Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09TOKYO1347, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/15/09-2

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO1347.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO1347 2009-06-15 21:57 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO9321
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1347/01 1662157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 152157Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3736
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6912
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4581
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8384
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 2153
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5107
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9844
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5871
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5583
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/15/09-2 
 
INDEX: 
 
(12) Aso administration enters turbulence; Ne effective means to 
buoy up his administration, with Lower House dissolution just around 
corner (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(13) Minister Hatoyama's resignation: PM's decision came too late, 
questioned even by ruling parties for inability to control his ally 
(Asahi) 
 
(14) DPJ President Hatoyama tolerates "Ozawa-style UN-based policy" 
(Asahi) 
 
(15) Yosano says: "Countries have seen economies hit bottom," but 
regards exit strategies as mid-term task (Nikkei) 
 
(16) Japan, U.S. finance chiefs agree to take joint steps over 
strategy toward China (Nikkei) 
 
(17) Interview with New Komeito Deputy Representative Junji Higashi 
on tasks regarding Okinawa - SOFA must be reviewed (Okinawa Times) 
 
(18) The reality of the fears for the first time in 50 years 
(Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(12) Aso administration enters turbulence; Ne effective means to 
buoy up his administration, with Lower House dissolution just around 
corner 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Abridged) 
June 13, 2009 
 
Shohei Yoshida 
 
Internal Affairs and Communications Minister Kunio Hatoyama's 
resignation is certain to deal a serious blow to Prime Minister Taro 
Aso, who is looking for the right timing for dissolving the House of 
Representatives. The Aso administration has barely been able to 
maintain its unity by containing a move to pull down Aso. The 
departure of his close ally from the Aso cabinet means that this 
structure has begun to collapse. The Aso administration has now 
entered a period of "turbulence," in which people are whispering 
about the possibility of replacing the prime minister before the 
next Lower House election. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Election Strategy Council Vice 
Chairman Yoshihide Suga, who is close to the Prime Minister, made 
the following comment about the possible impact on the Aso 
administration by Hatoyama's resignation: "I would be lying if I 
said there will be no impact. But the trouble has passed, so there 
will be no serious impact." 
 
But this is only an optimistic view on the prime minister's side. 
 
A ruling party executive candidly indicated that the Prime 
Minister's failure to put a speedy end to the row over the 
reappointment of Japan Post Holding Co. President Yoshifumi 
Nishikawa has raised a question about the Prime Minister's 
leadership. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001347  002 OF 010 
 
 
Former LDP Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa, who had been critical 
of Hatoyama for his persistent call for Nishikawa's resignation, 
noted: "Those opposed to the postal privatization program might make 
moves to leave the party. We must keep a close eye on them." His 
view is that Hatoyama, who has left the Aso cabinet, might bolt the 
LDP and revolt against the party in the next Lower House election. 
 
Following in the footsteps of Hatoyama, Health, Labor and Welfare 
Parliamentary Secretary Toru Toida also resigned from his post, 
exposing the loss of momentum of Prime Minister Aso. The Aso 
administration is clearly on the verge of collapse. 
 
Hatoyama is the third minister to leave the Aso cabinet. Fiscal 
Services and Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Kaoru Yosano has 
concurrently been serving as finance minister since Shoichi 
Nakagawa's resignation. This time around, National Public Safety 
Commission Chairman Tsutomu Sato has been picked to double as 
internal affairs and communications minister. The Aso cabinet 
contains many "patches." 
 
Some in the government and the ruling parties are calling for a 
cabinet reshuffle before the next general election with the aim of 
revamping the administration. But the prevailing view in the ruling 
bloc is that a halfhearted reshuffle before the election would be 
meaningless. There are no effective means in sight that are 
available for the Prime Minister to boost his administration before 
the election. 
 
Former Secretary General Koichi Kato and other LDP members who are 
keeping their distance from the Prime Minister have not made any 
conspicuous moves to unseat Aso. 
 
If the ruling bloc suffers successive defeats in the June 14 Chiba 
mayoral election, the July 5 Shizuoka gubernatorial race, and the 
July 12 Tokyo assembly election, many LDP lawmakers might refuse to 
go into the next Lower House election under Prime Minister Aso. 
 
