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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/01/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Editorial: We expect new U.S. ambassador to help resolve 
abduction issue (Sankei) 
 
(2) Aso to order a lengthy extension of Diet session, focusing on 
"early August" (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(3) MOFA bureaucrats manage secret accord on "introduction of 
nuclear arms" of 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, inform prime 
ministers selectively (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(4) Gist of testimonies on secret agreement on "introduction of 
nuclear weapons" (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(5) Mr. Hatoyama must not make an error in defense strategy (Sankei) 
 
 
(6) U.S. military population in Okinawa an all-time low since 
reversion (Okinawa Times) 
 
(7) Japan, U.S. agree to build billet, other facilities for Futenma 
relocation (Okinawa Times) 
 
(8) DPJ's Asao refers to Futenma integration into Kadena (Ryukyu 
Shimpo) 
 
(9) Prime minister in quandary over environment and economy in 
setting mid-term goal to cut greenhouse gas emissions (Tokyo 
Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Editorial: We expect new U.S. ambassador to help resolve 
abduction issue 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
May 31, 2009 
 
U.S. President Barack Obama has appointed California business lawyer 
John Roos, 54, as the next ambassador to Japan. 
 
Roos lacks a high profile in Japan-U.S. relations and his name is 
practically unknown in Japan, but he is said to be a person "who can 
directly talk to the President." The Japan-U.S. alliance is fraught 
with a host of issues. We hope that Mr. Roos will make use of his 
close ties with Obama to resolve such problems and further develop 
the bilateral relationship. 
 
Most of the U.S. ambassadors to Japan in the postwar period came 
from the academic, diplomatic, or political worlds, and they were 
all knowledgeable about Japan. This trend was broken with the 
appointment by the previous president, George Bush, of Thomas 
Schieffer, who was his friend and was not a Japan specialist. 
 
It was said that Schieffer "can even call Bush in his bedroom." In 
selecting someone for the ambassadorship in Japan, then President 
Bush gave priority to close ties over the factor of knowledge about 
Japanese and U.S. politics. That is why the U.S. State Department 
calls the nomination of Roos "a Schieffer type." 
 
When he first took up the post of ambassador, Schieffer was critical 
of then Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, 
 
TOKYO 00001228  002 OF 010 
 
 
expressing concern about relations between Japan and China becoming 
strained under the Koizumi government. 
 
On the other hand, Schieffer expressed his keen interest in the 
issue of past abductions by North Korea of Japanese nationals from a 
humanitarian point of view and deep sympathy for the families of the 
abduction victims. 
 
Schieffer visited the site at which Megumi Yokota had been 
kidnapped. He was the first ambassador to visit an abduction site. 
He also helped arrange the meeting between President Bush and family 
members of abductees, including the mother of Megumi. He had the 
belief that contact with the people is essential. 
 
Regarding the U.S. decision to take North Korea off its terror 
blacklist, it is well known that Schieffer strongly urged President 
Bush to reconsider the decision by sending a personal letter to him 
although he failed to persuade the U.S. government to change its 
mind. 
 
Roos won President Obama's personal confidence through his 
contribution to raising funds for the presidential bid. The 
appointment is indisputably a reward for such contributions. He has 
never served as an ambassador and has had few personnel ties with 
politicians. This point will undoubtedly be a cause of some concern. 
A comparison is likely to be made between Roos and Jon Huntsman, who 
has been designated as ambassador to China and has plenty of 
experience in political and diplomatic events. 
 
Even so, if Roos has a willingness to share an awareness of the 
problems and national sentiment with the people over certain issues 
while acknowledging the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance, Roos 
will be a great ambassador to Japan. We recommend that he visits the 
abduction sites and meet with the abductees' families as his 
predecessor did. 
 
Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the revision of the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. We hope Roos will demonstrate leadership 
in helping Japan-U.S. relations enter a new phase. 
 
(2) Aso to order a lengthy extension of Diet session, focusing on 
"early August" 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN ONLINE 
June 1, 2009, 1:28 PM 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso will instruct Secretary General Hiroyuki 
Hosoda of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to extend the current 
Diet session, which is due to recess on June 3, for a lengthy 
period. A plan to extend the session for about 60 days until early 
August is being considered in the ruling camp, with the aim of 
securing the passage of fiscal 2009 extra budget-related bills. But 
some coalition members say that extending the session until late 
July is enough. 
 
