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DE RUEHC #0611 1630048
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TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 060611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KTIP ELAB KCRM KPAO KWMN PGOV PHUM PREL SMIG SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN -- 2009 TIP REPORT: PRESS GUIDANCE AND 
DEMARCHE 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 59732 
     ¶B. (B) STATE 005577 
 
¶1. This is an action cable; see paras 5 through 7 and 10. 
 
¶2. On June 16, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. EDT, the Secretary will 
release the 2009 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report at a 
press conference in the Department's press briefing room. 
This release will receive substantial coverage in domestic 
and foreign news outlets.  Until the time of the Secretary's 
June 16 press conference, any public release of the Report or 
country narratives contained therein is prohibited. 
 
¶3. The Department is hereby providing Post with advance press 
guidance to be used on June 16 or thereafter.  Also provided 
is demarche language to be used in informing the Government 
of Sudan of its tier ranking and the TIP Report's imminent 
release.  The text of the TIP Report country narrative is 
provided, both for use in informing the Government of Sudan 
and in any local media release by Post's public affairs 
section on June 16 or thereafter.  Drawing on information 
provided below in paras 8 and 9, Post may provide the host 
government with the text of the TIP Report narrative no 
earlier than 1200 noon local time Monday June 15 for WHA, AF, 
EUR, and NEA countries and OOB local time Tuesday June 16 for 
SCA and EAP posts.  Please note, however, that any public 
release of the Report's information should not/not precede 
the Secretary's release at 10:00 am EDT on June 16. 
 
¶4. The entire TIP Report will be available on-line at 
www.state.gov/g/tip shortly after the Secretary's June 16 
release.  Hard copies of the Report will be pouched to posts 
in all countries appearing on the Report.  The Secretary's 
statement at the June 16 press event, and the statement of 
and fielding of media questions by G/TIP,s Director and 
Senior Advisor to the Secretary, Ambassador-at-Large Luis 
CdeBaca, will be available on the Department's website 
shortly after the June 16 event.  Ambassador de Baca will 
also hold a general briefing for officials of foreign 
embassies in Washington DC on June 17 at 3:30 EDT. 
 
¶5. Action Request: No earlier than 12 noon local time on 
Monday June 15 for WHA, AF, EUR, and NEA posts and OOB local 
time on Tuesday June 16 for SCA and EAP posts, please inform 
the appropriate official in the Government of Sudan of the 
June 16 release of the 2009 TIP Report, drawing on the points 
in para 9 (at Post's discretion) and including the text of 
the country narrative provided in para 8.  For countries 
where the State Department has lowered the tier ranking, it 
is particularly important to advise governments prior to the 
Report being released in Washington on June 16. 
 
¶6. Action Request continued:  Please note that, for those 
countries which will not receive an "action plan" with 
specific recommendations for improvement, posts should draw 
host governments' attention to the areas for improvement 
identified in the 2009 Report, especially highlighted in the 
"Recommendations" section of the second paragraph of the 
narrative text.  This engagement is important to establishing 
the framework in which the government's performance will be 
judged for the 2010 Report.  If posts have questions about 
which governments will receive an action plan, or how they 
may follow up on the recommendations in the 2009 Report, 
please contact G/TIP and the appropriate regional bureau. 
 
¶7. Action Request continued: On June 16, please be prepared 
to answer media inquiries on the Report's release using the 
press guidance provided in para 11.  If Post wishes, a local 
press statement may be released on or after 10:30 am EDT June 
16, drawing on the press guidance and the text of the TIP 
Report's country narrative provided in para 8. 
 
¶8. Begin Final Text of Sudan,s country narrative in the 2009 
TIP Report: 
 
-------------- 
SUDAN (TIER 3) 
-------------- 
 
Sudan is a source country for men, women, and children 
trafficked internally for the purposes of forced labor and 
sexual exploitation.  Sudan is also a transit and destination 
country for Ethiopian women trafficked abroad for domestic 
servitude.  Sudanese women and girls are trafficked within 
the country for domestic servitude.  Local observers report 
the recruitment ) sometimes by force ) of Darfuri girls to 
work in private homes, including those occupied by soldiers 
from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), as cooks or cleaners; 
some of these girls are subsequently pressured by male 
occupants to engage in commercial sexual acts.  Sudanese 
women and girls are trafficked to Middle Eastern countries 
such as Qatar, for domestic servitude and to European 
countries, such as Poland, for sexual exploitation.  Sudanese 
children are trafficked through Yemen to Saudi Arabia for 
forced begging.  Sudanese gangs coerce other young Sudanese 
refugees into prostitution in nightclubs in Egypt. 
 
