VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6578 1771848
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261826Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 066578

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034 TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL TW IR TU

REF: A. STATE 003403 B. ANKARA 000070 C. ANKARA 000095 D. ANKARA 000293 E. STATE 027957 F. ANKARA 000452

Classified By: ISN/MTR ACTING DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) AND (D).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please see paragraph 5.

¶2. (S) Background/Purpose/Objective: In January and March 2009, we raised with Turkish officials our concerns regarding the sale of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools by the Turkey-based firm Ak Makina to entities affiliated with Irans liquid propellant missile developer, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). We stressed to Turkish officials that Ak Makinas relationships with these Iranian companies posed proliferation risks and urged them to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a source of supply to Irans missile program. In response, Turkish officials agreed to investigate information provided by the United States on Ak Makina and indicated that they had been closely monitoring the activities of this firm (Ref C and F).

¶3. (S) We now would like to provide Turkish officials additional details on the business dealings between Ak Makina and a missile-related intermediary named Ardalan Machineries Company, which we initially discussed with the GOT in March 2009 (Ref E). Specifically, the United States has information that the vice president of Ak Makina visited Irans Ardalan Machineries in mid-January 2009. Following this visit, Ak Makina made arrangements to finalize the sale to Ardalan Machineries of various Spanish-, Taiwan-, and South Korean-origin machine tools, including several that may be controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.

¶4. (S) We want to share this information with Turkish authorities and reiterate that we believe that the machine tools being supplied to Ardalan Machineries by Ak Makina are intended to support Irans liquid propellant missile program. We therefore want to request the GOT take measures to prevent these machine tools from being exported to Iran and note that such action would be consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.

¶5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Ankara approach appropriate host government authorities to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET/REL TURKEY)

-- In January and March 2009, we raised with you our concerns regarding the sale of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools by the Turkey-based firm Ak Makina to entities affiliated with Irans liquid propellant missile developer, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG).

-- We noted that Ak Makinas relationships with these Iranian companies posed clear ballistic missile proliferation risks and urged you to take measures to stop Ak Makina from acting as a source of supply for machine tools to Irans missile program.

-- During our most recent discussions of this case in March 2009, you agreed to investigate information provided by the United States on Ak Makina and informed us that your government had been closely monitoring the activities of this firm.

-- We would appreciate an update on the status of your efforts in this case. We also would like to share with you additional details on continued dealings between Ak Makina and Irans Ardalan Machineries Company.

-- Specifically, we understand that the vice president of Ak Makina, an individual named Oguz Akyuz, visited Irans Ardalan Machineries Company in mid-January 2009.

-- As we have noted in our prior discussions regarding Ak Makina, Ardalan Machineries Company is a procurement cover for SHIG and likely is acting as a false end-user in its dealings with Ak Makina to circumvent your export controls.

-- Our information indicates that following Oguz Akyuzs mid-January 2009 meetings in Iran, Ak Makina made arrangements to finalize the sale of the following machine tools to Ardalan Machineries:

- model SKT-160, SKT250LM, and SKT400LMC CNC slant bed lathes, model VX700/40 and VX750MH CNC vertical machining centers equipped with rotary tables, and four KB100 horizontal boring and milling machines produced by the South Korean firm Hyundai-Kia;

- a model SR3-AXP CNC vertical machining center produced by Taiwans Akira-Seiki;

- a model DV1270 CNC vertical machining center produced by Taiwans Vision Wide Technology; and

- a model FS-1 milling machine with rotary table manufactured by the Spanish firm Maquinaria CME.

-- We understand that Ak Makina, using the name of its Turkey-based affiliate Akhavan Company, may have submitted licensing requests for these machines to be exported to Iran.

-- You will recall that in March 2009, we informed you that Ardalan Machineries was working to obtain several of these same machine tool models through Ak Makina.

-- We also advised you at that time that at least one of these machines, the FS-1 milling machine produced by Maquinaria CME is likely controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group.

-- We understand that two other machines that Ardalan Machineries is seeking -- the VX750MH and the VX700/40 CNC vertical machining centers equipped with rotary tables -- are also potentially controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement.

-- Although the remaining machines are not controlled, each is highly capable and could be used by SHIG to support its production of liquid rocket engine components.

-- Given the capabilities of these machines and Ardalan Machineries affiliation with SHIG, we urge you to take measures to prevent these items from being exported to Iran.

-- We believe such actions would be consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737, particularly since SHIG has been designated by the Security Council for its role in Irans missile program.

-- We look forward to continued cooperation on export control and nonproliferation issues and would appreciate hearing of the actions you take in response to this information at the earliest possible time.

End talking points/non-paper