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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1325 1651752
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O 141727Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 061325 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP PREL UN
SUBJECT: IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U. S. DELEGATION 
PARTICIPATING IN IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG) MEETING, 
JUNE 15-19, 2009. 
 
REF: A. REF A: UNVIE 253 
     ¶B. REF B: U.S. POSITION PAPERS EMAILED TO UNVIE BY 
        IO/T JUNE 10 2009 
 
¶1. Department appreciates the Mission's preview and 
analysis for the June IAEA BOG meeting (ref A). 
Instructions for the U.S. Delegation (USDel) in 
paragraphs 2-13 follow the revised agenda (GOV/2009/33/Rev.1) 
issued on June 12, 2009.  (Note: UNVIE should renumber the U.S. 
position papers in ref B according to the revised 
agenda.) 
 
¶2. AGENDA ITEM 1 - DG's INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
 
The statement will be available after delivery.  No U.S. 
action necessary.  USDel should fax the Director 
General's 
statement to IO immediately following delivery. 
 
¶3. AGENDA ITEM 2 - THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2008 
 
ISSUE:  The Board will be requested to transmit the 2008 
IAEA Annual Report, GOV/2009/23, to the 2009 General 
Conference (GC) in September, as required under Article 
VI.J of the Statute.  The IAEA Annual Report serves not 
only as the statutorily required report from the Board to 
the GC, but also constitutes the Agency report to the 
United Nations General Assembly. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  USDel should join anticipated Board 
consensus to transmit the 2008 Annual Report 
(GOV/2009/23)to the fifty-third (2009) regular session 
of the GC. USDel may make a statement, inter alia, 
welcoming the report and noting the remarkable diversity 
of the Agency's work, as reflected in the Report, which 
is a documented reminder of the IAEA's important role 
in many aspects of international nuclear cooperation. 
Of special interest to Washington are Agency efforts to 
promote nuclear safety,security and safeguards and the 
development of a sound infrastructure by countries 
newly considering the development of nuclear power for 
peaceful purposes. 
 
USDel should not comment on the anticipated Israeli 
intervention. 
 
¶4. AGENDA ITEM 3 - THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION REPORT FOR 
2008 ISSUE: The Board will be asked to take note of the 
Technical Cooperation Report for 2008 (GOV/2009/27) and 
to request that it be transmitted, with modifications as 
necessary, to the 2009 GC. 
 
U.S. Position: The USDel should read the statement in the 
U.S. position paper (ref B) reaffirming our strong 
Support for the TC Program, including TC activities focused 
on:nuclear applications in human health; safety, including 
safety at Iran's Bushehr power plant; security; and 
support for infrastructure development in countries with 
emerging nuclear power programs. 
 
¶5. AGENDA ITEM 4 - REPORT OF THE PROGRAM AND BUDGET 
COMMITTEE 
 
ISSUE:  The Board is asked to take note of the Report of 
the Program and Budget Committee (GOV/2009/26) and 
endorse the following recommendations: 
 
-- To transmit the Agency's Accounts for 2008 together 
with the draft resolution for adoption by the General 
Conference;-- To approve a target for voluntary contributions 
For 2010 to the Technical Cooperation Fund of $85,000,000; 
-- To approve keeping the Working Capital Fund at the 
level of 15,210,000 Euros; 
-- To approve use of the 2009 Equipment Replacement Fund; 
and 
-- To approve the terms and conditions for the 
Appointment of the Director General. 
 
U.S. POSITION: USDel should join consensus in supporting 
the recommendations of the Program and Budget Committee. 
USDel should make the statement on the 2010-11 Program 
and Budget found in the U.S. position paper (ref B). 
 
