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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/11/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japan, U.S. praise "strong resolution" against North Korea; not 
much new and not much expectations on effectiveness (Jiji) 
 
(2) Chief Cabinet Secretary positive about submitting possible "new 
law" on DPRK ship inspection to current Diet session (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Be prepared for the "Obama shock" in North Korean policy (Asahi) 
 
 
(4) Aso shows understanding to LDP proposals calling for possession 
of enemy-base strike capability (Sankei) 
 
(5) FX selection thrown into confusion (Asahi) 
 
(6) LDP exec implies settlement with minor changes to Futenma 
relocation plan (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(7) Decision to ratify Cluster Bomb Ban Treaty opens up new horizons 
for Japan's diplomacy through cooperation with NGO initiatives 
(Mainichi) 
 
(8) Interview with ex-PM Fukuda: Approval of Cluster Bomb Ban Treaty 
"matter of course; he ordered a positive stance (Mainichi) 
 
(9) Winning U.S. understanding problem in disarmament; unsure about 
methods, funding for discarding cluster bombs (Mainichi) 
 
(10) Defense spending must be set at 1.5 PERCENT  of GDP (Sankei) 
 
(11) Koizumi children having difficulties (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japan, U.S. praise "strong resolution" against North Korea; not 
much new and not much expectations on effectiveness 
 
JIJI.COM (Full) 
11:44, June 11, 2009 
 
New York, Jiji Press, June 10 
 
The Japanese and U.S. governments claimed on June 10 that the 
resolution against North Korea agreed upon by seven nations, 
including Japan and the U.S., is "very strong and appropriate." 
(U.S. ambassador to the UN Susan Rice) However, there is not much 
new in the draft proposals, which exclude the option of using force, 
and if North Korea continues with its provocations, a news response 
will be an issue in the future. 
 
Ambassador Yukio Takasu stressed on June 10 that the objective of 
the resolution is to make the existing Resolution 1817 on sanctions 
against the DPRK "effective." The new draft resolution provides for 
steps to reinforce the monitoring of the implementation of 
sanctions, such as by creating a seven-member experts' committee. 
 
Takasu went into details on the six provisions on the key issue of 
cargo inspection, explaining that if permission is not granted for 
ship inspection on the open seas, the flag state of the ship in 
question is obliged to direct the ship to an appropriate port. On 
financial sanctions, new provisions will be added on prohibiting 
 
TOKYO 00001317  002 OF 011 
 
 
loans and aid to the DPRK and blocking the transfer of funds 
relating to nuclear development. 
 
However, Resolution 1817 already includes provisions on cargo 
inspection and financial sanctions, albeit not as comprehensive. 
Furthermore, a similar menu of sanctions can also be found in the 
sanction resolution against Iran for its nuclear development. The 
two resolutions are similar in their objective of preventing nuclear 
proliferation and exclusion of the option of using force. The new 
resolution on North Korea will also be in the same league. 
 
A diplomatic source pointed out that sanction resolutions focused on 
nuclear proliferation tend to be similar in their contents, 
lamenting the "lack of ideas" on completely new sanctions. 
 
(2) Chief Cabinet Secretary positive about submitting possible "new 
law" on DPRK ship inspection to current Diet session 
 
YOMIURI ONLINE (Full) 
12:47, June 11, 2009 
 
At a news conference on June 11, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo 
Kawamura indicated that the government will study domestic 
legislations for the inspection of cargo on North Korean ships in 
light of the imminent adoption of a sanction resolution against the 
DPRK by the UN Security Council. 
 
Kawamura said: "We also need to study domestic legislations," 
indicating that either a new law will be drawn up or amendments to 
the ship inspection operations law will be considered. He also 
indicated that a new law may possibly be considered and said that 
"it is fully possible" that the bill may be submitted to the current 
Diet session. 
 
Meanwhile, with regard to Japan's imposing tougher sanctions of its 
own, Kawamura said that: "The question of unilateral sanctions is 
certain to come up. For example, the question of (complete ban on) 
exports or (regulation) of two-way travel will probably be 
discussed," indicating that these will be studied simultaneously 
(with ship inspection). 
 