Are the ruling parties going to fight the next general election 
under Aso or dump him before it? 
 
The series of local elections are now turning into a watershed, 
rather than a simple prelude to the next general election, that can 
determine the fate of Prime Minister Aso. 
 
Watanabe alarmed at possible Hatoyama party 
 
Former Administrative Reform Minister Yoshimi Watanabe gave a speech 
in Tokyo on June 12 in which he expressed alarm abut the possibility 
of Kunio Hatoyama forming a new party. Watanabe revealed a plan to 
expedite efforts for forming his own party so as not to be 
overshadowed by a Hatoyama party. 
 
Watanabe, who left the LDP in January, is aiming to launch a new 
party in collaboration with House of Representatives member Kenji 
Eda. 
 
Opposition parties criticize Prime Minister Aso for lack of 
leadership 
 
Opposition parties harshly criticized Prime Minister Aso on June 12 
for his inability to settle the postal row speedily. At the same 
time, rumors have it that Kunio Hatoyama will launch a new party or 
 
TOKYO 00001347  003 OF 010 
 
 
will join hands with his brother, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
President Yukio Hatoyama. The DPJ president also urged the Prime 
Minister to dissolve the Lower House swiftly to seek a mandate from 
the public. Furthermore, Hatoyama expressed a positive view about 
the option of submitting a censure motion against Abe to the House 
of Councillors. 
 
Other opposition parties, such as the Japanese Communist Party and 
the Social Democratic Party, also slammed the Prime Minister. 
 
(13) Minister Hatoyama's resignation: PM's decision came too late, 
questioned even by ruling parties for inability to control his ally 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
June 13, 2009 
 
Jun Tabuse, Hisanori Imamura 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso has finally taken action on the battle 
between Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Kunio 
Hatoyama and Japan Post President Yoshifumi Nishikawa and ended the 
episode by "replacing" Hatoyama. However, this is certain to 
undermine Aso's leadership since his decision took too long and he 
was unable even to persuade an "ally." Depending on the reaction of 
public opinion, which has applauded Hatoyama so far, this problem 
could drag down the steering of the administration even further. 
 
When Hatoyama came to the Prime Minister's Office Residence on June 
12 with his resignation letter in hand, Aso told him: "Since you are 
unable to change your conviction, I am sorry but this will be 
inevitable." 
 
While some people in the ruling parties had claimed that, "It is 
best to punish both parties in a fight," (former secretary general) 
the prime minister's aides, particularly Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Takeo Kawamura, had been trying to find a way for both Hatoyama and 
Nishikawa to keep their jobs until the last minute. 
 
The compromise plan was for Hatoyama to accept Nishikawa's 
continuing in office on condition that Japan Post would implement 
thoroughly its business improvement plan based on the order of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. However, the 
coordination was unsuccessful. According to Hatoyama, at his first 
meeting with Aso on the morning of June 12, Aso had proposed that 
Nishikawa apologize to Hatoyama. However, Hatoyama said that, "Mr 
Nishikawa should not be apologizing to me but should apologize to 
the people." 
 
It was undesirable to postpone the matter to the following week to 
avoid damaging the administration, so the prime minister had been 
prepared for the worst. "Sacking Mr Hatoyama will have a negative 
effect, but it will be even worse if the matter drags on." (prime 
minister's aide). So the "replacement" decision was made. 
 
From the beginning, the replacement of Nishikawa had not been a 
viable option on the part of the prime minister because Nishikawa's 
continuation in office had been decided by the nomination committee 
consisting of Japan Post's non-executive directors. The reasoning 
was that even though the government holds 100 percent of Japan 
Post's shares, it should not intervene in the appointment of the 
president of a private company. In addition, the dismissal of 
Nishikawa would rouse a strong reaction from former Prime Minister 
 
TOKYO 00001347  004 OF 010 
 
 
Junichiro Koizumi and other advocates of postal privatization, and 
this might cause a political upheaval within the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP). 
 
