VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6622 1580511
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021837Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 6391-6393

UNCLAS STATE 056622 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y   (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ MOPS UN PREL AORC
SUBJECT: UNAMI SECURITY UPDATE 
 
Summary: 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) DOD, State, and UN representatives met May 21 at the 
Pentagon to discuss continued USG security support to the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).  Issues 
discussed included U.S.-UN collocation within the 
International Zone and at PRT locations, and the UN,s desire 
to follow the U.S. lead in pursuing a lower-profile approach 
to security with increasing integration of Iraqi Security 
Forces.  Department, DOD, and UN officials agreed to meet 
again in October, 2009. 
End Summary. 
 
Background: 
---------- 
¶2. (SBU) The May 21 meeting was the fourth time DOD, State 
and UN representatives met to discuss security for UNAMI.  At 
the previous meeting on March 13, 2009 USG representatives 
briefed UN Under Secretary General (U/SYG) for Political 
Affairs Lynn Pascoe and U/SYG Sir David Veness on the U.S. 
forces, drawdown schedule and agreed to provide force 
protection, movement security, and static security to UNAMI 
in accordance with the U.S.-UN Security Agreement as long as 
U.S. Forces remained in Iraq. 
 
UN Compound, Middle-Ring Security and Red-Zone Movements: 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶3. (SBU) The UN delegation, led by Veness, began the May 21 
meeting by thanking the USG for Multi National Forces Iraq's 
(MNF-I) continued support of UNAMI.  The UN representatives 
discussed plans for a new, secure UN compound to be located 
in the International Zone.  The current cost estimate is 
$100M, to be paid half by Iraqi funds and half by the UN 
General Fund.  UNAMI expects this compound will be 
operational in 2011.  They asked about the compound's 
benefitting from static security used by the Embassy as it 
will be adjacent to the New Embassy Compound on al-Kindi 
Street.  Department officials responded that the USG hopes to 
move checkpoints further down al-Kindi Street to encompass a 
new USG landing zone (LZ Fernandez), which would have the 
effect of incorporating the new UN compound as well. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The UN representatives indicated that member states 
such as Fiji would continue to provide UNAMI,s inner ring 
security but asked if they could continue to rely on MNF-I 
for middle-ring protection for UNAMI. DOD officials assured 
them that for as long as U.S. Forces remained in Iraq under 
the Security Agreement, they could. (Note: The bilateral 
Security Agreement calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. 
Forces no later than December 31, 2011. End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Department representatives agreed to share with 
UNAMI assessments of the constantly developing security 
situation as Iraq assumes greater control of the 
International Zone and the USG consolidates its presence 
there.  All agreed that further information exchange between 
the Embassy RSO and UNAMI security office to share best 
practices and lessons learned on conducting red zone moves in 
armored vehicle convoys without MNF-I escort, and the 
integration of Iraqi Security Forces into security operations 
would be useful. 
 
Police Training Issues: 
---------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The parties also discussed training of Iraqi Police 
units to provide security to the diplomatic community. DS 
invited UNAMI to observe the training, but noted that the 
Embassy does not plan to transition all security to the 
Iraqis and suggested that the UN might need to look at using 
contractors to fill security gaps.  The UN representatives 
also noted that they are now working more closely with the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), as it takes over security 
responsibilities from the Ministry of Defense. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) U/SYG Veness described a recent meeting held in 
Amman to discuss Iraq security issues with the UN family of 
agencies.  He noted that, as the UN moves more aggressively 
to address humanitarian issues, it will need to revise its 
concept of operation.  He is awaiting policy guidance from 
the UN's policy committee. 
 