(3) Be prepared for the "Obama shock" in North Korean policy 
 
ASAHI (Page 19) (Full) 
June 11, 2009 
 
Young C. Kim, professor emeritus at George Washington University 
 
I think both North Korea's series of missile launches and its 
nuclear test will not result in any change in the Obama 
administration's basic stance on resolving the North Korean nuclear 
issue through dialogue and negotiations, namely, the Six-Party Talks 
or bilateral negotiations. The DPRK will persist in refusing to 
return to the Six-Party Talks, reinforcing its nuclear and missile 
capabilities, and aiming at being recognized as a nuclear power. 
 
The question is how the U.S. and North Korea will deal with each 
other's demands. It is impossible that the U.S. government will 
agree to normalization of diplomatic ties, signing a peace 
agreement, and supplying light-water reactors without the DPRK's 
denuclearization. It is also unthinkable that the U.S. government 
will accept a "change in its hostile policy," which, in effect, 
 
TOKYO 00001317  003 OF 011 
 
 
would mean the disintegration of the U.S.-ROK alliance. On the other 
hand, it is also unlikely that North Korea will agree to complete 
and verifiable removal of its nuclear capability. It is improbable 
that the DPRK, which is facing threats to the very survival of its 
regime and grappling with a serious crisis, including the problem of 
succession of power, will accept the U.S.' conditions. It is North 
Korea's position that the nuclear issue can be discussed among the 
four nuclear powers, the U.S., China, Russia, and itself. 
 
Although the U.S. government has stated repeatedly that it is aiming 
at the complete and verifiable removal of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal 
without recognizing it as a nuclear power, the methodology has 
remained unclear. While it is not impossible to find a compromise 
through summit talks, America at present lacks the determination to 
do everything it can to resolve the problem. The Obama 
administration's policy toward North Korea has not been established. 
I think for now, it will not reward the North's provocative actions, 
will impose tougher sanctions, and will implement a policy of 
"dialogue and pressure" to press the DPRK to return to the 
negotiating table. However, in the future, the Obama administration 
may shift to an appeasement policy under certain conditions for 
reasons such as the desire to prevent nuclear proliferation and mass 
production of plutonium, the lack of a better option, or the desire 
to prevent North Korea from becoming violent or starting a war. 
 
If the Obama administration takes action deviating from its 
principle of seeking verifiable nuclear abandonment without 
recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear power, this would be a serious 
development, damaging the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance. 
The Japanese government is probably studying all possible responses 
to such an "Obama shock." 
 
In any case, the Japanese government, in the first place, should be 
actively involved with discussions toward the goal of the 
denuclearization of North Korea, which has a critical impact on 
Japan's security, by using the Six-Party Talks and all other 
relevant forums. It should declare to the international community 
its willingness to take up an appropriate share of the 
responsibility. This means that Japan should participate in energy 
and economic aid to the DPRK, regardless of the abduction issue. 
Furthermore, it should respond positively to the creation of a new 
framework or negotiation mechanism to replace the Six-Party Talks 
and engage in comprehensive talks for Japan-DPRK normalization after 
a certain cooling off period. At the same time, it should implement 
more systematic and aggressive diplomacy toward the United States to 
coordinate policies with the Obama administration in a direction 
beneficial to Japan's national interest. 
 
With regard to the abduction issue, on condition of a firm 
commitment between the Japanese and DPRK governments to a final 
solution at the time of normalization of diplomatic relations, both 
governments should first make honest efforts at implementing 
humanitarian measures for the families of the victims - such as 
resumption of investigations along with inviting the victims' 
families to the DPRK, North Korea's apology to a Japanese mission to 
Pyongyang, briefings on the investigation of facts, and proposals 
for compensation. 
 
(4) Aso shows understanding to LDP proposals calling for possession 
of enemy-base strike capability 
 
SANKEI ONLINE (Abridged) 
 
TOKYO 00001317  004 OF 011 
 
 
12:53, June 11, 2009 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) National Defense Division defense 
policy subcommittee chairman Hiroshi Imazu and others met with Prime 
Minister and LDP President Taro Aso at 11 a.m. at party 
headquarters. In the session, the group presented Aso with a set of 
proposals regarding the National Defense Program Outlines that call, 
among other things, for the possession of the capability to strike 
enemy bases. In response, Aso reportedly expressed a willingness to 
consider the option based on the results of a blue-ribbon panel. 
 
According to a person who attended the meeting, the Prime Minister 
showed understanding to the option of possessing enemy-base strike 
capabilities, saying, "We must be fully aware that there is a 
country near Japan that is trying to possess nuclear weapons in the 
near future." 
 