Aso met secretly with New Komeito President Akihiro Ota at a Tokyo 
hotel last evening. They reportedly exchanged views on such 
questions as how long the ongoing Diet session should be extended 
and when the House of Representatives should be dissolved. The prime 
minister will make final decisions on these questions, based on the 
views exchanged there. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001228  003 OF 010 
 
 
The ruling camp will present its extension plan to the House of 
Representatives speaker and the House of Councillors president 
today. A vote on the plan will be taken in a Lower House plenary 
session tomorrow. 
 
After a regular meeting between the government and the LDP in the 
Diet to be held this noon, Aso will call in Hosoda and other LDP 
executives to his office. Later, Hosoda will officially inform his 
counterpart of the New Komeito of the plan during their meeting, and 
lastly, Aso and Ota will confirm the plan in their official 
meeting. 
 
Of the extra budget-related bills - now under deliberations in the 
Lower House, the ruling camp is aiming to enact four bills during 
the current Diet session. The four bills are now expected to clear 
the Lower House one after another by June 5. 
 
Since an ordinary Diet session can be extended only once, the ruling 
camp, on the assumption of rejection by the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) of the bills, is carrying out coordination, with a focus 
on the plan of extending the session until early August, when the 
bills are to be enacted into law with the override vote tactic under 
the so-called 60-day rule. 
 
Some lawmakers, however, take the view that there is no need to 
extend the Diet session until August because the ruling coalition 
has agreed with the DPJ to revise the four bills and also because an 
override vote can be taken on July 12 in the Lower House on the tax 
revision bills linked to the supplementary budget, which have 
already been sent to the Upper House. 
 
(3) MOFA bureaucrats manage secret accord on "introduction of 
nuclear arms" of 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, inform prime 
ministers selectively 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Top play) (Full) 
June 1, 2009 
 
Four former vice ministers of foreign affairs told Kyodo News that 
the secret agreement on the "introduction of nuclear weapons" -- 
which provides for Japan's acquiescence in visits by U.S. ships and 
aircraft carrying nuclear arms -- concluded at the time of the 
revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 has been managed 
over the years by the vice foreign minister and other top Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats. These bureaucrats decided at 
their own discretion to inform only certain prime ministers, such as 
Ryutaro Hashimoto and Keizo Obuchi, and foreign ministers. 
 
The government has maintained that "such a secret agreement does not 
exist." This is the first time that former vice foreign ministers, 
who had actually been involved with the matter, have admitted that 
the secret agreement has been managed systematically, and that a 
number of prime ministers and foreign ministers had knowledge about 
it. This contradicts the explanation the government has given over 
the years, and it is likely to be forced to give an explanation of 
the truth. 
 
According to these former vice foreign ministers, at the time the 
Security Treaty was revised, the U.S. side's interpretation was that 
the provision about the "introduction" of nuclear weapons requiring 
"prior consultation" between the two countries applied only to 
land-based deployment and not to those carried on ships or aircraft 
 
TOKYO 00001228  004 OF 010 
 
 
calling on Japanese ports and airports. The Kishi administration at 
that time also accepted that tacitly. 
 
However, the Hayato Ikeda cabinet which came into power after the 
treaty revision stated at the Diet that port calls by ships carrying 
nuclear arms were also included in the provision on "introduction" 
of nuclear arms, which requires "prior consultation" under the 
treaty. 
 
Then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer, who was concerned 
that the secret agreement might be abrogated, met Foreign Minister 
Masayoshi Ohira (who later became prime minister) in April 1963 to 
confirm that "visits by ships and aircraft carrying nuclear arms do 
not constitute 'introduction'." That was the first time Ohira 
learned about the secret agreement, and he consented. This was 
recorded in Japanese in a MOFA internal document which has been 
under the custody of MOFA's North American Affairs Bureau and 
International Treaties Bureau (now the International Legal Affairs 
Bureau). 
 
A former vice minister who has seen the document said that, "At the 
time of the handover when I became vice minister, I heard from my 
predecessor that 'there is a (confidential) understanding between 
Japan and the U.S.' I also passed this on to the next vice minister. 
It was a big secret." 
 
