japan remains 
complacent in thinking "it is impossible for the Japan-U.S. alliance 
to go away," the U.S. may indeed end up giving up on Japan. In that 
case, a G-2 framework consisting of the U.S. and China may emerge. 
 
What Tatsumi is talking about is precisely the "structure of 
dependence (amae-kouzou)" on the U.S. The DPJ's presumptuous 
attitude and its self-righteous security policy have made the 
likelihood of the alliance disintegrating from the Japanese side 
stronger than ever. 
 
(8) Japan must formulate security policy in context of relations 
with Asia 
 
SEKAI (Excerpts) 
July, 2009 
 
Interview with Katsuya Okada, Lower House member and DPJ secretary 
general: 
 
Signs of spring appearing for nuclear disarmament 
 
-- Mr. Okada, you have discussed as a lawmaker the issue of nuclear 
disarmament, and the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) Diet Members 
League to Promote Nuclear Disarmament, which you chair, has 
announced a plan for a treaty to make Northeast Asia a 
nuclear-weapons free zone. 
 
President Barack Obama said in a major speech in Prague on April 5: 
"We must realize a world free from nuclear weapons. As the only 
nuclear power that has used nuclear weapons, the U.S. has a moral 
responsibility to address the challenge of nuclear abolition." What 
do you think about his speech? 
 
Okada: Because President Obama in the past has referred to the 
 
TOKYO 00001357  015 OF 020 
 
 
nuclear issue at every crucial juncture, I had the impression that 
he must be interested in that problem, in contrast to previous 
presidents, such as George W. Bush. After India and Pakistan 
conducted nuclear tests in 1998, moves to eliminate nuclear weapons 
went into hibernation but I see signs of the start of spring finally 
appearing. 
 
President Obama has said the U.S. will resume negotiations with 
Russia before the First Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START1), 
signed in 1991, loses effect this December. In 2007, former U.S. 
political or military leaders, such as Kissinger, Nunn, Shultz, and 
Perry, called on the international community to promote the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Their joint call drew much attention 
as a major U.S. policy switch. Obama's statement is an extension of 
that trend. I feel that a new trend different than anything before 
has been created in the U.S. and that President Obama has solidified 
this trend. 
 
-- The Japanese government has expressed its welcome of the new U.S. 
policy and its willingness to offer cooperation, but at the same 
time, it has expressed its unwillingness to see the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent will weaken. 
 
Okada: In an earlier Budget Committee meeting, when I asked Prime 
Minister Aso for his view about Obama's Prague speech, he replied: 
"It was the most impressive speech I have ever heard." I, too, 
praised it, but I then quoted the foreign minister and the Foreign 
Ministry as saying in a Diet reply, as well as in a report, that it 
would not be desirable if the U.S. announced a policy of no 
preemptive nuclear strikes because that would undermine nuclear 
deterrence. I pointed out the inconsistency in what the ministry was 
saying. In short, when it comes to specific arguments, the prime 
minister remains unresponsive. 
 
The Japanese government has also advocated nuclear disarmament and 
nonproliferation. But it only presented a resolution calling for 
abolition of nuclear weapons to the United Nations, and has made no 
further efforts. The government is not eager to actually take any 
action. 
 
Moreover, when the Bush administration adopted a policy of 
distancing itself from nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation 
efforts, Japan did not offer any advice or views. This time, Japan 
has only echoed President Obama's call for nuclear disarmament. Such 
a stance naturally tends to evoke the criticism that the government 
has just blindly followed U.S. policy. 
 
Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation should be a key element in 
Japan's foreign policy. Some people are worrying about how Japan has 
been seen in the international community. In order to brush off such 
concern, Japan should present its own ideas. I think Japan should 
make three proposals: (1) The U.S. and other nuclear powers should 
declare they will not launch a preemptive strike; (2) agreement 
should be reached on the view that a nuclear strike on countries 
having no nuclear weapons is illegal; and (3) a nuclear-free zone 
should be established in Northeast Asia. 
 
-- When Japan criticized India's nuclear test, India claimed that 
Japan, which has been protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has 
no right to criticize it. Japan should take the initiative in 
promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide, but Japan 
has to depend on the nuclear umbrella. This situation is certainly 
 
TOKYO 00001357  016 OF 020 
 
 
inconsistent. 
 