The group led by Imazu also reported Policy Research Council 
Chairman Kosuke Hori on the proposals and asked for an increase in 
defense spending, which has been curtailed over the last several 
years. Hori showed understanding to the government's plan to treat 
defense spending separately from other areas, such as security, in 
its 2009 basic economic and fiscal policy guidelines. 
 
(5) FX selection thrown into confusion 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
June 10, 2009 
 
The government is in the process of selecting the fighter 
experimental (FX), or the follow-on fighter jet model, for the Air 
Self-Defense Force. This process, however, is now becoming confused 
prior to the revising of the government's midterm defense buildup 
plan late this year. The Defense Ministry has forgone FX selection 
due to the domestic circumstances in the United States. Even so, the 
F-22, a U.S.-developed state-of-the-art stealth fighter that the 
Defense Ministry wants the most, is now about to be dropped from the 
list. On the other hand, the Defense Ministry is under the gun, 
facing an unusual complaint from the domestic defense industry about 
its sad plight. "If the confusion is drawn out," a defense 
contractor says, "Japan may lose the production base of its defense 
industry at home." The government will be urged to select the final 
FX candidate model from among its limited choices. 
 
The Defense Ministry sees the F-22 as the best choice. The F-22 is 
an outstanding stealth fighter that is hardly detectable to radar 
and has multiple roles for air supremacy, ground attacks, and other 
functions. The F-22 is "the strongest fighter," according to an ASDF 
staff officer. 
 
The FX selection has been affected by the United States' 
circumstances. In 2007, the U.S. Congress decided to embargo the 
F-22, since it was concerned about the outflow of its advanced 
military technology. Japan asked the United States to provide F-22 
data. Washington, however, did not comply with Tokyo's request for 
information disclosure. In April, the Obama administration, driven 
to review the federal government's defense budget, announced its 
decision to discontinue F-22 procurement. As it stands, the United 
States is now almost certain to stop F-22 production. The F-22 is 
priced at about 14 billion yen for the U.S. Air Force. Even if the 
U.S. Congress approves F-22 exports to Japan, the F-22's per unit 
price is estimated to be over 30 billion yen, with its development 
 
TOKYO 00001317  005 OF 011 
 
 
cost and other costs added up. 
 
Even so, the Defense Ministry still has a glimmer of hope for the 
F-22. In the United States, budget-compiling authority belongs to 
Congress. There are now moves within the U.S. Congress seeking to 
continue F-22 production for job security, and the U.S. Congress may 
override the Obama administration's F-22 decision. This is why the 
Defense Ministry has yet to given up on the F-22. Apparently, Japan 
is lobbying the U.S. Congress, as well. 
 
In May, when Defense Minister Hamada visited the United States, he 
told Secretary of State Gates that Japan wanted to introduce the 
F-22. Gates, however, asked Hamada to consider the F-35, which is 
the follow-on mainstay fighter. The F-35 is a high-performance 
fighter jet that is on a par with the F-22. However, the F-35 is 
still under development. Even if Japan can be second to U.S. forces 
in introducing F-35s, its F-35 introduction will be in the mid 
2010s. If that is the case, it will be too late for Japan because 
the ASDF's F-4 fighter jets, currently deployed as the ASDF's 
mainstay fighters, will have become too old by then. 
 
The situation is now becoming muddled. Meanwhile, other U.S. and 
European manufacturers are now on the move. The most enthusiastic 
one is Britain's BAE Systems, a point of contact for the 
Eurofighter, which is a fighter jet co-developed by four European 
countries. BAE Systems has been getting in touch with Japanese 
aircraft manufacturers as well, making it a 'sales point' to approve 
licensed production in Japan and technological transfer to Japan. 
 
However, the Defense Ministry has not adopted any European fighter 
planes. The ASDF is voicing concern about European fighters from the 
perspective of maintenance and other factors. In addition, there are 
cautious views within the government. "We need to study this matter 
from the perspective of maintaining Japan's alliance with the United 
States," one official said. 
 