Sudanese children are unlawfully conscripted, at times 
through abduction, and exploited by armed groups ) including 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), all Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) factions, the Popular Defense Forces, Janjaweed 
militia, and Chadian opposition forces ) in Sudan's ongoing 
conflict in Darfur; the Sudanese Armed Forces, associated 
militias, and the Central Reserve Police also continue to 
unlawfully recruit children in this region.  There were 
confirmed reports of forcible child recruitment in 2008 by 
the JEM in several refugee camps in eastern Chad, as well as 
villages in Darfur.  Forcible recruitment of adults and 
particularly children by virtually all armed groups involved 
in Sudan's concluded north-south civil war was previously 
commonplace; thousands of children still associated with 
these forces await demobilization and reintegration into 
their communities of origin.  Although the Sudan People,s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) high command committed to preventing 
recruitment and releasing the remaining children from its 
ranks, reports suggest some local commanders continue 
recruiting children.  In certain states, the SPLA also 
persists in using children for military activities, even 
after these children have been formally identified for 
demobilization and family reunification. 
 
A recently released report by a consortium of NGOs found that 
government-supported militia, like the Janjaweed and the 
Popular Defense Forces, together with elements of the SAF, 
have systematically abducted civilians for the purposes of 
sexual slavery and forced labor as part of the Darfur 
conflict.  This practice was far more common, however, at the 
beginning of the conflict in 2003 than during the reporting 
period, when the conflict in Darfur had largely subsided. 
Some were released after days or weeks of captivity, while 
others escaped after a number of months or even years.  The 
vast majority of those abducted are from non-Arabic speaking 
ethnic groups like the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa.  Abducted 
women and girls are subjected to rape, forced marriage, and 
sexual slavery, as well as forced domestic and agricultural 
labor.  Abducted men and boys are subjected to forced labor 
in agriculture, herding, portering goods, and domestic 
servitude. 
 
Thousands of Dinka women and children were abducted and 
subsequently enslaved by members of the Missiriya and 
Rizeigat tribes during the north-south civil war.  An unknown 
number of children from the Nuba tribe were similarly 
abducted and enslaved.  A portion of those who were abducted 
and enslaved remained with their abductors in South Darfur 
and West Kordofan and experienced varying types of treatment; 
others were sold or given to third parties, including in 
other regions of the country; and some ultimately escaped 
from their captors.  While there have been no known, new 
abductions of Dinka by members of Baggara tribes in the last 
several years, inter-tribal abductions continue in southern 
Sudan between warring African tribes, especially in Jonglei 
and Eastern Equatoria States; Murle raids on Nuer villages in 
Jonglei State resulted in the abduction of an unknown number 
of children. 
 
The terrorist rebel organization, Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA), continues to harbor small numbers of enslaved Sudanese 
and Ugandan children in southern Sudan for use as cooks, 
porters, and combatants; some of these children are also 
trafficked across borders into Uganda or the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  UN/OCHA reported 66 LRA-related 
abductions in southern Sudan,s Western Equatoria Province in 
2008 and early 2009. 
 
The Government of National Unity of Sudan (GNU) does not 
fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination 
of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do 
so.  This report discusses the problem of human trafficking 
as it impacts the country in its entirety and analyzes the 
efforts of the national government, the Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS), and the state governments to combat 
the problem.  Sudan,s Tier 3 ranking reflects the overall 
lack of significant anti-trafficking efforts demonstrated by 
all levels of the country,s governing structures, each of 
which bear responsibility for addressing the crime.  While 
the GNU and the GOSS took greater steps to demobilize child 
soldiers, combating human trafficking through law enforcement 
or significant prevention measures was not a priority for any 
Sudanese government entity in 2008.  The national government 
published neither data nor statistics regarding its efforts 
to combat human trafficking during the year; it did not 
respond to requests to provide information for this report. 
 