Another former vice minister said that only politicians trusted by 
MOFA, such as Hashimoto and Obuchi, were informed of the contents of 
the secret agreement. Yet another former vice minister stated that, 
"The bureaucrats decided (whether a prime minister or foreign 
minister should be told about the secret agreement)," revealing that 
the bureaucrats, and not the minister decided how to handle this 
state secret. 
 
Since 1953, the U.S. Forces have deployed aircraft carriers and 
other vessels carrying tactical nuclear weapons in waters near 
Japan. After the end of the Cold War, these tactical nuclear arms 
deployed at sea were brought back to the U.S. mainland. U.S. 
official documents on the contents of this secret agreement had been 
made public in the late 1990s. (Kyodo) 
 
(4) Gist of testimonies on secret agreement on "introduction of 
nuclear weapons" 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
June 1, 2009 
 
Following is the gist of the testimonies of four former vice 
ministers of foreign affairs (in the 1980s and 1990s) on the secret 
agreement between Japan and the United States on the introduction of 
nuclear weapons: 
 
Mr. A 
 
-- During the handover process when I became vice minister, my 
predecessor told me that "there is a (confidential) understanding 
between Japan and the U.S. on nuclear weapons," and I also passed 
this on to my successor. This was a big secret. 
 
-- Japan and the U.S. have agreed since 1960 that nuclear arms 
carried on U.S. military vessels and aircraft are not subject to 
prior consultation. Therefore, the Japanese government has been 
 
TOKYO 00001228  005 OF 010 
 
 
lying to the people. 
 
-- A memo (on the contents of the secret agreement) exists in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and I have read it. When 
Masayoshi Ohira was foreign minister, there was a secret document 
stating that the agreement was reconfirmed (between Japan and the 
U.S.), and I have also read this document. 
 
-- The prime minister and foreign minister at that time were not 
informed, because if you tell politicians, the information tends to 
be leaked. 
 
Mr B 
 
-- I knew about the exchanges between Ohira and Reischauer. There is 
an internal document in MOFA about it. Of course, the incumbent vice 
ministers all knew about it. 
 
-- Officially, this was a matter that needed to be reported to the 
incumbent prime minister and foreign minister. You could say it was 
audacious on our part, but since it was a matter of great 
importance, we were selective (about whether we could tell a certain 
prime minister about it or not). 
 
Mr C 
 
-- There is a document on the Japanese side (about the U.S. side's 
interpretation that nuclear arms carried on ships and airplanes are 
not subject to prior consultation). This is completely identical, 
word by word, (to the English "secret memorandum" on the contents of 
the secret agreement already made public in the U.S.). 
 
--- Everybody in MOFA who is responsible for the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty knows (about the secret agreement). MOFA should still have 
the record (of Ohira and Reischauer's reconfirmation of the secret 
agreement). 
 
Mr Keizo Obuchi was told about this when he was foreign minister, 
before he became prime minister. MOFA also told Mr Ryutaro 
Hashimoto. These two former prime ministers both knew the truth. 
 
Mr D 
 
-- I was told when I became the chief of the Treaty Bureau. I 
personally had not talked to the prime minister (about the secret 
agreement). 
 
-- I was sort of embarrassed (by giving testimony that was contrary 
to the facts in the Diet repeatedly). (Kyodo) 
 
(5) Mr. Hatoyama must not make an error in defense strategy 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Abridged slightly) 
May 31, 2009 
 
Yukio Okamoto, foreign affairs commentator 
 
The major opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has made a 
fresh start under President Yukio Hatoyama. The rise in public 
support ratings for the party is so vigorous that even the advent of 
a Hatoyama administration seems possible. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001228  006 OF 010 
 
 
Mr. Hatoyama's policy centers on the buzzword "fraternity." In the 
Kojien dictionary, the word "fraternity" is defined as "a feeling of 
affection between brothers; affection toward friends." But the 
"promotion of fraternal diplomacy" does not seem appropriate in 
dealing with other countries. What concerns me is the government's 
year-end work to determine the new National Defense Program 
Guidelines and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program. The former 
determines the modalities of Japan's defense capabilities and the 
latter outlines the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) five-year defense 
buildup program in concrete terms. 
 