The Boeing Company, a U.S.-based aircraft manufacturer, has deep 
ties with the ASDF. In March, Boeing announced the F-15SE Silent 
Eagle, which is based on the F-15E as the F-15FX. The F-15E has high 
ground attack capability, and its upgrade version is the F-15SE, 
which is a new stealth fighter model. So far, the two 
Boeing-recommended fighter models have been underdog candidates. 
"The design concept is old and their stealth performance is low," an 
ASDF staff officer said. However, Boeing will approve the F-15SE's 
licensed production and technological transfer. 
 
The question is whether or not licensed production can be granted to 
Japan. In fact, this point is a matter of life or death for Japan's 
defense industry. 
 
There are two ways to procure fighter planes from abroad: 
manufacturing at home under a license and importing them. However, 
the ASDF's fighter planes have been seamlessly produced at home 
mainly on a licensed production basis for over 50 years. That is 
because the know-how for manufacturing fighter planes is defense 
infrastructure that cannot be acquired in a short period of time 
when that is needed. 
 
However, the FX selection has now been thrown into confusion. F-2 
production is timetabled to end up with its last one in 2011. After 
that, Japan's next production of fighter planes cannot be expected. 
It is almost certain that Japan's domestic production of fighter 
 
TOKYO 00001317  006 OF 011 
 
 
planes will cease for the first time in the postwar period. 
 
The F-22 uses a number of secret technologies. If Japan chooses a 
leading-edge fighter jet model like the F-22, Japan will likely have 
to import finished fighter jets. "The domestic aircraft industry may 
pull out of the defense sector," says Shinichi Kiyotani, a 
journalist on military affairs. 
 
Japan produces fighter planes with the support of about 1,200 
companies. These domestic companies have specially skilled engineers 
and maintain their production lines. An executive from Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, Japan's largest aircraft manufacturer, says: ""Our 
manufacturing know-how in the defense sector is like traditional 
arts. This know-how, once lost without being handed down, cannot be 
retrieved ever again." 
 
The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies (SJAC), which is made up 
of aircraft manufacturers, conducted a questionnaire survey of its 
members in private over the FX issue. SJAC tabulated findings from 
that survey. Since this February, SJAC has repeatedly briefed the 
Defense Ministry on its sad plight. This is unusual for SJAC. 
 
According to findings from the survey, 67 PERCENT  of its 
respondents were concerned about the fighter aircraft project's 
downsizing. The figure shows the serious situation. 
 
Toshikazu Miyabe, an SJAC senior vice president, says: "The way 
things are going, Japan's aircraft manufacturers will lose their 
infrastructure that supports the Self-Defense Forces' aircraft. We 
asked the Defense Ministry to think together about what we should 
do." 
 
(6) LDP exec implies settlement with minor changes to Futenma 
relocation plan 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1) (Full) 
June 11, 2009 
 
Hiroyuki Hosoda, secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party, set forth his views yesterday on the issue of relocating the 
U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Okinawa Prefecture's 
Ginowan City to a coastal area of Camp Schwab in the prefecture's 
northern coastal city of Nago), saying: "It's important to consider 
at least minor changes and reach a settlement with that location 
(off Nago City's Henoko district) in order to overcome the Futenma 
issue." With this, Hosoda indicated that the government should 
comply with the request from Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima and other 
local officials to move the relocation site to an offshore area 
within the scope of "minor changes" and settle the issue with the 
understanding of the local community. Hosoda, however, did not 
specify the scope of "minor changes" in his statement. "That's up to 
the government to consider," Hosoda said. He was answering a Ryukyu 
Shimpo reporter's questions in an interview at the LDP headquarters 
in Tokyo. 
 
Hosoda once negotiated with the U.S. government on the plan to move 
about 17,000 persons, including the families of Okinawa-based U.S. 
Marines, to Guam when he was chief cabinet secretary. "Okinawa does 
not militarily need so many (U.S. troops) in some (security) areas," 
Hosoda said. He added, "I suggested they sort out those who can be 
transferred from among the Marines, including families." With this, 
he explained why the Japanese government proposed transferring U.S. 
 
TOKYO 00001317  007 OF 011 
 
 
Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 
 
Hosoda also stressed: "In the sense of putting together (U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa), and in terms of public security, I think 
this is best for Okinawa. In connection with Futenma (airfield's 
relocation), there are now very unfortunate developments. But it 
would be better to say we want the Guam relocation to be carried out 
at an early date." 
 
