VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4170 1730206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220142Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 064170 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE - THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE ON 
U.S. CW DESTRUCTION FOR SENIOR-LEVEL VISIT, WEEK OF JUNE 
22, 2009 
 
REF: A) STATE 051992  CWC:  PLANNING FOR THE OPCW EC 
TRIP TO VISIT TWO CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
¶1. (U) This cable provides guidance for the senior-level 
U.S. team that will be in The Hague June 23-25 for 
consultations with Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
delegations on the currently anticipated U.S. timeline 
for destruction of its stockpile.  Several if-raised 
question and answers are at para 11. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Based on current plans, the United States is on 
track to destroy 90 percent of its declared chemical 
weapons stockpile by the extended CWC deadline of April 
29, 2012.  The United States will continue to make every 
effort to find ways to accelerate this process.  The 
United States is firmly committed to the CWC and has no 
intention to violate any of its obligations under the 
Convention.  The Obama Administration will be taking a 
hard look at how best to address the situation which, if 
mishandled, could have significant international 
political and legal ramifications both within the OPCW 
and in other international bodies and in other 
international compliance contexts relating to countries 
such as Iran and North Korea.  It also could undermine 
the Administration's broader arms control and 
nonproliferation agenda.  State and NSC will be 
reviewing our domestic and treaty obligations, including 
options for managing the legal aspects of missing the 
2012 deadline.  State will also be developing a strategy 
for exploring with key international constituencies our 
legal options for missing 2012, including the 
feasibility of extending the CWC destruction deadlines 
or obtaining OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference 
of the States Parties (CSP) approval to identify 
benchmarks and additional transparency measures until 
destruction is complete. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The remaining 10 percent of the U.S. stockpile 
is located at the two non-incineration facilities: the 
Pueblo Chemical Depot (Colorado) and the Blue Grass Army 
Depot (Kentucky).  Even with increased funding, DoD 
currently estimates that CW destruction at Pueblo will 
not start until after the destruction deadline, and will 
run from 2014 until 2017. The destruction at Blue Grass 
is expected to operate from 2019 to 2021.  Both 
facilities will use non-incineration technology 
consisting of neutralization followed by destruction 
methods for the by-products.  In addition, the current 
plan has gaps in CW destruction operations from 
approximately 2012 to 2014 and 2017 to 2021.  The 
Department of Defense will engage Congress  on exploring 
options for accelerating destruction, to include 
transporting the CW stockpiles at Bluegrass to declared 
incineration sites, but such measures would not be 
enough to meet the 2012 deadline. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia currently asserts that it will meet the 
2012 deadline, but we suspect it is unlikely to meet 
this milestone judging from delays in facility 
construction.  We do not know how Russia plans to 
address the question of its CWC obligations if it misses 
the deadline.  Russia, however, is likely to finish CW 
destruction before the United States.  The Japanese will 
not complete destruction of abandoned CW munitions in 
China until many years after the deadline.  However, 
these munitions may present a different treaty issue 
since they were only recently discovered.  Libya also 
has a declared stockpile, but should be able to meet the 
2012 deadline.  Iraq has residual items that are 
unlikely to be destroyed before the deadline.  (No other 
treaty parties, including Iran and China, have declared 
any stockpiles that remain to be destroyed.)  Thus, we 
do not know with certainty which states will be unable 
to meet the 2012 deadline or how long after 2012 their 
destruction schedules may extend. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Since 2006, the United States has explained 
that it did not expect to be able to meet even the 
extended deadline of 2012, but would continue to seek 
opportunities to improve our CW destruction progress. 
The ambiguity in this statement was deliberate, and at 
no time did the United States say definitively that it 
would miss the deadline or that, if it did, treaty 
obligations would be violated (for example, the treaty 
can be amended, or there may be arguments why the 
particular circumstances the U.S. faces might excuse 
missing the deadline).  The United States, in its 
previous request to extend its deadline (which, under 
the Convention, did not require a formal amendment), and 
in subsequent presentations to other States Parties, 
reported projections of only 66 percent of its stocks 
being destroyed by 2012, but it stated it would seek 
ways to accelerate the program.  In addition to the 