North Korea conducted its second nuclear test last week. North 
Korea's national strategy is extremely clear: ultimately possessing 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the 
continental United States. That would make it unnecessary for the 
United States to ensure the continuity of the (North Korean) regime. 
It would also give North Korea the upper hand in talks on the 
unification of the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, Pyongyang 
would be able to earn foreign currency through exports of missile 
and nuclear technology. The North, therefore, is likely to 
repeatedly launch missiles and conduct missile tests. We should not 
think that if Japan deals with North Korea with a sense of 
fraternity, Pyongyang would abandon its nuclear weapons. 
 
A clash with North Korea does not necessarily have to occur. The 
ultimate question is whether they will go so far as to wage a war 
against Japan by using missiles and possibly nuclear weapons. 
Chances for that are be high as long as the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements work as a deterrent. Japan, however, is certain to face 
a greater threat: China's marine strategy. In May 2008, the then 
commander of the U.S. Pacific Command testified before the Congress 
that a senior Chinese People's Liberation Army officer had made a 
proposal to divide up the Pacific Ocean in a way for the U.S. to 
take control of the sphere east of Hawaii and China of the area west 
of it. The proposal clearly reflects China's intention to advance 
into the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese Navy has in reality branched out 
into the Pacific Ocean beyond the First Island Chain connecting 
Kyushu, Okinawa, and Taiwan. China is also endeavoring to acquire a 
blocking capability to destroy the U.S. fleet in the oceanic area 
leading to the Second Island Chain connecting Yokosuka, the Bonin 
Islands, and Guam. Further, China will begin building an aircraft 
carrier shortly. China's submarine force is especially phenomenal. 
It has 62 submarines. Of them nine are nuclear-powered. Several 
submarines carry nuclear missiles. Japan, on the other hand, 
possesses only 16 diesel-type submarines. 
 
In April, Japan deployed interceptor missiles as a precaution 
against possible debris of a Taepodong-2 missile. The step was 
natural for the SDF. But such is not a real threat to Japan. A real 
threat is when China proceeds with its powerful marine strategy in 
the Second Island Chain and grows into a power capable of 
controlling the security of waters near Japan in a decade or two 
from now. The Chinese military's main objective is to block the U.S. 
fleet from navigating toward Taiwan to assist it. The acquisition of 
such a capability by China means the Pacific Ocean around Japan 
being placed under the control of China. 
 
Former DPJ president Ichiro Ozawa's Seventh Fleet comment and the 
DPJ's erroneous short-term security policy can be corrected later 
on. But it is not appropriate to formulate the new National Defense 
Program Guidelines and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program from a 
sense of fraternity. National interests could be damaged immensely. 
 
TOKYO 00001228  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
The time will come soon to determine the new National Defense 
Program Guidelines and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program. 
 
Mr. Hatoyama should look ahead 20 years from now. 
 
(6) U.S. military population in Okinawa an all-time low since 
reversion 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Abridged) 
May 31, 2009 
 
The population of U.S. military personnel stationed in Okinawa is an 
all-time low of 21,277 as of the end of September 2008, according to 
findings from the Okinawa prefectural government's annual survey 
conducted since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The figure 
shows a decrease of 1,443 over the same month a year ago. In the 
breakdown of U.S. troops in Okinawa, there are 12,402 from the 
Marine Corps, 5,909 from the Air Force, 1,682 from the Army, and 
1,284 from the Navy. 
 
These figures are based on findings from a hearing survey of U.S. 
forces in Okinawa. This survey was conducted by Okinawa Prefecture's 
Military Base Affairs Division, and the division revealed the data 
in its statistical report of March 2009, which was released May 29 
regarding U.S. military bases and Self-Defense Forces bases in 
Okinawa. 
 
Both the Marine Corps and the Air Force have a decrease of about 800 
over the corresponding month of the preceding year, posting an 
all-time low since Okinawa's reversion. The Army had 890 in 2006, 
1,600 in 2007, and 1,682 in 2008. As seen from such data, the figure 
in 2008 doubled that in 2006. This is because in November 2006 the 
Army launched a 600-strong unit operating Patriot Advanced 
Capability 3 (PAC) ground-to-air guided missiles. 
 