In addition, Hosoda also touched on why the government first chose 
an area off the coast of Nago City's Henoko district as the 
relocation site for Futenma airfield, saying: "There were rumors 
going around about some candidate locations, such as Shimochhijima 
Island, Kadena (Air Base's) ammunition depot, and Yomitan airfield. 
We made various studies. Of course, I claimed that Yomitan would be 
impossible." 
 
(7) Decision to ratify Cluster Bomb Ban Treaty opens up new horizons 
for Japan's diplomacy through cooperation with NGO initiatives 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 11, 2009 
 
Yoji Hanaoka, Ken Uzuka, Yasushi Sengoku 
 
The House of Councillors on June 10 passed a bill ratifying the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Treaty), which prohibits the 
use and possession of cluster bombs, the duds of which often end up 
killing or maiming civilians. This treaty, which is a product of the 
disarmament talks led by the interested nations and NGOs under the 
"Oslo Process," offers a new style of disarmament and may open up 
new horizon for Japan's "peace diplomacy," which has been moribund 
for a long time. However, the process toward the disposal of cluster 
bombs has just begun. There are numerous issues that need to be 
tackled, including the compatibility of this law with the cluster 
bombs possessed by the U.S. Forces Japan. 
 
Nobuyasu Abe, director of the Center for the Promotion of 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs and consultant to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), was directly in charge in 1998 as director of MOFA's 
Arms Control and Science Division when Japan ratified the 
"Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines." The Mine 
Ban Treaty, like the Oslo Treaty, was an initiative by interested 
nations and NGOs. Abe recalls his experience: "There was a big fuss 
(at that time). Ratification came after a lot of agonizing." 
 
Since landmines, unlike nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, 
are weapons the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were expected to use, the 
impact of the ratification of the treaty was tremendous. 
 
However, Abe observes that with regard to the Oslo Treaty, the 
government has handled the matter with composure. He says: "Thanks 
to the learning process at the time of the Mine Ban Treaty, there is 
now better understanding of the humanitarian standpoint among 
defense officials." 
 
Abe sees the emergence of a new Japanese diplomatic style in the 
decision to ratify the Oslo Treaty. He says: "Failure to advocate a 
position boldly is often criticized. However, disarmament has to do 
with a balance between the military and the humanitarian viewpoints. 
Japan has taken action promptly from a position of responsibility 
 
TOKYO 00001317  008 OF 011 
 
 
while also taking practical issues into account." 
 
He particularly noted the cooperation with the NGOs: "In this case, 
the NGOs showed that if there is a will to make things move, things 
will move. We count on the NGOs to save the victims and spread the 
principles of humanitarianism. The government will also cooperate. 
NGOs, experts, governments, and other parties should all work hard 
together." 
 
In the area of disarmament, U.S. President Barack Obama has 
advocated the elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal, 
and he is also positive about negotiations on the Fissile Material 
Cut-Off Treaty. 
 
It is said that the next subject of citizen-led disarmament treaties 
will be depleted uranium shells. Regulation of cyber warfare and 
biotechnological weapons is also attracting a great deal of 
attention. 
 
How well Japan can make use of the "new style" it has developed in 
the present case will be put to the test. 
 
(8) Interview with ex-PM Fukuda: Approval of Cluster Bomb Ban Treaty 
"matter of course; he ordered a positive stance 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 11, 2009 
 
Ken Uzuka 
 
Former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who was the prime minister when 
Japan gave its approval to the draft "Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (Oslo Treaty)" in May 2008, gave an interview to Mainichi 
Shimbun and revealed for the first time that he had ordered the 
approval of the treaty. He said that he had long been skeptical 
about the use of cluster bombs since "it is very questionable in 
terms of humanitarianism and human rights" and that his approval was 
a "matter of course." He commended disarmament talks by concerned 
nations and NGOs and adding, "This will be the inevitable 
direction," he noted that this will also contribute to nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
The Oslo Treaty was discussed in disarmament talks by interested 
nations and NGOs called the "Oslo Process." Participants in a 
meeting in Dublin, Ireland in late May, 2008, including Japan, 
approved the treaty. 
 
Before going to the meeting, Fukuda instructed the government 
representatives to take a positive stance, telling them: "Do not 
adopt the pathetic stance of Japan making a decision just because 
the other countries had first decided." He said that he kept in 
touch with the officials in Dublin and "in the end, made the 
decision based on our predetermined policy." He said that he 
confirmed with U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) at that time that they had 
"no objections". 
 
