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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
WHA/FO FOR A/S SHANNON AND DAS DAVE ROBINSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: CONGRESS PULLS BACK FROM THE BRINK ON REMOVING 
PRESIDENT ZELAYA 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000501  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On the evening of June 25, the National 
Congress came close to bringing to the floor a vote on the 
removal of President Zelaya from office.  The Ambassador 
strongly advised Congress President Micheletti against such 
hasty action that could plunge Honduras into a deeper 
constitutional crisis.  Other senior politicians also worked 
behind-the-scenes to push Congress back from the brink.  In 
the end, congressional leaders backed away from the vote and 
limited themselves to launching an inquiry into legal 
violations that may have been committed by President Zelaya 
and his Administration.  Supreme Court President Rivera told 
us that Congress does not have the power to impeach the 
President, since the repeal of such a law in 2005. 
Currently, the only means to remove a sitting President is 
through the filing of a criminal case filed by the Public 
Ministry with the Supreme Court itself.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On the evening of June 25, Congress President Robert 
Micheletti called the Ambassador to inform him that with the 
strong support of the Honduran political parties (including 
the two major parties ) Liberal and National), the National 
Congress had begun a formal debate to consider removing 
President Zelaya from office.  Micheletti said that Congress 
would deliberate and review legal violations committed by the 
President and his Administration during his term of office. 
He said that the President's illegal decision to fire Armed 
Forces Chief Romeo Vasquez had been the immediate catalyst of 
the Congressional action.  He said he believed that he had 
the votes to take this definitive action against the 
President.  Micheletti said he wanted the United States to be 
informed of the Congressional deliberations and likely 
action.  The Ambassador responded that while the USG had 
great respect for the Honduran Congress and would not ever 
attempt to tell the sovereign legislators what they should 
do, our view was that this action seemed totally premature, 
was dangerous and could precipitate a major constitutional 
crisis in Honduras with uncertain results.  The Ambassador 
spoke of the high tension prevailing in the country and said 
the potential for social conflict and violence was high.  Any 
hasty action by the Congress against a democratically-elected 
President was an extremely serious matter that could be 
viewed in a very critical manner by many in the international 
community.  The Ambassador also noted that the OAS's 
Permanent Council was scheduled to discuss and debate the 
situation in Honduras tomorrow.  He noted that while some 
people in the country were unsatisfied by the GOH's 
manipulation of the OAS's role in the June 28 poll, OAS 
involvement could be supportive of finding a legal, 
constitutional and peaceful way out of the crisis. 
 
¶3. (C) Micheletti responded that President Zelaya was bent on 
bringing down the democratic system in Honduras.  He noted 
that earlier that day Zelaya had threatened to shutdown the 
Congress and to put him in jail.  He said that Zelaya had 
completely alienated  the Honduran Congress and that the 
President had virtually no/no support.  Micheletti 
appreciated the Ambassador's honest advice but felt that the 
moment for decision had arrived.  The Ambassador again warned 
that such rash action could result in incalculably negative 
consequences in Honduras and advised patience and calm. 
Later the Ambassador made calls to several key Liberal Party 
leaders including Presidential candidate Elvin Santos and 
Former President Carlos Flores and conveyed our concern about 
the ongoing deliberations in Congress.  Both agreed that 
Congress' action seemed rash and irrational, but both said 
that Zelaya's increasing radical rhetoric and actions, his 
willingness to push for a poll that was clearly illegal, and 
his firing of the military high command had alienated the 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000501  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Congress.  However, Santos and Flores said they were also 
trying to influence key congressional leaders, including 
Micheletti (who both described as stubborn), and would 
continue to make calls that evening.  Later that evening we 
learned that following private consultations between the 
leaders of the different parties and delegations, an 
agreement was reached to avoid a floor vote on whether to 
remove the President.  Instead, Congress voted to launch an 
investigation of the President's misdeeds with the purpose of 
considering some future action by the Congress. 
 
¶4. (C) In a meeting on June 25, Honduran Supreme Court 
President Jorge Rivera Aviles told the Ambassador that he was 
extremely worried about the planned Congressional action 
against the President.  Rivera said that congressional 
leaders had approached him about their plans to remove the 
President.  Rivera said he advised against such action, which 
he described as illegal.  Rivera said that in 2005 the 
Congress had repealed the impeachment law.  Currently the 
only means to remove a President was through the filing of a 
criminal case by the Public Ministry (Attorney General) with 
the Supreme Court.  In such circumstances, the Supreme Court 
would appoint a Supreme Court Magistrate to hear the case.  A 
ruling by the Magistrate against the President represented 
the only means to legally separate him/her from the office. 
Rivera said the Public Ministry might opt to move against 
Zelaya if he goes forward with direct support for the June 
28, which a judge has ruled as illegal. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment:  Zelaya's decision to fire General Vasquez 
has further polarized Honduras and has radicalized 
anti-Zelaya sentiment in Congress and many public 
institutions including the judiciary and the armed forces. 
Fortunately, the decision by congressional leaders to pull 
back from the brink of a constitutional crisis provides a 
reprieve that hopefully can help ease the tensions from their 
current fever pitch.  In a conversation with the Ambassador 
on June 25,  Zelaya seemed to be more aware of his increasing 
isolation and vulnerability.  The Ambassador took the 
opportunity to encourage him to do use his role as President 
of  "all Hondurans" to do everything he could to lower the 
tensions and send conciliatory public messages, and engage in 
dialogue with the opposition. 
LLORENS