¶8. (SBU) At the UN's request, DOD extended from May 31 to 
June 30, 2009 the joint DOD-UN assessment of ISF ability to 
provide security for UNAMI.  All parties agreed that the 
assessment should be done right, not hurried, although the 
longer it takes the less time there is to act upon its 
recommendations before U.S. forces withdraw.  DOD officials 
concurred with the UN request that the ISF assessment become 
a continual/recurring process, vice a one-time assessment. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UN representatives also noted that they are 
considering ways to offer long-term help with the Iraqi 
police training mission. DOD and State officials indicated 
that as the U.S. police training program transitions from DOD 
to State lead, the UN could be useful in filling gaps. 
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 
-------------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) State representatives provided the UN delegation 
with an overview of the USG intention to reduce the PRTs from 
24 today to 16 and eventually to six.  The UN officers said 
that even with an expanding footprint they did not plan to 
request to station personnel at more PRTs than the six 
locations they already occupy, although they promised to 
inform MNF-I of any change in plans.  DOD officials 
reiterated MNFI,s intent to provide the same level of 
security and support to UNAMI provincial efforts as is done 
currently.  Since the PRTs and UN resources will overlap, 
MNF-I security for UNAMI will be mostly collateral. 
 
¶11. (SBU) State representatives observed that the PRT program 
is looking at ways to expand its role as a platform for the 
UN and other international organizations in Iraq.  The UN 
officials noted that there is a lack of understanding about 
this opportunity within the UN,s humanitarian community. 
The two sides agreed to exchange of information on 
humanitarian, development, and reconstruction efforts. 
 
UN Request for Air Assets: 
------------------------- 
¶12. (SBU) The UN side expressed interest in access to State 
helicopters.  DS responded that the RSO,s resources (24 
contracted aircraft) are fully committed to State missions 
and cannot be dedicated to UNAMI support; however they will 
continue to fly UNAMI personnel on State helicopter missions 
if seats are available, an arrangement that has worked well 
to date.  DS did offer to help the UN with threat assessments 
on proposed introduction of UN air resources (two 
helicopters) into Iraq, and cooperation in coordinating new 
State and UN contracts for helicopter maintenance that may 
provide mutual benefits. 
 
¶13. (SBU) DOD officers noted that the Iraqis are not ready to 
take over their airspace (under 24,000 feet), so the 
air-traffic control system will continue to be managed by 
MNF-I for the foreseeable future. Finally, in response to 
questions about Embassy use of commercial air transport into 
Iraq, State officers explained that EmbassyBaghdad has a 
working group considering the viability of use of commercial 
air for COM employees through both the civilian and military 
sides of Baghdad International Airport.  They invited the UN 
to contact this working group to benefit from their work on 
the issue. 
 
Elections and Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs): 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶14. (SBU) The UN officials noted significant funding 
challenges for the upcoming KRG and national elections.  The 
UN indicated they do not anticipate a need for US support for 
the KRG elections, and will create a detailed list for the 
national elections for MNF-I.  The UN will host a mid-June 
Provincial Elections After Action Review to better prepare 
for the end-of-year national elections. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The SRSG is expected to brief the Disputed Internal 
Boundaries (DIBs) report to the Iraqi Council of Ministers on 
June 18 and will push for action by the Article 23 Committee. 
 The UN delegation expressed concern about increasing 
Arab-Kurd tensions in Ninewa and asked about contingency 
planning in case the report causes violence.  DOD officials 
responded that MNF-I is prepared for such a contingency. 
 
607 Agreement: 
------------- 
¶16. (SBU) The UN officials indicated that they have received 
approval to complete the exchange of notes responding to the 
US request to extend the 607 agreement for an additional year 
through 2011.  The U.S. side agreed to look into whether 
Level I medical support should be added to the 607 agreement 
should local arrangements prove inadequate for UN needs. 
 
Roundtable: 
---------- 
¶17. (SBU) The UN officers indicated that the US MILADs were 
critical to UNAMIs success and that they had requested two 
additional MILADs.  (Note:  State received the request and 
forwarded it to DOD).  DOD officials promised to forward a 
recommendation for approval to the Department of the Army. 
 
¶18. (SBU) UN officials also indicated that Iraq has expressed 
an interest in contributing troops to UN Peacekeeping 
Operations. They indicated they would proceed cautiously on 
the Iraqi offer, suggesting several methods of participation 
more in line with Iraqi capabilities and ability to sustain 
deployed forces.  DOD officials welcomed this as an 
indication of Iraqi desire to reintegrate into the "community 
of nations." 
 
¶19. (SBU) Department and DOD officials agreed to meet again 
with the UN in October, 2009. 
CLINTON