¶6. AGENDA ITEM 5 - NUCLEAR VERIFICATION 
 
(A) THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND 
ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS 
 
ISSUE:  The BOG will have before it for approval a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) GOV/2009/37) and 
Additional Protocol (AP) (GOV/2009/38) for Rwanda, and an 
Additional Protocol for Serbia (GOV/2009/41).  All 
conform to the standard texts contained in GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 
and INFCIRC/540, respectively.  The safeguards agreement also 
contains a small quantity protocol, which conforms to the 
new model adopted by the Board in 2005.  Mission should 
advise if other safeguards agreements and Additional 
Protocols are submitted in advance of the June Board. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  USDel should support safeguards 
Agreements and Additional Protocols, provided they conform 
to the respective models.  USDel should join consensus in 
approving any safeguards agreements or Additional 
Protocols that conform to the standard models and deliver 
statement contained in the U.S. position paper (ref B) 
urging all NPT states that have not yet done so to 
conclude and bring into force the required safeguards 
agreements; and bring into force Additional Protocols, 
which represent the new safeguards standard.  USDel 
should also address the slow pace in adoption of the revised 
Small Quantity Protocol (SQP), which as of the end of 
2008 was in force in only 19 of 80 countries with SQPs (as 
contained U.S. position paper, ref B). 
 
(B) THE SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION REPORT (SIR) FOR 2008 
 
ISSUE:  The Board will have before it, in document 
GOV/2009/24, the Safeguards Implementation Report for 
¶2008. The report provides a description and analysis of 
the Agency?s safeguards operations in 2008 and summarizes 
problems encountered.  The Board will be asked to take 
note of the SIR and to authorize the release of the 
Safeguards Statement for 2008 and of the Background to 
the Safeguards Statement and Summary. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  The Safeguards Implementation Report 
(SIR) provides a description of the Agency's safeguards 
operations in 2008.  It reports on the Agency's efforts 
to implement safeguards for the past year, noting 
achievements and areas needing improvement.  USDel should 
join consensus to take note of the SIR and to authorize 
the release of the safeguards statement and the executive 
summary of the SIR.  USDel should provide general remarks 
on safeguards implementation, as indicated in the 
statement in the U.S. position paper (ref B).  The SIR 
statement addresses the need for progress in safeguards 
adherence, welcomes the work of the IAEA and cooperation 
by Egypt in resolving its safeguards questions, and urges 
the secretariat to continue to look toward ways of making 
the SIR more transparent.  The U.S. may subsequently 
provide by letter more specific and detailed comments on 
the SIR for 2008. 
 
(C) STAFF OF SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT TO BE USED AS AGENCY 
INSPECTORS 
 
ISSUE:  The IAEA Secretariat is required to obtain Board 
approval for lists of Agency staff to be used as 
safeguards inspectors.  The list of proposed inspectors 
became available on 28 May 2009.  U.S. review of the list 
will not be complete before the Board meeting on 15 June. 
However, like all Member States, the United States has a 
separate opportunity after Board approval of the list to 
reject individuals on the list for designation as 
inspectors to the United States.  Objection within three 
months prevents designation, and the United States can 
also revoke designation at any time.  Hence, the timing 
of the list's release does not affect the U.S. ability to 
complete its internal reviews before acceptance of the 
inspectors named. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  The U.S. should join consensus on the 
adoption of the list.  No statement is needed. 
 
(D)  REPORT BY THE DG ON SAFEGUARDS IN THE DPRK 
 
ISSUE: The Secretariat will not provide a written report 
on the implementation of safeguards in North Korea for 
the June Board meeting. We expect the Director General's 
introductory remarks will address the significant 
developments that have taken place since the March Board, 
including the termination of the IAEA?s monitoring and 
verification of the shutdown of key facilities at 
Yongbyon and Taechon, followed by the departure of IAEA 
inspectors, and the reported nuclear test on May 25. 
Although his remarks in March were markedly short, these 
recent events will likely prompt the DG to underline the 
urgency of the situation.  After the North's first nuclear 
test in October 2006, the DG noted "deep regret and concern, 
"and said the test was a serious challenge to the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime.  The DG also used the 
opportunity to "re-emphasize" the urgent need to 
establish a universal ban on nuclear testing and cited 
UNSCR 1172 (1998), in which the UN Security Council reaffirmed 
"the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential 
foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament." 
 
U.S. POSITION:  We call on the DPRK to refrain from 
further provocative actions, to uphold its commitments to 
abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs, and to abide by its international obligations.  We 
deplore North Korea's decision to reverse disablement activities 
and cease cooperation with the IAEA.  The May 25 nuclear 
test was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 
1718 and a threat to international peace and security. 
Such provocation will only serve to deepen North Korea's 
isolation.  North Korea will not find international 
acceptance unless it abandons its pursuit of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery.  We have 
been and will continue working with our allies and 
partners in the Six-Party Talks as well as other members 
of the U.N. Security Council in our pursuit for the 
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and 
the peace and stability of the North East Asian Region. 
 