Ruling party members are also divided in their view of Aso's 
decision. Former LDP secretary general Hidenao Nakagawa, a proponent 
of postal privatization who keeps his distance from Aso, welcomes 
the decision: "This is a correct judgment by the Aso cabinet, which 
is based on the people's mandate to thoroughly implement 
privatization." On the other hand, a senior New Komeito official 
claims that, "From the people's standpoint, it is hard to understand 
why Mr Hatoyama should resign." New Komeito Diet Affairs Committee 
Chairman Yoshio Urushibara also notes that, "There is no denying 
that questions will be raised about the prime minister's leadership. 
People will say that 'he is indecisive and his leadership is weak'." 
This is certain to have a negative impact on Aso's strategy for 
dissolving the Diet. 
 
The reason why Hatoyama had not backed off at all in his all-out 
confrontation with Nishikawa is that he was confident about support 
from public opinion. Some ruling party members also said that, "The 
popular sentiment is that Mr Hatoyama's position is more 
convincing." (former secretary general Bunmei Ibuki). 
 
Hatoyama's current constituency for his seat in the House of 
Representatives is the sixth district of Fukuoka. Although he has 
high name recognition, he has been moving from one district to 
another, so his political support base is actually not strong. With 
the cabinet support rating sagging, it appears that he judged that 
he has better chances campaigning as "Kunio Hatoyama" rather than as 
an "LDP member" in the next election. 
 
After his first meeting with the prime minister on June 12, Hatoyama 
told three Diet members close to him at his personal office in Tokyo 
about his intention to resign. Right after he submitted his 
resignation, parliamentary secretary of health, labor and welfare 
Toru Toida also submitted his resignation to Minister of Health, 
Labor and Welfare Yoichi Masuzoe. Hatoyama is a self-proclaimed 
"perpetual advocate of political realignment" and has been mumbling 
recently that, "It is possible that I might form a new party, 
although not right away." What happened must have been according to 
his planned scenario. 
 
However, the situation is not such that other politicians will 
follow in Hatoyama's footsteps. Parliamentary secretary of the 
environment Yoshihisa Furukawa, a former secretary to Hatoyama, had 
conveyed his intention to resign to senior Environment Ministry 
officials at first but later withdrew his resignation after being 
dissuaded by his aides. 
 
(14) DPJ President Hatoyama tolerates "Ozawa-style UN-based policy" 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
June 13, 2009 
 
By Kyohei Matsuda 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has yet to 
dip into the DPJ's guidelines concerning the overseas dispatch of 
the Self-Defense Forces, which were decided while Ichiro Ozawa 
assumed the presidency. At around the time of the presidential 
election in May, he criticized the party's policy of allowing the 
 
TOKYO 00001347  005 OF 010 
 
 
SDF personnel's use of force under the request of the United 
Nations, but he has not shown any signs of reviewing the 
guidelines. 
 
At a panel discussion held immediately before the leadership race, 
Hatoyama said: "Although President Ozawa puts his faith in the 
supremacy of the United Nations, I take a UN-centered policy." He 
declared that he would not follow the idea of abiding by whatever 
decisions the UN made. 
 
Ozawa's assertions were included in the "Policy Magna Carta," which 
the DPJ compiled in December 2006. The DPJ's policy of allowing the 
SDF to use armed force goes against the government's interpretation 
of the Constitution that the SDF is allowed to use arms for only 
self-defense. In the DPJ, Hatoyama's remark was taken to mean that 
he was aiming at more realistic security policies with an eye on a 
change in government. 
 
However, the meeting of the DPJ's foreign affairs and defense 
divisions in charge of issues related to SDF dispatch overseas 
failed to present "new guidelines" to the party's preparatory 
committee studying a manifesto for the next Lower House election, 
which stopped accepting applications for priority policies on June 
10. There are no signs that Hatoyama consulted the committee for 
reviewing the Policy Magna Carta. 
 
A senior DPJ member pointed out that, "Because reviewing 
(guidelines) means a Pandora's box will be opened." 
 
It can be said that the formation of the Policy Magna Carta is an 
extra effort to win members coming from the former Japan Socialist 
Party, who are reluctant to dispatch the SDF overseas. However, 
since the wording "democratic control" in the Policy Magna Carta 
means Article 9 of the Constitution, the SDF cannot use force 
abroad. This is a contradicting interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
This issue could become a source of trouble for the Hatoyama 
leadership, which was inaugurated under a unified party arrangement. 
In order to prevent such trouble from occurring, the view is now 
gaining ground among the LDP executives that there are no relations 
between the Policy Magna Carta and the manifesto for the next 
general election. 
 