Okada: Even if the U.S. makes a "no first use" declaration, it does 
not mean that Japan will be placed outside the scope of the 
umbrella. Under the situation in which nuclear weapons actually 
exist in the world, we naturally feel anxious of a possible removal 
of the umbrella. 
 
I have advocated Japan possibly being placed under partial coverage 
of the umbrella, but I have never said that Japan should not 
counterattack if it unfortunately comes under nuclear attack. The 
option of counterattack should be left as a guarantee. So I want you 
to understand that I have not made only idealistic suggestions. 
 
-- North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs are 
considered to be a major threat to Japan. The DPRK fired a rocket 
(over Japan) on April 5 and conducted a second nuclear test on May 
¶25. These moves generated calls in Japan for discussing preemptive 
strike and enemy base-strike options. Is the concept of a 
nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia an alternative to discussing 
these options? 
 
Okada: North Korea's nuclear test, which runs counter to the trend 
in the international community of building a nuclear-free world, is 
extremely regrettable. UN Security Council members need to discuss 
this problem and take joint steps against North Korea, going further 
than what they have done so far. In dealing with North Korea, 
however, I do not think the nuclear umbrella is absolutely 
necessary. Conventional weapons will probably be enough. Instead, 
China's nuclear threat is the premise when discussing the nuclear 
umbrella. 
 
North Korea's scrapping of its nuclear programs is the main 
precondition for the Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone concept, but a 
post-nuclear abolition vision has yet to be laid out. That is a 
problem. It is necessary to have North Korea promise to denuclearize 
itself and the U.S. and China promise not to use nuclear weapons. 
Under this concept, Japan, South Korea and North Korea, which are in 
the region, as well as the U.S., China and Russia, which are nuclear 
powers located near the region, would conclude a nuclear-free zone 
treaty. The countries in the region would promise not to test, 
possess and use nuclear weapons. The three nuclear powers would 
promise not to use nuclear weapons or pose a nuclear threat against 
the countries in the region. 
 
If the UNSC pressures North Korea to renounce its nuclear ambitions 
without presenting a vision of what would happen North Korea's 
denuclearization, it is unconceivable that it will meekly 
acquiesce. 
 
A number of nuclear-free zone treaties exist in Africa, South 
Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and many other regions in the 
world. If more nuclear-free zones are set up and if these areas are 
linked to each other and establish an encircling net around the 
nuclear powers, it will become possible to apply pressure to the 
nuclear powers to scrap their nuclear arms. 
 
Consider security policy in context of relations with Asia 
 
-- In your book "Aiming for a change of government," you reiterated 
your determination to establish a government totally different from 
that of the Liberal Democratic Party. You promised to give priority 
 
TOKYO 00001357  017 OF 020 
 
 
to the interests of ordinary citizens, taxpayers and consumers in 
mapping out policies. You also promised to give more shape to the 
principles in the Constitution, such as popular sovereignty, respect 
for basic human rights, and pacifism. Based on this stance, where 
will you place emphasis in formulating a security policy for the 
next generation? 
 
Okada: Although I am aware that some say if the DPJ government takes 
over political power, the alliance will be shaken, our party does 
place emphasis on the Japan-U.S. alliance. But since the two 
countries have their own national interests, they need to coordinate 
views. I do not think that Japan always needs to fall in step with 
the U.S. as its ally. 
 
When I visited the U.S. recently, I told those whom I met that we 
Japanese felt it was very regrettable for the U.S. to have removed 
North Korea from its list of terrorism-sponsoring nations. I do not 
think this remark undermined Japan-U.S. relations. I told them that 
since the U.S. has its own policy and its own circumstances, it 
naturally takes a different position from Japan. 
 
Once the DPJ comes into power, the party must discuss specific 
issues, including the Futenma relocation plan issue. I think the 
party must maintain the basic stance of giving priority to the 
Japan-U.S. alliance. 
 