The overall population of those connected to the U.S. forces in 
Okinawa, including civilian employees and families, is 40,416, a 
decrease of 8,074 over the corresponding month of the preceding 
year. Especially, the number of family members was 17,792, or 6,588 
fewer than 24,380 in the corresponding month of the preceding year. 
Air Force family members were about 46 PERCENT  fewer than in the 
preceding year. 
 
The division also revealed the number of U.S. military personnel 
living off base. They numbered 7,847 at the end of March 2004. This 
off-base population was 8,830 at the end of March 2005 and 8,584 at 
the end of March 2006. According to statistics already announced for 
the following years, the population of off-base military personnel 
was 10,319 at the end of March 2007 and 11,810 at the end of March 
¶2008. As seen from these figures, the number of off-base military 
personnel has increased from year to year. 
 
(7) Japan, U.S. agree to build billet, other facilities for Futenma 
relocation 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Abridged) 
May 31, 2009 
 
The Japanese and U.S. governments agreed in a meeting of their joint 
committee yesterday to construct 10 buildings with a total space of 
about 16,550 square meters, including a billet for noncommissioned 
 
TOKYO 00001228  008 OF 010 
 
 
officers, on the premises of Camp Schwab along with the planned 
relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. The two 
governments have yet to decide on when to start construction. 
Contractors have already been selected, and construction work will 
be started within the year at the latest. Their contract is to 
complete construction work by February 2001. The cost of 
construction is estimated at approximately 3.5 billion yen. 
 
The 10 buildings are all ferro-concrete. One of the 10 buildings is 
a five-storied billet for noncommissioned officers with a total 
floor space of about 11,000 square meters. A police office is also 
planned to be built. Its main building has two floors with a total 
floor space of about 1,900 square meters. In addition, the planned 
construction includes one-storied installations for power 
generation, bicycle parking, bus stop sheltering, and recycled 
container storage. 
 
(8) DPJ's Asao refers to Futenma integration into Kadena 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
May 31, 2009 
 
Appearing on a TV Asahi news show aired yesterday, Keiichiro Asao, a 
House of Councillors member of the leading opposition Democratic 
Party of Japan (Minshuto) and the defense minister in the DPJ's 
shadow cabinet, referred to the possibility of integrating the 
heliport functions of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in 
Okinawa Prefecture into the U.S. Kadena Air Base in the prefecture 
as a solution to the issue of relocating Futenma airfield. 
Integrating Futenma airfield into the Kadena base means Futenma 
airfield's relocation within Okinawa Prefecture. Asao is believed to 
be the first in his party to touch on this Kadena integration. When 
it comes to the issue of relocating Futenma airfield, the DPJ has so 
far shown its basic stance of relocating the airfield elsewhere 
outside Okinawa Prefecture. Accordingly, his remarks will likely be 
called into question in terms of consistency with his party's policy 
course. The DPJ will come up with its manifesto in the run-up to the 
forthcoming election for the House of Representatives, and its 
response to the issue of Futenma relocation will draw attention. 
 
"The key point of our Okinawa vision is not to build any more new 
bases in Okinawa Prefecture," Asao said. "If there's something I can 
imagine," he added, "we can think of integrating Futenma into Kadena 
and leaving Futenma for emergencies only." This was his answer to 
Takushoku University Professor Satoshi Morimoto's question asking 
how the DPJ would respond to the Futenma issue after taking the 
reins of government. 
 
DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama, in his inaugural press remarks, 
stated: "Basically, we will relocate Futenma airfield elsewhere 
outside Okinawa Prefecture and we want to push for this." 
 
DPJ to consider specific ways after taking office: Yamaoka 
 
Regarding the issue of relocating Futenma airfield, DPJ Diet Affairs 
Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka indicated yesterday that the DPJ 
would not step into any specific counterproposal in the next House 
of Representatives election. "We will consider specific ways right 
away after taking the reins of government," Yamaoka said. "Even if 
we try to push for this issue when we are not in office," he added, 
"we cannot even negotiate." Asked about Asao's Kadena integration 
remarks, Yamaoka said: "That is his personal view, not on the agenda 
 
TOKYO 00001228  009 OF 010 
 
 
of our party's discussions." 
 