On the other hand, since the position of the Policy Magna Carta is 
murky, there is fresh turmoil in the DPJ. 
 
The DPJ's shadow defense minister, Keiichiro Asao, who takes a 
positive stance toward the overseas deployment of the SDF, presented 
a tentative plan to a meeting on June 9 of the foreign affairs and 
defense divisions. With sanctions against North Korea in mind, the 
tentative plan stipulates that the SDF would be allowed to use arms 
in carrying out ship inspections in international waters under a UN 
resolution. This is more specific than a bill the government is now 
drafting. 
 
Toward the view that allowing the SDF to use force is a violation of 
the Constitution, Asano explained: "We considered the overseas 
deployment of the SDF based on the Policy Magna Carta. In the 
meeting, such views were raised: "Is the Policy Magna Carta still 
effective?" and "With the resignation of Ozawa, it is invalid." As 
Ozawa's has lost his influence, internal discussion appears to have 
dispersed. 
 
TOKYO 00001347  006 OF 010 
 
 
 
Hatoyama told reporters on June 12: "There was a rumor that since I 
have close ties to Mr. Ozawa, Mr. Ozawa has the same UN-centered 
policy as me. I don't think there is a big difference in our 
views." 
 
(15) Yosano says: "Countries have seen economies hit bottom," but 
regards exit strategies as mid-term task 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
June 14, 2009 
 
(Tsuyoshi Fujita, Lecce) 
 
In a press conference at the conclusion of a meeting of finance 
ministers from the Group of Eight countries on June 13, Finance 
Minister Kaoru Yosano said: "I got the impression that countries 
have seen their economies hit the bottom," indicating the global 
economy is gradually recovering. 
 
Yosano recognized the need for a discussion on "exit strategies," as 
specified in a joint statement, saying: "We must consider 
appropriate strategies for winding down extraordinary policy 
measures taken so far." But he added: "It is not proper to consider 
it now," defining it as a mid-term task. 
 
Yosano did not make any comment on the recent rise in long-term 
interest rates, just saying: "The government cannot manipulate 
rates." But regarding a review of the international accounting 
standard now under deliberation, he reportedly expressed his concern 
in the G-8 meeting about a possible negative effect on the 
possession of government bonds and stressed the need to classify 
them appropriately. 
 
According to officials accompanying Yosano, discussion is underway 
on a review of the current system to enable value changes of 
government bonds held for long periods of time by financial 
institutions as salable assets to be reflected in each term's 
profit-and-loss account, in the same way as bonds aimed for 
transactions. 
 
(16) Japan, U.S. finance chiefs agree to take joint steps over 
strategy toward China 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Excerpts) 
Evening, June 13, 2009 
 
(Yusuke Yoneyama, Lecce) 
 
Japanese Finance Minister Kaoru Yosano and U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner in their meeting on June 12 discussed the Chinese 
economy, in addition to the two countries' economic conditions and 
North Korean issues. An expansion of domestic demand in China is 
imperative for the global economy to be put onto a recovery and 
growth track. China is increasing its influence as the world's 
largest buyer of U.S. government bonds. As a result, it is becoming 
more important for Japan and the U.S. to take joint steps toward 
policy coordination with China. 
 
Yosano took up the importance of the Chinese economy first. 
According to officials accompanying Yosano, Geithner responding by 
talking about the results produced during his visit to China in 
 
TOKYO 00001347  007 OF 010 
 
 
early July. They shared the view that strengthening U.S.-China 
relations will benefit both Japan and the U.S. Also based on the 
view that since Japan-U.S. relations remain solid, the U.S. can 
focus its efforts on China, they affirmed the need for the U.S. to 
promote a strategy toward China on the premise of cooperation with 
Japan. 
 
While in China, Geithner indicated his determination to address the 
task of restoring fiscal health, besides economic recovery efforts. 
He obtained understanding from the Chinese government, which has 
purchased U.S. government bonds. 
 
China's sustainable economic growth is the key for Japan to boost 
exports and turn around its economy. The Japanese and U.S. finance 
chiefs discussed China even though it did not participate in the 
meeting of finance ministers from the Group of Eight (G-8) 
countries. This shows China's growing influence over the global 
economy. 
 