(E)     IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT 
AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 
1737(2006), 1747(2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) IN 
IRAN 
 
ISSUE: The Board will discuss the Director General's 
latest report on the status of the implementation of the 
IAEA's Safeguards Agreement in Iran, Iran's compliance 
with UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 
and 1835, and the Secretariat's investigation into Iran's 
nuclear activities. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  Instructions will be sent septel. 
 
(F)  IMPLEMENTATION OF NPT SAFEGUARDS IN SYRIA 
 
ISSUE: For the third time since the IAEA began 
investigating Syria's undeclared nuclear activities, 
Syria is an official item on the Board's agenda.  On June 5, 
the Director General submitted the third Syria report to 
Board members (GOV/2009/36), which describes Syria's steadfast 
refusal to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into 
its nuclear activities.  El Baradei lists the litany of 
fruitless attempts by the IAEA to obtain additional 
information and clarifications from Syria.  The list of 
unanswered questions appears to be growing.  The IAEA 
notes in this report that it detected traces of 
chemically processed uranium in the hot cells of Syria's declared 
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus. 
Like the uranium found at al Kibar, these traces do not match 
uranium in Syria's declared nuclear material inventory. 
According to the report, the Agency is conducting further 
analysis to determine a possible connection between the 
uranium detected at the MNSR and that detected at the al 
Kibar site.  The presence of additional, unexplained 
particles of uranium in Syria is a potential source of 
concern and could indicate more widespread undeclared 
nuclear activities in the country.  These particles also 
reinforce the IAEA?s assessment that the particles at al 
Kibar were not introduced by Israeli munitions, as Syria 
maintains, though the IAEA also notes that further 
Israeli cooperation in this regard would be helpful.  Consistent 
with past practice, Syria delivered an eleventh-hour 
letter related to the finding at the MNSR on 1 June 
attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation 
immediately before the report's release.  The IAEA's 
report, however, notes that the Syrian letter "did not 
address the presence and origin of the uranium" detected 
at the MNSR.  The report also notes that Syria continues 
to refuse to grant Agency inspectors access to debris and 
equipment removed from the Dair al Zour site or access to 
sites believed to be related to the destroyed reactor. 
 
At the November 2008 and March 2009 Board of Governors 
meetings, Syria, supported by Cuba, Iran and Egypt, 
successfully prevented the public release of the previous 
Director General's reports on Syria (GOV/2008/60 and 
GOV/2009/9).  The U.S. delegation should expect a similar 
effort at this Board meeting. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  USDel should deliver the cleared 
Statement (to be provided septel) and coordinate with like-minded 
states to deliver strong national and regional group 
statements highlighting in detail the growing evidence 
that Syria was constructing a clandestine reactor and 
concern that new evidence suggests that its activities 
went beyond the destroyed reactor.  Statements should 
also highlight Syria's ongoing efforts to hinder the IAEA 
investigation. 
 
USDel should call for the DG?s report on Syria to be 
released publicly and encourage the like-minded to do the 
same.  As it may be detrimental to other key objectives 
at the Board, primarily public release of the Iran report, 
delegation should not call for a vote on this matter if, 
as expected, some states object to releasing the Syria 
report.  However, if a like-minded member state calls for 
a vote, delegation is instructed to vote in favor of 
publicly releasing the report. 
 
USDel should keep Washington apprised of any developments 
and seek further guidance as needed. 
 
¶7. AGENDA ITEM 6 - ASSURANCE OF SUPPLY 
 
(A) Proposal by the IAEA DG for establishment of an IAEA 
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank 
(B) Russian Initiative to establish a reserve of LEU for 
supply to the IAEA for its Member States 
(C) German proposal on Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary 
Project (MESP) 
 
ISSUE:  For items 6(a) and 6(b), the Board will be asked 
to take note of two Secretariat reports, "Proposal by the 
Director General for the Establishment of an IAEA Low 
Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank' (GOV/2009/30), and "Russian 
Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve of Low 
Enriched Uranium (LEU) for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA 
for its Member States' (GOV/2009/31), and to request the 
Director General to submit detailed proposals for the 
Board's subsequent consideration.  For Item 7(c) the 
Board will be asked take note of a German paper (GOV/2009/32) 
on that country's Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project 
(MESP). 
 