reporting in 2006, the United States has provided 
updates on destruction progress at each Informal Session 
of the EC.  These briefings have not included program 
end-dates.  Thus, although the prospect of the U.S. 
missing the 2012 deadline is known to many States 
Parties and criticism to date has been relatively mild, 
we can expect more attention in the wake of a May 2009 
DOD report to Congress that we have no realistic 
options for meeting the 2012 deadline.  Currently, the 
United States is on track to complete destruction of 90 
percent of its stockpile by the 2012 deadline, 98 
percent in 2017 and 100 percent in 2021, as outlined in 
the May 2009, Chemical Demilitarization Program Semi- 
Annual Report to Congress.  The report details options 
that DoD considered to accelerate destruction.  Our 
decision in 2006 to be more forthcoming has helped to 
moderate reactions. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Since 2006, the Iranian CWC delegation has been 
questioning, in multiple sessions of the EC, our ability 
to meet the 2012 deadline.  Starting in 2007, upon 
submission of a report every 90 days to the Council on 
the status of our CW destruction program, Iran started 
to make a political issue out of our inability to 
provide dates for the start of operations at Pueblo and 
Blue Grass.  Although the degree of Iranian 
obstructionism has ebbed and flowed with the composition 
of its delegation, they have raised this issue at 
virtually every EC session.  Brazil recently (EC-56) 
called for discussions of the feasibility of meeting the 
2012 deadline, though at this point we do not know their 
intentions.  It is also likely that the United States 
will not receive much political support from our Allies 
if we do not have a plan for addressing the impending 
deadline and that they will raise the issue (at some 
point) with the United States bilaterally at a senior 
political level. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On May 21, 2009, the U.S. CWC delegation 
informally informed OPCW Director-General (DG) 
Pfirter(Argentina) and EC Chairman Ambassador Lomonaco 
(Mexico) of the likely U.S. inability to complete 
destruction by 2012, with destruction completing at 
Pueblo in 2017 and Blue Grass in 2021 (ref A).  All 
other international participants on the trip were 
informally notified the week of May 25, 2009, that the 
non-incineration sites of Pueblo and Blue Grass would 
not be operational until after the 2012 deadline.  These 
briefings were designed to pave the way for the EC visit 
(May 31  June 5, 2009) to Pueblo (and Umatilla, Oregon, 
an operational CW destruction facility using 
incineration technology).  The trip was led by EC 
Chairman Lomanoco (Mexico) and DG Pfirter.  During the 
visit to Pueblo, the EC members heard officially, for 
the first time, the projected operational dates for 
Pueblo and Blue Grass.  The EC members were not 
surprised at the receipt of this information and their 
responses were constructive. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The first official multilateral disclosure of 
the operational dates for Pueblo and Blue Grass during 
the recent EC visit, along with the pending circulation 
of the draft trip report, could make for a hostile 
political environment for the United States at the 
upcoming 57th Session of the OPCW EC, July 14-17.  To 
mitigate the potential negative political fallout, a 
senior-level team will be in The Hague June 23-25 for 
consultations.  Consultations are being arranged with a 
variety of EC members, regional groups, and senior 
Technical Secretariat (T.S.) staff.  This cable provides 
guidance for these consultations with CWC delegations, 
along with several answers to difficult questions that 
could be raised. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Goals of the consultations: 
--Articulate a positive message by highlighting the 
successful elements of the U.S. chemical destruction 
program, the U.S. commitment to the CWC, and the Obama 
administrations commitment to examining all possible 
options for accelerating CW destruction; 
--Minimize, to the extent possible, criticism of the 
United States timetable for CW destruction; 
--Ensure that significant EC delegations and players are 
made aware of the current status of the U.S. CW 
destruction program, including the projected operational 
dates for the Pueblo and Blue Grass facilities in 
advance of the T.S. circulating the draft report on the 
EC visit to Pueblo and Umatilla; however, note that the 
projected dates represent the current schedule and the 
United States is actively reviewing what options may be 
available to it to accelerate our destruction activity. 
--Assuage concerns of any delegations that the United 
States is not committed to 100 percent destruction of 
the CWC stockpile as rapidly as possible; 
-- Emphasize that the Obama Administration is reviewing 
options for dealing with the situation and avoid any 
statement that the U.S. expects to violate any of its 
CWC obligations; 
--Make clear in consultations that the United States is, 
to the greatest possible extent, committed to pro-active 
full disclosure and consultations with other parties; 
--Hear concerns of delegations and gain insight into 
their positions heading into EC-57 (July 14-17). 
 