During the brief 15-minute bilateral meeting, Yosano and Geithner 
also discussed the issue of the Chinese currency, yuan. They 
apparently agreed on the need to continue to urge China to adopt a 
more flexible exchange rate system. 
 
It is imperative to draw China into the framework of G-8 
coordination also on issues of preventing protectionism and global 
warming. Japan and the U.S. will take the initiative in forming a 
framework for policy coordination. 
 
(17) Interview with New Komeito Deputy Representative Junji Higashi 
on tasks regarding Okinawa - SOFA must be reviewed 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
June 14, 2009 
 
-- What is the significance of the (next) general election and what 
is your party's strategy for the four constituencies in Okinawa? 
 
"The New Komeito and the Liberal Democratic Party will work closely 
in conducting election campaigns. The significance is that the 
administrative power and the ability to run the government will be 
called into question. A change of government is often discussed as 
if it is a purpose rather than a means. The absence of the ability 
to run the government will only create disorder." 
 
-- How are you going to deal with the plan to relocate Futenma Air 
Station to waters off Henoko in Nago? What is your evaluation of the 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan? 
 
"We want to closely watch Governor Hirokazu Nakaima's views on the 
environmental assessment. There is much room to consider the noise 
factor, and there are all sorts of opinions about specifics, such as 
the option of making minor changes to the offshore plan. How to 
convince local residents and how to settle the matter are important. 
Efforts to eliminate dangerous aspects in Okinawa must be expedited. 
Reducing bases in Okinawa is a long-held dream of our party, as 
well. The return and redevelopment of facilities south of Kadena Air 
Base are vital for building an independent economy." 
 
-- What about the question of a fundamental revision of the 
Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)? 
 
 
TOKYO 00001347  008 OF 010 
 
 
"The government has been dealing with the situation concerning the 
operation of SOFA. Our party has yet to unify views in the party. I 
personally wonder if the operation of SOFA is all it takes. The time 
has come for us to consider the matter while keeping a review of 
SOFA in mind." 
 
-- The Okinawa Promotional Special Measures Law will expire in March 
2012. What factors are involved in the promotion of Okinawa? 
 
"(Legal measures) are necessary as long as there are gaps with 
mainland Japan. But Okinawa has to break away from its dependence on 
bases and to build a self-supporting economy, so measures must be 
taken in the form of supporting Okinawa's independence. Necessary 
public works projects must be implemented. The start of the use of a 
new runway at Naha Airport is too late. It will lead to the 
promotion of tourism, so it must be rushed. In view of the prospect 
of (Okinawa) becoming an independent bloc as a result of a shift to 
a doshu (regional bloc) system, it is important to make the fiscal 
foundation firm. We would like to see Okinawa turn its eye to Asia 
and carry out exchanges actively." 
 
-- The unemployment rate in Okinawa is high. What are your views on 
the economy, employment policy, and the correction of disparities? 
 
"Okinawa must climb out of the recession. The government has 
implemented many policies, and it is important for them to produce 
positive effects early. In order for Okinawa to achieve an 
independent economy, there is no other option but to create jobs 
centering on public works projects, tourism and so on." 
 
-- Do you think Japan and the United States concluded a secret pact 
when returning Okinawa to Japan? 
 
"The government has denied it. The government's position is that 
because the notes exchanged between Japan and the United States do 
not specify an advance notice on 'nuclear introduction' into Japan, 
the two countries did not conclude a secret pact. Our view is the 
same as the government's." 
 
Interviewed by Ikue Nakaima 
 
(18) The reality of the fears for the first time in 50 years 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 14, 2009 
 
Katsuji Nakazawa, deputy political editor 
 
"Can the Self-Defense Forces engage in retaliatory bombing in Korea? 
Quite apart from the question of whether it will actually do so or 
not, is this possible theoretically?" "How do we defend Japan from a 
large long-range guided missile?" Such were the heated exchanges 
that took place at the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee in 
February, 1956, which could have been mistaken for the current Diet 
session, where North Korea's nuclear and missile tests have been a 
key issue. 
 