U.S. POSITION: USDel may join consensus to note the three 
documents and should support requests for the Secretariat 
to provide agreement texts for consideration by the 
September BOG.  However, an agreement based solely on the 
concepts in GOV/2009/30 would be flawed since it would 
allow the IAEA to disperse LEU without attaching 
sufficient nonproliferation conditions.  It would not, 
for example, reflect the export guidelines adopted by the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group by requiring full-scope 
Safeguards in the recipient state, nor would it require 
Compliance with UNSC resolutions on proliferation issues. 
The IAEA will also need to clarify the conditions for disbursal 
Of fuel from the bank (e.g., what is a "supply disruption 
unrelated to technical or commercial considerations") and 
how it will manage a physical stockpile (including 
liability issues).  We should therefore call for 
consultations on the content of the agreement and other 
details of implementation with the NTI donors (U.S., EU, 
Norway, UAE, Kuwait), some 31 states, many of which are 
on the Board, other suppliers (including Russia), and 
potential beneficiary states between the June BOG and the 
September meeting.  Our key goal during these 
consultations would be to develop terms and conditions 
for the NTI fuel bank for Board consideration in September 
that correct the deficiencies of the IAEA paper.  In 
particular, we would push to add the full-scope 
safeguards criterion that is already in the Russian paper on 
Angarsk.  As appropriate, we should also seek to 
establish the principle that supplier states could impose criteria 
required by their own laws and policies for retransfer of 
donated LEU by the IAEA. 
 
The German MSEP proposal (GOC/2009/32) is fundamentally 
flawed.  Among other problems, it would interfere with 
the international commercial market, and it is not clear that 
the IAEA could assume duties under this proposal 
consistent with the IAEA Statute (e.g., governing 
territory and licensing exports). 
 
USDel should oppose any effort to raise the procedural 
argument that the General Conference rather than the 
Board must or should approve IAEA involvement in any 
multilateral nuclear arrangements.  The delegation may 
draw upon the following points as appropriate: 
 
-- Article XI of the Statute assigns to the Board the 
authority to approve Agency projects.  (The General 
Conference has authority to approve agreements between 
the Agency and other international organizations, which is 
not relevant to this situation.) 
 
-- Rule 50 of the Board?s Provisional Rules of Procedure 
provides a mechanism by which Member States can 
contribute their views on this issue.  Several states did 
so in past Board meetings. We encourage Member States to 
contribute to the discussion when the Board has detailed 
proposals before it. 
 
-- This priority, identified by the Director General some 
years ago, deserves the Board?s continued active 
consideration, informed by expert views from the 
Secretariat and all Member States that wish to 
contribute. 
 
U.S. STATEMENT:  USDel should deliver the statement in 
U.S. position paper (ref B), modified as appropriate. 
USDel may, if desired, deliver an abbreviated statement, 
with the entire statement made available to Member States 
and the IAEA Secretariat.  USDel should also encourage 
other Board members to make similar statements. 
 
¶8. AGENDA ITEM 7 - DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS TO SERVE ON THE 
BOARD IN 2009-2010 
 
ISSUE:  Pursuant to Rule 47 of its Rules of Procedure, 
the Board will be requested, in accordance with Article 
VI.A.1 of the Statute, to designate members to serve on the 
Board of Governors from the end of the fifty-first (2009) 
regular session of the General Conference to the end of 
the fifty-second (2010) General Conference.  A draft 
memorandum, by which the Board could notify the General 
Conference of the names of the members which it 
designates, will be before the Board in document 
GOV/2009/28. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  USDel is authorized to join the expected 
consensus in approving the designation of the thirteen 
member states identified in GOV/2009/28 to serve on the 
Board in 2009-2010.  No statement is needed. 
 
¶9. AGENDA ITEM 8 - APPOINTMENT OF DG 
 
ISSUE/U.S. POSITION:  The Board Chair will make a 
statement on the status of the election for Director 
Genera,l including the results of the latest straw poll. 
No appointment will be made at this time.  No statement 
is necessary. 
 