¶10. (SBU) Themes that should be highlighted in 
consultations: 
--The United States is fully committed to meeting the 
objectives of the CWC, including verified destruction of 
100 percent of our CW stockpile as rapidly as possible; 
--The Obama administration is fully committed to examine 
all possible options for accelerating CW destruction; 
--On April 29, 2012, the United States is currently 
projected to have destroyed approximately ninety-percent 
of its CW stockpile, which means that seven of the 
original nine storage sites will have eliminated all of 
their chemical weapons.  (Approximately eight-percent of 
the CW stockpile will remain at Pueblo, and 
approximately two-percent at Blue Grass.); 
--Since 2006, the United States has found ways to 
accelerate its CW destruction program.  We are exploring 
options to accelerate destruction at Pueblo and Blue 
Grass consistent with the CWC and safety, technical and 
other requirements (e.g., Article IV, para 10 
protecting the environment); 
--The United States is committed to proactive disclosure 
of the U.S. CW destruction program, including schedule 
and cost data. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Answers to questions that may come up during 
consultations 
 
Begin questions and answers: 
 
Q1: Will the United States seek, or support, an 
amendment to the CWC on the extended destruction 
deadline of April 29, 2012? 
 
A1:  Article XV of the CWC specifies the process for 
amending the Convention: one-third of the States Parties 
would need to support an amendment conference; a 
majority of all States Parties would have to vote in 
favor of the amendment (with no State Party casting a 
negative vote); and all States Parties casting a 
positive vote would have to ratify the amendment. 
Countries may also propose opening up other parts of the 
CWC to possible amendments, which could create serious 
obstacles to agreement.  We would like to hear other 
parties views on this option, but we are mindful of the 
obstacles to amending the treaty. 
 
Q2: During the EC-56 General Debate, Brazil called for 
the Council to address the feasibility of the 2012 
deadline sooner rather than later.  Does the United 
States support this action? 
 
A2: The Council is currently receiving reports from 
possessor states every 90 days on CW destruction that 
has taken place during that particular period. 
Furthermore, the Council has sent representatives to 
facilities in both the United States and Russia.  Thus, 
the Council is already engaged to some extent in 
overseeing destruction efforts.  We would be interested 
in learning more about the Brazilian suggestion. 
 
Q3: Will the United States support additional 
transparency measures? 
 
A3: The United States is committed to proactive full 
disclosure, to the greatest possible extent, on its CW 
destruction program, including schedule and cost data. 
The United States supports measures to ensure 
transparency of its CW destruction program.  We are 
willing to consider additional transparency measures as 
well.  Please let us know of any specific suggestions 
that your delegation may have. 
 
Q4: Does the U.S. claim that it does not have an 
obligation under the Convention to destroy 100% of its 
stockpile by 2012? 
 
A4: The The United States is making no such claim.   We 
are examining how to address the situation in a manner 
that will best address the treatys requirements. 
 
End questions and answers. 
CLINTON