(9) Prime minister in quandary over environment and economy in 
setting mid-term goal to cut greenhouse gas emissions 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
June 1, 2009 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso will decide on Japan's mid-term (2013-2020) 
goal to cut greenhouse gas emissions by the middle of this month. 
This is a good opportunity for Japan to make a public appeal on its 
stance of tackling the environmental issue. However, coordination of 
views is very difficult with motives of business circles, which are 
concerned over its impact on the economy, and those of the New 
Komeito, which attaches importance to environmental conservation, 
become entangled. It will be difficult to set such a goal because 
whether an ambitious goal is set or a low figure is adopted with the 
ongoing economic crisis in mind, one side or the other is bound to 
feel dissatisfied with it, according to a government source. 
 
Prime minister puts on air of confidence 
 
The prime minister during a telephone conversation with British 
Prime Minister Brown on the evening of May 28 said with confidence, 
"Although business leaders are objecting, I will release a mid-term 
goal that is decent as the world's top energy-saving country." He 
apparently indicated a desire to lead discussions at the 15th 
session of the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change 
Convention (COP15) to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009, which 
will focus on a mid-term goal. 
 
The prime minister will enter near-final talks with related 
ministers on June 5. He will hold a press conference as early as the 
10th to reveal Japan's mid-term goal. 
 
Regarding a new framework to curb global warming (post-Kyoto 
Protocol), the long-term goal covers a period up to 2050 and the 
mid-term goal up to 2020. Former prime minister Yasuo Fukuda last 
year came up with a long-term goal to cut emissions by 60 PERCENT 
-80 PERCENT  from the present level. Setting a mid-term goal was 
relegated to his successor Aso. 
 
What the prime minister is thinking in his heart 
 
The government at a meeting of the Round Table on the Global Warming 
Issue boiled down proposals for a mid-term goal into six ranging 
from a 4 PERCENT  increase to a 25 PERCENT  cut in comparison with 
the 1990 level. 
 
If the sixth proposal with the largest margin of an emissions cut - 
a 25 PERCENT  cut is adopted, the real gross domestic product (GDP) 
would fall by between 3.2 PERCENT  and 6.0 PERCENT . The 
unemployment rate is estimated to drop by between 1.3 PERCENT  and 
1.9 PERCENT  from the 1990 level. The unemployment rate is estimated 
to worsen by between 1.3 points and 1.9 points from the 1990 level. 
The per-household burden is projected to increase by 330,000 yen in 
real terms. 
 
Business circles are strongly alert to such proposals. The Japan 
Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren) in joint names with leading 
labor unions announced in May a stance of supporting the first 
proposal with the most lenient emissions cut or a 4 PERCENT 
 
TOKYO 00001228  010 OF 010 
 
 
increase from the 1990 base year. 
 
The prime minister, who considers economic recovery as his top 
priority, cannot afford to overlook the impact of a high numerical 
target on the domestic economy. 
 
Referring to the mid-term goal, Aso in a speech made at the World 
Economic Forum's annual meeting (Davos Conference) in January 
underscored, "I would like to come up with a mid-term goal that is 
not a pledge without backing but something that is feasible and 
contributes to curbing global warming." A Kantei source spoke for 
the prime minister, noting, "The prime minister is concerned that 
measures to curb global warming will serve as an factor of limiting 
economic growth. 
 
Three elements 
 
For this reason, a move to settle for the third proposal or a 7 
PERCENT  cut, which is slightly above the figure in the Kyoto 
Protocol, has surfaced in the government. 
 
However, if Japan comes up with that decision, it would be difficult 
for it to display leadership in international talks. Not only 
domestic environment conservation group but also the New Komeito, 
which is calling for adopting a 25 PERCENT  cut from the 1990 level 
for a mid-term goal, will not remain quiet, since the Lower House 
election is close at hand. 
 
Environment Minister Tetsuo Saito of the New Komeito lashed out at 
Nippon Keidanren's move, noting, "If Japan comes up with such a 
lenient goal, it would become a laughingstock of the world and its 
position in the international community would be injured." Party 
head Akihiro Ota said, "It is important to boil down figures a 
little more." However, persons around the prime minister are 
troubled by the New Komeito with one noting, "The New Komeito is 
stubborn." 
 
It is difficult to find an answer to a question involving the 
environment, the economy and the New Komeito. A Round Table member 
said with a forced smile: "It is a very difficult decision to make. 
I am glad I am not the prime minister." 
 
ZUMWALT