Former Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama's response in the Diet half a 
century ago in 1956 that the capability to attack enemy bases was 
"constitutional," which Prime Minister Taro Aso has mentioned in 
relation to the present debate on this capability, was read out on 
his behalf by Defense Agency Director General Naka Funada. It went: 
 
TOKYO 00001347  009 OF 010 
 
 
"It is unthinkable that the spirit of the constitution is for us to 
just do nothing and wait for our own destruction. Legally, it is 
within the scope of self-defense to attack bases of guided missiles 
and other weapons if no other means are available." 
 
At that time, although an armistice had been concluded for the 
Korean War, the situation was still unstable and battles had been 
fought in the Taiwan Strait. Only four years had passed since the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952, and 
Japan was not yet a member of the United Nations. 
 
Like today, nuclear tests also became an issue at the 1956 Diet 
session, where alarmist statements like "a third world war will 
break out" were sometimes made. A Diet resolution asking the U.S., 
the Soviet Union, and other nations to ban testing of atomic and 
hydrogen bombs had just been passed before Hatoyama made his 
response. Entertainment movies at that time also roused fears about 
nuclear weapons. The movie "The Great Aerial Monster Radon" released 
in 1956 was about the resurrection of dinosaurs as a result of 
nuclear and other experiments. 
 
It was evident from Hatoyama's response that since Japan did not 
possess nuclear weapons, he wanted to leave some theoretical leeway 
for Japan to retaliate as a way to deal with the unstable 
international environment. 
 
Subsequently, talk about the capability to attack enemy bases 
disappeared from the surface until the 1990s. During the Cold War 
era, the Japan-U.S. security alliance functioned effectively and 
there had been few occasions where Japan felt any direct threat. It 
was also a period in which the economy came before anything else. 
North Korea's recent nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches 
have awakened the sense of crisis again for the first time in half a 
century. 
 
The enemy base attack capability recommended by a joint meeting of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) defense-related divisions to 
Prime Minister Taro Aso on June 11 consists of long-range cruise 
missiles or long-range ballistic-type solid rockets. This was in 
anticipation of the government's revision of the "National Defense 
Program Guidelines (NDPG)" in late 2009. 
 
The unfamiliar term "ballistic-type solid rocket" is another way to 
say "ballistic missile." This reflects the idea of taking one step 
further from passive missile defense to possessing offensive 
missiles for deterrence. Although this was a recommendation by LDP 
divisions which take a deliberately radical view, it does symbolize 
the depth of Japan's anxiety. 
 
The Six-Party Talks have not been effective even though the whole of 
Japan is within the range of missiles carrying nuclear warheads, 
while the United States, which Japan relies on, has removed the DRPK 
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, shelving the abduction 
issue. 
 
The mid-ranking and junior Diet members who cry out for enemy base 
strike capability are disturbed by the fact that Japan has no 
alternative defense capability of its own in a situation where the 
weakening of America's power has made it difficult to fully rely on 
for security. The shakiness of Japan's position as the number two 
economic power, which used to be source of its confidence, has also 
made Japan anxious. 
 
TOKYO 00001347  010 OF 010 
 
 
 
The current debate on the enemy base attack capability also includes 
a tactical diplomatic message for the U.S. and China. To the U.S., 
Japan is testing the proposition of reviewing the division of labor 
in security that has persisted in the post-World War II period - 
that "Japan will serve purely as a shield." On the other hand, for 
China, which is sensitive to Japan's "military expansion," Japan 
reckons that it will now think seriously about applying pressure on 
North Korea after the latest UN resolution. There seems to be a 
notion that although nuclear armament is not an option for Japan, 
"making other countries think about 'what if' could serve as a 
deterrent." 
 
Even though Japan will not embark on preemptive strikes under its 
exclusively defensive policy, if it goes beyond the realm of legal 
theory and comes to possess offensive weapons such as "Tomahawk" 
missiles, this will mean a critical change in the character of Japan 
in the postwar era. There can be an infinite number of debatable 
points in the interpretation of the phrase "if no other means are 
available" in Hatoyama's response. 
 
Advocates of the enemy base strike capability are also present in 
the Democratic Party of Japan, which is headed by Ichiro Hatoyama's 
grandson. Policy toward North Korea and security issues brought to 
light by the DPRK should be discussed intensively in the House of 
Representatives election that will come before the NDPG review later 
in the year. 
 
ZUMWALT