It is also important to place emphasis on Asia. When I was serving 
as party president, I announced my vision in which I said that 
priority should be given to Asia first and then to the Japan-U.S. 
alliance. It was surprising that this view triggered a controversy, 
but I think Japan is very lucky because it is located in the Asia 
region, where the economies of nations are closely interlinked. 
Japan should pursue affluence in an East Asia community, centering 
on the Asian region, and also help build peace. Based on the view 
that stability should be brought in the region through economic 
exchanges, the Japanese government should formulate an Asia policy. 
 
-- Various evaluations have been made of the Koizumi administration, 
but it is true that Japan's relations with Asia, particularly, with 
China and South Korea, became seriously strained during that 
period. 
 
Okada: Relations with the ASEAN countries also turned sour. Until 
then, Japan and ASEAN countries had established very close ties, but 
ASEAN and China became much closer. It is truly regrettable that 
Japan's relations with China and South Korea deteriorated due to the 
prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. A five-year vacuum was 
created in our country's policy toward Asia. 
 
-- On the security front, keeping favorable relations with neighbors 
is imperative. Some speculate that a military clash could occur in 
East Asia in the future, but that is open to question. 
 
Okada: You are right. Although I said that China is behind the need 
for a nuclear umbrella, interdependent relations have deepened in 
the economic area in the region. We would like to build a 
relationship with China in which we can discuss military 
disarmament. I mean such discussion should also include the U.S., 
that is, the U.S. military. 
 
-- When State Secretary Clinton visited Japan, Japan and the U.S. 
concluded a Guam transfer agreement, and the accord went into effect 
 
TOKYO 00001357  018 OF 020 
 
 
in May. The people of Okinawa have fiercely reacted to the pact, 
claiming their will was ignored. The DPJ is against the accord, 
isn't it? 
 
Okada: The accord is premised on the transfer of Futenma Air 
Station. If these two plans had been handled separately, we would 
have taken a different stance. Since they have been made a set, we 
oppose the accord. 
 
-- The two countries might have decided to treat them as a package, 
fearing the Guam plan might not be implemented if it was handled 
independently. In Okinawa, there is even the speculation that both 
sides decided to reach a governmental agreement so that the plan 
will be implemented even under a DPJ government. 
 
Okada: There is another view that the handling of the plans in a 
package was intended to make the DPJ raise its opposition. 
Particularly on the Futenma plan, we have insisted its functions be 
transferred to somewhere outside the prefecture or Japan. Okinawa 
Prefecture and the central government have yet to reach an 
agreement, so I think this issue should be discussed more 
thoroughly. The problem is that there are two major U.S. military 
bases - Kadena and Futenma - on a very small island, Okinawa, and 
that such a situation might last for another 30 or 50 years. If 
Futenma is relocated to another area in Okinawa, the base will stay 
there forever. It is necessary to have the U.S. think about it some 
more. The relocation issue should be discussed more thoroughly. 
 
-- Japan has always formed a security policy reflecting and 
responding to U.S. policy. 
 
Okada: Japan is still living in the shadow of the last war. The 
current state of Okinawa being pressed with a heavy base burden is a 
result of the miserable ground battle on that island. U.S. Marines 
must be thinking that they acquired the bases through a bloody 
battle. So they probably will not easily give up the bases. 
 
However, decades have passed since the San Francisco Treaty was 
signed, and the postwar period has already ended. It is now 
necessary to discuss whether the concentration of U.S. bases on 
Okinawa is normal. I think such a discussion is possible under the 
Obama administration. 
 
-- You proposed stabilizing the region under the Northeast 
nuclear-free zone concept. Is this idea linked to a plan to reduce 
U.S. bases in Okinawa, which is the U.S. military's strategic point 
in the Far East region? 
 
Okada: Of course, there is such an aspect, but the U.S. has seen the 
bases in Okinawa in the context of its Asia strategy and also its 
global strategy. Even so, there are so many U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa. I have to say that their retrenchment and reallocations 
must be considered. In realigning U.S. forces in Japan, 
consideration naturally should be given to this point. 
 
It is also necessary for our side to prepare a security policy or a 
diplomatic policy to that end in a positive manner. I just said that 
the Futenma base should be transferred to somewhere outside Okinawa, 
but it might be unrealistic to think there is a local government 
willing to host the base. 
 