Fukuda also issued orders to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "not 
just once" to coordinate views on three aspects: (1) security 
issues; (2) diplomatic issues with regard to international public 
opinion; and (3) relations with USFJ. 
 
Cluster bombs are envisioned to be used to attack enemies landing on 
 
TOKYO 00001317  009 OF 011 
 
 
Japan, but Fukuda expressed skepticism about the basic assumption: 
"They will not fall in line and turn up in hordes," and, "Can we 
really use them, because they have become very questionable on 
humanitarian grounds?" 
 
Fukuda also expressed his hopes that the momentum created by signing 
the Oslo Treaty "will also contribute to (discussions about) the 
futility of possessing nuclear arms and how to prevent nuclear 
proliferation." 
 
Commenting on the U.S., which is not a signatory to the Oslo Treaty, 
Fukuda said that, "If Japan is going to engage in disarmament, it 
will have to tell the USFJ." As to calling on the USFJ not to use 
cluster bombs, he said: "Can we tie the hands of the USFJ, which 
defends Japan? We need to look at this realistically." 
 
(9) Winning U.S. understanding problem in disarmament; unsure about 
methods, funding for discarding cluster bombs 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
 
The Oslo Treaty presents Japan with various issues. 
 
The first issue is relations with the U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ). 
Since the U.S. is not a signatory to the treaty, there is a 
contradiction in that its forces will continue to possess cluster 
bombs in Japan. 
 
A senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official defends the USFJ's use 
of cluster bombs, stating, "This is necessary for achieving the 
mission of the Japan-U.S. security alliance," but goes to great 
lengths to dispel concerns: "They will only be used under 
exceptional circumstances, and humanitarian concerns will also be 
taken into account." 
 
The treaty allows a certain extent of "military cooperation and 
actions" with non-signatory states. Therefore, the Self-Defense 
Forces and private companies will be able to transport cluster bombs 
during joint exercises with the USFJ. When queried about joint 
exercises using cluster bombs at the House of Councillors Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada 
would only say: "There are no plans for such exercises at this 
point." He avoided answering the question of whether there is any 
plan to ask the USFJ not to use cluster bombs. This illustrated the 
"limitations" of disarmament under the Japan-U.S. relationship. 
 
The U.S. has decided not to use cluster bombs with a failure rate of 
over 1 percent beyond 2018. President Barack Obama has also signed a 
budget bill in March with provisions banning the export of cluster 
bombs with high failure rates, showing a certain extent of 
understanding (of the Oslo effort). Japan, on its part, will need to 
come up with concrete measures in support of its stance. Foreign 
Minister Hirofumi Nakasone says: "We will start with what is 
feasible, bearing in mind the United States' position." 
 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which does not have any 
knowhow on this matter, has begun to research methods for discarding 
cluster bombs. Right now, it possesses four types of cluster bombs 
(worth some 27.6 billion yen). Since the government's policy is to 
dispose of them within eight years of the Oslo Treaty taking effect, 
it has allotted 200 million yen for the research of disposal methods 
in the FY09 budget. 
 
TOKYO 00001317  010 OF 011 
 
 
 
According to the MOD's Arms Division, which is in charge of the 
disposal program, the disposal procedures are expected to be 
outsourced to bomb and explosive manufacturers in Japan. The 
division explains that, "The big goal is to complete the disposal 
within eight years, but we will not know whether it is possible to 
finish sooner until the research is done." 
 
(10) Defense spending must be set at 1.5 PERCENT  of GDP 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Excerpts) 
June 11, 2009 
 
Atsuyuki Sassa, first generation director of the Cabinet Security 
Affairs Office 
 
To the public's disappointment, the first party-heads debate between 
Prime Minister Taro Aso and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
President Yukio Hatoyama centered on the futile topics of 
"fraternity" and "Nishimatsu Construction Co.," with little regard 
to the state's basic missions of security, national defense and 
foreign policy. Of the 46 minutes, they spent only 2 minutes and 17 
seconds discussing the growing threat from North Korea. Recently, 
the North has been brazenly using brinksmanship techniques, such as 
preparing for launching an improved Taepodong missile and 
short-range missiles and intimidating the UN Security Council that 
was discussing possible sanctions on the reclusive country. 
 