Recommendations for Sudan:  Increase efforts to investigate 
suspected human trafficking cases, prosecute trafficking 
offenses, and convict trafficking offenders; implement 
trafficking-related provisions of newly-enacted legislation, 
including the Sudan Armed Forces Act; establish an official 
process for law enforcement officials to identify trafficking 
victims and refer them for assistance; demobilize all 
remaining child soldiers from the ranks of the armed forces, 
as well as those of aligned militias; take steps to identify 
and provide protective services to all types of trafficking 
victims found within the country; and make a much stronger 
effort, through a comprehensive policy approach that involves 
all vested parties, to identify, retrieve, and reintegrate 
abductees who remain in situations of enslavement. 
 
Prosecution 
----------- 
The government's anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts 
were negligible during the reporting period; it did not 
investigate or prosecute any suspected trafficking cases. 
Sudan is a large country with porous borders and destitute 
hinterlands; the national government had little ability to 
establish authority or a law enforcement presence in many 
regions.  Sudan's criminal code does not prohibit all forms 
of trafficking in persons, though its Articles 162, 163, and 
164 criminalize abduction, luring, and forced labor, 
respectively.  No trafficker has ever been prosecuted under 
these articles.  In May 2008, the Council of Ministers 
received the Child Act 2008 for review; the act must be 
approved by the council and ratified by the parliament before 
it can be implemented.  The Act prohibits the recruitment of 
children under the age of 18 into armed forces or groups and 
ensures the demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration 
of child victims of armed conflict.  Several states 
subsequently drafted their own Child Acts based on the 
national act; in November 2008, Southern Kordofan State 
ratified its Child Act.  In December 2008, Sudan,s National 
Assembly approved the Sudan Armed Forces Act of 2007, which 
establishes criminal penalties for persons who recruit 
children under 18 years of age, as well as for abduction and 
enslavement; the act prescribes penalties of up to five 
years, imprisonment for child recruitment and up to 10 
years, imprisonment for enslavement.  In August 2008, the 
Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed the Southern Sudan 
Child Act of 2008, which prohibits the recruitment and use of 
children for military or paramilitary activities and 
prescribes punishments of up to 10 years, imprisonment for 
such crimes. The President of the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GOSS) signed the act into law in October 2008.  The 
Southern Sudan Penal Code Act, enacted in July 2008, 
prohibits and prescribes punishments of up to seven years, 
imprisonment for unlawful compulsory labor, including 
abduction or transfer of control for such purposes; the Act 
also criminalized the buying or selling of a minor for the 
purpose of prostitution and prescribes a punishment of up to 
14 years, imprisonment.  In December 2008, the Minister of 
Justice issued a decree establishing offices with specialized 
children,s attorneys in Southern Darfur, Gedaref, Southern 
Kordofan, Sennar, Blue Nile, Western Darfur, and Kassala 
States to supervise investigations.  The government neither 
documented anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts nor 
provided specialized anti-trafficking training to law 
enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial personnel during the 
year.  At the request of the Sudanese Police, in January 
2009, UNPOL trained 122 women police officers who staff 
gender desks in child protection.  UNPOL also conducted a 
five-day training program on human rights, gender, and child 
protection for 25 police officers in Aweil. 
 
Protection 
---------- 
Sudan,s Government of National Unity (GNU) made only minimal 
efforts to protect victims of trafficking during the past 
year, and these efforts focused primarily on the 
demobilization of child soldiers.  The government continued 
to demonstrate extremely low levels of cooperation with 
humanitarian workers in the Darfur region on a broad spectrum 
of issues, including human trafficking.  The GOS and GOSS 
provide little to no protection for victims of trafficking 
crimes; Sudan had few victim care facilities readily 
accessible to trafficking victims and the government did not 
provide access to legal, medical, or psychological services. 
The government did not publicly acknowledge that children are 
trafficked into prostitution or domestic servitude in Sudan 
or take steps to identify and provide protective services to 
such victims.  The Khartoum State Police,s child and family 
protection unit, which offers various services such as legal 
aid and psychosocial support, assisted an unknown number of 
child victims of abuse and sexual violence in 2008 and could 
have potentially provided these services to trafficking 
victims.  In 2008, similar units were established with 
UNICEF,s support in Western Darfur, Northern Darfur, 
Southern Kordofan, Northern Kordofan, and Gedaref States. 
The government did not have a formal referral process to 
transfer victims to organizations providing care or a system 
of proactively identifying victims of trafficking among 
vulnerable populations. 
 