¶10. AGENDA ITEM 9 - PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE 53rd 
(2009) REGULAR SESSION OF THE GC 
 
ISSUE: The Board will be consulted on the Provisional 
Agenda for the 53rd regular session of the GC 
(GOV/1009/29), scheduled to begin on Monday, 14 
September, 2009. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  As the Board is only being "consulted" on 
the agenda, no U.S. position is required. 
 
¶11. AGENDA ITEM 10 - REPRESENTATION OF OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONS AT THE 53rd (2009) REGULAR SESSION OF THE GC 
 
ISSUE:  The Board will be asked to invite the OPEC Fund 
for International Development, the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, and the U.S. Civilian Research 
and Development Foundation (listed in GOV/2009/21) to be 
represented as observers at the forthcoming September 
2009 General Conference. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  USDel is authorized to join the expected 
consensus in recommending that the OPEC Fund for 
International Development, the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, and the U.S. Civilian Research 
and Development Foundation be invited to be represented 
at the fifty-third (2009) regular session of the General 
Conference.  No statement is needed. 
 
¶12. AGENDA ITEM 11 - DE-RESTRICTION OF DOCUMENTS OF THE 
BOG 
 
ISSUE:  At its March session, the Board agreed to place 
on the agenda of its next meeting an item on this matter. 
It may be recalled that the Board approved in March 1996 a 
proposal, contained in document GOV/2843 and dated 15 
February 1996, for de-restriction of Board documents. 
This document has been re-circulated in a report by the 
Director General (GOV/2009/25). 
 
U.S. POSITION:  USDel should underscore the Board's 
prerogatives with respect to early de-restriction of 
Board Documents.  To counter likely NAM rhetoric on this agenda 
item, USDel may note that the IAEA Board decisions, 
unlike UN Security Council resolutions or those of other UN 
bodies, are not accessible to the public, i.e., they are 
only available on GOVATOM once incorporated into the 
record of the meeting, and call for greater transparency. 
 
USDel should hold the line on release of the Iran reports 
consistent with past Board practice and as a matter of 
transparency on an issue of international concern, but 
otherwise downplay the debate.  USDel should reassert the 
Board's authority to release its own reports on a 
case-by-case basis, as noted in the cover note to the 
DG's report on the de-restriction issue, which cites the Board 
Chair's explicit statement in this regard upon adoption 
of the policy in 1997.  USDel should indicate that, in this 
context, the United States remains supportive of 
releasing the reports on Syria that have been provided by the 
Secretariat.  If appropriate, USDel is authorized to 
deliver the brief statement in the U.S. position paper 
(ref B). 
 
In the unlikely event that a NAM member attempts to table 
a decision on de-restriction, USDel is instructed to vote 
as necessary to maintain the status quo and to protect 
the Board's right to release documents as it deems 
appropriate.  Also, if deemed appropriate, USDel may 
state: 
 
-- The United States notes that the Agency has no 
proactive policy for publishing de-restricted reports on 
its website.  IAEA Board decisions, unlike UN Security 
Council resolutions or those of other UN bodies, are not 
accessible to the public. 
 
-- The United States believes strongly that the issues 
being addressed by this Board are matters of interest to 
the general public, particularly as the IAEA?s work 
continues to gain prominence in international affairs. 
As a matter of transparency and consistent with other UN 
organizations, the Secretariat should publish the 
decisions of the Board on the public website and 
implement the current de-restriction policy by posting 
de-restricted reports. 
 
-- The basis for the confidentiality of safeguards 
information is found in the safeguards agreements, all of 
which require that the Agency protect "commercial and 
industrial secrets and other confidential information, 
coming to its knowledge in the implementation" of those 
agreements, and subject to exceptions, not publish or 
communicate to any State, organization or person any 
information obtained by it in connection with the 
"implementation of safeguards."  The United States 
Believes that the release to the public of the reports on Iran 
(and Syria, if relevant) do not violate this obligation. 
 
¶13. AGENDA ITEM 12 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS 
 
ISSUE:  Ref A reports few if any interventions may occur 
under this agenda item. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  No action is needed at this time.  If 
issues arise for which guidance exists, USDel should draw 
on existing guidance.  If other issues arise, USDel 
should immediately seek instructions from Washington. 
CLINTON