The option of possessing an enemy-base strike capability has 
suddenly surfaced in national defense discussions, following the 
pointless Aso-Hatoyama debate. 
 
From here on, the discussion is likely to head for the introduction 
of cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk, and air tankers. But given 
the current framework of defense spending, those options seem only 
pie in the sky. Instead, the government is advised to swiftly expand 
the budget's framework to improve the missile defense (MD) system 
now being implemented. 
 
Government agencies have begun making budgetary requests for fiscal 
¶2010. This is not the time to engage in a vain 
fraternity-vs.-Nishimatsu wrangle. In the same column in the 
newspaper's April 21 issue, I urged the government to abolish the 
Basic Policy for National Defense of 1957 and to adopt instead a new 
basic policy proclaiming autonomous national defense, missile 
defense, and international contributions. This time around, I advise 
the government to have the Security Council of Japan swiftly discuss 
an increase in defense spending, include it in the budgetary request 
after a cabinet decision, and set the framework of defense spending 
at 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for defending the 
country on our own. 
 
(11) Koizumi children having difficulties 
 
MAINICHI (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
Evening, June 10, 2009 
 
The House of Representatives general election is looming. The 
election gives voters the chance to choose the party they think 
should take the reins of government. Now that many of the so-called 
"Koizumi children," first-term lawmakers of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), who were elected in the 2005 House of 
 
TOKYO 00001317  011 OF 011 
 
 
Representatives election for the first time to the Diet, are in a 
difficult situation. The Aso cabinet has been suffering from low 
support rates. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will retire 
from the political world. What will the "Koizumi children" do? 
 
The LDP has decided not to give preferential treatment to its 
first-term lawmakers in the proportional representation segment. 
 
Of the 83 "children," 47 lawmakers were elected in the proportional 
representation election. Out of those 47, 14 ran only for the 
proportional representation seats. Political analyst Atsuo Ito calls 
them "part-time lawmakers." Those lawmakers are in the most 
difficult situation. Taku Otsuka, 35, who is representing the No. 9 
district in Saitama Prefecture, and Keisuke Suzuki, 32, the 
representative of the No. 7 district in Kanagawa Prefecture are the 
only lawmakers who are expected to secure the LDP's official 
endorsement. Although Fukuyo Nakamori ran in the mayoral election of 
Saitama City, she was defeated. Kuniko Inoguchi, 57, and some other 
members plan to run only for the proportional representation 
segment. 
 
Taizo Sugimura, 29, who was defeated in a competition to win the 
LDP's endorsement in a single-seat constituency, decided on June 4 
not to seek another term. 
 
Junichiro Yasui, 59, elected in the Tokyo bloc in the proportional 
representation system, said: "The whirlwind of Koizumi was created 
by the times, not by Koizumi himself. There is nothing to worry 
about if our perception of the times is right." 
 
The LDP members, who were once defeated in the single-seat elections 
but were elected under the proportional representation system, face 
a tough situation. Kotaro Nagasaki, 40, who failed to get the 
party's nomination, appears to be running for the No. 2 district 
seat in Yamanashi Prefecture. Yukari Sato, 47, said: "I have been 
working frantically." In the previous Lower House election, she was 
fielded in the No. 1 district in Gifu Prefecture, as an "assassin" 
for Seiko Noda, currently state minister of consumer affairs. She 
changed her constituency from Gifu to the No. 5 district in Tokyo in 
February last year, when Noda got the LDP's official endorsement. 
She was raised in the No. 5 district. However, she is experiencing 
more crucial campaigning in Tokyo than Gifu, because she has neither 
a list of supporters nor her own support group. She travels back and 
forth between her office and Tokyo's political battleground of 
Nagatacho five times every day. She only gets three to four hours of 
sleep every day. 
 
The LDP secured 296 seats in the last Lower House election. In the 
three general elections prior to the previous race, the party 
obtained 233 to 239 seats. "If this is the LDP's real strength, the 
LDP will be able to add about 60 seats to the 233 or 239 seats. Many 
of the Koizumi children were defeated in the single-seat elections. 
In theory, the possibility is high that they will fail to be 
elected," said Ito. 
 
Hiromi Miura, an election planner, said: "Only ten percent of the 
Koizumi children will be reelected. Since they got their Diet seats 
in the whirlwind that Koizumi brought, they will be blown away if 
they do nothing." 
 
ZUMWALT