In January 2008, the government and its UN counterparts 
established a forum to share information and coordinate an 
appropriate response to children affected by armed conflict; 
the group met three times during the year.  In May 2008, the 
Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and the Southern Sudan 
DDR Commission (SSDDRC), with support from UNICEF and the 
Integrated UNDDR Unit, demobilized 88 children formerly 
associated with the SPLA in Kurmuk, Blue Nile State.  In 
December 2008, the SSDDRC demobilized 46 children from the 
SPLA training academy in Korpout, Upper Nile State; they were 
part of a group of 68 children registered for demobilization 
in July 2007.  Identification and registration programs were 
ongoing for remaining children still serving under the SPLA 
in Unity and Jongley States, as well is in South Kordofan. 
In July 2008, NSDDRC in Blue Nile State and UNICEF commenced 
an interim program to monitor demobilized children,s 
participation in reintegration opportunity programs; in 
October 2008, the program provided training to NSDDRC,s 
child DDR workers on DDR standards and communicating 
effectively with children.  In August 2008, the GOSS opened a 
child protection unit to ensure that no children are part of 
the SPLA,s ranks.  In December 2008, the Sudan Armed Forces, 
the National Council for Child Welfare, and UNICEF signed a 
memorandum of understanding to strengthen the protection of 
children in Sudan and prevention of recruitment into the 
armed forces. 
 
During the reporting period, the government punished 
trafficking victims for crimes committed as a direct result 
of being trafficked.  Following the May 2008 clash between 
JEM and government forces in Omdurman, a suburb of Khartoum, 
Sudanese authorities arrested 110 children on charges of 
attempted violent overthrow of the state and held them with 
adults for several days.  The government then established a 
Presidential High Committee to care for the children under 
the leadership of the Humanitarian Aid Commissioner.  The 
National Council for Child Welfare (NCCW) took custody of 100 
children, placed them in a National Security detention 
center, and provided medical care and psychosocial support; 
international NGOs certified the quality of the center as 
good and in keeping with international standards.  However, 
10 children were not sent to the separate facility and 
remained in detention with adults and an estimated 30 
children were used as witnesses in trials of JEM combatants. 
The government pardoned and released 103 children for family 
reunification; tried, acquitted, and released four children; 
and sentenced one child to death, pending appeal.  The 
whereabouts of one child is unknown. 
 
The Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and 
Children (CEAWC), established in 1999 to facilitate the safe 
return of abducted and enslaved women and children to their 
families, was not operational during the reporting period. 
Its most recent retrieval and transport missions took place 
in March 2008 with GOSS funding; since that time, neither the 
GNU nor the GOSS provided CEAWC with the necessary funding 
for the transport and reunification of previously identified 
abductees with their families.  The government made no 
efforts to address issues of abduction and enslavement in 
Darfur during the reporting period. 
 
Prevention 
---------- 
The government made limited efforts during the reporting 
period aimed at the prevention of trafficking.  In September 
2008, the SSDDRC and the UN,s DDR unit began a weekly radio 
talk show to sensitize the public on demobilization and 
reintegration issues.  In June 2008, the government NCCW, in 
collaboration with UNICEF, hosted its national celebration of 
the Day of the African Child in Kadugli, South Kordofan 
State.  Based on the theme &No use of children under 18 
years in the military,8 activities included speeches, radio 
and television interviews, songs, children,s theater, 
traditional dance, sporting events, and the distribution of 
printed materials such as posters, leaflets, and banners; 
these events reached an estimated 85,000 people in Kadugli. 
Similar celebrations took place in all other states in 
collaboration with state Councils for Child Welfare and state 
Ministries of Social Welfare.  During 2008, Sudanese national 
security personnel prevented the publication of newspaper 
articles on human trafficking.  The government did not take 
any known measures during the reporting period to reduce the 
demand for forced labor or commercial sex acts.  Sudan has 
not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
 
