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UNCLAS STATE 061153 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL KNNP IT
SUBJECT: READOUT OF JUNE 5 MEETING OF G-8 NONPROLIFERATION 
DIRECTORS GROUP (NPDG) 
 
REF: STATE 45019 
 
Summary 
 
¶1. (SBU) Acting ISN DAS Matthias Mitman led the U.S. 
Delegation to the last NPDG meeting before the G-8 Summit. 
After some heated discussion, the Group agreed on most of the 
Leaders' nonproliferation statement, but several paragraphs 
remained in brackets.  France remained isolated in opposition 
to a reference to "a world free of nuclear weapons."  Japan 
insisted on a reference to "abductions" in the North Korea 
paragraph, and the NPDG agreed that a final draft would need 
to await a UNSC Resolution.  The Syria reference dropped out, 
as Russia insisted on language rejecting "the unilateral use 
of force...whatever the pretext," while the Iran paragraph 
required an uneasy compromise over how strongly to press 
Tehran.  Italy will try to resolve outstanding issues by 
email.  On its other agenda item, the NPDG agreed to a 
meeting of G-8 1540 experts in September in either Germany or 
Italy. End Summary 
 
Review of Draft Leaders' Statement on Nonproliferation 
 
¶2. (SBU) At the outset, France (Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel), 
supported by Japan (Toshio Sano), proposed reordering the 
structure of the statement to put regional issues (Iran, 
DPRK) near the top, as had been done in 2008.  Doing so, they 
argued, would make clear the importance of those issues.  The 
chair (Italy: Filippo Formica) said he would prefer to keep 
the order as he had originally set it.  No one objected. 
 
¶3. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards: Russia (Anatoly Antonov) wanted to 
make a distinction between comprehensive safeguards, which it 
considered obligatory under the NPT, and the voluntary 
Additional Protocol, but since the NPT does not specifically 
mention a "Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement," Russia's 
proposal was not accepted.  The U.S. proposal for language on 
IAEA resources was accepted, but Germany (Claus Wunderlich), 
France, the UK (Liane Saunders) and Canada (Andre Giroux) 
objected strongly to "increased" resources, and the word was 
dropped.  Japan said the final text would depend on the 
outcome of the June 15-16 IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) 
meeting. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The paragraph on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) was ageed without discussion.  The Group 
accepted the addition to the paragraph on a Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) of a sentence to welcome the adoption by 
the Conference on Disarmament of a program of work, which 
includes negotiation of an FMCT.  After France made clear it 
would not accept reference to a "verifiable" FMCT, the Group 
accepted the French compromise of an FMCT "including 
verification provisions," the language that was also used in 
the EU FMCT statement at the NPT Preparatory Committee 
meeting in May. 
 
¶5. (SBU) France continued to reject reference to "a world 
free of nuclear weapons," which Simon-Michel said was a 
"strong red line."  After Mitman and others insisted on 
retaining the reference, the Group agreed to put the sentence 
in brackets and seek resolution later.  The Italian 
Presidency indicated they may raise this issue at the 
Political Directors level or higher. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The discussion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
was largely hung up over a listing of various proposals on 
fuel banks.  Antonov insisted that Russia's international 
enrichment center at Angarsk be mentioned first because it is 
already operational.  The Chair pressed for listing the fuel 
bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) first 
because it is listed first on the IAEA BOG agenda and is a 
multilateral initiative involving several G-8 members. 
Formica agreed to redraft the listing when he re-circulated 
the text; if it could not be agreed, the paragraph would just 
mention proposals in general, as last year's text had done. 
(Note: In a revised nonproliferation Leaders' statement 
circulated by the Italian Presidency on June 10, the Angarsk 
Center is listed first. End note) 
 
¶7. (U) Language on the consideration by the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group of the transfer of sensitive technology was left 
unchanged pending conclusion of the NSG meeting on June 12. 
If no decision is reached at the NSG, as seems likely, the 
language will remain unchanged. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Wunderlich objected to the specific mention of 
biological and chemical safety, security, and related 
assistance in the references to the BWC work program and the 
OPCW in the paragraph proposed by the U.S. on the 
implementation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Conventions, arguing that these were only examples.  After 
some discussion these references were deleted, and what 
remains is support for progress under the treaties and a call 
for their full and effective implementation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The discussion of Iran focused on Antonov's 
objection to a sentence that "warmly welcome(d)" the new 
direction of  U.S. policy toward Iran, which opened a "window 
of opportunity" for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. 
Mitman and others, including the British and French, pushed 
back by stressing that Iran had limited time to pursue a 
negotiated settlement.  Antonov saw this as an implication 
that the open window would close at some time, implying a 
threat to use military force.  France and others wanted to 
keep the implication that it was time for Iran to seize the 
opportunity.  In the end the reference to a new U.S. policy 
was dropped, but the window of opportunity remained.  The 
compromise seemed tenuous, however; it could well come undone 
betweeen now and the Summit. 
 
¶10. (SBU) As has become traditional in NPDG debates on North 
Korea, Japan insisted on retaining a reference to "the 
abduction issue," while others, including the U.S., wanted it 
deleted on grounds that it was not relevant to 
nonproliferation.  The reference remained in brackets, and 
the Group understood that the paragraph would have to be 
revised in any case, based on the outcome of negotiations in 
New York on a UN Security Council resolution.  (Note: The 
UNSC adopted a resolution on the DPRK on June 12, and the 
Italian Presidency plans to circulate a new DPRK paragraph on 
June 15.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) In the discussion of Syria, Russia insisted again 
on language rejecting "the unilateral use of force...whatever 
the pretext."  Many others (France, the UK, the U.S., 
Germany, and the Chair) said they could not accept such 
language, which the Chair said was a subject for the UN 
Security Council, not the G-8.  Recognizing consensus could 
not be reached, the Italians deleted the paragraph on Syria. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The paragraph on WMD and terrorism included a 
reference to President Obama's initiative to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear material in four years.  Antonov objected 
, noting it was too soon to welcome and commit to 
participating in the initiative without more details.  The 
reference to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), 
proposed by the U.S. and included in this draft by the Chair, 
was deleted when several representatives objected to the 
reference to a non-governmental initiative.  The reference 
proposed by the U.S. to continued information exchanges 
within the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group did not make it 
into the June 5 Chairman's draft. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Russia insisted in deleting the reference to 
"related materials" in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
paragraph because it is not a member of the Australia Group. 
The paragraph on the Hague Code of Conduct on Preventing 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation was strengthened by reference 
to "positive developments" at the recent HCOC annual meeting 
and an expression of confidence that "all subscribing states 
will soon fully implement their commitments." 
 
¶14. (U) The Group accepted the paragraph on the Global 
Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction that had been agreed by the GP Working Group 
the previous day.  (GPWG discussion reported septel.) 
 
¶15. (U) The Chair said he would delete the paragraph on 
Chernobyl, which Germany and the UK thought duplicated 
references to Chernobyl in other G-8 documents, but the draft 
circulated after the meeting still contained that paragraph. 
 
UNSCR 1540 
 
¶15. (U) After a brief discussion, the Chair asked if there 
was agreement to hold a meeting of G-8 experts on UNSCR 1540, 
and when no one objected, announced that such agreement 
existed.  He said he would consult with Germany, which was 
considering whether to host such a meeting, and would have an 
answer the following week.  Mitman subsequently followed up 
with Wunderlich, and the Germans are close to making a final 
decision to host a meeting of around 30 experts in September 
prior to the 1540 Committee's Comprehensive Review. 
CLINTON