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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1334, RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN CHECK ON M-113 ENGINE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TELAVIV1334 2009-06-19 07:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #1334 1700739
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190739Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2256
INFO RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0336
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 001334 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PM/DTTC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC IS
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN CHECK ON M-113 ENGINE 
RETRANSFER 
 
REF: STATE 46926 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Per reftel, Post raised the possible 
unauthorized retransfer of M-113 engines by the GOI through 
Israeli company L.A. Nordan to U.S. company Pan Pacific 
Enterprises (PPE).  According to both the Israeli MOD and 
L.A. Nordan, no M-113 engine transaction or retransfer 
occurred, contrary to the reftel PPE letter suggesting 
otherwise.  Polmiloff discussed the case with the MOD and 
L.A. Nordan point of contact Didi Aspis on June 19.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) According to Kobi Fogler from the MOD's Directorate 
of Security Defense Establishment (MALMAB), no retransfer of 
M-113 engines ever took place.  He acknowledged that L.A. 
Nordan had been contacted by PPE's President David Pan 
regarding the engines, and that L.A. Nordan subsequently 
contacted the MOD regarding a potential transaction. 
However, Fogler stated that PPE never obtained an export 
license and L.A. Nordan opted not to pursue the case any 
further.  Moreover, he said the IDF currently lacks any spare 
M-113 engines.  From the GOI's perspective, Fogler stated the 
case was "closed," and that the PPE letter to DTTC was 
inaccurate. 
 
3. (SBU) L.A. Nordan point of contact Didi Aspis also 
confirmed via telephone that no transaction regarding M-113 
engines had taken place.  He acknowledged that PPE's Pan 
contacted him "over a year ago" about the possibility of 
supplying 30 M-113 engines.  Aspis said he told Pan that he 
did not possess any such engines, and would need to contact 
the IDF due to the engines' military purpose.  Aspis was well 
aware of the export control process, noting that a typical 
export license would require three to six months, while 
suspecting a license for military equipment would take 
longer.  He said he passed this information on to Pan, and 
since PPE never obtained an export license, Aspis considered 
the case dropped.  He added that he had heard PPE chose to 
pursue the engine transaction through another supplier, but 
could provide no further details. 
 
4. (SBU) Aspis said he was "surprised" by the recent 
attention to a case that from his perspective "never 
happened."  He stressed that he made no money on the case, as 
no transaction was made.  He also disputed PPE's claim 
regarding the "untraceable" contract numbers for the engines, 
as cited in PPE's letter to DTTC.  To the contrary, Aspis 
said Pan had asked for engine contract numbers, and that he 
specifically told Pan that was not possible. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
********************************************* ******************** 
CUNNINGHAM