¶9. Post may wish to deliver the following points, which offer 
technical and legal background on the TIP Report process, to 
the host government as a non-paper with the above TIP Report 
country narrative: 
 
(begin non-paper) 
 
-- The U.S. Congress, through its passage of the 2000 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, as amended (TVPA), 
requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual Report to 
Congress.  The goal of this Report is to stimulate action and 
create partnerships around the world in the fight against 
modern-day slavery.  The USG approach to combating human 
trafficking follows the TVPA and the standards set forth in 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (commonly known as the "Palermo Protocol").  The TVPA 
and the Palermo Protocol recognize that this is a crime in 
which the victims, labor or services (including in the "sex 
industry") are obtained or maintained through force, fraud, 
or coercion, whether overt or through psychological 
manipulation.  While much attention has focused on 
international flows, both the TVPA and the Palermo Protocol 
focus on the exploitation of the victim, and do not require a 
showing that the victim was moved. 
 
-- Recent amendments to the TVPA removed the requirement that 
only countries with a "significant number" of trafficking 
victims be included in the Report. Beginning with the 2009 
TIP Report, countries determined to be a country of origin, 
transit, or destination for victims of severe forms of 
trafficking are included in the Report and assigned to one of 
three tiers.  Countries assessed as meeting the "minimum 
standards for the elimination of severe forms of trafficking" 
set forth in the TVPA are classified as Tier 1.  Countries 
assessed as not fully complying with the minimum standards, 
but making significant efforts to meet those minimum 
standards are classified as Tier 2.  Countries assessed as 
neither complying with the minimum standards nor making 
significant efforts to do so are classified as Tier 3. 
 
-- The TVPA also requires the Secretary of State to provide a 
"Special Watch List" to Congress later in the year. 
Anti-trafficking efforts of the countries on this list are to 
be evaluated again in an Interim Assessment that the 
Secretary of State must provide to Congress by February 1 of 
each year.  Countries are included on the "Special Watch 
List" if they move up in "tier" rankings in the annual TIP 
Report -- from 3 to 2 or from 2 to 1 ) or if they have been 
placed on the Tier 2 Watch List. 
 
-- Tier 2 Watch List consists of Tier 2 countries determined: 
(1) not to have made "increasing efforts" to combat human 
trafficking over the past year; (2) to be making significant 
efforts based on commitments of anti-trafficking reforms over 
the next year, or (3) to have a very significant number of 
trafficking victims or a significantly increasing victim 
population.  As indicated in reftel B, the TVPRA of 2008 
contains a provision requiring that a country that has been 
included on Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years after 
the date of enactment of the TVPRA of 2008 be ranked as Tier 
¶3.  Thus, any automatic downgrade to Tier 3 pursuant to this 
provision would take place, at the earliest, in the 2011 TIP 
Report (i.e., a country would have to be ranked Tier 2 Watch 
List in the 2009 and 2010 Reports before being subject to 
Tier 3 in the 2011 Report).  The new law allows for a waiver 
of this provision for up to two additional years upon a 
determination by the President that the country has developed 
and devoted sufficient resources to a written plan to make 
significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the 
minimum standards. 
 
-- Countries classified as Tier 3 may be subject to statutory 
restrictions for the subsequent fiscal year on 
non-humanitarian and non-trade-related foreign assistance 
and, in some circumstances, withholding of funding for 
participation by government officials or employees in 
educational and cultural exchange programs.   In addition, 
the President could instruct the U.S. executive directors to 
international financial institutions to oppose loans or other 
utilization of funds (other than for humanitarian, 
trade-related or certain types of development assistance) 
with respect to countries on Tier 3.  Countries classified as 
Tier 3 that take strong action within 90 days of the Report's 
release to show significant efforts against trafficking in 
persons, and thereby warrant a reassessment of their Tier 
classification, would avoid such sanctions.  Guidelines for 
such actions are in the DOS-crafted action plans to be shared 
by Posts with host governments. 
 