Even so, if we think the current situation of the Futenma base is a 
 
TOKYO 00001357  019 OF 020 
 
 
problem, we must make efforts to find a new host municipality. This 
challenge is not easy, but since the government has erased the 
option of moving the base somewhere outside the prefecture, there 
will be no change in the state of bases permanently stationed in 
Okinawa. 
 
Information disclosure will deepen democracy 
 
-- You have said that (if the DPJ assumes political power), you will 
disclose the details of secret treaties having to do with Okinawa. 
In my view, since the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty contains provisions 
contradictory to the Constitution, particularly during the post-Cold 
War period, Japan and U.S. concluded many secret agreements in order 
to carry out operations. I think the so-called secret agreement on 
the reversion of Okinawa is a typical one. 
 
Okada: I have promised to disclose all information, including the 
secret agreement on Okinawa reversion, if we assume political power. 
A change of government has not taken place for such a long time that 
transparency of information has not been guaranteed. 
 
When the problem of the USS Kitty Hawk refueled by a Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's ship in the Indian Ocean came to light, I felt 
strongly about that issue. The U.S. government revealed almost all 
parts of the Kitty Hawk's logbooks, but the Japanese government 
refused to release information regarding the supply ship. Both 
sides' responses were totally different. 
 
In Japan, information inconvenient to the government tends to be 
concealed from the public at the bureaucrats' discretion. There are 
even cases in which people in Japan do not know what was already 
disclosed in the U.S. or in South Korea. Such a situation must be 
rectified immediately. Only our party, which is free from any 
fetters, can do that. 
 
We must not do what we cannot explain about later. But if we dare 
explain why we did it, the people might understand our option. I 
believe information disclosure will deepen public understanding 
about the nation's foreign policy. This is very important in light 
of popular sovereignty, and once the government is replaced, 
information will be easily disclosed. 
 
Former Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi said that although there 
was a secret agreement on Okinawa reached by only four persons, the 
accord has already become a dead letter (noted in the May 22, 2009, 
issue of the Shukan Asahi). At that time, the presence of the secret 
agreement itself was significant, because Japan was able to use it 
as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the U.S. government. Japan 
should have disclosed the secret agreement at a certain point. 
 
Learning the presence of the secret accord, some might claim it is 
outrageous, but others might think that then Prime Minister Sato had 
no choice but to make this bitter decision. I think democracy will 
deepen as a result of different views presented. 
 
(9) Prime Minister's schedule, June 14, 2009 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 16, 2009 
 
Prime Minister's schedule, June 14, 2009 
 
 
TOKYO 00001357  020 OF 020 
 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 16, 2009 
 
07:46 Took a walk around the official residence. 
10:04 Wedding ceremony and reception for the eldest daughter of 
former environment minister Shunichi Suzuki at Conrad Hotel in 
Higashi-Shimbashi. 
15:21 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Higashi-Ueno. 
16:01 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Higashi-Ogu. 
16:50 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Shimane, Adachi Ward. 
17:06 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Hirano, Adachi Ward. 
17:49 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Itabashi. 
18:05 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Nakajuku. 
18:29 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Nishi-Ikebukuro. 
19:10 Arrived at the official residence. 
 
Prime Minister's schedule, June 15, 2009 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 16, 2009 
 
10:20 Greeted the Emperor and the Empress at the Japan Art Academy 
Hall in Ueno Park. Then attended the award ceremony of the Japan Art 
Academy. 
11:26 Sent off the Emperor and the Empress. 
12:59 Met with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka at the Kantei. 
15:01 Party executive meeting in the Diet building. Secretary 
General Hosoda and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto 
remained. 
15:57 Met with Lower House member Yoshitaka Sakurada at the Kantei. 
 
16:15 Met with Finance Minister Yosano, followed by Chairman 
Katsuhiko Shirai of the Federation of Japanese Private Colleges and 
University Associations. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura remained. 
Then met with Internal Affairs Minister Sato and Vice Internal 
Affairs Minister Takino. 
18:01 Peace of Mind Society Realization Conference (PMSRC). 
19:07 Dined with PMSRC members. 
20:22 Dined with Election Committee Chairman Koga, former foreign 
minister Komura and former defense minister Kyuma and former METI 
minister Hiranuma. 
22:05 Arrived at the official residence. 
 
ZUMWALT