-- The 2009 TIP Report, issuing as it does in the midst of 
the global financial crisis, highlights high levels of 
trafficking for forced labor in many parts of the world and 
systemic contributing factors to this phenomenon:  fraudulent 
recruitment practices and excessive recruiting fees in 
workers, home countries; the lack of adequate labor 
protections in both sending and receiving countries; and the 
flawed design of some destination countries, "sponsorship 
systems" that do not give foreign workers adequate legal 
recourse when faced with conditions of forced labor.  As the 
May 2009 ILO Global Report on Forced Labor concluded, forced 
labor victims suffer approximately $20 billion in losses, and 
traffickers, profits are estimated at $31 billion.  The 
current global financial crisis threatens to increase the 
number of victims of forced labor and increase the associated 
"cost of coercion." 
 
-- The text of the TVPA and amendments can be found on 
website www.state.gov/g/tip. 
 
-- On June 16, 2009, the Secretary of State will release the 
ninth annual TIP Report in a public event at the State 
Department.  We are providing you an advance copy of your 
country's narrative in that report.  Please keep this 
information embargoed until 10:00 am Washington DC time June 
¶16.  The State Department will also hold a general briefing 
for officials of foreign embassies in Washington DC on June 
17 at 3:30 EDT. 
 
(end non-paper) 
 
¶10. Posts should make sure that the relevant country 
narrative is readily available on or though the Mission's web 
page in English and appropriate local language(s) as soon as 
possible after the TIP Report is released.  Funding for 
translation costs will be handled as it was for the Human 
Rights Report.  Posts needing financial assistance for 
translation costs should contact their regional bureau,s EX 
office. 
 
¶11. The following is press guidance provided for Post to use 
with local media. 
 
Q1:  Why is Sudan on Tier 3? 
 
A:  The Government of National Unity of Sudan did not make 
significant efforts to combat trafficking during the 
reporting period.  While the government took greater steps to 
demobilize child soldiers, combating human trafficking 
through law enforcement or significant prevention measures 
was not a priority for the government in 2008.  The Sudanese 
government published neither data nor statistics regarding 
its efforts to combat human trafficking during the year; it 
did not respond to requests to provide information for this 
report. 
 
Q2:  What progress has Sudan made in the past year? 
 
A:  Sudan,s National Assembly approved the Sudan Armed 
Forces Act, which establishes criminal penalties for persons 
who recruit children under 18 years of age, as well as for a 
range of human rights violations, including abduction and 
enslavement.  The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed 
the Southern Sudan Child Act, which prohibits the recruitment 
and use of children for military or paramilitary activities. 
The National Council for Child Welfare took custody of 100 
children arrested for association with an armed group, placed 
them in a separate facility from adults, and provided medical 
care and psychosocial support.  The government demobilized 
child soldiers from the SPLA.  In June 2008, the government, 
in collaboration with UNICEF, hosted its national celebration 
of the Day of the African Child in South Kordofan State with 
the theme &No use of children under 18 years in the 
military.8  These activities ) including speeches, radio 
and television interviews, songs, children,s theater, 
traditional dance, sporting events, and the distribution of 
printed materials ) reached an estimated 85,000 people. 
 
Q3:   What can Sudan do to further the fight against 
trafficking in persons? 
 
A:  To improve its anti-trafficking efforts, the Government 
of Sudan could:  increase efforts to investigate suspected 
human trafficking cases, prosecute trafficking offenses, and 
convict trafficking offenders; implement trafficking-related 
provisions of newly enacted legislation, including the Sudan 
People,s Armed Forces Act; establish an official process for 
law enforcement officials to identify trafficking victims and 
refer them for assistance; demobilize all remaining child 
soldiers from the ranks of the armed forces, as well as those 
of aligned militias; take steps to identify and provide 
protective services to all types of trafficking victims found 
within the country; and make a much stronger effort, through 
a comprehensive policy approach that involves all vested 
parties, to identify, retrieve, and reintegrate abductees who 
remain in situations of enslavement. 
 
 
¶12. The Department appreciates posts, assistance with the 
preceding action requests. 
CLINTON